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ABSTRACT 
 
Achieving a distribution of benefits derived from the use of genetic resources (GR) and 
traditional knowledge (TK) has proven to be a target difficult to achieve. For this reason, the 
objective of this thesis is to find the key elements useful for a feasible implementation of ABS. 
Such elements respond to the problems evidenced throughout this work regarding the 
difficulties experienced so far in the operationalisation of ABS. Those problems are, (i) that 
developing proposals for the application of legal frameworks on this very specialised, complex, 
fragmented, and highly political issue, requires more than one approach, (ii) that the accessible 
proposals on how to address ABS are predominantly theoretical, and (iii) that there seems to 
be resistance to the inclusion of new aspects in the discussion on ABS. 
Therefore, the hypothesis of this thesis is that the experience gained by countries in 
the implementation of ABS laws provides practical ways to solve some of the issues related to 
the achievement of benefit-sharing that should be explored to complement the existing 
theoretical proposals. For that reason, the adoption of a practical rather than a theoretical 
approach has been preferred. However, solving those problems requires theoretical support. 
Thus, the analysis found in López, de Sousa Santos, and McCann and March have been 
acknowledged. From different perspectives, these authors support the creation of legal 
systems according to the way people behave in their daily life. 
Fundamental aspects taken into consideration in the current study include the variety 
of conceptual recommendations aimed to achieve ABS. Another aspect is the legal frameworks 
and mutually agreed terms (MATs) available in the ABS Clearing House (ABSCH) of the CBD. 
This work concludes that the most significant obstacles to effective implementation of 
ABS are: (i) the national/bilateral approach to the CBD; (ii) the lack of specific regulation for 
access to GR ex-situ in the CBD; and, (iii) the application of the concept of public domain in the 
ABS context. Due to the lack of agreement between the Parties concerned, these obstacles are 
not about to be amended soon, and, for now, possible solutions can only be sought through 
national laws. 
This thesis considers that benefit-sharing could be better addressed if provider 
countries were to abandon the current schema of entering into single negotiations every time 
a GR or a TK is accessed. This task, together with controlling and monitoring all the different 
ways these resources could be used once access is granted, seems so vast that it would be very 
difficult to accomplish. Instead, it is suggested that a mandatory sharing of non-monetary 
benefits with a voluntary sharing of monetary benefits is the best solution. The sharing of 
benefits could be encouraged by: (i) introducing a certificate of compliance upon actual sharing 
of non-monetary benefits; and (ii) providing tax benefits for the sharing of monetary benefits. 
The use of mutually agreed terms (MATs) is recommended as a tool to facilitate dispute 
resolution at an international level. 
Given the potential that the global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism (GMBSM), 
proposed in Article 10 of the NP, has in achieving benefit-sharing, the implementation of a 
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basic GMBSM is suggested. Modifications of this mechanism could be introduced by the Parties 
as they reach new agreements.  
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CHAPTER 1. Introduction 
 
The distribution of benefits derived from the use of genetic resources (GR) and 
traditional knowledge (TK) is a right recognised in favour of the countries and indigenous and 
local communities (ILCs) providing these resources. However, effective implementation has 
proven a task difficult to achieve, thus constituting one of the topics debated at great length 
within academia. Despite this, progress on practical implementation has been slow. Perhaps, 
this is because decisions are made in international fora where the work carried out by the 
academia is not necessarily taken into account, as highlighted by Vogel and Ruiz.1 
Notwithstanding this limitation, this thesis investigates the law and current application of the 
obligation to distribute the benefits derived from the access and utilisation of GR and TK (ABS). 
In particular, it focuses on the design of the global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism 
(GMBSM), contained in Article 10 of the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and 
the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (NP). Therefore, this first section introduces the topic through a literature 
review, and presents the proposals made by some academics for the implementation of the 
ABS system, in general, and of a GMBSM in specifics. Nonetheless, it should be stressed that 
the focus of the thesis will be on the effective implementation of ABS through the study of 
national laws, with the aim of identifying the key elements for the establishment of a GMBSM. 
 
1. First approach to ABS developments and proposals 
 
1.1 ABS: origins and scope 
 
To understand what might be the origin of ABS, we must keep in mind that human life 
largely depends on natural resources and thus controlling their use is a matter of interest to 
both countries and industry. This could explain why sovereign rights of states over their natural 
resources has long been recognised by national laws and international legal instruments. 
Over time, scientific and technological developments allowed the utilisation of natural 
resources in ways other than the known. This created the need to modernise the existing laws 
and generated new expectations in natural-resources-rich countries regarding the benefits 
they could receive from the new utilisations of their biodiversity. For this reason, and based on 
of such sovereign rights, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) of 1992 established an 
obligation to share in a fair and equitable way the benefits derived from the use of GR.2 The 
mention in the CBD of GR as the object of access, and the results of research and development 
as benefits to distribution,3 not only reflects the above-mentioned interests, but also creates a 
 
1 Joseph Henry Vogel, Klaus Angerer, Manuel Ruiz, Omar Oduardo-Sierra ‘Bounded openness as the modality for 
the global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism of the Nagoya Protocol’ in Charles R. McManis and Burton Ong 
(eds) Routledge Handbook of Biodiversity and the Law (Routledge, London and New York, 2018) 382. 
2 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity 31 ILM (1992), 818, Article 15.1 
3 ibid, Article 15.7 
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distinction respecting the obligations derived from the utilisation of biodiversity. In this regard, 
after the CBD, the utilisation of GR results in ABS obligations while, for example, mining 
activities or the extraction of forest timber do not. 
However, the CBD is not the first international instrument regulating the use of GR. The 
FAO had previously established rules on the use of plant GR. Its International Undertaking on 
Plant Genetic Resources (the International Undertaking) of 1983 states that ‘plant genetic 
resources are a heritage of mankind and consequently should be available without restriction.’4 
This is a statement that reflects the way property rights over GR were traditionally perceived. 
That view changed, however, over time, and in 1991, the recognition of sovereign rights over 
plant GR were included in the International Undertaking.5 The CBD enshrines this change, and, 
because its recognition goes beyond the FAO’s scope, this Convention could be seen as the 
first international instrument destined to recognise sovereign rights of states over all GR within 
their frontiers. Nevertheless, in the opinion of some academics, such as Mgboji, it is an error 
to argue that the CBD and the FAO created a new regime of state sovereignty over biodiversity 
because they merely reaffirmed an inherent pre-existing right of state jurisdiction over plant 
life forms.6 While this may be true, it is also true that before the CBD ABS obligations did not 
exist. Thus, the CBD did not create sovereignty rights over nature, but extended those existent 
rights to the use of ‘new’ elements of biodiversity; namely, GR and TK. 
As was the case with regulations on the use of GR, the CBD was not the first 
international forum discussing the conditions under which ABS should operate. On an 
international level, this discussion began within the GATT and continued in other forums such 
as the WTO, the FAO, the WHO, and the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO). Thus, 
the CBD is a result and a part of a process that had started earlier. 
In addition to one of the CBD’s objectives being the achievement of ABS,7 the issue was 
also debated in other fora. As a result, there are currently three different ABS systems: i) the 
FAO’s system, contained in the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture (ITPGRFA), is designed to rule on the use of plant GR for food and agriculture; ii) 
the WHO’s system, devised in the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework, was 
created to regulate the use of GR for the development of vaccines in a pandemic situation; and 
(iii) the system of the CBD, further developed in the NP, aims to govern the utilisation of GR for 
all purposes different from those regulated by the FAO and the WHO. These three systems 
consist of a set of rules that comprise the international ABS system, which were created to 
 
4 FAO, International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, Resolution 8/83 (1983), Article 1 
5 FAO, Annex 3 to the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources. Resolution 3/91: 
‘The Conference, Recognizing that: (…) the concept of mankind’s heritage, as applied in the International 
Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, is subject to the sovereignty of the states over their plant genetic 
resources, (…) 
Endorses the following points: 1. that nations have sovereign rights over their plant genetic resources ; (…)’ 
http://www.fao.org/3/x5587E/x5587e06.htm#Resolution3, accessed 08.05.2019 
6 Ikechi Mgboji, ‘Beyond Rhetoric: State Sovereignty, Common Concern, and the Inapplicability of the Common 
Heritage Concept to Plant Genetic Resources’ (2003) 16 Leiden Journal of International Law 821, 837. 
7 CBD (n 2), Article 1 
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complement each other and be mutually supportive. Their relationships and characteristics are 
studied in Chapter 5. 
The basic logic of ABS is that access to GR is subject to the prior informed consent (PIC) 
of the Party providing the resource and, where granted, shall be upon mutually agreed terms 
(MATs). On the grounds of the exercise of sovereign rights, each country, through their 
national laws, can determine the conditions under which ABS will operate in their territories.8 
This means that compliance with ABS obligations must be achieved by each country at a 
national level. This aspect is known as the bilateral/national approach to compliance with ABS 
obligations and, as explained in Chapter 3, it has been identified as one of the obstacles for 
benefit-sharing realisation. 
GR are not, however, the only subject matter of ABS. The knowledge of ILCs regarding 
the use and management of biodiversity (called traditional knowledge -TK), and when 
associated with GR, also falls within the ABS scope.9 Article 3 of the NP clarifies the issues with 
respect to TK.10 Importantly, the NP creates an obligation for the countries to take into 
consideration customary law in the development of national law and policy.11 Although this 
could be interpreted as a step forward in the protection of TK and the ILCs’ rights, some authors 
seem less sure. For example, Tobin12 noted that as the negotiations for the agreement on one 
or more instruments for the protection of TK advanced within the WIPO Intergovernmental 
Committee on Intellectual Property, Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore 
(IGC), references to customary law started to disappear from its draft instrument. 
Discussions on the ABS scope do not only involve GR and TK. Matters such as by-
products, derivatives, and information are also under debate. This appeared to be caused by 
the fact that advances in science and technology came accompanied by economic expectations 
on new forms of utilisation of GR and TK. For this reason, as pointed out by Oberthür and 
Rosendal, such advances also brought an economic incentive to introduce patent protection 
for biodiversity-based inventions.13 As a result, the ABS debate was placed into the WIPO forum 
where the relationship between the CBD and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) has been discussed for many years, as explained in Chapter 
6. 
To better understand this debate, it is important to stress that, despite the 
acknowledgement of the right to benefit from the use of GR and TK, neither the CBD nor the 
NP establish or recognise states’ property rights over their GR or of ILCs on their TK, nor the 
 
8 ibid, Article 15.1, 15.5, and 15.5 
9 ibid, Preamble, and Article 8j 
10 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from 
their Utilisation to the Convention on Biological Diversity (2010), Article 3 
11 ibid, Article 12.1 
12 Brendan Tobin ‘Bridging the Nagoya Compliance Gap: the fundamental role of customary law in protecting of 
indigenous peoples’ resource and knowledge rights’ (2013) 9(2) Law Environment and Development Journal 142, 
152. 
13 Sebastian Oberthür and G. Kristin Rosendal ‘Global governance of genetic resources. Background and analytical 
framework’ (ch 1) in Sebastian Oberthür and G. Kristin Rosendal (eds), Global Governance of Genetic Resources: 
Access and Benefit Sharing after the Nagoya Protocol (Routledge, New York, 2014) 4 
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TRIPS. For Tvedt and Schei, recognition of intellectual property rights (IPRs) over TK in 
international fora, such as TRIPS and the WIPO, have largely failed.14 Oguamanam believes that 
this might be caused by the lack of political will of industrialized countries who benefit from 
continued appropriation of local knowledge, the informal/non-scientific way TK is produced, 
the asymmetrical relationship of power between industrialised countries and ILCs, and because 
IPRs are seen as a capitalist instrument which is not suited to societies that operate in a mainly 
communal model outside or on the fringes of the contested paradigms of the market economy 
framework.15 
This clarification helps to explain why, given the lack of recognition of IPRs over GR and 
TK, and the poor integration of the ABS rules with the IP system, there have been some claims 
where IPRs over inventions using GR and/or TK could be obtained allegedly without complying 
with ABS obligations (PIC, MAT, and benefit-sharing). As could be predicted, this is perceived 
as another obstacle to ABS realisation. 
Despite the apparent simplicity of ABS (mutual exchange of resources between two 
parties), it seems that the majority of authors agree that this system does not properly work.16 
As Oguamanam and Jain show, ABS is a complex matter containing controversial aspects such 
as mandatory obligations under the patent system to disclose the origin of the resources and 
proof that PIC was obtained.17 The main aspects of ABS under discussion are presented below. 
 
1.2 The problematic features of ABS 
 
Apart from what has been already said above, the problematic aspects of ABS identified 
by some authors as impeding ABS operativity can be grouped in three categories: i) wrong, 
unclear, or insufficient definitions of the core concepts of ABS; ii) gaps between the ABS rules 
and reality, including the absence of rules for accessing GR ex-situ, progress in the 
 
14 Morten Walløe Tvedt and Peter Johan Schei ‘The term ‘genetic resources’ Flexible and dynamic while providing 
legal certainty?’ (ch) 2 in Sebastian Oberthür and G. Kristin Rosendal (eds), Global Governance of Genetic 
Resources: Access and Benefit Sharing after the Nagoya Protocol (Routledge, New York, 2014) 38 
15 Chidi Oguamanam, ‘Local Knowledge as Trapped Knowledge’ (2008) 11(1) The Journal of World Intellectual 
Property 29, 41. 
16 See for example: Bronwyn Parry, Trading the Genome. Investigating the commodification of Bio-information 
(Columbia University Press, New York, 2004) 11; Ruiz (n 7) 36; Oberthür and Kristin Rosendal (n 14) 2, 4; Manuel 
Ruiz, ‘Genetic Resources as Natural Information: Implications for the Convention on Biolog ical Diversity and 
Nagoya Protocol’ (Routledge, New York, 2015) 33; Joseph Henry Vogel, Manuel Ruiz Muller, and Klaus Angerer, 
‘Submission of views in preparation for the Expert Meeting on the need for and modalities of a global multilateral 
benefit-sharing mechanism and the first meeting of the Compliance Committee of the Nagoya Protocol’ 
<https://www.uni-
giessen.de/fbz/fb11/institute/histor/mitarbeiter/mitarb_dwnl/IUCNAnnexsubmissionArt10.pdf> accessed 
26.05.2019, 3; Graham Dutfield, ‘If we have never been modern, they have never been traditional: ‘traditional 
knowledge’, biodiversity, and the flawed ABS paradigm’ (ch 18) in Charles R. McManis and Burton Ong (eds) 
Routledge Handbook of Biodiversity and the Law (Routledge, London and New York, 2018) 285. 
17 Chidi Oguamanam and Vipal Jain, ‘Access and Benefit Sharing, Canadian and Aboriginal Research Ethics Policy 
after the Nagoya Protocol: Digital DNA and Transformations in Biotechnology’ (2017) v3 (1) Journal of 
Environmental Law and Practice 79, 89. 
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biotechnology field, and considerations about the public domain; and iii) the national/bilateral 
approach of the CBD. The next sections deal with each of these aspects. 
 
1.2.1 Wrong, unclear, or insufficient definitions of the core concepts of ABS 
 
Because the CBD is an instrument whose commitments are commonly expressed in 
aspirational terms, many criticisms relate to its lack of clarity. This becomes particularly 
problematic for the core concepts of ABS as they aim to determine to whom, when and how 
an ABS obligation arises. For example, Tobin highlights the ambiguity of the NP in relation to 
when PIC is required18 and the difficulties in knowing when ILCs have an established right to 
GR, when these resources are held by those communities, and when TK is associated with a 
GR.19 In addition, Ruiz mentions that providers have been told what type of benefits can be 
expected, but not how much to expect in those up-front payments,20 and Tvedt points out that 
the NP neither attempts to specify what is meant by ‘fair and equitable’ in a substantive 
manner nor does it establish any procedural standard to this effect.21 
Given this, a large proportion of the studies conducted on ABS focus on re-defining its 
concepts. As these concepts are further explored in Chapter 4, the following is only a summary 
of two of the main concepts of ABS: GR and TK. 
 
A. Genetic resources 
 
Article 2 of the CBD describes GR as any material of plant, animal, microbial, or other 
origin containing functional units of heredity. A good deal of the criticism of this concept is 
directed towards identifying the insufficiency of its scope, while others stress that given its 
inadequacy, there is a case for a new definition. On the first point, Chaparro points out that 
the concept of GR, apart from containing an artificial separation between biological and 
genetic resources, is based on classical notions of genetics that restrict the interpretation of its 
use to the application of molecular tools. Therefore, he advocates an extended interpretation 
of the concept of the CBD.22 Similarly, Schei and Tvedt suggest that an international ABS regime 
 
18 Brendan Tobin, ‘Bridging the Nagoya Compliance Gap: the fundamental role of customary law in protecting of 
indigenous peoples’ resource and knowledge rights’ (2013) 9(2) Law Environment and Development Journal 142, 
148. 
19 ibid 148. 
20 Manuel Ruiz ‘The Museum as a Vehicle for Considered Judgements on Access and Benefit Sharing’ in Joseph 
Henry Vogel (ed) The Museum of Bioprospecting, Intellectual Property, and the Public Domain: A Place, A Process, 
A Philosophy (Anthem Press 2010) 34. 
21 Morten Walløe Tvedt, ‘Beyond Nagoya: Towards a legally functional system of access and benefit sharing’ (ch 
9) in Sebastian Oberthür and G. Kristin Rosendal (eds), Global Governance of Genetic Resources: Access and 
Benefit Sharing after the Nagoya Protocol (Routledge, New York, 2014) 163. 
22 Alejandro Chaparro Giraldo, ‘Definiciones de Acceso a Recursos Genéticos en la Legislación Colombiana y sus 
efectos en la Investigación Científica’ (2016) 21 Acta Biológica Colombiana 305, 305-306. 
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could incorporate a broad and dynamic understanding of the GR concept.23 On the other hand, 
Tvedt highlights the fact that the difference between accessing a biological resource and a GR 
is in its use, for which he considers that benefit-sharing should be due as soon as the use has 
resulted in a product and revenue starts flowing.24 
From a different perspective Vogel and others, suggest that the concept of GR in Article 
2 of the CBD does not fit the cutting-edge and high-tech field of, for example, ‘synthetic 
biology,’ whose very essence will be deployed when considering GR as a ‘material’.25 In their 
view, there is a misconception of GR, for which they recommend the creation of a new 
definition. They propose that, because the object of R&D is the information of GR, the field of 
economics appropriate for ABS is the economics of information.26 Thus, based upon Samuelson 
and Nordhaus’ assertion that information is costly to produce but cheap to reproduce, they 
consider that GR are costly to access but cheap to replicate.27 In their understanding (and that 
of other authors such as Oldham, Hall, and Forero), only by redefining GR from ‘material’ to 
‘natural information’ could fairness and equity be achieved in ABS transactions.28 For Oldham, 
conceiving GR as natural information is also supported by the fact that GR can be expressed as 
information, as proven by the current trends in the genomic sector, suggesting a decreasing 
dependence on physical transfers of biological materials and an increasing tendency towards 
electronic transfers.29 For Ruiz, identification of natural information as the object of access 
allows national laws to include any natural substance extracted from a biological source or 
their biochemical or genetic composition through the use of biotechnology within ABS 
obligations.30 
Moreover, Vogel and others suggest that when considering GR as natural information, 
GR are transboundary resources; and, for that reason, the ABS system should be based on a 
GMBSM rather than on the bilateral approach established through national or local laws. This 
idea has been criticised, for example, by D’Alessandro, in whose opinion, within the context of 
the NP, GR are not species, subspecies or any other taxonomic entity, or information, but 
tangible matter. He considers that GR as material cannot occur in two or more countries at the 
same time and, consequently, the bilateral approach is probably applicable in most cases, as 
 
23 J. Schei and M.W. Tvedt, ‘Genetic resources in the CBD: The wording, the past, the present, and the future’ 
(2010) FNI Report, in Ruiz (n 17) 13. 
24 Tvedt (n 21) 159. 
25 Vogel and others (n 1) 388. 
26 ibid, 377. 
27 ibid 
28 ibid; Joseph Henry Vogel and Manuel Ruiz, ‘Wronged by the Wrong Language: The International Regime on 
Access and Benefit-Sharing’ (2010) BIORES <https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/biores/news/opinion-wronged-
by-the-wrong-language-the-international-regime-on-access> accessed 03.02.1029; P. Oldham, S. Hall and O. 
Forero, ‘Biological Diversity in the Patent System’ (2013) 8(11) PLoS ONE, in Joseph Henry Vogel, Manuel Ruiz, 
and Klaus Angerer (n 17) 1. 
29 P. Oldham, ‘Global Status and Trends in Intellectual Property Claims: Genomics, Proteomics and Biotechnology’ 
(2004) Submission to the Executive Secretary of the Convention on Biological Diversity. Centre for Economic and 
Social Aspects of Genomics. United Kingdom, in Ruiz (n 17) 13. 
30 Ruiz (n 16) 15-16. 
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in principle it should always be possible to determine the source of a specific material.31 
Similarly, for Ibañez de Novion, the understanding of GR as natural information is not coherent 
within the content of the CBD.32 
Opposing the views perceiving the inadequacy of the GR concept, for Tvedt and Schei, 
the GR concept set out in the CBD is robust enough to grasp GR utilisation in a changing 
technological context,33 while for Oberthür and Rosendal, the scope of the NP includes 
derivatives.34 
 
B. Traditional Knowledge 
 
To date, no consensus exists on the concept of TK, and the inclusion of accessible TK in 
the ABS scope generates much debate. To some scholars, widely disseminated TK should be 
free to be used,35 while, for others, its use generates benefit-sharing obligations.36 Given the 
existence of different national negotiating positions at present, it appears that TK related issues 
could only be solved case-by-case through the application of national laws. 
There are many proposed concepts for TK. In general terms, they refer to the close link 
between the traditional lifestyles of ILCs, the traditional context in which TK is created, and the 
importance of this knowledge for the livelihood of ILCs and for the preservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity (this is explained in Chapter 4). Additionally, in a similar way to 
Vogel, who views GR as natural information, Tobin and Ruiz consider TK is also information, 
more precisely, shared and widely disseminated.37 In Ruiz’s view, the cultural context in which 
TK develops and the apparent inability of classic IP tools to provide appropriate protection, 
make this knowledge different from other forms of shared and disseminated information.38 
Despite the acknowledgement of the beneficial effects of TK for biodiversity, the 
establishment of ABS obligations for the access and use of TK face some degree of resistance. 
This might be because the obligation is found in Article 8j (on in-situ conservation) rather than 
in Article 15 (on access to GR and benefit-sharing) of the CBD, where it should belong. Although 
Article 3 of the NP completely removes the doubts that may exist in that regard, controversy 
has been sustained by moving the debate onto more detailed aspects of TK. Hence, it is 
possible to find in the specialised literature many terms created for the identification of the 
 
31 Vogel and others (n 1) 383. 
32 ibid 384. 
33 Tvedt and Schei (n 14) 29. 
34 Oberthür and Kristin Rosendal (n 13) 7. 
35 Dutfield (n 16) 285. 
36 Enrique Sánchez, María del Pilar Pardo, Margarita Flores and Paola Ferreira, Protección del Conocimiento 
Tradicional. Elementos Conceptuales para una Propuesta de Reglamentación – el Caso de Colombia – (Instituto de 
Investigación de Recursos Biológicos von Humboldt, Bogotá, 2000) 275-276. 
37 Tobin (n 12) 145; Manuel Ruiz, ‘The legal protection of widely shared and dispersed traditional knowledge’ in 
Daniel F. Robinson, Ahmed Abdel-Latif and Pedro Roffe (eds) Protecting Traditional Knowledge: The WIPO 
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore 
(Routledge, London, New York, 2017), 124-126. 
38 ibid, Ruiz. 
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‘many types’ of TK that raise questions about whether those ‘different types’ fall within the 
ABS scope or not. For instance, Young proposes that ABS should only apply to TK where it is 
useful for preservation and conservation of biodiversity, because the CBD only pertains to 
respect, preservation, and maintenance of biodiversity.39 Similarly, Dutfield suggests that TK in 
the public domain or widely distributed cannot be part of ABS, and that any demand of 
property rights over such TK by a government is a ‘de facto nationalisation of common 
knowledge whose distribution may not even be confined to any country anyway.’40 
Overall, it can be said that in an ABS context the use of TK is not confined to biodiversity 
preservation and its sustainable use, as is the case, for example, of traditional medical 
knowledge, whose importance and need for protection have been extensively recognised by 
the WIPO41 and the WHO.42 Moreover, neither the CBD nor the NP provide the right to benefit 
from the use of TK to the level of disclosure of this knowledge. Particularly, the way in which 
TK has been widely disseminated, which erroneously has been understood as one way in which 
TK can become a part of the public domain, cannot be ignored. Specifically, some demands of 
ILCs relate to the way they did lose control over their TK and their consequent inability to 
benefit from its use. What lay behind these claims is a valid vindication of the rights which they 
have been denied since and as a result of colonialism. In other words, ILCs have never had a 
chance to benefit from the economic use of their TK or prevent others from using it without 
their authorisation. In this regard, it could be argued that society owes a legal debt to ILCs. On 
this issue, Oguamanam adds that ILCs’ reclamations are not only based on the fact that they 
are denied basic compensation, but also they are unable to afford the resulting drugs, seeds, 
or agricultural products that emerge from the resources they provide.43 Given this, for some it 
is difficult to accept that it is fair and equitable to exclude widely disseminated TK from ABS 
when the impossibility for ILCs to benefit from the TK over which they have lost control is 
precisely one of the causes that motivated the creation of ABS obligations regarding TK. 
Although many scholars and policy-makers could agree with the recognition of IPRs 
over ILC creations, including TK, its materialisation in one or more international agreements 
seems unlikely in the short term. For instance, Oguamanam observes that the exclusion of TK 
from IPRs has historically taken root in TRIPS,44 and shows that more than one author (e.g. 
 
39 Tomme Young, ‘Clearing the Air: Applying the Intellectual Property Framework to Individual, Community, and 
National Rights in The Convention on Biological Diversity’ in Joseph Henry Vogel (ed) The Museum of 
Bioprospecting, Intellectual Property, and the Public Domain: A Place, A Process, A Philosophy (Anthem Press 2010) 
51. 
40 Dutfield (n 16) 285. 
41 See for example: WIPO. Intellectual Property and Traditional Medical Knowledge. Background Brief No. 6. 
<https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/documents/pdf/background_briefs-e-n6-web.pdf> accessed 
22.05.2019 
42 Carlos Correa, ‘Protection and Promotion of Traditional Medicine, Implications for Public Health in Developing 
Countries’ (2002) <https://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/s4917e/s4917e.pdf> accessed 22.05.2019 
43 Chidi Oguamanam, ‘Genetic Resources & Access and Benefit Sharing: Policies, prospects and opportunities for 
Canada after Nagoya’ (2011) 22(2) Journal of Environmental Law and Practice 87, 104. 
44 Oguamanam (n 15) 40. 
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Brown, Arewa, Osborne, and Sunder) oppose the recognition of property rights over TK.45 
Because of this difficulty, it is advisable that regulations on ABS of TK should not be linked to 
the recognition of IPRs over TK. 
 
1.2.2 Gaps between ABS and reality 
 
ABS seems not to reflect reality accurately, as many scholars have noted. Some of the 
main issues identified by the literature are as follows. 
 
A. Implementation 
 
Obstacles to ABS implementation have been extensively discussed. A problem that 
particularly draws attention is that politicians and policymakers do not seem to be listening to 
the recommendations developed by the academia.46 Vogel has called this the ‘tragedy of 
unpersuasive power’.47 As an example, Vogel and others describe how the Secretariat of the 
CBD conducted an on-line discussion group in 2013, where opinions should have been based 
on peer-reviewed articles or other reliable sources.48 The report published by the Secretariat: 
‘Synthesis of the On-line Discussions on Article 10 of The Nagoya Protocol on Access and 
Benefit-sharing’ did not include most of the elements discussed by the experts on that 
occasion.49 In the same line, Vogel and Ruiz highlight that, for example, GR references within 
the economics of information were excluded from such reports, and that, so far, references to 
GR as natural information have never been considered within the official agenda of the COP.50 
Tobin, for his part, warns that under WIPO, customary law references have been deleted or 
replaced with the term ‘cultural norms’, which is unknown in international law.51 Although he 
sees in customary law an important opportunity for ILCs to influence the nature of national 
and international regulations of TK,52 there is room for doubt regarding the ability of ILCs to 
modify national and international laws. 
Additionally, Tobin notes that efforts on ABS implementation tend to focus on the 
establishment of ‘due diligence’ requirements for users of GR and TK. For him, this concept 
should include compliance with customary law in the countries where ILCs have the jurisdiction 
to govern access to their GR and TK.53 He, therefore, considers it a weakness that the European 
 
45 ibid, 42-43. 
46 Vogel and Ruiz (n 28). 
47 Joseph Henry Vogel, ‘The Tragedy of unpersuasive power: The Convention on Biological Diversity as Exemplary’ 
5(4) International Journal of Biology, 44-54 in Vogel and others (n 1), 389. 
48 ibid, 382. 
49 ibid, 387. 
50 ibid; Ruiz (n 20) 37. 
51 Brendan Tobin, ‘Where custom is the law: state and user obligations to ‘take into consideration’ customary law 
governing traditional knowledge and genetic resources’ (ch 19) in Charles R. McManis and Burton Ong (eds) 
Routledge Handbook of Biodiversity and the Law (Routledge, London and New York, 2018) 297. 
52 ibid, 303-304. 
53 ibid, 302. 
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legislation makes no reference to customary law, and only extends protection to TK that is 
legally protected in the country of origin.54 
For their part, Nijar, Posey and Dutfield, and Laird and Noejovich, consider that TK 
protection is crucial for achieving ABS of both GR and TK.55 Although this might be true, it 
should not be forgotten that after almost twenty years of intense work within the WIPO, no 
agreement on one or more instruments for the protection of TK has been achieved. Given this, 
it seems reasonable to propose that the design of any ABS mechanisms for TK should not be 
subject to TK protection or the recognition of IPRs over this knowledge. 
 
B. Contradictions in the arguments against the distribution of benefits 
 
As McGraw56 and Rosendal57 have both pointed out, the commercial value of GR is in 
itself greatly disputed. For instance, Grajal has shown that user countries and corporations 
tend to hold the view that bioprospecting is not profitable enough for sharing its benefits, while 
criticising ABS legislation in provider countries for allegedly undermining access and innovation 
efforts.58 This position seems contrary to the figures provided by authors such as ten Kate and 
Laird,59 Gehl Sampath,60 and Swanson61 about the economic impact of GR. As the figures show 
(in Section 3.2 of Chapter 7), developed industrialised countries appear to be the main 
beneficiaries of the commercial use of biodiversity. As an example, the UNDP demonstrates 
that, at the time the CBD was negotiated, provider countries only had about 1% of all patents 
in biotechnology.62 For Tvedt and Schei, the great expectations in the business community 
regarding what bio-economy could achieve sharply contrasts with the views of business 
 
54 ibid, 293-294. 
55 G.S. Nijar, In Defence of Indigenous Knowledge and Biodiversity: A Conceptual Framework and Essential 
Elements of a rights Regime (Third World Network, Biodiversity Convention Briefings, TWN Penang, 1996); D.A. 
Posey, G. Dutfield, Beyond Intellectual Property: Toward Traditional Resource Rights for Indigenous Peoples and 
Local Communities (International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, 1996); S. Laird, F. Noejovich ‘Building 
Equitable Research Relationships with Indigenous Peoples and local communities’, in S. Laird (ed) Biodiversity and 
Traditional Knowledge: Equitable Partnerships in Practice, (Earthscan. London and Sterling, VA, 2002), in Tobin (n 
51) 291. 
56 D.M. McGraw, ‘The Story of the Biodiversity Convention: Origins, Characteristics and Implications for 
Implementation’ in P.G. Le Preste (ed) Governing Global Biodiversity: The Evolution and Implementation of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (Al-dershot, UK: Ashgate, 2002) in Oberthür and Kristin Rosendal (n 13) 3. 
57 G.K. Rosendal, ‘Balancing Access & Benefit-Sharing and Legal Protection of Innovations from Bioprospecting: 
Impacts on Conservation of Biodiversity’ (2006) 15(4) Journal of Environment and Development 428,447 in 
Oberthür and Kristin Rosendal (n 13) 3. 
58 A. Grajal ‘Biodiversity and the Nation State: Regulating Access to Genetic Resources Limits Biodiversity Research 
in Developing Countries’ (1999) 13(1) Conservation Biology 6, 10 in Oberthür and Kristin Rosendal (n 13) 3. 
59 K. ten Kate, S.A. Laird, The Commercial Use of Biodiversity: Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-sharing, 
(Earthscan, London, 1999) in Oberthür and Kristin Rosendal (n 13) 3. 
60 P. Gehl Sampath, Regulating Bioprospecting: Institutions for Drug Research, Access and Benefit-sharing (United 
Nations University, New York, 2005) in Oberthür and Kristin Rosendal (n 13) 3. 
61 T. Swanson, Intellectual Property Rights and Biodiversity Conservation (Cambridge University Press, 1995) 59 in 
Oberthür and Kristin Rosendal (n 13) 3. 
62 UNDP, Human Development Report (United Nations Development Programme, New York, 2005) in Oberthür 
and Kristin Rosendal (n 13) 4. 
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representatives to the CBD, who often stress that the value of GR is low.63 Brand, Rosendal, 
and others see this imbalance as foundational for the North-South conflict that has structured 
international ABS politics since the beginning.64 
From a different point of view, Vogel and others claim that when value has been added 
to natural information (GR) and the associated IPRs have expired, any future value added to 
the same natural information should not fall under an ABS obligation.65 This idea is similar to 
the existent prohibition of second use patents in some jurisdictions. Although this might be a 
practical solution for ABS operativity, it should not be forgotten that ABS obligations originate 
each time a GR is used, regardless of the value added by a previous utilisation of the same GR. 
Also, this generates economic expectations in some provider countries, and is perhaps why, 
for example, the inclusion in the ABS scope of continued uses of GR collected before the CBD 
is one of the matters currently under discussion. Nevertheless, only the states can take these 
kinds of decisions as only they can regulate ABS within their jurisdiction. Unless an agreement 
is reached at the international level, many different positions can be found in this regard. 
 
C. GR ex-situ 
 
While many authors have drawn attention to the potential risk posed by ABS 
obligations to academic research66, especially given that many of the materials used for such 
purposes were collected before the CBD entered into force67, it should not be overlooked that: 
(i) the collection of GR for such purposes is still ongoing; (ii) that not all ex-situ GR, whenever 
collected, are in fact used exclusively for non-commercial research purposes; and (iii) that non-
commercial uses in any event remain within the scope of ABS, which can readily be 
implemented in such cases through the sharing of benefits in non-commercial form. Because 
of this, they suggest that a system for academic non-commercial research should be of free 
access and involve non-monetary benefits, and that the sharing of economic benefits might be 
assured via a decoupled funding mechanism through the GMBSM.68 To secure compliance, 
they recommend using a common standard/set of guidelines/code of conduct, which should 
be complemented by a top-down political process at the level of the NP, flagging minimum 
requirements, such as control measures and temporal scope.69 However, as explained in 
Section 3.1.5 of Chapter 3, the NP contemplates the creation of simplified ABS processes for 
 
63 Tvedt and Schei. (n 13) 19. 
64 U. Brand, C. Görg, M. Wissen, Conflicts in Environmental Regulation and the Internationalisation of the State. 
Contested Terrains (Routledge, London and New York, 2008) in Oberthür and Kristin Rosendal (n 13) 3; G.K. 
Rosendal, The Convention on biological Diversity and Developing Countries (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 2000) in Oberthür and Kristin Rosendal (n 13) 4. 
65 Vogel, Ruiz, and Angerer (n 16) 2. 
66 Susette Biber-Klemm, Kate Davis, Laurent Gautier and I. Martinez Sylvia, ‘Governance options for ex-situ 
collections in academic research’ (ch 12) in Sebastian Oberthür and G. Kristin Rosendal (eds), Global Governance 
of Genetic Resources: Access and Benefit Sharing after the Nagoya Protocol  (Routledge, New York, 2014) 213, 215. 
67 ibid, 217. 
68 ibid, 224. 
69 ibid, 227. 
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non-commercial scientific research. Thus, the problem with this matter would be the lack of 
legal developments to regulate it rather than difficulties arising from the provisions of CBD or 
the NP. 
For their part, Dedeurwaerdere and others consider that GR in ex-situ conditions are 
de facto transboundary, since GR ex-situ are typically shared ‘amongst many researchers in 
transboundary situations’, i.e., researchers located in different jurisdictions. Thus, access to ex-
situ GR should be treated as access to resources in a transboundary situation.70 
 
D. Synthetic biology 
 
The CBD and the NP were not designed for digital resources. Technological 
developments allow, however, the use of digital tools in research activities using GR 
information. As Bagley shows, this raises concerns about sequenced information being made 
freely available in online databases, because, allegedly, this practice leads to what has been 
called ‘digital misappropriation’ or ‘digital biopiracy’ of GR.71 In this regard, the NGOs ETC 
Group and Friends of the Earth note, for example, that the difference between ‘traditional’ and 
‘digital’ biopiracy is that the latter allows one to take DNA sequences from databases to 
transfer them digitally to a DNA synthesiser to be copied and re-built elsewhere without the 
need of ABS agreements, because no physical material is transferred.72 For Pottage, this may 
create reluctance on the part of provider countries to enter into non-commercial agreements 
due to the possibility of digitalising GR information that could be later used for the 
development of lucrative ABS-free modified organisms and products for commercial 
applications.73 Thus, many have raised doubts about the rights applicable to synthetic biology 
parts and information. 
There are two sides to this issue, as Bagley shows. The first considers synthetic biology-
engineered parts and information as open sources that should be disclosed, shared, and be 
freely accessible; the second sees patent protection as a beneficial incentive for development. 
As she points out, both of these approaches are being pursued by researchers, freely 
distributing certain novel sequences, while seeking patent protection for more commercially 
viable outputs.74 For Torrance, the focus on open sources as an option to regulate access to 
 
70 Tom Dedeurwaerdere and others, ‘Governing Global Scientific Research Commons under the Nagoya Protocol’ 
(ch 13) in Elisa Morgera, Matthias Buck and Elsa Tsioumani (eds), The 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-
Sharing in Perspective: Implications for International Law and Implementation Challenges (Legal Studies on Access 
and Benefit-sharing, v. 1, BRILL Nijhoff 2012), 418. 
71 Margo A. Bagley, ‘De-materializing genetic RESOURCES Synthetic biology, intellectual property and the ABS 
bypass’ (ch 15) in Charles R. McManis and Burton Ong (eds) Routledge Handbook of Biodiversity and the Law 
(Routledge, London and New York, 2018) 227. 
72 SynBioWatch, ‘101 Fact Sheets from Friends of the Earth’ (2013). 
<http://www.synbiowatch.org/2013/05/synthetic-biology-101-some-technical-details-from-friends-of-the-
earth/> in Bagley (n 71) 227. 
73 A. Pottage, ‘Too Much Ownership: Bio-Prospecting in the Age of Synthetic Biology’ (2006) 1(2) Biosocieties 137, 
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GR information reflects some interest in granting copyrights instead of patent rights, as 
copyright protection may produce a more ‘socially desirable balance’ of permitted versus 
restricted uses of DNA sequences.75 On this matter, Rai and Boyle suggest the use of ‘copyleft 
licences’76 as a way to impose sharing requirements on users.77 This is a position criticised, by 
Holman, Karjala, Torrance and Kahl, Murray, and others, as copyright is a poor fit for synthetic 
biology, because sequences are generally dictated by the desired function they are to perform 
rather than by the author’s express choices.78 
Due to the challenges posed by copyright and patent law for the protection of synthetic 
biology, Samuelson, Rai and Boyle argue that a sui generis IP regime might be most 
appropriate.79 Additionally, Bagley considers that countries could include digital information 
and products derived therefrom into ABS through national laws, but recognises that 
compliance in this case is likely to be significantly more challenging than for tangible GR 
materials.80 She also criticises the proposal of Yamamoto and others of watermarking DNA, 
considering that (i) this process may not be economically feasible or efficient for large 
quantities of DNA sequences; (ii) watermarks may be susceptible to degradation; and, (iii) it 
may be possible for third parties to identify and remove watermarks.81 
Finally, for Vogel and others, the reluctance to include digital information under a 
definition of synthetic biology, as a shift in the understanding of what constitutes a GR, as for 
example in the USA position, could be seen as a defence of the conceptual status quo.82 
 
E. The public domain 
 
The public domain is a legal category describing a situation in which immaterial goods 
are not protected under IPRs. The most common path for goods to become a part of the public 
domain is through the expiration of the term of protection. The public domain could be 
 
75 A. Torrance, ‘DNA Copyright’ (2011) 46 Valparaiso University Law Review 1-41 in Bagley (n 71) 222-223. 
76 ‘Copyleft licences’ or ‘creative commons licences’ are a system of licences built on the copyright law and 
principles to legally share knowledge and works. More information available in: https://www.copyleft.org/, and 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
77 A. Rai, J. Boyle, ‘Synthetic Biology: Caught between Property Rights, the Public Domain, and the Commons’ 
(2007) 5(3) Plos Biology 58 in Bagley (n 71) 223. 
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‘Synthetic Biology: Caught between Property Rights, the Public Domain, and the Commons’ (2007) 5(3) Plos 
Biology in Bagley (n 71) 223. 
80 Bagley (n 71) 228. 
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understood as a common pool of immaterial goods of free access and use by anyone. Maybe 
because of this, it is commonly and erroneously understood that accessible GR and TK are in 
the public domain. This is the case of ex-situ GR and widely disseminated TK. Since the question 
of GR ex-situ has already been discussed, the following paragraphs focus on widely 
disseminated TK. 
As Oguamanam points out, Brown supports the idea that TK is in the public domain 
because culture is not static and gives rise to creative mixing. He reasons that it is not possible 
to demarcate TK creation, and claims that doing the opposite could pose a threat to the public 
domain.83 In this regard, Oguamanam argues that, if ILCs’ claims to IPRs are accepted as a 
threat to the public domain, the same assumption should be made regarding the patenting of 
information or insights from the ILCs by second comers to their cultural process.84 He notes 
that during the last decades the public space has been enclosed by private proprietary claims, 
while a re-conceptualisation of IPRs over TK has been assumed as a part of the public domain.85 
For Okediji, reluctance to recognise IPRs over TK may be caused by fears of possible threats 
that recognition of new categories of property could pose to the interests of existing property 
rights, which could alter the competitive landscape for the long run. She notices, for example, 
that in the WIPO draft Articles for the protection of TK, insertions of the public domain appear 
principally to curtail the scope of TK that could be subject to entitlement claims by resource 
holders.86 Because of this, Okediji sees the public domain as a tool for denying IPRs in GR, TK, 
and traditional cultural expressions, which, for her, is both incomplete and inconsistent with 
the underlying logic of most property regimes, including the IP system.87 In her opinion, public 
access and private ownership are not incompatible. However, she acknowledges the need to 
identify first whose interests such a customised public domain would serve, as currently, it 
appears that defining the public domain is about protecting existing beneficiaries of the IP 
system.88 
Because TK is a different type of immaterial good located somewhere between the 
private and the public spheres, a re-definition of the public domain when applied to TK has 
been proposed. To construct a new category of public domain, Okediji proposes to begin by 
using the various degrees of ‘publicness’ of TK: secret/sacred/closely held and widely-diffused 
TK. For widely-disseminated TK, she suggests unfettered access with rights of attribution or 
other form of acknowledgement, and for secret TK, to create a system of limitations and 
exceptions using a three-step mechanism.89 McCook, for his part, suggests a three-tier system 
 
83 Oguamanam (n 15) 43. 
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in which the top tier, sacred, secret, and closely held TK, would be given the highest level of 
protection, requiring PIC and MAT for its use. A second tier addresses publicly available but not 
widely distributed TK, for which only MATs are required. At the lowest tier, widely-shared TK 
would be freely usable, subject to protection of moral rights, with benefit-sharing to be done 
by a payment of user fees to a state fund.90 Similarly, taking the experience of ILCs in Australia, 
Raven states that there is not one but rather a number of different, overlapping public 
domains, where the sharing of TK does not necessarily mean an intention that the relevant 
information should become a part of the global public domain.91 
Despite the initiatives for a re-definition of the public domain, reform progress has 
been slow, as stated by Biber-Klemm, Davis, Gautier, and Martinez Sylvia.92 However, for 
Okedij, efforts to treat TK as falling within the public domain have fallen short, not only because 
the concept’s rhetoric and analogies are incomplete and imprecise, but also because a 
monolithic conception of the public domain obscures the variegated ways in which property 
rights are constructed to achieve specific societal outcomes.93 In any case, as Tobin noted, 
benefit-sharing of TK in the public domain is valid when agreed in MATs.94 
 
1.2.3 National/bilateral approach 
 
Most authors identify this as a factor obstructing ABS implementation. Its practical 
implementation is explained in Section 2 of Chapter 3. Two issues have been identified as the 
most problematic: the many different approaches to ABS in national laws,95 and the difficulties 
in enforcing MAT obligations in different jurisdictions.96 The latter could be more harmful, 
because the CBD and the NP lack positive and negative incentives for ABS compliance. For 
Tved, this is why ABS has become a voluntary system.97 
 
90 Brendan Tobin, ‘Now you see it now you don’t: The rise and fall of customary law in the IGC’ (ch 10) in Daniel 
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93 Okediji (n 89) 13. 
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Despite the acknowledgement of the problems caused by bilateralism and the national 
approach, the difficulty of finding a single ABS norm that fits all national circumstances has also 
been recognised.98 
 
1.3 Proposals to achieve benefit-sharing 
 
Given the difficulties experienced by countries in the implementation of ABS, some 
proposals to address the problems identified have been raised. These are described below and 
later analysed in Chapter 7. 
 
1.3.1 Defensive measures 
 
Creation of databases of GR and TK has frequently been suggested as a complementary 
measure to achieve compliance with ABS obligations.99 Nonetheless, as Robinson and Chiarolla 
state, there is no agreement on this issue. For example, within the IGC of WIPO, many 
delegates have supported the use of databases, contracts and codes of conduct for regulating 
activities (research and development, ethnobotanical fieldwork, archaeological activities, 
museum curation, and other related work), while others have expressed concern that these 
might not be sufficient to prevent erroneous patents, and have argued for a legal text for a 
patent disclosure of origin requirement.100 Regarding the latter, Bagley considers that reaching 
agreement on a binding instrument creating a disclosure obligation for patent applicants is 
difficult to achieve. Instead, she proposes developing a binding instrument that reaches a 
middle ground, providing both floors and ceilings for disclosure requirement, through the 
mechanism of a formal requirement.101 
Despite the apparent agreement on the use of defensive measures as a resource for 
patent examiners, for Okediji, using GR, TK and traditional cultural expressions to deny 
entitlement claims effectively transforms these resources in common resources and justifies 
anyone’s access and use of them.102 For this reason, she thinks that defensive protection 
measures are unlikely to significantly enhance the public domain or result in better 
patentability criteria; the latter because there is room for the examiner’s discretion and 
judgement in the concession of patent rights, where limited information is only one of their 
constraints.103 For her, defensive protection offers no meaningful defence against the unjust 
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appropriation of TK and it confers no certain value-added dimension to the operation of the 
patent system.104 
 
1.3.2 A trade secret based approach 
 
Because TK is an adaptative response to biodiversity, many ILCs may possess the same 
or similar confidential or secret TK, i.e., knowledge that is maintained as confidential by one 
ILC, even though such knowledge is common to other ILCs at the same time. For these cases, 
Ruiz proposes a coordinated action among all communities involved for the implementation of 
a trade secret-based approach to ensure that TK is guarded and maintained undisclosed.105 For 
its application, it would also need to incorporate an unfair competition framework and 
consider TK as a trade secret, provide tools to support registration of confidential TK and 
ensure its use only for defensive purposes, and to carry out actions towards developing the 
ILCs’ capacity to negotiate the conditions upon which this TK would be shared and used.106 
Among all the proposals, this could be the most difficult to implement because of the level of 
sophistication of capacity building that may be required from ILCs and countries. 
 
1.3.3 Customary law 
 
Customary law has a key role to play in determining the existence or otherwise of ILC 
rights over GR and TK. This is why, for Tobin and Taylor, international protection of TK can be 
achieved through customary law,107 including TK in the public domain.108 
For securing recognition of customary law in foreign jurisdictions, Tobin proposes: (i) 
the bringing together of international customary law, human rights law, and the NP for the 
application of the due diligence standard to ensure that there has been compliance with their 
customary law and decision making process,109 and (ii) the establishment of a verification 
system to certify compliance, with PIC based on customary law and overseen by an 
international body representing ILCs or an ombudsman, which would have links and be 
supported by the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues.110 Concerning the 
process, Dutfield considers that customary law should be applied in the first instance,111 while 
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for Combe and Tobin, customary law should be incorporated as a third source of regulatory 
norms.112 
However, for Borrows, Cornell and Muvangua, and Tobin, there seem to be ‘a growing 
resistance by some developed nations, in particular ex-colonial powers and settler states, to 
the resurgence of the status of customary law under constitutional and international human 
rights.’113 It could be accepted that some developing countries could show some resistance in 
accepting customary law as it may conflict with their own national laws and policies. Tobin adds 
that the application of customary law raises many practical and legal issues, where the greatest 
question facing the judiciary and arbitrators will be whether and to what extent they can and 
should adopt a flexible approach to the application of customary law principles.114 
 
1.3.4 Domaine public payant, biocultural or community protocols, and cultural 
objection 
 
Under the assumption that TK disclosed in publications, available in documents, or 
simply widely distributed is in the public domain, Ruiz proposes that three limitations on its use 
can be imposed. First, defensive protection, namely, registration to support the prevention of 
misappropriation. Second, the application of the domaine public payant in a compensatory 
context; and, third, biocultural community protocols to provide ex ante guidance on to what 
to expect if projects and activities are developed in the lands of ILCs. In his view, publications 
disclosing TK should serve to recognise the rights of its holders.115 
Cultural objection or ‘moratoria’ is a proposal to safeguard TK made by some 
indigenous leaders, such as Lorenzo Muelas (a former Colombian senator). In short, it consists 
of opposing TK utilisation, and even PIC, based on cultural reasons. It is argued that ILCs have 
limited capacities to safeguard their cultural heritage and to control TK utilisation once access 
is granted. Consequently, due to the fear of possible negative impacts that access to TK could 
have on their culture, they have decided not to grant such access until there is a clear 
understanding of how their traditional lifestyles could be affected, and they have been 
provided with appropriate tools for the protection of TK.116 
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1.3.5 National/regional laws 
 
For Oberthür and Rosendal, as well as Tvedt, one of the causes of deficiencies in the 
implementation and enforcement of ABS could be found in the fact that user countries fail to 
effectively incorporate benefit-sharing requirements into their national legal systems. They 
propose: (i) the creation of an obligation for user countries to ensure that an opportunity to 
seek resources is available under their legal systems in cases of disputes arising from MATs; (ii) 
implementation of effective measures regarding access to justice; and, (iii) mutual recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgements and arbitral awards.117 In a similar vein, Tvedt 
highlights the fact that failure to enact compatible legislation in user and provider countries 
makes it difficult to enforce ABS in courts or through other judicial means. In his view, 
compliance can be achieved by using the international customary law because this would lead 
to state responsibility.118 For his part, Isozaki considers that achieving fairness and equity in 
national laws should be pursued through the application of the principle of ‘mutual benefit,’ 
so that benefit-sharing will only apply when a company receives any tangible benefit.119 Tvedt 
does see the need for strong sanctions to motivate user countries to adhere to the rules of 
providing countries,120 and considers that standardization of ABS national laws can be made 
functional under the ABS system at the international level121. He is also in favour of a reporting 
system, although acknowledging that the ABSCH has not fully achieved its objective in this 
respect.122 Isozaki proposes the creation of a network of national or local ABS offices, each of 
which should incorporate a clearing-house to assist the Parties in MATs negotiations and to 
monitor the status of compliance of MATs with domestic law.123 Delivering MATs have positive 
effects on ABS compliance because, as noted by Tvedt, ABS obligations can only be enforced 
before a court when a MAT exists.124 
For their part, Morgera, Buck, and Tsioumani assert that ABS implementation can only 
succeed ‘on the basis of incentives, trust and pragmatism, allowing for a certain degree of 
experimentation on the ground and the possibility to complement international obligations 
with bottom-up approaches or incentives by indigenous and local communities, the research 
community, or the private sector.’125 
 
117 Oberthür and Kristin Rosendal (n 13) 6; Tvedt (n 21) 158-159. 
118 Tvedt (n 21) 158, 161-163. 
119 Hiroji Isozaki, ‘Enforcement of ABS Agreements in User States’ (ch 23) in Evanson Kamau, and Gerd Winter 
(eds), Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and the Law. Solutions for Access & Benefit Sharing (Earthscan, 
2009) 450. 
120 Tvedt (n 21) 165. 
121 ibid, 166. 
122 ibid, 174. 
123 Hiroji Isozaki, ‘Enforcement of ABS Agreements in User States’ (ch 23) in Evanson Kamau , and Gerd Winter 
(eds), Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and the Law. Solutions for Access & Benefit Sharing (Earthscan, 
2009) 450-451. 
124 Tvedt (n 21), 172. 
125 Elisa Morgera, Matthias Buck and Elsa Tsioumani (eds), The 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-
Sharing in Perspective: Implications for International Law and Implementation Challenges (Legal Studies on Access 
and Benefit-sharing, v. 1, BRILL Nijhoff 2012), 507. 
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For Fisher, a complex and more variegated system of norms, consisting of three parallel 
provisions that serve as a defence to a claim of patent, trademark, and copyright infringements 
is a better option than a harmonised global regime. The main idea is to preclude enforcement 
of IPRs in instances where those rights derive from unauthorised access and use of GR and 
TK.126 Similarly, Mgboji suggests that it would be ‘practically impossible for weak states to 
create a new global legal mechanism for the protection of plants and TK’. For this reason, he 
considers their best option would be the creation of a regional patent system that reflects their 
particular concerns, priorities and values.127 
 
1.3.6 Courts 
 
Godt suggests that ABS reclamations can be raised in Europe based upon either the law 
of contracts or torts,128 and proposes civil suits for damages based on ‘immaterial rights sui 
generis’ as another route to be explored.129 She also considers that reparation of damages can 
be established upon the economic value of the material good as taxed and/or the equivalent 
to the license fee payable for the infringement of an immaterial good.130 Similarly, Isozaki 
considers, in the case of non-compliance with MATs, that a lawsuit could be instituted at a 
user’s national court, and recommends the use of arbitration tribunals for disagreements or 
non-compliance with MATs.131 For Chiarolla, compliance with MATs can be achieved through 
private international law,132 while for Tobin, the burden of enforcing ILC rights is likely to fall 
on national or regional human rights courts, such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.133 Thus, he proposes the creation of a 
jurisdiction in the country of origin of ILCs to protect TK in cases of infringement in another 
country. This is because ‘courts often cannot hear cases against foreigners who have no 
connection with the jurisdiction, but if the act of infringement has a subject matter connection 
to the place where the court sits some courts will take jurisdiction.’134 
 
 
 
 
126 William Fisher, ‘Two Thoughts About Traditional Knowledge’ (2007) 70 Law and Contemporary Problems 131–
134 in Okediji (n 85) 161-162. 
127 Ikechi Mgboji, Global Biopiracy : Patents, Plants, and Indigenous Knowledge (UBC Press, 2005) 195. 
128 Christine Godt, ‘Enforcement of Benefit-Sharing Duties in User Countries’ (Chapter 22) in Evanson Kamau, and 
Gerd Winter (eds), Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and the Law. Solutions for Access & Benefit Sharing 
(Earthscan, 2009), 432. 
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Matthias Buck and Elsa Tsioumani (eds), The 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing in Perspective: 
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1.3.7 International instruments or existing institutions 
 
Young suggests modelling particular elements of ABS on elements of other 
international instruments or trying to incorporate the operation of particular elements of ABS 
into the work already undertaken by existing institutions. For her, the ‘comparability’ and 
‘functionality’ of the systems will determine whether another framework or regime would 
provide a useful model for ABS. In her approach, ‘comparability’ means having a similar general 
structure, and ‘functionality’ involves similar underlying factors that motivate effectiveness. 
She notes that the most common attempts to use such shortcuts have arisen with regard to 
monitoring aspects.135 Similarly, Coolsaet, Dedeurwaerdere, and Pitseys propose applying 
other mechanisms from different sectors to ABS, including integrating ABS obligations within 
patent and IP schemes at national and international levels, using the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) and customs control entities, as well as the 
creation of certification systems.136 Another approach, from Dedeurwaerdere and others, 
suggests the implementation of a full-fledged intergovernmental organisation based on a 
binding international treaty, like the MLS of FAO; i.e. a purely science-driven non-governmental 
organisation building upon existing institutions like the World Federation for Culture 
Collections (WFCC) or the International Union of Microbial Sciences; or a contractual 
framework between willing governments to establish a common position as adopted, for 
example, by the International Rice Genome Sequencing Project.137 For Dedeurwaerdere and 
others, the gap between the formal institutional arrangements of the system and the goals of 
the scientific community is one of the leading issues to be addressed.138 Regarding the level of 
internationalisation of the instrument that would operate, Isozaki considers that regional 
rather than national centres would be more likely to achieve control over common 
resources.139 
For their part, Halewood and others claim that adopting an approach such as that 
proposed by Dedeurwaerdere and others may have the following negative impacts: (i) limited 
scope to plant GR; (ii) insufficient policy reinforcement, which allows contributors and non-
contributors to the MLS to benefit equally from the system; and, (iii) a mandatory financial 
benefit-sharing provision which falls somewhere between multilateralism and bilateralism, 
undermining the participation of some actors in the MLS.140 
 
 
135 Tomme Rosanne Young, ‘An International Cooperation Perspective on the Implementation of the Nagoya 
Protocol’ (ch 5) in Elisa Morgera, Matthias Buck and Elsa Tsioumani (eds), The 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access 
and Benefit-Sharing in Perspective: Implications for International Law and Implementation Challenges  (Legal 
Studies on Access and Benefit-sharing, v. 1, BRILL Nijhoff 2012), 464. 465. 
136 Brendan Coolsaet, Tom Dedeurwaerdere, John Pitseys, ‘The Challenges for Implementing the Nagoya Protocol 
in a Multi-Level Governance Context: Lessons from the Belgian Case’ (2013) 2(4) Resources 555, 573-574. 
137 Dedeurwaerdere and others (n 70) 402-403. 
138 ibid 401. 
139 Isozaki (n 123) 451. 
140 Michael Halewood, Isabel López Noriega and Selim Louafi (eds), ‘Crop Genetic Resources as a Global Commons. 
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CHAPTER 1. Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
1.3.8 Development of new agreements 
 
For Cabrera and López, the issues on ABS operativity could be best solved by the 
achievement of new international agreements.141 Similarly, Dedeurwaerdere and others seek 
to build bilateral or multilateral framework agreements between willing governments as the 
most feasible short-term solution.142 As an example, they point to the International Rice 
Genome Consortium, a consortium established by a collaborative agreement between 
research organisations, the private sector, and the government.143 Young also believes that 
bilateral negotiations offer the best hope for developing countries in addressing ABS 
implementation. However, she draws attention to the fact that this approach is potentially 
beneficial to developed countries seeking to support users in their jurisdictions.144 
 
1.4 Proposals for the implementation of a global multilateral benefit-sharing 
mechanism (GMBSM) 
 
Article 10 of the NP proposes the creation of a global multilateral benefit-sharing 
mechanism (GMBSM) for GR and TK in transboundary situations or where it is not possible to 
grant or obtain PIC. Benefits derived from this mechanism are expected to be used to support 
the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity on a global scale. Although this norm does 
not mention the establishment of a fund as the mechanism for the distribution of benefits, 
most of the views expressed in regard to the way such a GMBSM should be designed include 
the implementation of an international fund. Those views also tend to modify (usually to 
extend) the scope of Article 10. This tendency can be partly explained because these proposals, 
in addition to seeking the implementation of a GMBSM, usually try to solve some of the 
weaknesses identified in the ABS design. For example, Ruiz proposes the application of this 
mechanism for all GR and TK because, despite the fact that they are intangibles, policies 
drafted and implemented are identical with those for tangibles.145 Vogel and others appear to 
agree with the idea of a global solution for benefit-sharing, considering this as a way to remove 
the negative effects of the bilateral approach of ABS. In their view, the bilateral approach can 
never be fair or equitable, as the competition among providers would cause a fall in prices of 
accessing GR and deny any benefit to all parties but one.146 The previous and more examples 
of the proposed mechanisms to implement the GMBSM of the NP are presented below. 
 
 
141 Jorge Cabrera Medaglia and Cristian López Silva, ‘Addressing the Problems of Access: Protecting sources, while 
giving users certainty’ (IUCN Environmental Policy and Law, Paper No. 67/1 2007), 65. 
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1.4.1 Funds 
 
The creation of common funds as a mechanism that could realise the distribution of 
benefits has been proposed often.147 For Parry, benefits would be paid directly into a 
superfund, that would ideally be administrated by a global regulatory agency such as the Global 
Environment Facility, to which countries and ILCs might apply with proposals for development 
and conservation projects.148 For Vogel and others, benefits derived from the use of GR would 
be directed towards a global fund to be distributed among all countries of origin, proportional 
to their habitat.149 The International Barcode of Life (iBOL) could facilitate that 
determination.150 This form of benefit-sharing would not be applied, however, for rare 
commercial success, and cases where the origin of the resource is ubiquitous (e.g., many 
microorganisms). In the first scenario, the best estimate of boundaries based on the current 
state of science would be applied. In the second, the royalties collected ‘should defray the fixed 
costs of the infrastructure which drives the system.’151 This final sentence seems to imply the 
exclusion of some resources to pay the operational costs of the system. While guaranteeing 
the sustainability and operability of any system is logical and necessary, one would think that 
countries would not readily agree to this type of proposal because it could limit the benefits 
they can receive. These authors also explain that MATs would be binding only for the natural 
information (GR) that is endemic to the provider, so that, in any other case, the user would 
have to remit royalties to the global fund.152 Smith places doubts on the proposal by Vogel and 
others because the practicality of benefit-sharing based on the percentage of habitats or 
ecosystems of a country has not been scientifically demonstrated.153 On this subject, Tangham 
Galea stresses that Africa would require substantial capacity building and technology transfer 
to make this system work,154 and Young and Minnis suggest that the lack of clarity in the 
determination of the causes triggering ABS obligations could impede the global regime 
functionality.155 
As discussions have advanced, new resources other than GR, such as TK, synthetic 
biology, databases of GR information and TK, and continued uses of GR collected before the 
 
147 See for example: Enrique Sánchez and others (n 36) 276; Peter Drahos, ‘Indigenous Knowledge, Intellectual 
Property and Biopiracy: Is a global bio-collecting society the answer?’ (2000) 22(6) European Intellectual Property 
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University Press, 2004) 262. 
149 Vogel and others, (n 1) 379. 
150 ibid, 383. 
151 ibid, 384. 
152 Vogel, Ruiz, and Angerer (n 16) 3. 
153 ibid, 384. 
154 ibid, 385-386. 
155 T.R. Young, A. Minnis (eds), K. Angerer, L. Benjamin, E.C. Kamau, G. Dutfield, C.H.C. Lyal, E. Mawal, S. Peña 
Moreno, M. Ruiz Muller, T.T. Huong Trang and J.H. Vogel (2015) ‘Submission of views in preparation for the Expert 
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CBD have been considered for their inclusion in fund regulations for benefit-sharing. For 
example, in the case of shared and widely distributed TK, Ruiz proposes the creation of a 
fund156, and Vogel and others recommend the use of funds as a mechanism to achieve benefit-
sharing due to factors such as: (i) control of exclusive rights over this type of TK is impossible 
to exercise; (ii) some ILCs could be excluded from the benefits; (iii) PIC might be impossible to 
obtain where there is no defined right holder; and, iv) tensions may be created among and 
between the ILCs participating in the process of negotiation.157 Regarding synthetic biology, 
Bagley suggests assimilating the uses of GR information from accessible databases in a 
transboundary situation or in a situation where it is not feasible to obtain PIC, thus enabling 
collection and distribution of the benefits derived from their use through a common fund.158 
Parry advocates for the inclusion of databases and continued uses.159 
The MLS of FAO implements a global fund for the distribution of benefits of plant GR 
used under this system. For that reason, some academics have looked at the experience gained 
through the implementation of this fund to make recommendations for the GMBSM. For 
example, Chege Kamau considers that the MLS: (i) creates space for participation of developed 
and developing countries because, allegedly, developing countries receive technology from 
developed countries;160 (ii) strengthens the obligation of users to share benefits with providers; 
(iii) establishes a system of monitoring the downstream movement of materials by obliging the 
recipients to report each transfer downstream to the Governing Body; (iv) establishes a fund 
with benefit-collection and benefit-distribution functions; (v) harmonises the calculation of 
payments for commercialisation, and centralises revisions and variations to the level of 
payment under the sole discretion of the Governing Body; (vi) bases the criteria for benefit-
sharing not on the source country but on the need for conservation and sustainable use;161 
and, (vii) facilitates free access to GR for the purposes of research that is beneficial to 
conservation and sustainable use.162 Kamau also sees the financial, technical and institutional 
incapacity of many developing countries, the imbalanced rights and obligations, and the impact 
of IPRs as the main causes affecting the optimum implementation of the MLS.163 On the 
contrary, for Bagley, the MLS ‘has not been a success to-date’ given that ‘virtually all 
contributions to the fund have come from countries, not commercial enterprises, and the fund 
has collected millions of dollars less than had been forecast.’164 
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1.4.2 A cartel of provider countries 
 
Vogel proposes the creation of a cartel of provider countries which would distribute 
the benefits derived from the use of GR. For the cartel’s function, access to GR should remain 
free under a scheme of ‘bounded openness’ (explained later in this chapter).165 This idea of a 
cartel is close to the ‘collusive oligopoly’ or ‘trust’ or ‘cartel’ understood by Samuelson and 
Nordhaus as ‘an organisation of independent firms, producing similar products, that work 
together to raise prices and restrict output’ that brings, as a result, the ability for companies 
to agree to charge the same price (which maximises their joint profits) and to share the 
market.166 Based on economic theories, Vogel understands that because the object of interest 
for Research and Development (R&D) is the natural information and not the vehicle (GR), 
competition among provider countries will reduce the price of the genetic material to the cost 
of access, where the CBD failure to generate benefits from bilateral bioprospecting agreements 
lies.167 For Vogel, Ruiz, and Angerer, this cartel could eliminate competition among providers, 
allowing benefit-sharing.168 
 
1.4.3 Rents 
 
For Vogel and others, payment of rents on the use of GR is justified by the intangible 
nature of GR as information. They see this as the same justification for rents under IPRs, which 
could be achieved through the creation of a ‘cartel of provider countries’ (previously explained) 
and would establish rents that would be directed toward a common fund.169 To secure 
compliance, a cost for non-disclosure of the use of natural information in patent applications, 
greater than the benefit of non-compliance, should be established. A sharing of benefits would 
only be required for commercially successful patents,170 no PIC or MATs would be needed, and 
GR ex-situ would be covered under this system, as the royalties would be standardized across 
Parties according to a negotiated matrix of utilizations that would apply, even in the absence 
of measures in a Party to implement ABS.171 Eleven steps were designed for the application of 
this modality,172 where encouragement of non-member countries to adhere to the CBD and 
 
165 Joseph Henry Vogel, ‘Case Study 6: Bioprospecting’ in WHITE PAPER final report The Successful Use of 
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Development, Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia December 6-8, 1996; available in <https://www.cbd.int/doc/case-
studies/abs/cs-abs- cartel.pdf> accessed in 03.02.2019 
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the NP could be achieved by levying a royalty on biotechnology imports to Parties which derive 
from transboundary resources (for these authors, GR are transboundary resources when 
accepted that they are natural information) in a non-Party.173 This last part of the proposal 
seems a logical and feasible solution that not only could achieve the adherence of countries to 
the CBD and the NP, but also could constitute the base for an ABS collecting system similar to 
the collective copyright management societies, though only if the countries agree on it as a 
mechanism for benefit-sharing. 
Concerning the way a cartel of provider countries should be implemented, Ruiz explains 
that in Vogel’s view, countries and ILCs which could have supplied a GR or a ‘secret’ TK would 
share in a set royalty of 15%, according to the habitat size or, in the case of secret knowledge, 
proportional to the number of communities that register the same knowledge.174 Similarly, for 
Parry, the best option for benefit-sharing could be reaching a voluntary global agreement 
where the pharmaceutical industry could share between 3 and 5% of their profit ration to (i) 
all products in use regardless of whether or not they were accessed before or after the CBD; 
and (ii) to genetic-sequence and TK databases.175 
Criticising Vogel’s proposal, Roca argues that it appears to suggest GR liberalisation 
through the establishment of a global uniform rate for commercialised patents using GR. He 
considers that Vogel’s error is in the assertion that neo-classical theory is characteristic of 
biodiversity analysis as a public good, when according to the economic literature, this type of 
analysis applies to private goods.176 In Roca’s opinion, there is no way to determine the 
economic value of the natural information used in the production of private goods, because 
the market works better at the end of the productive chain rather than at the beginning. Thus, 
the application of political-administrative rules, such as the regulation and market policy 
doctrine, would be preferable, although in his view the use of MATs could also be a 
possibility.177 Roca sees Vogel’s proposal as the privatisation of GR for the purpose of 
conservation. He concludes that if this is the aim, biodiversity should not be privatised, and 
instead of the tax payments proposed, limits to deforestation together with sanctions and class 
actions should be implemented.178 
Another important point to note is that, for his proposal, Vogel uses as an example the 
experience of the oil industries. This is critical because every time a company wishes to do 
business in the oil sector, it must go to the country of origin of the resource to extract it in-situ. 
In theory, this means that the country of origin can control the use of its resources and is able 
to create/be a part of a cartel of provider countries for establishing a standardised international 
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price for the extraction. However, given that there is no need to access GR in-situ every time 
resources are used, the analogy may not be appropriate. 
Roca also argues that for the establishment of a rent, a new agreement must be 
achieved on sensitive issues such as the concept of GR as natural information and a matrix of 
utilization on which benefits would be distributed.179 In the light of experience in the processes 
of negotiation of the CBD and the NP, Roca’s warning seems entirely valid, as it appears that 
achieving an agreement that allows different implementation of the designed ABS system 
under the CBD is not possible—at least for now. As some authors have noted, countries may 
not agree on expanding the scope or operability of the ABS system in a way that would threaten 
their existent rights, which has nothing to do with the unfavourable conditions that could exist 
during those negotiations.180 
Moreover, the proposal of Vogel and others appears to be focused only on the 
monetary benefits. This is because it does not take into account the non-monetary benefits 
such as the transfer of technology or the sharing of scientific information, which may be of 
interest to provider countries. Adding to this, in Ripley’s opinion, a flat royalty rate would leave 
aside considerations about different industry-cost structures or market prices and could 
influence companies’ decisions on whether to use GR in R&D.181 Although Vogel and others 
seem to be well aware of the difficulties in achieving agreement on a system different than the 
one enshrined in the CBD and the NP, for them, this task needs to be done.182 
Finally, it should be noted that Vogel’s proposal does not include the whole spectrum 
of TK, as it excludes everything which is not secret, which, according to Ruiz, may comprise the 
largest portion of TK.183 Also, benefit-sharing with ILCs seems to be subjected to a register of 
TK that in many cases may not exist. These aspects could be problematic because ILCs do not 
always have these systems in place, and because of the issue of excluding widely-disseminated 
TK from ABS, as previously explained. 
 
1.4.4 Bounded openness 
 
For Vogel and others, under the criteria of efficiency and equity, ‘bounded openness’ 
is the optimal modality for transboundary situations.184 This term is defined by the Peruvian 
Society of Environmental Law as ‘legal enclosures which default to, yet depart from, res nullius 
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[property of no one], to the extent that the departures enhance efficiency and equity, which 
must be balanced when in conflict.’185 Under this idea, GR will be freely accessible, a cartel of 
provider countries would control the prices for its access, and the benefits would be collected 
through a common fund.186 Given this, bounded openness could be seen as a form of  common 
pool of GR. As already mentioned, Roca opposes GR liberalisation,187 while du Plessis sees 
bounded openness as fairly unassailable and considers it as a complementary option for the 
bilateral ABS system.188 
 
1.4.5 Common pools 
 
For Winter, common pools of GR and TK could alleviate some ABS deficiencies. In this 
case, the common pool comprises GR and TK provided by resource holders to a group of people 
for common use. Resource holders cooperate in the preservation of their resources, and 
providers and users enter into cooperative R&D, enriching their capacities and sharing the 
monetary and non-monetary benefits produced. Under this scheme, providers become users 
when participating in R&D processes, and users become providers by feeding their R&D results 
into the pool. Thus, (i) equity can be achieved between providers having the same GR and TK 
and between providers and users; (ii) R&D is enabled; and, (iii) resources and incentives to 
preserve biodiversity are provided.189 
Although common pools have long existed as in the case of seed exchange systems, 
networks of botanical and zoological gardens, network of microbial collections and biological 
databanks, Winter is conscious that free use of resources from the pool may prevent 
participants from supplying their GR, TK, and results (knowledge and money) to the 
commons.190 In his view, ABS caused a negative impact on this type of common pool ‘because 
resource holders are affirmed as proprietors and encouraged to make individual use of their 
rights.’191 For him, this ‘dilemma’ could be solved by placing a duty on users to feed their own 
material, knowledge, and gain into the pool, and by enhancing the participatory rights and 
opportunities of providers within the pool.192 He finds the positive effects of pools on R&D 
sufficient enough to defend their implementation against ABS claims of individual providers.193 
Similarly, Stoll claims that, because the Convention on the Law of the Sea declared certain parts 
 
185 Peruvian Society of Environmental Law (SPDA) ‘Submitted view for the Updated report and synthesis of views 
in response to paragraph 7(b) of Decision XII/24; and Report of the Meeting of the Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group 
on Synthetic Biology’ (2016) 2 in Vogel and others (n 1) 378. 
186 ibid, 379. 
187 Roca (176) 97-106. 
188 Vogel and others (n 1) 385. 
189 Gerd Winter, ‘Common pools of genetic resources and related traditional and modern knowledge: An 
overview’ (ch 1) in Evanson Chege Kamau and Gerd Winter (eds) Common Pools of Genetic Resources: Equity and 
innovation in international biodiversity law (Earthscan, London and New York, 2013) 3-4. 
190 ibid, 4. 
191 ibid, 5. 
192 ibid 
193 ibid 
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of the deep seabed and its mineral resources to be the common heritage of mankind and 
provided a number of mechanisms to enable developing countries to participate in mining 
activities and benefit from its commercial results, benefit-sharing can be achieved by either 
assigning a sovereign entitlement to a resource or by creating a common good based on the 
concept of a common heritage of mankind.194 However, for Mgbeoji, this concept is not 
applicable to plant GR and seems to oppose the idea of a global commons of GR that is freely 
available to all mankind.195 
For Winter, there are three ways to offer provider state incentives for waiving their 
rights into common pools: (i) introducing conditions for the use of data, requiring that any 
commercial use must first be agreed upon with the provider state; (ii) requiring the database 
organisation to ask for disclosure of the country of origin of the sample from which the data 
were derived; and, (iii) enabling the tracking back and forth of R&D processes, unique and 
interchangeable identifiers of genes and tools to connect information would have to be 
developed.196 Noticeably, proposals involving payments for commercial use and disclosure 
obligations are not new. It is relevant, therefore, to ask what has not worked well in the ABS 
system for common pools. 
Regarding benefit-sharing, Winter proposes that databases could be responsible for 
supervising use, collecting and redistributing the shares’ monetary benefits; or that a system 
which he calls the ‘biodiversity charge’ could be created. It seems that this proposal consists 
of a tax on sales of products based on GR to be collected through a single or many funds, as 
Vogel and others proposed.197 
 
1.4.6 A global bio-collecting society 
 
On the grounds of copyright-collecting societies, Drahos proposes the creation of a 
global bio-collecting society consisting of a private organisation to distribute the benefits 
derived from TK utilisation.198 The differences between copyright-collecting societies and his 
proposal are: (i) rather than having many collecting societies at the national level, there will be 
only one global bio-collecting society; (ii) the purpose of the bio-collecting society will be the 
protection of TK; therefore, membership of the society in itself constitutes an acceptance that 
ILCs property rights will be respected; and, (iii) fund resources would come from the World 
Bank.199 Participation of companies and ILCs in the global bio-collecting society would be 
encouraged through the provision of ABS-related services. For companies it will offer freedom 
 
194 Peter-Tobias Stoll, ‘ABS, justice, pools and the Nagoya Protocol’ (ch 15) in Evanson Chege Kamau and Gerd 
Winter (eds) Common Pools of Genetic Resources: Equity and innovation in international biodiversity law 
(Earthscan, London and New York, 2013) 306. 
195 Ikechi Mgboji, ‘Beyond Rhetoric: State Sovereignty, Common Concern, and the Inapplicability of the Common 
Heritage Concept to Plant Genetic Resources’ (2003) 16 Leiden Journal of International Law 821, 823. 
196 Winter (n 147) 290-291. 
197 ibid, 291. 
198 Drahos (n 147) 247. 
199 ibid, 247-248. 
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of contract, low search and transaction costs, and certainty of use. For ILCs, the benefits are 
recognition of their property rights over TK by the user companies, a means by which they 
could enforce their rights (although the proposal does not mention how their rights will be 
enforced), monitoring the use of TK, help with the negotiation of licensing agreements, and 
collection and distribution of royalties.200 The following services are proposed in addition to 
what has just been mentioned: (i) repository for community registers of TK; and (ii) a dispute 
resolution function.201 
Although Drahos admits that functionality of this collecting society will depend largely 
upon its membership, he believes that it could provide order between international companies 
and local actors, and avoid corruption in some developing countries that could potentially 
affect ABS implementation.202 
 
2. Hypothesis, research questions and methodology 
 
The initial aim of this thesis was to analyse ABS to propose a feasible way in which an 
ABS mechanism could be designed for the distribution of benefits derived from the use of TK. 
However, during the research stage of this study, it was decided to present recommendations 
for the implementation of a single system of ABS. This avoids any potential negative effects 
that might result from the division of ABS into two separate processes, one for GR and one for 
TK, and recognises the need to link the use of TK with that of GR. With that purpose in mind, 
the way in which the countries have implemented ABS through national laws, the ABS system 
of the CBD, its further development in the NP, its relationship with other ABS systems and the 
IP system have been studied. 
The analysis was conducted while taking into account the difficulties experienced by 
countries during the process of negotiation, agreement, and incorporation of ABS obligations 
in the texts of the CBD and the NP. Among other things, Chapters 2 and 3 suggest that new 
agreements, with the potential to modify the contents of the CBD and NP, could be difficult to 
achieve in the near future. One possible implication of this is that, as countries have shown a 
great deal of disagreement on different developments, some aspects contained in the 
proposals summarised in Chapter 1 would be difficult to implement, despite their 
reasonableness. To consider one example, the concept of GR has been redefined by some 
academics as information, to affirm that, within the ABS context, all GR are transboundary and, 
therefore, all benefit-sharing should be conducted through a global mechanism, as indicated 
in Article 10 of the NP. Although this interpretation and the proposal itself could be considered 
valid and reasonable, it is highly probable that the Parties to the CBD and NP would not agree 
to such an interpretation because, based on the records of the negotiation sessions of the NP, 
it appears that the countries could not agree on better definitions or conditions for the ABS 
 
200 ibid, 248. 
201 ibid, 247. 
202 ibid, 248-149. 
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system. Furthermore, from those records, it can also be inferred that the countries were aware 
of the limitations imposed on ABS by the contents of the CBD.203 
Consequently, the literature review and the difficulties experienced during the 
negotiations of the NP suggest that the possibilities for the design of an ABS mechanism could 
be the result of proposals supported on: (i) theoretical approaches; (ii) practical bases; or (iii) 
a combination of these two. 
This thesis addresses that issue from a more practical approach, suggesting that by 
reviewing how the countries have implemented ABS in their practice is a more feasible 
response to proposed recommendations for the designing of an ABS mechanism. Regarding 
the implementation of laws, some studies exist about the cases in which the law to be 
implemented has not been designed specifically for the country (i.e., the concrete situation) in 
which they will be applied. Particularly, the analysis made on this matter by López, de Sousa 
Santos, and McCann and March constitute the theoretical basis of the methodological 
approach of the work that has been done. 
López has extensively studied the limitations in the interpretation and application of 
legal texts deriving from theories and general principles of law from one country to another 
(understood as the copy and paste of laws). He has demonstrated, for example, how the 
narratives and legal culture are different in Latin America (the so-called place of reception) 
from those in Europe (the so-called place of production), even though those narratives are 
based on the same legal texts, theories, and principles.204 Despite the different approaches to 
legal transplants,205 the work of López is important for this thesis because its conclusions are 
based on the practical consequences of legal transplants. From legal pluralism theories, de 
Sousa Santos suggests that a legal system designed from the existent reality is more likely to 
be effective, due to people’s willingness to comply with rules closer to their real world.206 For 
their part, McCann and March encourage examination of the way the law is used by citizens in 
their everyday lives as one of the most valuable forms of legal research.207 
 
203 See for example: Stefan Jungcurt and others, ‘Summary of the Resumed Ninth Meeting of the Working Group 
on Access and Benefit-Sharing of the Convention on Biological Diversity: 10-16 July 2010’ (Earth Negotiations 
Bulletin, iisd Reporting Services, IISD, 19 July 2010, vol 9, n 527); and ‘Summary of the Tenth Conference of the 
Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity: 18-29 October 2010’ (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, iisd Reporting 
Services, IISD, 1 November 2010, vol 9, n 544); Johannes Gnann and others, ‘Summary of the Ninth Meeting of 
the Working Group on Access and Benefit-Sharing of the Convention on Biological Diversity: 22-28 March 2010’ 
(Earth Negotiations Bulletin, iisd Reporting Services, IISD, 31 March 2010, vol 9, n 503). 
204 Diego López, Teoría Impura del Derecho: Transformación de la cultura jurídica latinoamericana (Universidad 
de los Andes, LEGIS, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2004) Chapter 1. 
205 See for example: Tran Kien, ‘Can copyright law be transplanted? Vietnam’s experiences with droit d’auteur, 
1864-1975’ (ch 22) in Paul Torremans (ed) Research Handbook on Copyright Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 
Cheltenham, Northampton, second edition, 2017) 539-540. 
206 See for example: Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Estado, Derecho y Luchas Sociales (ILSA, 1991) 163-165; ‘El 
Discurso y el Poder: ensayo sobre la sociología de la retórica jurídica’ (Revista Crítica Jurídica No. 26, 2007) 78-81, 
91-98. 
207 Michael McCann and Tracey March, ‘El derecho y las formas cotidianas  de resistencia: una evaluación 
sociopolítica’ (ch 9) in Mauricio García Villegas (ed) Sociología Jurídica: Teoría y sociología del derecho en Estados 
Unidos (Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2001) 306-309, 329-330. 
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One aspect of these theories seems to be confirmed by the low level of implementation 
of ABS expressed in the number of accessions of samples of biological materials through the 
MLS versus the number of MATs reported to the ABSCH. This indicates that it is very difficult 
to shape human behaviour through the implementation of laws.208 Seemingly, one of the 
causes of this limited application is the lack of coherence between ABS and the realities of 
current institutional practice, as indicated in the literature review.209 This being the case, it 
might be possible that a system regulating the way users of biodiversity and TK behave could 
more easily be adopted than a system which is trying to change behaviour. This is particularly 
true when those behaviours are rooted in common and accepted practices based on the rules 
of well-established systems, such as the ex-situ centres that are part of the CGIAR,210 botanical 
gardens such as Kew,211 and gene-banks such as the Rice Genome Consortiums of the IRRI,212 
among others. 
For this reason, in this thesis, the study of the way in which the countries have designed 
their ABS systems will prevail over the theoretical approaches to the problem. Particular 
attention is given to developments within sensitive ABS issues, such as GR ex-situ, the public 
domain, and shared TK. Nonetheless, this thesis is also aware that a comprehensive study of 
ABS, involving its development, contents, and relationship with the legal systems to which it 
relates, is also indispensable to gain a better understanding of the logic and the context in 
which it is applied and to provide a better opportunity to find the key elements that would be 
required for a feasible implementation of ABS. 
In view of the above, the hypothesis of this thesis is that the ABS mechanisms 
incorporating elements already implemented by some countries may potentially be more 
readily acceptable to the Parties to the CBD and the NP, as well as by the providers and users 
of GR and TK. A proposal developed from a purely theoretical approach can find obstacles in 
practice. Therefore, such a practical approach has a better possibility of success in the task to 
achieve benefit-sharing. 
This does not mean that the existent studies and proposals on how to improve ABS 
have no value or are not of interest in this thesis. Those proposals are taken into account to 
complement the findings from the implementation of national laws on ABS, for which a 
 
208 As of 31 October 2016, Easy-SMTA (an online non-mandatory application that assists users in the generation 
of Standard Material Transfer Agreements -SMTA-) had 1,272 users with 5,985 unique recipients of material 
worldwide. 48,313 SMTAs were agreed with providers located in 35 countries, and the plant GR was distributed 
to recipients based in 175 countries. In time, these SMTAs had transferred 3.25 million accessions. For its part, as 
of 15 March 2018, notification of the issuance of 143 MATs has been provided to the ABSCH (see Table 3, in 
chapter 2). 
CBD, COP-MOP, ‘Update on recent developments under the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for 
Food and Agriculture of relevance to the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilisation’ (2016) UNEP/CBD/NP/COP-MOP/2/INF/10. 
209 Dedeurwaerdere and others (n 70) 401. 
210 CGIAR is a global research partnership for a food secure future dedicated to reducing poverty, enhancing food 
and nutrition security, and improving natural resources. More information at: 
https://www.cgiar.org/research/research-centers/ 
211 More information at: https://www.kew.org/ 
212 More information at: https://www.irri.org/about-us/research-networks 
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doctrinal methodological approach was used. Nevertheless, they are considered only so far as 
they are compatible with the contents of the CBD and the NP. This is because, as Vogel and 
Ruiz have argued, there seems to be resistance to including new aspects in the discussions on 
ABS.213 Additionally, with the aim of offering a more accurate approach to the technical 
concepts of the CBD and NP, informal chats with Professors working in the field of natural 
sciences were held, and literature from the life sciences, social sciences and humanities fields 
were consulted. Moreover, when required, the history of the discussions on ABS was taken 
into account and contexts are provided based on the official records of the negotiations 
available on the CBD webpage. 
Based on the hypothesis, this thesis proposes the following research question: what 
are the key elements required for a feasible implementation of ABS? To answer this question, 
the thesis also aims to resolve the following questions: 
 
1. In what way have the Parties to the CBD and the NP developed national laws on ABS? 
2. What is the design of ABS in the CBD and the NP? 
3. How should the core elements of ABS be understood? 
4. In which way does the ABS system of the CBD connect with the ABS systems of the 
FAO and the WHO? 
5. In what way does ABS relate to the IP system?  
 
Each of these sub-questions is examined individually in each chapter of the thesis. 
The final conclusions, presented in Chapter 7, are based on two main ideas. First, that the 
current ABS rules have been made at a high international political and diplomatic level 
without considering the behaviour of users of GR and TK. Second, that serious academic 
criticism informs new recommendations to bring laws closer in line with the day to day 
reality and existing habits. It is in this sense that this thesis seeks to make an original 
contribution to the field by formulating a proposal of key elements useful for the 
implementation of ABS, extracted from the experience gained by the countries through the 
implementation of national laws. 
 
3. Structure 
 
Chapter 2 analyses information available from the ABSCH as of 15th March 2018 (this is 
the cut-off point for this study) to investigate how ABS functions in practice. ABSCH operates 
under the CBD, and provides data regarding legal developments on ABS measures, and the 
number and characteristics of the MATs signed up. The study of national and regional ABS laws 
as well as the MATs concluded, affords insight into the key elements that would be useful for 
a feasible implementation of ABS. 
 
213 Vogel and Ruiz (n 157) 
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Chapter 3 analyses ABS under the CBD and the NP texts to seek potential causes for its 
limited operability and effectiveness in achieving benefit-sharing. It concludes that the flaws 
and loopholes in the drafting of these instruments affect ABS operability. It ascribes this 
limitation to the countries’ impossibility of agreement on essential aspects, such as access ex-
situ and the public domain. 
Chapter 4 considers ABS through the lenses of the CBD and its Protocol. It offers an 
explanation for certain basic elements, including concepts such as GR, TK, PIC, MAT, fair and 
equitable distribution of benefits, etc. The chapter concludes that ABS does not reflect 
practical reality, mainly because it only considers access to GR in-situ, and does not regulate 
the public domain or have a national/bilateral approach to compliance. These are identified as 
the problematic aspects of ABS. 
Chapter 5 establishes how the CBD interlinks with the other international treaties which 
also govern the distribution of benefits derived from the use of GR and TK. It outlines the ABS 
systems adopted by the FAO and the WHO, and explains the manner in which they are intended 
to interact with the CBD. It will be seen that these norms were created to constitute a single 
international ABS system, with the separate treaties complementing each other to operate in 
a mutually-supportive way. However, in practice, it appears that these different systems 
function in a separate and uncoordinated way. The chapter concludes that one of the most 
severe consequences of this lack of coordination is that the rules of the CBD are not followed 
when GR is accessed in ex-situ conditions through the MLS of FAO. 
Chapter 6 examines the relationship between ABS and IP. Apart from the long-standing 
claims regarding the lack of integration of the ABS rules within the text of TRIPS, this chapter 
emphasises the influence that the political will of the Parties of the CBD and the WTO have had 
in the implementation of ABS. The chapter recognises that, although a legal solution for the 
limited level of implementation of ABS can be proposed, solving this problem encompasses a 
political dimension which is not studied in depth here, but is used to offer some context when 
necessary to explain the way the ABS rules were built into the international fora and the 
difficulties it brings. The exposition emphasises that not only do ABS and IP laws not contradict 
each other, but that mutual respect is required when each is implemented. ABS should not 
obstruct the award of IPRs, yet grant of IPRs should take the ABS rules into account. The 
chapter concludes that, owing to the fragmentation and complexity of the international system 
of ABS, a distribution of benefits will be almost impossible to achieve unless a global solution 
is sought. This is why the conclusions include recommendations for the implementation of a 
global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism GMBSM. 
The conclusions of Chapter 7 comprise two aspects: the implementation of ABS at a 
national level and the creation of a GMBSM. First, it is concluded that the greatest obstacles 
faced by the countries when implementing ABS are: (i) the national/bilateral approach to the 
CBD; (ii) the exclusion of GR ex-situ from the CBD; and, (iii) the application of the concept of 
public domain in the ABS context. The impact on ABS is so great that the countries will probably 
continue to encounter obstacles in the application of their ABS laws until these limitations are 
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amended. However, because the flaws could only be modified through new negotiations, it is 
proposed, for now, that the creation of national ABS mechanisms be based on a mandatory 
obligation for the sharing of non-monetary benefits and a voluntary sharing of monetary 
benefits. This is a consequence of the difficulties in tracking and monitoring all uses of GR and 
TK as a necessary condition for obtaining a distribution of benefits, and the difficulties posed 
by the national/bilateral approach to compliance of the CBD. 
Second, as it is considered that a GMBSM has a great potential to achieve benefit-
sharing, additional key elements are proposed for its establishment. Among others are (i) a 
basic mechanism based on the same benefit-sharing scheme as previously proposed; (ii) a 
mechanism with global reach; and (iii) the use of a fund that functions in a similar way to the 
collective rights management societies, i.e., having in each country a responsible organisation 
for the collection and distribution of benefits. 
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CHAPTER 2. ABS in Practice 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The search for a feasible way to implement ABS necessarily requires an understanding 
of how ABS works in practice, the system as such, and the way it connects with other ABS 
systems and the IP law. In this regard, this chapter seeks to understand how ABS is 
implemented by the countries. For this purpose, the information provided by the Parties to the 
CBD and the NP to the ABS Clearing-House (ABSCH)1 until 15th March 2018 is used in two 
aspects: the legal instruments developed, and the number of MATs subscribed. 
The importance of reviewing this information is the possibility to have an approximate 
idea of what could be happening with ABS in practice and, therefore, what might be the 
suitable elements of an ABS mechanism. 
 
2. Analysis of information provided by countries to the ABS Clearing House (ABSCH) of the 
CBD 
 
The first thing to be noted is that countries with ABS developments are small in number 
when compared with the number of parties to the CBD and the Protocol (See Figure 1). As of 
15 March 2018, the CBD has 196 State Parties, of which 105 are Parties to the Nagoya Protocol. 
Among all the Parties to the CBD and the Protocol, 57 countries have ABS legal developments 
(legislative, administrative, or policy measures),2 12 of which are Members only of the CBD, 
and 45 are also Members of the Protocol. Only 74 countries have delivered national reports on 
ABS implementation,3 and only three have customary protocols, procedures, or laws in place 
 
1 The ABSCH was established by Article 14, paragraph 1, of the Nagoya Protocol as part of the Clearing-House 
Mechanism under Article 18, paragraph 3, of the CBD. This is the official on-line platform of the CBD created for 
the exchanging of information on access and benefit-sharing. There, Parties and Non-Parties of the Convention 
can have their own site to upload relevant information about their national experience on ABS. In this regard, the 
ABSCH has been designed to ensure that the countries will report the same aspects on ABS. Therefore, a set of 
on-line formats have been developed for the Countries to fill and make information available regarding: (i) ABS 
National Focal Point (NFP); (ii) Competent National Authorities (CNA); (iii) legislative, administrative or policy 
measures on ABS (MSR); (iv) national databases and websites (NDB); (v) checkpoints (CP); (vi) internationally 
recognised certificates of compliance (IRCC) – referred to ABS contracts or permits that can serve as an IRCC -; 
(vii) checkpoint communiqués (CPC); and (viii) interim national report on the implementation of the Nagoya 
Protocol. 
More information about the ABS Clearing-House in: 
CBD, ‘Introduction to the Access and Benefit-Sharing Clearing-House (ABSCH)’ 
<https://absch.cbd.int/help/about> accessed 05 October 2017 
2 It is important to point out that the EU is counted as if it was an independent entity of the countries of which is 
it composed, and, at the same time, the Andean Community of Nations and its countries, having an ABS law in 
place, are excluded. 
Moreover, in a number of cases, the measures disclosed in the ABSCH are the Act ratifying the Nagoya Protocol 
(as in the case of Mexico), a strategy or plan, but not necessarily an ABS law. 
3 ABSCH, Interim National Reports on the Implementation of the Nagoya Protocol 
<https://absch.cbd.int/search/nationalRecords?schema=absNationalReport> accessed 01 April 2018 
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(Brazil, Kenya, and Panama). Among the countries with legal developments on ABS, only 12 
have reported information to the ABSCH regarding ABS contracts or permits (MATs). These 
countries are Bulgaria, Belarus, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, India, Kenya, Malta, Mexico, 
Panama, Peru, South Africa, and Spain. Noteworthy is that Mexico, having no ABS regulations, 
reported the signature of three MATs, two for the access to GR and one for accessing TK. 
 
 
 
 
 
While the amount of legal and contractual developments on ABS reported to the ABSCH 
is small in number, we should not lose sight of the fact that some countries have over ten years 
of experience in ABS implementation. The importance of the knowledge gained during that 
time should not be overlooked, especially when limited practical experience with ABS exists. 
The analysis of the mechanisms of implementation of ABS laws in some countries 
provides not only an idea of the ABS in practice, but some insights into the shortcomings and 
This table has been made by the author based on the information available on the 
ABSCH website and accessed on 15 March 2018 
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strengths of the existing developments, and the ABS mechanisms the countries might be willing 
to implement in a GMBSM. 
On that basis, the following sections analyse the information of the ABSCH regarding 
ABS legal developments and MATs subscribed. The first section looks at the scope of those 
laws and ABS obligations within the frame of the CBD and the Protocol. The second section 
examines the data of the MATs reported (134) to the ABSCH for accessing GR and TK. 
 
2.1 Countries’ legal developments on ABS 
 
The CBD and the NP themselves do not provide for practical and effective solutions to 
accomplish benefit-sharing. These norms leave a number of issues unsolved for the countries 
to decide and regulate through their national laws. It was not until 2002 when the CBD 
produced the Bonn Guidelines on Access and Benefit-Sharing (the Bonn Guidelines) to guide 
the countries about the way national laws on ABS should be developed. Devising the Bonn 
Guidelines does not, however, solve those issues. For example, the Guidelines do not provide 
indications about the concepts of the CBD and, therefore, the scope of ABS remains unclear.4 
In this context, some national ABS laws were created. Naturally, they reflect the 
countries’ particular interests and, therefore, have different approaches to ABS. Cabrera 
Medaglia and López Silva characterise this regulatory process as (i) happening mostly in 
developing countries; (ii) having developed without international guidelines or consensus on 
how to construct them; and (iii) having been devised under the belief that the CBD and the NP 
were adequate, without modification to establish operative ABS systems.5 Siebenhüner and 
Suplie note that, in addition, such a process has generally been accompanied by reflexive 
mechanisms consisting of the development of evaluations, specific committees, or topic-
centred workshops in which the common elements of ABS are studied and/or discussed at the 
national and international levels.6 As explained in Chapter 6, what these authors are referring 
to are what have been identified in international law as complex systems. In other words, the 
way ABS have been negotiated and implemented by the countries make it a complex system, 
which, in turn, could explain why they are experiencing obstacles for its implementation. 
Despite this, to better understand the way ABS operates, it is necessary to know how 
the countries are applying the CBD and the NP. This is why ABS implementation through 
national laws is explored in the following sections. The first one shows the legal developments 
as contained in the CBD and the NP; the second describes the way some countries have 
regulated three aspects relating to the issues that, whilst they can be considered as part of 
ABS, were not included in the texts of the CBD or the NP. These three aspects are: GR ex-situ, 
 
4 On this particular issue, the Guidelines are limited to clarify that ABS is applied to all GR and associated TK 
covered by the CBD, but no definition or instruction on how the concepts of GR, TK, or access should be built are 
provided. 
5 Jorge Cabrera Medaglia and Christian López Silva, ‘Addressing the Problems of Access: Protecting sources, while 
giving users certainty’ (IUCN Environmental Policy and Law, Paper No. 67/1 2007), 4-5. 
6 Bernd Siebenhüner and Jessica Suplie, ‘Implementing the Access and Benefit-Sharing Provisions of the CBD: A 
Case for Institutional Learning’ (2005) 53 Ecological Economics 507, 517.  
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the public domain, and shared TK. The information contained in these sections was obtained 
from the ABS Clearing-House of the CBD (ABSCH), since this is the official website where the 
parties to the CBD provide information about legal aspects and practical implementation of 
ABS. The information analysed from the ABSCH is that which is available in English, Portuguese 
or Spanish; any information found in another language was not included, as the author is not 
proficient in other languages. For the selection of the countries, account was taken of the MATs 
subscribed; i.e., the laws of the countries reporting MATs were reviewed, provided they were 
disclosed to the ABSCH. National laws of the countries that are apparently using GR, as 
identified in Chapter 6, were also reviewed. This is why, despite the USA not being a member 
of the CBD or the NP, its regulations on ABS were included. 
However, attention must be given to the fact that, because the number of measures 
available and, therefore, reviewed is small, it is not possible to draw general conclusions about 
the level of implementation and existent gaps in ABS norms. Nonetheless, this information is 
considered sufficiently indicative of trends for this subject. 
 
2.1.1 National developments on aspects regulated in the CBD and the Nagoya 
Protocol 
 
The information contained in the ABSCH shows that ABS has different levels of 
implementation. Some countries have only ratified the CBD and the NP, whilst others have 
different sets of measures that could include ABS laws, a strategy, guidelines, codes of good 
practice in research, and specialised government agencies which operate with more or less 
autonomy. 
Noticeably, ABS legislation reproduces the objectives of the CBD and the NP, i.e., states 
having the aim to achieve the distribution of benefits derived from the use of GR and 
associated TK. Likewise, their own objectives, scope, definitions, requisites, obligations, 
competent authorities, procedures for obtaining PIC and MATs, infractions and sanctions, 
appear relatively clear in all of them. This does not mean, however, that the countries have 
limited themselves to reproducing the texts of the CBD and the NP. In fact, some of them, for 
example, have incorporated new elements to the ABS scope. A summary of the different ways 
in which the countries under study here have regulated ABS, can be seen in Table 1. 
The parties of ABS transactions are the provider country and the user. National ABS 
developments endorse the sovereign rights of the states over their GR. On that basis, their 
exclusive right to concede PIC, subscribe MATs, and grant access is stated (Bulgaria,7 
Dominican Republic,8 the Andean Community of Nations9). However, some differences can be 
observed in relation to the rights of ILCs over their TK and the GR located in their territories. 
 
7 Biological Diversity Act, 2017, Bulgaria. Articles 66.1, 66.3, 66.5 
8 Regulation of Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-sharing (ABS) of the Dominican Republic, 2017. Article 
12 
9 Decision 391 of 1996, Common Regime on Access to Genetic Resources, of the Commission of the Cartagena 
Agreement. Article 5 
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For example, although all countries studied uphold the principle that ABS processes must 
respect the rights of ILCs over their TK, few laws acknowledged their right to grant PIC for the 
access of GR located in their lands (the African Union,10 the Andean Community of Nations,11 
Peru12). 
 
 
 
 
 
In general, the scope of ABS comprises both GR and TK. However, the EU13 and Japan14 
only recognise rights to benefit from TK to the extent that such a right is regulated in the 
country of origin of the ILCs providing the TK. Some national developments have clarified the 
kind of resources that are or are not included in such scope, regardless of whether or not they 
are mentioned in the texts of the CBD and the NP. In this way, biological resources (India),15 
 
10 African Model Legislation for the Protection of the Rights of Local Communities, Farmers and Breeders, and for 
the Regulation of Access to Biological Resources, 2000, Organisation of African Unity (OAU), Algeria. Article 5.1.i, 
5.1.ii 
11 CAN (n 9). Article 35 
12 Supreme Decree No. 003-2009-MINAM, Regulation on Access to Genetic Resources, 2009, Peru. Article 6 
13 Regulation (EU) No 511/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014, on compliance 
measures for users from the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing 
of Benefits Arising from their Utilization in the Union. Article 2.4 
14 Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their 
Utilization. The Government of Japan. 2017. Chapter 3 No. 1.3 
15 The Biological Diversity Act, 2002, India. Article 2c 
This table has been made by the author based on the information available on the 
ABSCH website and accessed on 15 March 2018 
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biochemical elements (Costa Rica,16 Panama17), genetic heritage (Brazil),18 derivatives 
(Bhutan)19 or by-products (Dominican Republic,20 the Andean Community of Nations,21 the 
African Union, 22 India23), viruses and cell cultures (Bulgaria),24 GR data (Belarus,25 Brazil26), and 
indigenous biological resources (South Africa)27 are included in ABS. Some countries exclude 
certain types of resources from ABS: GR obtained from breeding programs (Kenya),28 GR used 
as bulk commodities, derivatives accessed independently of GR, GR acquired before the CBD 
(Malta),29 information concerning GR and synthetic nucleoid acids (Japan),30 and GR and TK 
accessed before the entry into force of the Nagoya Protocol (the EU,31 Japan32). 
Usually the obligation to distribute benefits is triggered by the ‘use’ of GR and TK, in the 
African Union, for example.33 However, in some countries it is not the use but the ‘access’ 
which triggers the obligation to distribute benefits (Brazil,34 Costa Rica,35 India,36 the Andean 
Community of Nations,37 Panama38). Sometimes access has been broadly interpreted to 
include, for example, developing research activities or the production of technological 
developments, as happens in Brazil.39 
The process for obtaining PIC is quite similar in the laws reviewed. Usually the applicant 
completes an application form with similar requirements: identification of the applicant, 
identification of the resource and identification of the geographical area where the samples 
will be collected, specification of the kind of research intended (scientific or commercial), and 
a description of the activities to be developed or a transcription of the research project. The 
 
16 Biodiversity Law, 1998, Costa Rica. Article 7.13 
17 Executive Decree No. 25 of 2009, Panama. Article 2 
18 Law 13, 123, 2015, Brazil. Article 2.1 
19 Access and Benefit Sharing Policy of Bhutan, 2015. Article 5 
20 Dominican Republic (n 8). Article 2 
21 CAN (n 9). Article 1 
22 OAU (n 10). Article 2.1.i, 2.1.ii, 2.1.iii, 2.1.iv, 2.1.v 
23 ibid, (n 15) 
24 Bulgaria (n 7). Article 118.10.3 
25 Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus, 1 October 2014, N933, On Establishment of 
the National Coordination Centre on Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-Sharing. Deciding 2 
26 Brazil (n 18). Art. 2.I, 2.II 
27 National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act, 2004, Republic of South Africa. Article 2a.iii 
28 The Environmental Management and Coordination (Conservation of Biological Diversity and Resources, Access 
to Genetic Resources and Benefit Sharing) Regulations, 2006, Kenya. Article 3b 
29 L.N. 379 of 2016, Environment Protection Act  CAP. 549), Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable 
Sharing of Benefits arising from their Utilisation Regulations, 2016, Malta. Article 2.2b, 2.2c, 2.2g 
30 Japan (n 14). Chapter 1 No. 3.1.1, No. 3.1.2 
31 The EU (n 13). Article 2.1 
32 Japan (n 14). Chapter 1 No. 3.1.5 
33 OAU (n 10). Part Id 
34 Brazil (n 18). Article 1.I 
35 Costa Rica (n 16). Article 10.4 
36 India (n 15). ‘An Act to provide for conservation of biological diversity, sustainable use of its components and 
fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the use of biological resources, knowledge and for matters 
connected therewith or incidental thereto.’ 
37 CAN (n 9). Article 2 
38 Panama (n 17). Article 1a 
39 Brazil (n 18). Art. 2VII, 2IX 
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process of obtaining PIC for accessing GR is usually determined with relative clarity. However, 
the process of accessing TK is not always described, and regulations in this regard are 
commonly limited to stipulate that PIC must be conducted with the concerned ILCs in 
accordance with their customary laws and protocols. 
Under some national developments, more than one person (for example, the owner of 
the land where the GR and TK are in-situ or the owner of the biological resource containing the 
GR) can concede a permit for access to the resource (the Andean Community of Nations,40 
Panama41), although in strict sense this is not a PIC—still, the permits are closely linked to PIC 
because their absence could obstruct access. ILCs also can grant PIC (the Andean Community 
of Nations,42 the African Union43, Ethiopia44), which is considered a pre-requisite for access 
(the African Union,45 Costa Rica,46 Brazil47). In other cases, accessing TK requires a joint PIC 
from the competent authority and the ILCs concerned (Malta,48 Dominican Republic49). In 
Panama, any change of use or the transfer of the accessed resources requires a new PIC, and 
if a TK is involved, the PIC should include aspects related to IPRs.50 
Although all provisions grant the respect and protection of TK, most of the countries 
reviewed have not designed specific rules for obtaining PIC from ILCs. Some establish that 
access should be done according to customary law and/or community protocols (Bhutan,51 
Brazil52). For others, the collective nature of TK is recognised (Brazil,53 and Peru54), and PIC as 
condition for accessing TK is acknowledged (Peru).55 Some countries establish the inalienability 
of ILCs’ rights (the African Union56) and their indefeasibility (Peru).57 TK protection can be found 
in the African Union,58 and recognition of IPRs in Costa Rica59 with independency of TK 
registration, declaration, or other formalities. 
 
40 CAN (n 9). Article 41a, 41b, 41c, 41d 
41 Panama (n 17). Article 25a, 25b, 25c, 25d 
42 CAN (n 9). Article 7 
43 OAU (n 10). Article 5.1.i, 5.1.ii 
44 Access to Genetic Resources and Community Knowledge, and Community Rights Council of Ministers Regulation 
No. 169/2009, Ethiopia. Article 21.1 
45 OAU (n 10). Articles 3.1, 18 
46 Costa Rica (n 16). Article 65 
47 Brazil (n 18). Articles 8.1, 9, 9.2 
48 Malta (n 29). Article 6.1 
49 The Dominican Republic (n 8). Article 9 
50 Panama (n 17). Articles 27, 28 
51 Bhutan (n 19). Article 6h 
52 Brazil (n 18). Art. 2.VII 
53 ibid, Article 10.1 
54 Law No. 27811 de 2002 of the Peruvian State. Law Introducing a Protection Regime for the Collective Knowledge 
of Indigenous Peoples derived from Biological Resources. Article 12 
55 ibid, Articles 6, 23.1 
56 OAU (n 10). Article 23.1, 23.2, 23.3 and 23.4 
57 Peru (n 54). Article 10 
58 OAU (n 10). Article 23.3 
59 ibid 
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The Dominican Republic60 defines PIC in the same way as prescribed in the ILO 
Convention 169 of 1989, while in Kenya it means an international procedure for exchanging, 
receiving, and handling notification and information by a competent authority.61 Although ILCs’ 
right to refuse access is implied in PIC, a few countries expressly incorporate it in their ABS laws 
(the African Union,62 Costa Rica). Costa Rica particularly recognises the right of ‘cultural 
objection’,63 consisting of the right of ILCs to oppose access to their resources based on 
cultural, spiritual, social, economic, and other reasons. Only the African Union law establishes 
the right for ILCs to withdraw PIC.64 
In other countries, users are only obliged to obtain PIC when access is required for 
acquiring IPRs or for the commercial use of the accessed resources (the USA).65 Japan does not 
require PIC for accessing GR existing in the country, unless the resources will be sent to another 
country.66 
Access is always granted by a National Competent Authority. However, there is often 
more than one authority involved in ABS processes. Because of this, it is possible that users 
experience difficulties in identifying each of those competent authorities and their roles in the 
process of granting access. Because of that, by 29 March 2018, from among a total of 196 
Parties to the CBD, only 53 have designated Competent National Authorities.67 This figure is 
almost the same as the number of countries with ABS legal developments (57, see Figure 1). 
In addition, some countries have created different conditions for ABS processes based on: 
 
i. Nationality of the applicant. For example, Brazil prohibits access to GR and TK of 
foreign natural persons,68 and India requires the participation of a national person 
as a condition for access applications;69 
ii. Type of resource. India has different process for accessing GR and TK, for seeking 
approval for transferring results of research, for seeking approval before applying 
for IP protection, and for third party transfers;70 
iii. Type of intended utilisation. Costa Rica71 and the Dominican Republic72 have 
differentiated access for commercial and non-commercial purposes. Kenya73 does 
not require ABS when access is intended for educational purposes and provided by 
 
60 Dominican Republic (n 8). Article 4i 
61 Kenya (n 28). Article 2 
62 OAU (n 10). Article 19 
63 Costa Rica (n 16). Article 66 
64 OAU (n 10). Article 20 
65 United States Department of the Interior. National Park Service. Director’s Order #77-10: NPS Benefits Sharing, 
2013. Available at: https://www.nps.gov/policy/DOrders/DO_77-10.pdf accessed in 01.03.2018. Articles 4.1.1, 
4.2.1 
66 Japan (n 14). Chapters 4, 5 
67 ABSCH, ‘the Access and Benefit-Sharing Clearing-House’ <https://absch.cbd.int/> accessed 29 March 2018. 
68 Brazil (n 18). Article 11.1 
69 India (n 15). Article 3.2a, 3.2b, 3.2c.i, 3.2c.ii 
70 The Biological Diversity Rules, 2004, India. Articles 14, 17, 18, 19 
71 Costa Rica (n 16). Article 64 
72 Dominican Republic (n 8). Article 12a, 12b 
73 Kenya (n 28). Article 3d 
CHAPTER 2. ABS in practice 
 
 
 
 
44 
national institutions. In all cases, there is the obligation to subscribe a new MAT 
when the original application changes from non-commercial to a commercial 
purpose. In Bhutan,74 GR, when used as commodities, are excluded from ABS, 
except when later used for research and/or commercial purposes. The USA does 
not concede permits for commercial uses, and has different contract models based 
on the legal authority to use the agreement, the nature of the other party, or the 
type of benefits;75 
iv. Number of resources accessed. Under the Andean Community of Nations76 and 
Costa Rican77 regulations, it is possible to obtain a single MAT for the utilisation of 
many GR and TK, as long as the resources accessed are part of a scientific research 
project developed by universities, research centres, or well-known researchers; and 
v. Related activities. India provides processes for transfer of research results, approval 
for seeking IPRs, and third party transfers of GR or TK.78 
 
It is usually established that MATs should be concluded in written form. Accounting 
documents such as permits (from the owner of the land or the biological resource containing 
the GR, the ex-situ collection, and the ILCs) and material transfer agreements (MTA) are also 
part of MATs. However, material transfer agreements are only required when GR are accessed 
in ex-situ conditions (Panama,79 Peru80). 
Many countries have models of MATs in place. The parties to MATs are generally a 
State, an ILC when the use of a TK is intended (Andean Community of Nations81 and the African 
Union82), and a user. However, some restrictions could be imposed on users. For example, in 
the USA, only those who have a permit from the National Park Services can subscribe MATs.83 
Sometimes different national agencies participate as the body responsible for monitoring 
compliance with MATs and to receive the transfer of technology. 
Under the USA law, PIC is not required, and the park authority grants MATs only for 
non-commercial purposes. Commercial permits are given if the applicant has entered into a 
Cooperative Research Development Agreement or other benefit-sharing agreement approved 
by the National Park Service.84 While in Brazil, MATs are only required for the commercial use 
 
74 Bhutan (n 19). Article 5 
75 The USA (n 65). Articles 4.1.1, 5.2 
76 CAN (n 9). Article 36 
77 Costa Rica (n 16). Articles 63.3, 74 
78 India (n 15). Articles 4, 6.1 
79 Panama (n 17). Article 30 
80 Peru (n 12). Article 22 
81 CAN (n 9). Article 35 
82 OAU (n 10). Article 22 
83 National Park Service. Benefit-Sharing Handbook. 2018. The USA. Available at: 
<https://www.nps.gov/policy/DOrders/Benefits-Sharing_Handbook_(2018).pdf> accessed in 01.06.2019. Article 
1.7 
84 The USA (n 65). Articles 4.1.1, 4.2.1 
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of GR and TK. In all other cases the samples of GR are accessed using material transfer 
agreements (MTAs).85 
All reviewed laws include monetary and non-monetary forms of benefits. Almost all 
include a list with examples of benefits. Non-monetary benefits are expected from non-
commercial MATs (Bulgaria),86 and are usually identified as capacity-building, transfer of 
technology, the participation of nationals in research projects, the sharing of research results, 
and the disclosure of the origin of the resources in scientific publications (India,87 Peru88). 
Some countries establish the minimum percentage of their participation in the benefits 
(Costa Rica,89 the African Union,90 Brazil91). In Brazil, when the monetary benefits are derived 
from the economic exploitation of GR ex-situ, a percentage of the monetary benefits will be 
directed towards the collection,92 and no benefit-sharing from the use of GR is required when 
the benefits from the use of TK have been distributed.93 Others provide details regarding the 
purpose for which the benefits obtained should be invested, such as the conservation of 
biodiversity and the promotion of community knowledge (Ethiopia).94 
Most of the laws reviewed provide for the creation of funds, and have established two 
ways for the distribution of benefits. First, direct distribution of benefits between the country 
of origin and the user of GR (the Andean Community of Nations,95 the EU,96 the USA,97 Japan98) 
and TK in accordance with MATs (Bhutan),99 or directing the benefits towards a fund 
(Ethiopia,100 India101). Under the Andean Community of Nations legislation, ILCs can directly 
negotiate the benefits,102 while in Malta,103 they are negotiated by the national authority. 
Second, through depositing the sum agreed in a fund (Costa Rica,104 Brazil,105 Peru,106 South 
Africa107). The resources of such funds are usually composed of the money received as a share 
of benefits, other payments derived from access activities (licences, royalties), duties and 
 
85 Brazil (n 18). Article 2.XIX 
86 Bulgaria (n 7). Article 66.4 
87 India (n 70). Article 20.2 
88 Peru (n 12). Article 23c, 23d, 23e, 23f, 23g, 23h, 23i 
89 Costa Rica (n 16). Article 75 
90 OAU (n 10). Article 22 
91 Presidency of the Federative Republic of Brazil. Civil House. Legal Sub-Office. Decree 8.772 of May 11 of 2016. 
Articles 20, 21, 24 
92 Brazil (n 18). Article 32.II.2 
93 ibid, Article 25.3 
94 Ethiopia (n 44). Articles 27.1, 28 
95 CAN (n 9). Article 1 
96 The EU (n 13). Article 4.2 
97 The USA (n 65). Article 4.3.1 
98 Japan (n 14). Chapter 3 No. 1.1 
99 Bhutan (n 19). Article 8.4.9 
100 Ethiopia (n 44). Article 26.1 
101 India (n 15). Art. 21.3 
102 CAN (n 9). Article 35 
103 Malta (n 29). Article 6.2 
104 Costa Rica (n 16). Article 114 
105 Brazil (n 18). Articles 24.2, 25.II.1, 25.II.4 
106 Peru (n 54). Article 8 
107 South Africa (n 27). Article 85.1 
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taxes, resources from the government, donations, and fines for infractions to the ABS law. 
Although it is usually established that the resources from the fund will be used for biodiversity 
preservation, some laws indicate the right of ILCs to be recipients. In those cases, the ILCs can 
retrieve resources from the fund to finance the development of communal projects (Brazil,108 
the African Union,109 Ethiopia,110 Peru111). In India, monies of the fund can be used for repairing 
any damages caused by the access activities.112 
The relationship between ABS and IP has been limited to the obligation of States to 
respect existing IPRs when conceding access, as well as their obligation to ensure that IPRs 
have been granted respecting the ABS rules. Some countries have incorporated specific 
obligations when ABS relates to IPRs. For example, in granting IP protection, Costa Rica requires 
the certificate of origin of the resource and proof that PIC was obtained.113 India stipulates that 
the distribution of benefits when access involves the acquisition of IPRs should be solved on a 
case-by-case basis through MATs.114 In few countries, ILCs’ rights over their TK can affect the 
granting of patent rights (in Costa Rica, IPRs are granted only if PIC has been obtained,115 the 
Andean Community of Nations116); some other recognise IPRs over TK in favour of ILCs (the 
African Union,117 Costa Rica118). 
Similar measures for controlling and monitoring the use of GR and TK have been 
established in ABS laws. Controlling activities mainly consist of the obligation to develop 
collaborative scientific research, to disclose the origin of the resources (Brazil,119 Costa Rica,120 
India,121 Peru122), and the request for information (Andean Community of Nations,123 the 
Dominican Republic124, Japan125). Under the EU law monitoring is performed by requesting all 
recipients of research funding involving the utilisation of GR and TK associated with GR to 
declare that they exercise due diligence.126 
 
108 Brazil (n 18). Article 19.IIa 
109 OAU (n 10). Article 66.4 
110 Ethiopia (n 44). Article 31.1, 31.2 
111 Peru (n 54). Articles 37, 38 
112 India (n 15). Article 32.2b 
113 Costa Rica (n 16). Article 80 
114 India (n 15). Article 6.1, 6.2 
115 ibid, Article 80 
116 Decision 486 of 2000, Common Provisions on Industrial Property, of the Commission of the Cartagena 
Agreement. Article 3 
117 OAU (n 10). Article 23.1, 23.2, 23.3, 23.4 
118 Costa Rica (n 16). Article 82 
119 Brazil (n 18). Article 10.II 
120 Costa Rica (n 16). Article 71 
121 India (n 70). Article 14.6.ii, 14.6.iii, 14.6.ix 
122 Peru (n 12). Article 23c, 23d, 23k, 23l 
123 CAN (n 9). Article 18 
124 Dominican Republic (n 8). Article 26a 
125 Japan (n 14). Chapter 2 No. 5.1 
126 The EU (n 14). Article 7.1 
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Another means of monitoring GR and TK has been the creation of inventories of 
national biodiversity and associated knowledge (Bhutan,127 India,128 Peru129), and the use of 
barcodes (the Dominican Republic).130 
For these purposes, the EU131 and Japan132 have suggested the use of an 
internationally-recognised certificate of compliance, records of access and disclosing the 
information to the ABS Clearing-House, with the exception of the commercial or industrial 
information, which is confidential. The African Union stipulates the use of a certificate of fair 
trade when a significant part of the benefits go back to the concerned ILCs.133 
Some prohibitions have been established such as: (i) sharing the accessed resources 
without prior consent in written form (Bulgaria,134 India135) or under different conditions from 
those under which they were received (Panama,136 Peru137); (ii) sharing the research results 
(India)138; and (iii) claiming IPRs over the accessed resources (India)139 and their by-products 
(Peru).140 Also, providing false information, collecting samples of non-authorised material, or 
collecting authorised GR in non-authorised sampling locations are commonly considered as 
violations to the ABS law. The consequences from infringements to ABS regulations are almost 
identical in the laws reviewed. These are usually fines and administrative sanctions, including 
MATs suspension, cancellation, or revocation and, where applicable, other domestic penalties 
(Costa Rica141, India142). 
 
2.1.2 National developments on aspects not regulated in the CBD or the NP 
 
As explained in sections 3.2 and 3.3 of the next chapter, some important aspects have 
been left out of the scope of ABS. Although they were not initially contemplated in the CBD, 
the State Parties tried to reach an agreement during the negotiations of the NP, but with no 
positive results. Thus, they are not regulated by the CBD and the NP. In this thesis, those 
aspects have been grouped in two: non-agreed issues of the Draft Text of the NP, and one issue 
that was not discussed during the negotiations of the NP. The first group comprehends (i) the 
use of pathogens and viruses, and their relationship with the WHO Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness (PIP) Framework; (ii) GR for food and agriculture; (iii) access through ex-situ 
 
127 Bhutan (n 19). Article 8.2.1 
128 India (n 15). Article 36.1 
129 Peru (n 54). Article 16a, 16b 
130 Dominican Republic (n 8). Article 27e 
131 The EU (n 13). Article 7.2a, 7.2b, 7.3, 7.5 
132 Japan (n 14). Chapter 2 No. 1.2, 4.1 
133 OAU (n 10). Article 27.2 
134 Bulgaria (n 7). Article 66.5 
135 India (n 70). Article 19.1 
136 Panama (n 17). Note 44, Article 27 
137 Peru (n 12). Article 23b, 23j 
138 India (n 15). Article 4 
139 India (n 70). Article 18.1 
140 Peru (n 12). Article 23a 
141 Costa Rica (n 16). Article 112 
142 India (n 70). Article 15.1.i, 15.2 
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conservation centres; (iv) publicly-available TK; and (v) GR in the Antarctic Treaty Area and 
marine GR from areas beyond national jurisdiction. The non-discussed issue is the use of 
genetic sequence data in conjunction with technologies that would allow the use of GR without 
the need of having physical access to these resources, i.e. what could be regarded as ‘use 
without access’.  
Few countries have regulated only three of those issues through their national laws, 
namely: GR ex-situ, the public domain, and shared TK. The cause for that is possibly related to 
the difficulties experienced during the NP negotiations. Nonetheless, these legal developments 
are of utmost importance, not only because they offer solutions for some of the most 
controversial aspects of ABS, but also because the results of their implementation could 
provide valuable insights about the effectiveness of these solutions. For these reasons this 
section is dedicated to their explanation. 
One of the non-agreed issues regulated in national laws is access through ex-situ 
conservation centres. This has been done in two different ways: in association with the MLS of 
FAO, and irrespective of whether or not the ex-situ centre providing GR forms part of the MLS. 
Regarding the MLS, and as it will be explained in Section 2.3 of Chapter 5, through 
Resolution 7/93 the FAO requested a forum for negotiations among governments ‘for 
consideration of the issue of access on mutually agreed terms to plant genetic resources, 
including ex-situ collections not addressed by the Convention.’ As a result, the MLS (as an ABS 
system) was included in the International Treaty on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
(ITPGRFA) of 2001. Section 2.6 of Chapter 5 deals with the MLS, however, it is useful to recall 
here that Articles 11.5 and 12.1 of the ITPGRFA establish that the MLS was created for the 
facilitated access of the plant GR listed in Annex I of such instrument, for their use in food and 
agriculture, and held in the International Agricultural Research Centres of the Consultative 
Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) and in other international institutions. 
This means that the MLS has a particular scope and different nature than the CBD. Thus, the 
use of the MLS aiming at achieving compliance with the CBD could create confusion and legal 
gaps in its application. 
Despite this, the MLS is used as a reference point for ABS regulations in Bhutan. This 
way, accessing GR ex-situ through the MLS generates benefit-sharing obligations in that 
country.143 In contrast, under EU law no benefits are due when access is gained through an ex-
situ centre whether or not it is part of the MLS. This means that unlike Bhutan, in the EU 
accessing GR from an ex-situ centre forming part of the MLS does not generate benefit-sharing 
obligations. To come to this understanding in the EU law, it was assumed that GR ex-situ are in 
the public domain which, in turn, implies that they are free to use; and it was established that 
accessing GR through the MLS constitutes an exercise of ‘due diligence’.144 It was also stated 
that accessing GR ex-situ from a collection included in the register of collections within the 
Union is deemed to satisfy due diligence requirements, i.e., it is assumed that the GR held in 
those collections were accessed in accordance with the ABS law of the provider country, and 
 
143 Bhutan (n 19). Article 8.5.5 
144 The EU (n 13). Article 4.1, 4.4 
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that the benefits were fairly and equitable shared upon MATs.145 In this way, users of the MLS 
in the EU are not required to conduct ABS. These users are only obliged under the terms of the 
MTAs subscribed with the ex-situ centre. The problem with such MTAs is that they are usually 
limited to settling the conditions for the transfer of the samples to be accessed, but they do 
not generally contain obligations regarding the distribution of benefits with the country of 
origin. 
Although the EU approach could be seen as a reasonable way to deal with access to GR 
ex-situ, some comments are required. On the one hand, it must not be overlooked, as 
explained above, that the ABS scope of the CBD and the FAO are different. In a strict sense, 
this means that any access to and distribution of benefits arising from the use of all national 
GR which is not human, not listed in Annex I of the ITPGRFA, or not a virus used for pandemic 
vaccine production (regulated by the WHO), must be conducted following the ABS rules of the 
CDB. In addition, accepting that all GR ex-situ should be considered to be placed in the public 
domain could meet strong opposition from provider countries of GR. Access ex-situ is 
consistently identified as one of the most serious failures of the ABS system of the CBD, 
because, among other things, it seems that the majority of accessions to GR ex-situ is made 
through the MLS, which limits the possibility for providers to directly receive the distribution 
of benefits derived from their use. Nonetheless, GR ex-situ can be deemed as a part of the 
public domain if new agreement on it is reached among the Members of the CBD. 
On the other hand, as explained in Chapter 5, it should not be forgotten that for a long 
time, ex-situ conservation centres operated under the philosophy of the free sharing of 
biological materials and their related information (which includes GR) as a necessary condition 
for the advance of science and the benefit of humankind. That means that there is a high 
probability that the ex-situ centres had acquired GR without following the CBD rules on ABS, 
even when this Convention had already entered into force. There is, therefore, a critical point 
for which it does not seem reasonable to assume that all GR in ex-situ conservation centres 
were acquired in accordance with the CBD or before it entered into force, meaning that due 
diligence cannot be presumed when accessing GR ex-situ through these centres. 
Regarding regulations on access through ex-situ collection centres, irrespective of 
whether or not they form part of the MLS, under the Panamanian law, ex-situ centres have the 
obligations to declare before the National Authority all the biological material under their 
possession and to subscribe MTAs every time a biological or a genetic resource is provided.146 
The obligation for obtaining PIC only exists when the access includes the use of a TK. In a similar 
way, Peruvian law provides for the subscription of MTAs, with the difference that these 
agreements must be previously approved by the National Competent Authority.147 MTAs 
determine the conditions for the accession, the recognition of the origin of the resources, an 
obligation to not transfer the material accessed without authorisation, and the prohibition to 
claim IPRs over the accessed resources. Ex-situ collections can only provide GR for non-
 
145 ibid, Article 4.7 
146 Panama (n 17). Articles 29, 30 
147 Peru (n 12). Articles 29, 30 
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commercial purposes. This law is, however, silent regarding how to proceed when the 
utilisation of the resource accessed ex-situ changes from non-commercial to commercial. 
However, it could be assumed because the Community law (from which it follows) establishes 
the need for a new agreement to decide the way in which the benefits will be distributed. 
In Bulgaria, samples deposited in ex-situ collections should disclose its country of 
origin.148 In the Dominican Republic, collecting GR for its preservation in ex-situ centres is not 
in the ABS scope unless those samples are used for R&D activities.149 Under the Andean 
Community of Nations legislation and Bhutan,150 GR ex-situ are in the ABS scope, and in the 
Andean Community of Nations, ex-situ centres have to subscribe MATs with the country of 
origin when acting as providers of GR.151 
Regulations of both GR and TK in the public domain have been found in some national 
developments on ABS. Of all the laws analysed, Costa Rica is the only country ruling on access 
to GR in the public domain. Interestingly, under this law, all GR and TK are in the public domain, 
but the State retains the right to control and benefit from their use.152 Additionally, the concept 
of GR has been understood in its broad sense as ‘biochemical and genetic components’ which, 
in practical terms, can be deemed as equivalent to ‘biodiversity’.153 Therefore, in Costa Rica, 
the access to any element of biodiversity and associated TK (in-situ, ex-situ or in the public 
domain) triggers the obligation to distribute benefits. Similarly, under the African Union law, 
ILCs do not lose the right to benefit from disclosed GR and TK.154 
In Panama155 and Peru,156 users have the obligation to distribute benefits provided they 
are the country of origin of the accessed TK in the public domain. The benefits shall be 
deposited in an account of the national fund to be invested in the training of ILCs on how to 
strengthen and defend their TK and cultural identity.157 
Under Brazilian law, a distribution of benefits is mandatory any time Brazilian TK is used, 
regardless of whether or not it is in the public domain, and regardless of the possibility of 
linking the knowledge to a particular community or group of communities. Attention is drawn 
to the way in which the origin or provenance of TK can be proved. Under this law, the common 
understanding respecting the way in which immaterial assets are placed in the public domain, 
i.e., making the knowledge publicly accessible, is used precisely to demonstrate their origin. In 
this way, scientific publications, registers, databases, and inventories showing the Brazilian 
origin of a given TK serve to prove its origin and, therefore, to legally claim the right to receive 
a distribution of benefits.158 
 
148 Bulgaria (n 7). Articles 58.1, 60.2.1 
149 Dominican Republic (n 8). Article 3f 
150 Bhutan (n 19). Article 6c 
151 CAN (n 9). Article 37 
152 Costa Rica (n 16). Article 6 
153 ibid, Articles 7.1, 13, 14 
154 OAU (n 10). Article 23.4 
155 Panama (n 17). Article 35 
156 Peru (n 54). Article 13 
157 Panama (n 17). Article 38.1a; Peru (n 54). Article 37 
158 Brazil (n 18). Articles 8.3.I, 8.3.II, 8.3.III, 17.II.6, 24.2 
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Dominican Republic law does not expressly affirm that TK in the public domain is within 
the ABS scope, but it stipulates that TK can be found in oral or documented forms among 
others.159 
The distribution of benefits of shared resources appears to be one of the most difficult 
issues to solve in ABS regulations. As explained in Chapter 2, the Nagoya Protocol suggests the 
creation of a mechanism for the distribution of benefits of shared resources in transboundary 
situations. An example would be when the same TK is shared by communities belonging to 
different countries or living at their frontiers, or when PIC cannot be obtained, e.g., when more 
than one community has the same TK and no legislation has been established to solve such a 
situation. 
So far, no country has yet implemented the mechanism suggested in Article 10 of the 
Protocol. Nonetheless, some countries have regulated the distribution of benefits arising from 
the use of shared TK. For example, Bhutan establishes that when a TK is held by more than one 
ILCs, all should enter into negotiation with the user, and, if not possible, to rely on the National 
Focal Point who will negotiate on behalf of the communities.160 Ethiopia determines that the 
benefits should be shared among the concerned ILCs according to their relative contribution 
to the conservation of GR and/or TK.161 In Brazil, the user can obtain PIC and sign a MAT with 
the ILC of their election among all those ILCs who are acknowledged as owners of the TK. That 
ILC is deemed the provider of the shared TK and will directly benefit from its utilisation 
according to what was agreed (MAT).162 The other ILCs that also own the same TK can benefit 
from its use by obtaining resources from the National Fund for the Distribution of Benefits, 
where the user has to deposit 50% of the annual net revenue obtained from the economic use 
of the accessed TK or what has been agreed in the sectorial agreement.163 Importantly, it will 
be always presumed that more than one ILC holds the same TK every time TK is accessed.164 
Based on the previous information, the main conclusion is that ABS regulation reflects 
the contents of the CBD and the NP. However, as earlier stated, these laws also reveal the 
particular interests of each country and, consequently, present differences. Some aspects 
appear more sensitive than others; for example, at the same time information on GR and TK, 
GR ex-situ, and derivatives are included and excluded from the ABS scope. Also, although all 
laws reviewed recognise PIC as one of the elements of ABS, the instructions about how to 
proceed to obtain it seem less clear than instructions about other ABS aspects. Other aspects 
are problematic as well, for example, the possibility that infractions to ABS obligations can 
undermine IPRs, expanding the scope of ABS to information, derivatives, by-products, and the 
use of new biotechnological tools (synthetic biology and bioinformatics). In addition, Cabrera 
Medaglia and López Silva note that studies on ABS legal developments often report similar 
limitations in the laws: their extent of scope and coverage; cumbersome application process; 
 
159 Dominican Republic (n 8). Article 4h 
160 Bhutan (n 19). Article 8.4.10 
161 Ethiopia (n 44). Article 29.2 
162 Brazil (n 18). Article 24.1, 24.2 
163 ibid, Articles 20, 24.3, 24.4 
164 ibid, Article 24.5 
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difficulties involving PIC; complexity of institutional mechanisms; and the level of demand 
imposed under ABS legislative requirements.165 Those aspects were also identified in an 
empirical research conducted on the MATs subscribed in Colombia. The study concluded that 
ABS implementation is hindered by the lack of clarity in the Colombian ABS law regarding the 
mechanisms for obtaining PIC, the competent authority or authorities dealing with each part 
of the process, and the excessive bureaucracy of these processes.166 
Finally, some matters appear to be generally accepted by the countries. MATs are the 
common form for establishing benefit-sharing obligations and some countries have developed 
models of standards MATs, the participation of nationals in research activities, the sharing of 
research results, the convenience of disclosing the origin of the resources and activities 
regarding the use of the resources, the use of certificates as a means to demonstrate the legal 
access, the need to respect the IPRs granted over creations based on the accessed resources, 
and the creation of funds for collecting and distributing the benefits. On this latter point, it is 
important to note that none of the laws studied contains a different way to manage the monies 
derived from ABS activities. This finding may indicate that the countries would be more likely 
to accept a fund as the modality to operationalise the GMBSM of Article 10 of NP. 
A summary of the legal developments made by the countries previously considered in 
this section, on issues not regulated by the CBD and the NP are presented in the table below. 
 
 
 
 
 
165 Cabrera Medaglia and López Silva (n 6), 8-9. 
166 Dalí Aleixandra Rojas Díaz and Gabriel Ricardo Nemogá Soto, ‘Algunas Lecciones Sobre el Acceso a Recursos 
Genéticos en Colombia. Dos Estudios de Caso’ (2009) 14(2) Acta Biológica Colombiana 137, 138-139, 158-159. 
Table 2. Legal Developments on Issues Not Regulated by the CBD and the NP 
GR ex-situ The Public Domain Shared TK
Within the MLS of FAO:
- Some laws prescribe no benefit-sharing 
obligations exist given compliance with 
the due diligence principle.
- Others stipulate benefit-sharing 
obligations: directing a percentage of the 
benefits to a fund.
Outside the MLS of FAO:
- In some cases access is possible simply 
by subscribing MTAs, but only for non-
commercial purposes, and usually with 
limitations for the sharing of samples and 
seeking protection through IPRs.
- In some others access always requires 
MATs between the country of origin and 
the user and a MTA between the ex-situ
centre and the user. In this case, non-
commercial use generates the obligation 
to share non-commercial benefits.
One country considers that all GR and 
TK is in the public domain, but reserves 
the right to grant access.
In other countries GR and TK may not be 
in the public domain, and, in such cases, 
benefit-sharing obligations exist provided 
the origin of the resources can be 
ascertained. In this case the benefits 
should be deposited in a fund.
There are three ways in which the 
countries have regulated shared TK:
- Granting the right to all concerned ILCs 
to negotiate the benefits with the user. If 
no agreement could be achieved, the 
national authority will negotiate on 
behalf of all ILCs.
- The national authority negotiate the 
benefits and distribute them among all 
concerned ILCs according to their 
relative contribution to conservation of 
the GR and/or TK accessed.
- Direct negotiation between the user and 
one ILC of their election, and the deposit 
of a determined amount of money to a 
fund, from which the ILCs sharing the 
same TK can retrieve the benefits 
through the submission of communal 
projects.
This table has been made by the author based on the information available on the 
ABSCH website and accessed on 15 March 2018 
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2.2 ABS contracts 
 
In regards to ABS contracts/permits (MATs), the countries can report to the ABSCH 
about: (i) issuing authorities; (ii) reference numbers; (iii) dates of issuance; (iv) any additional 
information; (v) if PIC was provided; (vi) general information about MATs; (vii) conditions for 
third party transfer; (viii) accessed resources; (ix) resource utilisations; and, (x) user’s 
nationality and sector (government agency, academic or research institute, and private sector). 
Thus, as of 15 March 2018, notification of the issuance of 143 MATs has been provided. 
Of these, 134 were for accessing GR and 9 for accessing TK. Belarus, the Dominican Republic, 
Malta, and Peru each issued one MAT, Guatemala two, Bulgaria and Mexico three each, Spain 
four, Kenya five, Panama 12, South Africa 24, and India 86. During the years 2018, 2013, and 
2008, only one agreement was signed; there were 14 in 2014, 25 in 2017, 44 in 2015, and 57 
in 2016 (See Table 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
Although 12 countries providing information on MATs to the ABSCH is a small amount 
considering the number of States Parties to the CBD and the Protocol (196), and the number 
of countries having national measures on ABS (57), the number of MATs reported is not so 
small (134). Given this, it is expected that analysing such MATs can provide an indication of the 
way in which those countries are currently implementing ABS. In that regard, this section 
systematises the information provided to the ABSCH on MATs concerning the accessed 
This table has been made by the author based on the information available on the 
ABSCH website and accessed on 15 March 2018 
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resource (GR or TK), its intended use (commercial, non-commercial), the characteristics of the 
applicant (national/foreigner, academic or research institute/governmental agency/private 
sector), and the amount of information that has been classified as confidential. 
The first thing to be noted is that this information does not provide a clear view of the 
impact of the Protocol on ABS implementation. This is first because the information on the 
ABSCH is incomplete and, second, because the countries do not exhibit a similar behaviour 
towards the issuance of MATs. For example, India, which is the country with the largest number 
of notifications in this regard (86 MATs), reported the issuance of five contracts in 2014, 34 in 
2015, 43 in 2016, and four in 2017. The number of contracts produced during the years 2015 
and 2016 were similar, while there was an evident decrease in 2017. Based on this information, 
it cannot be suggested that India has experienced an expansion in ABS implementation. 
Moreover, it is unlikely that such a difference is due to a reduction in ABS transactions. Instead, 
it appears that for one reason or another, at some point during 2017, India stopped reporting 
to the ABSCH. In contrast, South Africa, the country with the next highest number of MATs 
reported (24), has shown stable issuances. For its part, Kenya recorded the issuance of four 
contracts in 2014 (three before the entry into force of the Protocol) and just one in 2016, i.e., 
this information shows a higher activity on ABS transactions before the Protocol. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the figures show an increase in the number of MATs produced 
since the entry into force of the Protocol (see Table 3). 
 
 
 
 
This table has been made by the author based on the information available on the 
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The second important point is the fact that 63 (61 on GR and two on TK) out of 143 
MATs have confidential information. This means that almost half of the information (47%) is 
unknown (See Tables 4 and 5). 
In 25 MATs (24 on GR and one on TK), the information about the resource accessed, its 
intended use (commercial or non-commercial), and the user (nationality and sector) is 
confidential. In this regard, it should be pointed out that this information is vital to knowing 
how the access has been conducted. From Tables 7 and 8 show that in 25 MATs for accessing 
GR with commercial purposes, it is not possible to know who the user is. In two contracts, the 
intended use is confidential, one for accessing GR with a national user and the other for 
accessing TK with a foreigner user. In 36 contracts on GR, the resource and the user are 
confidential; 11 MATs are for non-commercial purposes, and 25 are for commercial purposes. 
In one MAT for accessing TK, the resource is confidential and the user is foreign. This mean 
that it is not possible to know which TK has been used, and the fact that the user is located in 
a foreign jurisdiction makes it more difficult. Therefore, the possibility to sign a new MAT in 
the case of a change in the intended use from non-commercial to commercial is even more 
remote. 
It is remarkable that the MATs reported by the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, 
Panama, Peru, and South Africa have no confidential information. This could be interpreted as 
indicating that provider countries (with the exception of India) are more willing to disclose 
information than user countries. The problem of keeping confidentiality over some vital 
information on ABS is that it could be counterproductive for developing activities of controlling 
and monitoring the use of GR and TK, which, in turn, is counterproductive for achieving ABS 
compliance. In addition, 16 MATs on GR do not disclose the information about transfer permits 
with third parties (See Table 6) and, consequently, it is not be possible to know if those users 
have been authorised to transfer samples of the materials accessed to third parties. 
 
 
 This table has been made by the author based on the information available on the 
ABSCH website and accessed on 15 March 2018 
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Also, of concern is the fact that in 38 MATs on GR and two on TK, it is not possible to 
know who the authority granting PIC was. Moreover, in two MATs on TK this information is 
confidential (see Tables 4 and 5). This might be especially problematic for accessing TK 
because, with the exception of the Andean Community of Nations, in all ABS laws reviewed in 
the previous section, PIC has to be granted by the traditional authority representing the ILCs 
who owns the TK. This information should be public to ensure that such an obligation has been 
performed. 
When the type of intended use of the accessed resources in non-commercial, 30 MATs 
were public, 28 were for accessing to GR, and two for accessing to TK. Among the MATs on GR, 
nine have national users (two governmental agencies, six academic or research institutes, and 
one from the public sector), and 19 foreigner users (one governmental agency, and 18 
academic or research institutes). The two non-commercial MATs on TK were signed with 
foreign users, one academic or research institute and the other with a user form the private 
sector. 
Among the 50 MATs with commercial purposes, 45 are for accessing GR and five for 
accessing TK. Among the MATs on GR, 43 have national users (one governmental agency, 24 
academic or research institutes, and 18 from the public sector), and two foreign users from 
academia. The five MATs on TK have national users, three from academia, and two from the 
private sector. 
In sum, 50 MATs have commercial purposes and 30 have non-commercial purposes. 
This number supports the idea of the great economic potential of GR and TK utilisation, 
previously expressed in Section 4 of Chapter 5 in regards to patent activity. 
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It is quite remarkable that out of 143 MATs, only nine are for accessing TK. This 
represents 6.3% of all these instruments. Five have commercial purposes, two non-commercial 
purposes, and the remaining two, the information is confidential. Three of the applicants were 
foreigners, one was national, and the nationality of the remaining is unknown. Two of the 
applicants work in academia, two in the private sector, and for the last the information is 
confidential. Although nine of 143 seems a small sample, it should be stressed that five of those 
nine, i.e., more than half, have a commercial purpose. As already stated, this may indicate that 
there is a real interest in the commercial use of TK. 
According to the available information on the ABSCH, ABS processes appear to be 
primarily developed by national applicants working at universities or research institutes 
conducting commercial research (50 commercial contracts/permits in contrast to 30 non-
commercial; see Tables 7 and 8). National users (56) are around twice as common as foreign 
users (24). However, this does not necessarily mean that nationals are predominantly using GR 
and TK. For example, as explained in Section 2.1.1 C of this chapter, India requires the 
participation of a national person as a condition for access applications. This combined with 
the fact that India is the country with the largest number of MATs reported to the ABSCH (86) 
may be affecting the overall average of participation of national applicants in ABS activities. 
Notwithstanding the above, the high participation of nationals in ABS processes could 
also indicate that users might find it easier to conduct ABS processes within their own country. 
This idea is supported by the data retrieved from the official web site of the International 
Treaty (ITPGRFA) of the FAO. Accordingly, as of 12 April 2018, the samples provided by 41 
countries were transferred to recipients located in another 179 countries.167 As observed, the 
number of foreign users of GR is more than four times the number of providers. Because of 
this, it is logical to suppose that the small number of MATs subscribed by foreign applicants is 
not related to their lack of interest in using the GR located in other jurisdictions. Otherwise, 
the same behaviour should be observed in the number of accessions to GR conducted through 
the MLS, but this is not the case. This might prove that fragmentation and complexity of ABS 
pose major obstacles for foreign applicants who have to know and understand different ABS 
laws, requirements, and processes developed by provider countries. 
In addition, the amount and quality of the information contained in the ABSCH seem to 
indicate that this system, as it is currently operating, cannot be a suitable tool for facilitating 
the implementation of the Nagoya Protocol. This is because much of the information required 
to be certain about the way in which ABS was conducted and the obligations arising from it is 
missed. Thus, the ABSCH does not meet the objectives for which it was created, namely, being 
a platform for the exchange of information on ABS that enhances legal certainty, clarity and 
transparency on ABS process, and the monitoring the utilisation of the accessed resources.168 
It is believed that an effective and efficient tool for the exchange of ABS information will only 
 
167 FAO, The International Treaty on Plan Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
<https://mls.planttreaty.org/itt/index.php?r=stats/pubStats> accessed 12 April 2018. 
168 More information on the objectives of the ABSCH available on: <https://absch.cbd.int/help/about> accessed 
12 April 2018. 
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be possible if there is the obligation for users to disclose the necessary information to discover 
whether or not an obligation to share benefits has emerged and under what conditions. On 
this basis, and given that much of the ABS information is missing from the system, it becomes 
necessary to change the way it operates. 
The above data is consistent with the conclusions reached in different studies about 
ABS implementation. From those studies, it can be affirmed that the practical implementation 
of ABS laws reveals the impossibility for individual countries to solve the main problems of ABS, 
as well as the difficulty of reaching international agreement on how to proceed regarding the 
application of these complicated aspects. The evident inability of the current international ABS 
system (CBD, FAO, and WHO) and IP system to resolve the problems resulting from the 
application of ABS regulations is perceived as the major obstacle for the distribution of 
benefits, and evidences the need for a response at the international level. 
For this reason, this thesis argues that ABS implementation requires (i) an international 
understanding and agreement about the foundational aspects of ABS; (ii) the adoption of 
uniform international rules and proceedings for access, PIC, model agreements for MATs, and 
minimum percentages for the distribution of benefits; (iii) new utilisation of existing concepts, 
particularly, regarding access ex-situ and the public domain; and, (iv) an international dispute 
settlement body. 
 
3. Ex-situ centres’ progress towards compliance with ABS norms 
 
This section deals with the participation of ex-situ centres in ABS transactions and seeks 
to offer a general understanding of their level of compliance with the obligations under such 
transactions. Regular claims about the alleged disruption to the ABS system caused by these 
ex-situ centres when they transfer biological samples to third parties (presumably without the 
sharing of benefits with the provider countries)169 cast doubts on how much these centres have 
implemented ABS in their policies, how effective such implementation has been, the extent to 
which benefits have been distributed, and how many of these benefits have reached the 
countries of origin of the shared resources. 
Whilst there is information on ABS, many issues related to benefit-sharing remain still 
unclear. In fact, one of the conclusions of the study conducted by Kate Davis and others is that: 
 
‘A major challenge for the botanic gardens community is to recognise, record and 
effectively communicate these benefits, to ensure that all benefit-sharing obligations 
are met (…) and to demonstrate to government authorities and ABS stakeholders the 
general and specific benefits that arise from botanic gardens’ involvement in 
biodiversity conservation, research and sustainable use.’170 
 
169 See for example: CBD, Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-Sharing, ‘Analysis of the 
Claims of Unauthorised Access and Misappropriation of Genetic Resources and Associated Traditional Knowledge’ 
(2005) UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/4/INF/6, 19-20 
170 Kate Davis and others, ‘An Access and Benefit-Sharing Awareness Survey for Botanic Gardens: Are they 
prepared for the Nagoya Protocol?’ (2015) 98 South African Journal of Botany 148, 156 
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Seemingly, the number, type and identity of beneficiaries of the benefits shared by ex-
situ centres remain unclear. Nevertheless, despite the small amount of, and/or incomplete, 
information available regarding such benefits, this section will attempt to provide insights into 
these aspects of benefit sharing. To that end, the information obtained from the survey 
conducted by Davis and others is taken as a starting point.171 Their data are supplemented by 
examples from other sources, such as Botanic Gardens Conservation International (BGCI) and 
the Royal Botanical Gardens at Kew. 
The present analysis is relevant due to the fact that ex-situ centres’ activities generate 
different reactions. For example, there is concern in the academic/scientific community that 
ABS might hamper scientific/non-commercial research.172 In contrast, the reports of the Ad 
Hoc Open-ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-Sharing173 and the Executive Secretary 
of the CBD174 reveal the concern of some of the parties to the CBD that ABS is not designed for 
access ex-situ and that ABS obligations may be difficult to achieve in these cases. These two 
views reflect the main challenge for the implementation of ABS by ex-situ centres: how to 
continue contributing to scientific research without being accused of not complying with ABS. 
 
3.1 Level of ABS implementation in ex-situ centres’ collection policies 
 
The majority of the gardens surveyed in Davis and others’ study had plant collection 
policies in place. Thus, whilst US gardens were least likely to be addressing ABS in their policies, 
almost half of global-south and global-north gardens were addressing ABS, and 
municipal/provincial/state/federal and internationally-involved175 gardens were significantly 
more likely to address ABS.176 In terms of self-reported familiarity with ABS, the study found 
that gardens ‘were less likely to be familiar with ABS than with the CBD and less familiar with 
the Nagoya Protocol than ABS generally,’ with US gardens being the least familiar. The factors 
identified by the study, which would appear to determine gardens’ familiarity with ABS, are: 
global-region reach, international involvement and full-time staff number.177 
Overall, the gardens’ most important initial sources for ABS information was the BGCI 
and other colleagues, while governments’ CBD or ABS National Focal Points played a lesser 
 
171 ibid 
172 Matthias Buck and Clare Hamilton, ‘The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilisation to the Convention on Biological Diversity’ (2011) 20 
RECIEL 47, 59 
173 CBD, Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-Sharing, ‘Matrix on the Analysis of Gaps’ 
(2005) UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/4/3, 2-3; CBD, Ad hoc Open-Ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-Sharing, 
‘Analysis of Gaps in Existing National, Regional and International Legal and Other Instruments Relating to Access 
and Benefit-Sharing’ (2007) UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/5/3, 32-33 
174 CBD, Executive Secretary, ‘Report of the Expert Meeting on Article 10 of the Nagoya Protocol on Access and 
Benefit-Sharing’ (2013) UNEP/CBD/ABSEM-A10/1/3, 4-5 
175 Although this term is not explained by Davis and others in their article, it appears to refer to gardens’ 
participation in international nets for the exchange of biological materials. 
176 Davis and others (n 170) 152. 
177 ibid, 151 
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role.178 This suggests that, garden staff and users may feel satisfied that they are complying 
with ABS obligations when following the recommendations and/or policies developed in this 
regard by the BGCI, instead of consulting the CBD, the NP or the information provided by the 
ABS national authorities. This possibility justifies a review of the BGCI’s ABS developments to 
see whether they are adequate. 
The BGCI policies on ABS are composed of two voluntary approaches: ‘The Principles 
on Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-Sharing’ (the principles) and ‘The International 
Plant Exchange Network (IPEN)’. The principles ‘provide a framework to help guide gardens 
and herbaria when developing their own individual policies’, and the IPEN is a system aimed at 
complying with the CBD and the NP regulations. Further, IPEN was created for facilitating the 
exchange of living collections for non-commercial activities within a network of gardens that 
sign a Common Code of Conduct.179 The usefulness of these tools cannot be denied. For 
example, the administrative burden could be reduced when all gardens develop their activities 
under the same rules. However, the fact that the BGCI policies on ABS are voluntary rather 
than mandatory may possibly create a false sense amongst garden staff and users that benefit-
sharing is not an obligation derived from the CBD and the NP but something that depends more 
upon their good will, or where no damage is caused if no benefits are shared. 
The BGCI present three case studies to demonstrate the success of ABS 
implementation.180 The first one is the ‘Documentation of Specimens and Samples’ carried out 
by the Botanic Garden and Botanical Museum (BGBM) in Berlin. The existing information on 
this is limited to stating that BGBM activities are developed in line with EU regulations and 
international agreements on GR. However, mention of the national ABS laws of provider 
countries or to the benefits shared with them could not be found.181 
‘Implementing ABS at Oxford University’ is the second example. In this case, reference 
is made to the non-monetary benefits shared with provider countries182, the users’ obligation 
to comply with benefit-sharing under the NP is set out, as well as the need for students taking 
part in overseas expeditions to address any ABS-related issues and obtain approval from the 
University Expedition Council. Clearly, thereby the University raises awareness amongst users 
of biological samples about the need to comply with ABS regulations, and it is a positive policy 
that the Oxford Botanic Garden and Arboretum (OBGA) refuses to supply materials when there 
 
178 ibid, 152 
179 <https://www.bgci.org/our-work/policy-and-advocacy/access-and-benefit-sharing/> accessed 09 December 
2019. 
180 ibid 
181 <https://www.bgci.org/our-work/projects-and-case-studies/documentation-of-specimens-abs-and-nagoya/> 
accessed 09 December 2019. 
182 ‘As well as the sharing of project-specific benefits agreed during planning, taxonomically verified specimens 
and digital images are sent back to the countries where plants were collected, duplicate material is stored in that 
country and, when only unicates are collected, they are sent back after identification. Holotypes are returned to 
the provider country’s herbarium, although if there is no herbarium, holotypes and isotypes may be retained by 
the Oxford University Herbaria with an agreement that the material will be returned when a herbarium is 
established.’ 
<https://www.bgci.org/our-work/projects-and-case-studies/implementing-abs-at-oxford-university/> accessed 
09 December 2019. 
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are doubts regarding future compliance with ABS.183 However, because materials obtained 
from commercial suppliers are taken despite only requiring the supplier to ‘sign a form 
declaring that the material concerned has been obtained in compliance with the Nagoya 
Protocol, to the best of their knowledge’, it appears that the University is less strict when 
receiving samples.184 It is of particular concern that the expression ‘to the best of their 
knowledge’ is used because through it the suppliers may seem authorised to say that they do 
not know whether the resources are of a legal origin but they think this is likely. A written 
declaration of this kind should not be accepted as suitable proof for legal access. A copy of a 
MAT or any other kind of permit delivered by the ABS national authority of the provider country 
would be better. The use of this declaration form may make it possible for the OBGA to receive 
biological samples that have not been acquired according to the ABS regulations of the country 
of origin. This may also contribute to decreased opportunities for provider countries to benefit 
from the use of their resources, because once a sample of dubious legal origin is incorporated 
into the OBGA, the same sample is by this act assumed to be of legal origin. Additionally, no 
information on the acquisition of samples from non-commercial suppliers was found. Thus, it 
is not clear whether all the samples they receive from these suppliers are from gardens that 
are members of the BGCI or not. This may suggest that gardens (and, perhaps, researchers in 
general) could assume that the sharing and acquisition of biological samples have different 
requisites and obligations, depending on whether they are obtained from commercial 
suppliers or non-commercial transactions (as the resources shared using the IPEN). 
The final example is ‘A Process for ABS-Compliant Fieldwork’ implemented by the Jardín 
Botánico Universitario of the Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla (BUAP) in Mexico. 
The Botanical Garden of BUAP is a member of the Mexican Association of Botanic Gardens 
(AMJB in its Spanish acronym) and, consequently, implements the AMJB’s ethical code of 
conduct and best practices. However, and within this frame, the information about this case is 
limited to describing the process of collecting and storing samples in the herbarium, but no 
information on ABS is provided.185 
Davis and others’ finding that gardens’ most important initial sources for ABS 
information is the BGCI and other colleagues, rather than the CBD or ABS national 
authorities186, seems to be confirmed by the information contained on the BGCI’s webpage. 
This circumstance could generate problems of interpretation and application of the CBD and 
the NP, whilst also keeping ex-situ centres disconnected from the national and international 
ABS tools designed for the sharing of information on ABS related matters, such as the ABSCH 
of the CBD. The fact that only the MATs agreed to by ex-situ centres belonging to universities 
or research centres were reported to the ABSCH, as is shown in Table 4 in Section 2.2 of this 
chapter, seems to confirm this. 
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There is little clarity about what the gardens’ responsibility should be in terms of their 
role as intermediaries in the exchange of biological samples. Seemingly, the BGCI’s position 
(taking it as an example) is that gardens have no responsibility for the way their recipients use 
the resources, and there is no need to take stronger measures to prevent resources of dubious 
legal origins entering their collections. On this, Article 15 CBD establishes that only the 
countries of origin or those authorised by them and that have acquired the GR in accordance 
with the Convention can be providers of GR. The key word in this situation is ‘providers’. This 
is because, to be able to transfer samples of biological resources (which contain GR), providers 
must comply with the ABS regulations of the country of origin of the resources. 
In this regard, although ex-situ centres act as providers of biological samples, they label 
themselves as ‘suppliers’, a term that does not exist in the CBD or the NP to describe or refer 
to the transfer of biological material to third parties by an agent other than an ABS national 
authority or a person authorised by it. Under the label of ‘supplier’, ex-situ centres seem to 
have created a different legal status, whereby they do not need to obtain PIC from the provider 
country to supply biological materials to third parties. This may reduce the chances for 
providing countries to know the use to which their GR is put, and, consequently, their chances 
to benefit from that use. 
However, this does not mean that ex-situ centres are not committed to ABS compliance 
and benefit-sharing. In fact, as presented in the next section, they do share a broad range of 
benefits, some of which appear to be directed towards provider countries. Nonetheless, the 
responsibility of ex-situ centres in ABS transactions is a topic that needs to be studied, 
developed and clarified by academia and policy makers, since it is of similar importance to 
other IP issues, such as the responsibility of internet service providers (ISP) with regard to the 
legality of the content circulating through their systems. It could be argued that only if ex-situ 
centres check that the materials they hold were acquired according to the CBD, could they be 
considered safe harbours for sharing GR. In the same vein, it should be determined whether a 
declaration from a supplier attesting to the legal origin of the biological samples would be 
sufficient for ex-situ centres in order to receive samples in their collections or whether proof 
of legal access is also necessary. 
In addition, it is remarkable that one main conclusion of the survey is ‘that many 
respondents are not yet familiar with access and benefit-sharing or the Nagoya Protocol’.187 
This may indicate that ex-situ centres are sharing benefits without having a strong level of 
institutional knowledge/expertise in ABS. Moreover, it might suggest that such centres have 
had benefit-sharing systems in place for many years, possibly even before the CBD. The fact 
that they have implemented benefit-sharing systems without knowing much about ABS 
suggests that the way in which some ex-situ centres conduct benefit-sharing does not 
necessarily derive from the application of the CBD or the NP, but from their experience and 
previous practices. The fact that ex-situ centres located in the US, a non-party to the CBD (and 
the country least familiar with ABS)188, conduct benefit-sharing reinforces this idea. For these 
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reasons, a proposal for a mechanism to achieve ABS at an international level should 
incorporate the practices already implemented by ex-situ centres. 
 
3.2 Amount and type of benefits distributed 
 
The first finding to be noted is that the survey reveals the existence of a reasonably 
wide range of benefits that have in fact been shared, many of which (joint publications, 
exchange of knowledge and staff, and provision of educational materials and of technical 
support) may possibly be with countries of origin, while some (especially 
reintroduction/habitat restoration, joint expeditions, and access to and publication of research 
results in provider country) seem particularly likely to be directed to countries of origin.189 
Although the survey states that benefit-sharing is not analysed in depth, it contains 
some statistical data.190 Among other things, it indicates that most respondents reported 
sharing benefits (86%), with the highest proportion of gardens having international 
involvement (97%) and being located in the global north (92%), followed by non-
internationally-involved gardens (88%), gardens in the global south (84%) and in the US 
(81%).191 The most commonly-shared benefits were knowledge (horticultural and taxonomic 
knowledge).192 Joint expeditions and taxonomic knowledge were commonly-shared benefits 
for internationally-involved gardens, while the oposite was true for non-internationally-
involved gardens.193 Internationally-involved and gardens in the south also reported more 
research-related benefits, such as joint publications, local publication and access to results.194 
Table 9 of the survey reveals that other benefits have been shared, such as the exchange of 
garden staff, education materials, technical support, reintroduction/habitat restoration, 
publication of results in provider country, access to results in provider country, and direct 
financial support, although to a lesser degree.195 
 
3.3 Amount and type of benefits shared with the countries of origin 
 
From the available information it is very difficult to establish the amount and type of 
benefits that ex-situ centres share with countries of origin. However, from the same 
information, it could appears that the distribution of benefits may very often occur between 
ex-situ centres and their users (most of which apparently are other ex-situ centres) rather than 
between ex-situ centres and countries of origin. 
The first indication for this deduction is found in the results of the survey conducted by 
Davis and others, in which it is shown that ex-situ centres ‘are often intermediaries in networks 
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of use of plant biodiversity’196 where they most commonly supply materials to other 
botanic/public gardens and universities/research institutions.197 As previously noted, it is 
possible that gardens usually obtain their samples from other gardens and share them with 
other gardens, i.e. access in-situ is the exception, meaning that on only a few occasions benefits 
are shared with countries of origin. 
In addition, the majority of gardens surveyed do not use MTAs, with only 43% doing so. 
Where used, this accounts for 59% of global-south gardens, 56% of global-north gardens, and 
24% of US gardens. Moreover, internationally-involved gardens are more likely to use MTAs 
than non-internationally-involved gardens. Where MATs are employed, a majority of gardens 
(60%, which is equivalent to the 25.8% of all surveyed gardens) link permit/agreement terms 
to their records of sharing activities.198 This may mean that the fact that gardens have ABS 
policies in place does not guarantee that gardens are always or fully implementing them. Also, 
MATs contain the agreements on access and benefit-sharing, for which, they are essential to 
check that ABS commitments have been fulfilled. Thus, the absence of MATs within the 57% 
of the surveyed gardens, with only 25.8% of them recording sharing activities, seems to 
indicate that in all other cases no benefits have been shared or that the sharing of benefits may 
be happening under standard rules/uses of the collection providing the resource, instead of 
under mutual agreements between the parties involved. 
An additional perspective on MATs can be found on the IPEN website, where two 
instruments are suggested: the ‘IPEN Mutually Agreed Terms’ and the ‘Material Transfer 
Agreement Template’.199 The first directs readers towards guidelines for the development of a 
‘basic agreement on access and benefit-sharing for academic research’, as proposed by Susette 
Biber-Klemm and others200, while the second is a ready-to-use MAT. In other words, the first 
provides guidance to gardens for the creation of their own MATs, while the second is a ready-
to-use instrument. This provision suggests that MAT documents could be used to a greater 
extent by gardens. Unfortunately, there is no information available on the number and 
characteristics of the MATs agreed in the context of IPEN gardens. 
Nevertheless, it is worth drawing attention to the fact that the instructions given by 
Biber-Klemm and others meet the criteria contained in the CBD, while the MAT template 
created by the IPEN is not so reflective. Regarding the use of the word ‘supplier’, previously 
discussed, the IPEN format seems to relieve gardens of ABS liability in terms of absence of 
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responsibility by considering them as ‘suppliers’. In this case, the responsibility for ensuring 
benefit-sharing with the country of origin and obtaining PIC in the events of commercial use or 
transfer to third parties for commercial use is passed on to the recipient. However, due to 
Article 15 of the CBD establishes that ex-situ centres, when acting as suppliers of GR, have to 
access the supplied resources according to the national law of the country of origin; it might 
be inconvenient to set out a general rule (in this case, a ready-to-use MAT) to be applied on 
every occasion for a situation that could be regulated differently by countries of origin. This 
could create the perception for gardens that compliance with ABS means compliance with the 
IPEN rules rather than with the ABS national laws of countries of origin and, therefore, could 
generate claims of alleged non-compliance with those national laws. 
Additionally, because the majority of the gardens surveyed track the arrival of materials 
(52%), while transfer to third parties was much less likely to be tracked (36% did not; 12% did 
not know)201, it seems that gardens are less interested in keeping information about the users 
of the samples they supply, which is also an essential aspect of benefit-sharing reclamations, 
either by them or by a country of origin. 
Although both the survey and the website of the BGCI indicate that some benefits have 
been shared, it is not clear what kind of benefits or in what amount these have been directed 
towards countries of origin. In particular, on the BGCI’s website it is confirmed that the use of 
plant resources in research and development is promoted in compliance with national and 
international ABS laws and policies. To do this, affiliated gardens and research centres have 
developed a range of ABS sectorial policy tools, including codes of conduct and best practice, 
which recommend obtaining PIC from providers and ILCs before accessing their plant resources 
and TK, data management systems, and awareness-raising.202 This seems to be confirmed by 
the survey, in which most respondents reported having shared benefits (86%).203 The BGCI’s 
website also states that although ‘[I]n many cases research is non-commercial and benefits are 
non-monetary, (…) non-commercial research can also involve the sharing of monetary 
benefits.’204 Nevertheless, the survey also confirms that the benefit largely shared is 
information while monetary benefits are less common.205 
The ‘Bilateral and Global Benefit Sharing at the Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew’ and the 
‘Good practices for working with the Mexican Association of Botanic Gardens (AMJB in its 
Spanish acronym)’ are presented by the BGCI as examples of successful cases of benefit-
sharing.206 Because of this, it would be reasonable to expect to find, through the links provided 
in the website, a description of the type and amount of monetary and non-monetary benefits 
shared in those cases. However, the links lead to other websites with detailed information 
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about the ABS policies and practices that Kew and the AMJB use. For example, Kew uses ABS 
agreements (Memoranda of Collaboration and Access and Benefit Sharing Agreements), where 
benefits typically include: research results, specimen data and images, copies of publications, 
training and funding opportunities, and joint publications or authorship,207 while the AMJB has 
developed a code of conduct for working with ILCs.208 The code includes useful information 
about the way research projects should be formulated and implemented, and mentions, as 
examples of non-monetary benefits: the development of fieldwork, consisting of workshops 
aimed at diverse groups of the community and covering areas such as education, horticulture, 
ethnobotanical approaches; inviting the ILCs to visit the botanic garden to observe the results 
of the project in which they have participated; and planning guided visits to the botanic garden. 
Also recommended is the sharing of publications generated by the project; developing a report 
to deliver to the authorities, including data about the participants; including recommendations 
for possible projects for the benefit of the ILCs; ensuring that the wording is appropriate to the 
type of recipient; and linking the community with potential markets.209 
Despite these recommendations, no additional information is given on the BGCI,210 
Kew,211 and AMJB212 websites showing data regarding the benefits actually shared. Thus, the 
level of compliance of Kew and the AMJB with provider countries’ ABS laws and particular 
obligations derived from MATs remains unknown. Furthermore, the type and amount of 
benefits actually shared with provider countries is also uncertain. However, it should be 
acknowledged that this does not mean that they have not done anything to comply with ABS, 
or that this conclusion can be drafted. 
Another possible indication that the benefits from access ex-situ might be mostly 
shared between ex-situ centres is the number of resources accessed vs the number of 
resources shared in the MLS of the FAO. In 2018, samples provided by 41 countries were 
transferred to recipients located in another 179 countries, which permitted access 3.25 million 
times.213 Given that the MLS is a system designed to facilitate the sharing of samples by ex-situ 
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centres, these figures may suggest that some resources went from ex-situ centres located in 
41 countries of origin to ex-situ centres located in 179, which are not countries of origin, and 
that shared 3.25 million times these samples with other ex-situ centres, which possibly are not 
in all cases located in countries of origin. 
Whilst it is not possible to say to what extent the countries of origin benefit from the 
use of their resources, based on this information, it seems highly probably that ex-situ centres 
are more likely to acquire biological samples from other ex-situ centres rather than from 
countries of origin. This being the case, it may be difficult to conclude that countries of origin 
receive a portion of the benefits shared by ex-situ centres after accessing GR from another ex-
situ centre, when neither one is the country of origin of the shared GR. If this is so, one of the 
major challenges for ex-situ centres and countries of origin is to work together to find a way in 
which the latter can benefit from the use of their resources, even in cases where these are 
shared between ex-situ centres which are not countries of origin. 
In the same vein, the little existing information on PIC, MATs and benefit-sharing seems 
remarkable. This fact is also noted by Davis and others, who identify the need for the botanic 
garden community to ‘record and effectively communicate these benefits, to ensure that all 
benefit-sharing obligations are met (as set out in permits/agreements with providers)’.214 
Adding to this, it could be said that ex-situ centres should provide information to the ABSCH 
and national facilities created for the sharing of information on ABS related matters. They 
should also engage with their ABS national authorities to avoid different interpretations, 
approaches, and/or implementation of the CBD and the NP, and to develop their ABS policies 
in coordination with those authorities. 
Despite these flaws, the developments of ex-situ centres in the incorporation of ABS 
rules in their policies and procedures is evident, although the available information leaves 
many gaps in regard to their level of compliance with ABS. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
On the occasion of the entry into force of the CBD, ABS obligations were introduced in 
the national or regional laws of some Parties to the Convention. An overview of the number of 
legal measures adopted on ABS makes it quite clear that the level of implementation is low 
(139 Members of the CBD (71%) have not yet implemented any such measure) and usually 
incomplete (for example, many legal developments are limited to repeating the content of the 
CBD and the Protocol and to stating that its clauses will be regulated in detail in further 
regulations, which have not yet been developed). 
Such measures often reflect some of the characteristics of the country implementing 
the law, i.e., their legal and administrative structure, priorities regarding ABS (facilitated access 
or protection of GR and TK), and their reality (those countries that do not have ILCs have no 
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measures on access to TK, although they affirm the need to distribute the benefits derived 
from its use). 
The broad concepts and unclear obligations contained in the CBD bring the logical 
consequence of the absence of a harmonised approach to ABS. This way, ABS local 
developments exhibit multiple interpretations of the concepts of the CBD and diverse forms to 
conduct ABS processes (as described in Section 2.1.1 of this chapter). 
Differences in ABS laws seem to be connected with the potential role of countries as 
providers or users in ABS transactions. This way, it can be observed that provider countries’ 
provisions are mainly directed towards clarifying the elements outlining the ABS scope. Thus, 
the concepts of GR, genetic heritage, TK, non-identifiable TK, by-products, derivatives, 
biochemical elements, and access, among other things, are provided. For its part, user 
countries appear to be more concerned about determining when an obligation to distribute 
benefits exist. 
Generally speaking, it can be said that national and regional ABS developments are 
relatively clear regarding their own scope, concepts, procedures, obligations, and sanctions 
resulting from non-compliance with ABS obligations. 
A more detailed observation of these aspects led to the view of some common and 
non-common elements. For example, all countries have an ABS competent national authority. 
A written authorisation from the competent authority is required for accessing GR and TK. 
However, PIC as a pre-requisite for access to GR is only an obligation in the CAN, Costa Rica, 
and the African Union. To access TK, PIC is only referred to in those countries which have ILCs 
within their frontiers, being a pre-requisite for access in Brazil, the CAN, Costa Rica, and the 
African Union. Another common element is the obligation to concede access upon a written 
agreement reached between the parties. This instrument is often referred to as ‘the access 
contract’ and some models and guidance for its elaboration have been established within 
national legislations. 
Prohibitions are also clear: they can utilise the prohibition to use the resources in 
different ways than those authorised; the prohibition to collect resources outside the 
authorised lands; the prohibition to collect more than the resources authorised; the 
prohibition to share samples of GR, their related information and associated TK; and the 
prohibition to obtain IPRs or the obligation to share such rights with the provider. 
Controlling activities are mainly related to the development of collaborative scientific 
research and the obligation to disclose the origin of the resource in scientific publications; 
while monitoring is commonly limited to the request of information regarding to the activities 
developed within the authorisations made under MATs. 
Regarding the use of TK, provider countries’ laws show a clear trend towards the 
recognition and protection of ILCs’ rights over their TK. In this regard, these norms provide for: 
(i) PIC as a requisite for accessing TK; (ii) the right of ILCs to refuse access and to withdraw PIC; 
(iii) the obligation to respect customary laws and protocols of ILCs, (iv) the obligation to 
distribute the benefits derived from the use of TK, even in cases where such knowledge is in 
CHAPTER 2. ABS in practice 
 
 
 
 
69 
the public domain; and (v) clear instructions regarding the way benefits must be distributed 
with the ILCs, even when dealing with particular and complicated cases, such as shared TK. 
Although all measures share the common elements of ABS in the CBD and the Protocol, 
national laws exhibit different levels of development and detail. For example, a number of 
countries have different rules for access to GR and TK depending on the sector to which the 
applicant belongs (e.g., a researcher based in a university or a researcher from a company); 
the intended use of the resource (commercial or non-commercial); the type of resource (GR 
or TK); and the number of resources to be accessed (single access contract or multiple 
framework contract). These agreements usually include provisions for compliance, such as 
fines, seizure of samples, and revocation or cancellation of the access permits (MATs). 
Additionally, some solutions for the non-regulated aspects of ABS have been 
implemented through national and regional developments, on access ex-situ, the public 
domain, and shared TK: 
i. Although some rules have been established on access ex-situ they do not fulfil the 
purpose of distributing the benefits. Under the EU, access ex-situ is considered 
outside ABS because GR ex-situ is assumed to be in the public domain and access 
ex-situ is presumably be conducted with due diligence. In other countries, access 
ex-situ is allowed for conducting non-commercial research and the sharing of 
samples and acquisition of IPRs over developments based on the accessed 
resources is forbidden. However, no rules indicate how to proceed for a change of 
the resource’s use from non-commercial to commercial. 
ii. In Costa Rica, all GR and TK are considered to be in the public domain, but the State 
retains the right to authorise their use and benefit from it. In Brazil, the use of all 
TK generates the obligation to distribute benefits. Publications, databases, 
inventories, and any other way of disclosing TK is used as a proof of the TK’s 
Brazilian provenance and, as such, as proof that a distribution of benefits is due. In 
Panama and Peru, the obligation to distribute the benefits derived from the use of 
TK in the public domain exists, as long as they are the country of origin of such TK. 
The Dominican Republic does not expressly stipulate that TK in the public domain 
is in the ABS scope, but declares that TK can be found in oral and written forms. 
iii. In Brazil, the benefits arising out of shared TK must be distributed among all ILCs to 
whom such TK belongs. The community granting PIC has the right to benefit in the 
terms established in the MAT. Part of the benefits must be paid into a national fund 
in charge of distributing them between the rest of communities to whom the 
accessed TK belongs. In Bhutan, all ILCs holding the same TK have the right to 
negotiate MATs and to benefit from its use. Ethiopia holds that the distribution of 
benefits should be done according to the ILC’s relative contribution to the 
conservation of the accessed GR and/or TK. 
As regards MATs, although the data might be small in number (134), some provisional 
conclusions can be drawn from their analysis: 
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i. It is not possible to affirm that legal certainty and detailed processes can produce 
better results in terms of the production of MATs. For example, Peru has a 
complete legislative response and one single authority ruling ABS, and IPRs 
reported only one MAT, whilst Mexico who has no ABS law and signed three MATs. 
ii. It cannot be affirmed that the small number of MATs is caused by a lack of interest 
of the industry and private sector in the utilisation of GR and TK. On the one hand, 
as statistically demonstrated in Section 4.3 of Chapter 5, the number of patents 
and patent applications using GR and TK has shown a sustained growth. On the 
other hand, the number of MATs subscribed with the private sector represent 35% 
of the total (see Tables 7 and 8). This trend seems to be confirmed by the number 
of accessions to GR happening through the MLS of FAO (Section 2.2 of this 
chapter). 
Implementation of ABS appears almost impossible to achieve through individual 
actions of the Parties to the CBD. In addition, the evident inability of the current international 
ABS system, in conjunction with the IP system, evidences the need for a response at the 
international level. 
This response can be achieved if ABS implementation gains a certain level of 
international reach, as well as international agreement on (i) the foundational aspects of ABS; 
(ii) uniform international rules and proceedings for access, PIC, model agreements for MATs, 
and minimum percentages for the distribution of benefits; (iii) new utilisation of existing 
concepts, particularly, regarding access ex-situ and the public domain; and, (iv) an international 
dispute settlement body. 
In conclusion, based on the available information, it could be inferred that, despite the 
extent of benefits shared by ex-situ centres, the majority of ABS transactions are between 
centres. Therefore, is not possible to establish which of these benefits are actually going back 
to the countries of origin. Consequently, it is uncertain whether ex-situ centres are fully 
complying with ABS regulations. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
71 
CHAPTER 3. The design of the Access and Benefit-Sharing (ABS) System of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Nagoya Protocol (NP) 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses the way in which the ABS system has been designed. It first 
describes how ABS should work according to the CBD, and then shows the way in which the 
NP clarifies the content of the CBD. From this explanation, the fact that the NP does not modify 
or add new obligations on ABS to those already prescribed in the CBD begins to be clear. Finally, 
those aspects over which the Parties to the CBD could not reach an agreement, and those that 
were not discussed during the negotiations of the NP are presented. This information is 
relevant because it presents a more complete vision of ABS. 
The chapter concludes by suggesting that the problems experienced by the countries 
in the application of ABS laws could be due to the absence of agreement on sensible aspects, 
such as access to GR ex-situ and the public domain. 
 
2. ABS in the CBD 
 
2.1 The legal basis of ABS 
 
The CBD is a multilateral agreement aiming to address all aspects of biodiversity. It has 
three major objectives: 
 
i. The conservation of biological diversity; 
ii. The sustainable use of biodiversity; and, 
iii. The fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilisation of 
genetic resources (GR). 
 
These objectives are based on the premise that protection and preservation of natural 
resources is a common concern of mankind and that an appropriate sharing of the benefits 
(scientific knowledge, technologies and economic value) derived from its use could help with 
the in-situ conservation of biodiversity. 
To achieve these objectives, the CBD recognises the sovereign rights of the countries 
over their natural resources, which has three main effects. First, each country has the authority 
to determine the access and utilisation of their biodiversity. Second, each is responsible for the 
loss or reduction of biodiversity within their territories. Third, each has the right to benefit from 
the utilisation of their biodiversity. The first two constitute the specific allocation of both rights 
and obligations regarding the preservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, while the third 
is a consequence of the exercise of sovereign rights. 
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The exercise of sovereign rights over biodiversity is the legal basis of ABS. Based on this, 
the CBD recognises the right of each country to benefit from the use of their GR, regardless of 
whether they have been accessed in in-situ or ex-situ conditions. Access can only be granted 
by the country of origin, which is understood as the country where the GR is found in-situ even 
in cases when the resource is stored in an ex-situ centre. For this reason, after the CBD entered 
into force, ex-situ centres are required to follow the ABS rules for the activities of collecting 
and storing GR. Additionally, they need the authorisation of the country of origin before they 
share samples of GR. Accordingly, the countries of origin and ex-situ centres could be providers 
of GR. This refers to the national/bilateral approach explained in Section 1.2.3 of Chapter 1. 
 
2.2 The ABS Process of the CBD 
 
The process of ABS, as established in Article 15 of the CBD,1 requires that users of GR 
ask for permission to providers before they physically access the resources. Once such 
authorisation has been given, users and providers have to reach an agreement on the 
conditions for access, the permitted uses, and the distribution of benefits. The first step is 
known as seeking and obtaining ‘prior informed consent’ (PIC), and the resulting agreement is 
known as the ‘mutually agreed terms’ (MATs). In this way, access is conditional on PIC, and 
benefit-sharing has to be done according to MATs. 
 
Other elements complementing ABS include: 
i. The states’ right to determine access to GR through their national law; 
 
1 Convention on Biological Diversity (adopted 05 June 1992, entered into force 29 December 1993) 1760 UNTS 
79 (CBD). 
‘Article 15. Access to Genetic Resources: 
1. Recognizing the sovereign rights of States over their natural resources, the authority to determine access to 
genetic resources rests with the national governments and is subject to national legislation. 
2. Each Contracting Party shall endeavour to create conditions to facilitate access to genetic resources for 
environmentally sound uses by other Contracting Parties and not to impose restrictions that run counter to the 
objectives of this Convention. 
3. For the purpose of this Convention, the genetic resources being provided by a Contracting Party, as referred to 
in this Article and Articles 16 and 19, are only those that are provided by Contracting Parties that are countries of 
origin of such resources or by the Parties that have acquired the genetic resources in accordance with this 
Convention. 
4. Access, where granted, shall be on mutually agreed terms and subject to the provisions of this Article. 
5. Access to genetic resources shall be subject to prior informed consent of the Contracting Party providing such 
resources, unless otherwise determined by that Party. 
6. Each Contracting Party shall endeavour to develop and carry out scientific research based on genetic resources 
provided by other Contracting Parties with the full participation of, and where possible in, such Contracting 
Parties. 
7. Each Contracting Party shall take legislative, administrative or policy measures, as appropriate, and in 
accordance with Articles 16 and 19 and, where necessary, through the financial mechanism established by Articles 
20 and 21 with the aim of sharing in a fair and equitable way the results of research and development and the 
benefits arising from the commercial and other utilization of genetic resources with the Contracting Party 
providing such resources. Such sharing shall be upon mutually agreed terms.’ 
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ii. Their obligation to create favourable conditions for accessing GR for 
environmentally-sound uses; 
iii. The exclusive right of countries of origin to authorise access to their GR in-situ 
and ex-situ; 
iv. The obligation for ex-situ centres to concede access to GR only when these 
resources have been acquired in accordance with the CBD; and 
v. To distribute the monetary and non-monetary benefits derived from the use of 
GR in a fair and equitable way. 
 
Despite the apparent simplicity of this process, problems in its implementation have 
existed since its introduction in the CBD. That is why the parties to the CBD have continued to 
search for a better way to put ABS into practice. As a result, the NP was agreed upon in 2010. 
Its practical implications for ABS are explained below. 
 
3. ABS in the Nagoya Protocol to the CBD 
 
The NP is a supplementary agreement to the CBD containing legal obligations on ABS. 
After more than six years of negotiations, it was adopted in the Japanese city of Nagoya in 2010 
at the tenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP) of the CBD. From a legal point of 
view, the CBD and any protocols subsequently concluded are separate instruments. This means 
that the parties to the CBD have no obligation to become parties to any of its protocols2 and, 
therefore, are only bound by the terms of the Convention. The logical consequence of this is 
that non-members to the NP have no obligation to comply with any new obligations on ABS 
that are introduced. However, as further demonstrated in this chapter, the NP does not create 
new ABS obligations, it rather makes them more precise. 
The NP’s critical importance is that it seeks to provide a legally-binding framework for 
ABS. For Robinson, the reproduction of the CBD’s principles and rules in the text of the NP 
represents a step forward in the achievement of benefit-sharing.3 This is relevant because the 
CBD is a hard law instrument that operates in the manner of an aspirational, policy-oriented 
soft law;4 because its provisions are expressed as overall goals and policies rather than as 
concrete obligations.5 Given this, doubts have been raised regarding the effectiveness of the 
CBD in achieving ABS. For example, Raustiala notes that the vague commitments and 
 
2 This can be clearly seen when comparing the number of Members of the CBD (196) with the number of Members 
of the Nagoya Protocol (104). CBD, ‘List of Parties’ <https://www.cbd.int/information/parties.shtml#tab=2> 
accessed 04 April 2018 
3 Daniel Robinson, ‘Nagoya Protocol in the Spotlight with CBD Meet Ahead’ (2014) 8 BioRes 4, 6. 
4 In opinion of Birnie and Boyle the soft nature of the CBD is the result of a difficult process of negotiation, in 
which the countries were not disposed to accept more precise commitments in a Convention but pleased to clarify 
its details through national laws. 
Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle and Katherine Redgwell, International Law & the Environment, (OUP) (2009, 3rd edn), 
617. 
5 Stuart Harrop and Diana Pritchard, ‘A Hard Instrument Goes Soft: The Implications of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity’s Current Trajectory’ (2011) Global Environmental Change 474, 476.  
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ambiguous phrases6 of the CBD facilitates the avoidance of its obligations by its Parties.7 For 
that reason, it was expected that the NP could give better binding power to the CBD clauses 
on ABS. However, as explained below, the countries also experienced difficulties in reaching 
agreement on sensitive issues during the negotiations of the Protocol, some of them could not 
be agreed upon and, therefore, were not incorporated in its final text. 
In order to identify the possible flaws in the design of the CBD and the NP which may 
be hindering ABS implementation, the following sections present: (i) the ways in which the NP 
attempts to provide clarity and achieve compliance with ABS, and (ii) the issues that were not 
addressed by the CBD and Protocol. The latter is divided into non-agreed and non-discussed 
issues. They have been incorporated in this analysis because a better understanding of ABS 
should consider aspects that were both included and not included in the system. 
 
3.1 Clarifications provided by the Nagoya Protocol to the ABS process of the CBD 
 
The NP seeks to specify the legally-binding framework of ABS through reference to 
Articles 1, 15, 16 and 19 of the CBD. In doing so, it: 
 
i. Reaffirms the sovereign rights of states over their natural resources; 
ii. Recognises that the fair and equitable sharing of the economic value of 
biodiversity are key incentives for the conservation of biodiversity; 
iii. Recognises the importance of providing legal certainty with respect to ABS; 
iv. Recognises the interdependence of all countries with regard to GR for food and 
agriculture as well as the importance of such resources for the mitigation of 
climate change; 
v. Acknowledges the ongoing work in other international forums relating to ABS 
(FAO and WHO); 
vi. Recognises that international instruments related to ABS should be mutually 
supportive with a view to achieving the objectives of the CBD; 
vii. Recognises the interrelationship between GR and TK, and the importance of this 
knowledge for the conservation of biodiversity, the sustainable use of its 
components, and the sustainable livelihoods of these communities; 
viii. Recognises that it is the right of indigenous and local communities (ILCs) to 
identify the rightful holders of their TK within their communities; and 
 
6 Some of the terms used in the CBD’s preamble recitals and its substantive articles are for example ‘as possible’, 
‘practicable in accordance with particular conditions and capabilities’, ‘taking into account special needs’, ‘likely 
to’, ‘grave and imminent’, ‘significant’, and the inclusion of weak words accompanying its obligations, for instance 
‘endeavour’, ‘encourage’, ‘promote’ and ‘minimise’. Their adoption has  made it difficult to determine the scope 
of the obligations and commitments over the State Parties of the CBD, and consequently has facilitated their 
unfulfillment. 
7 Kal Raustiala, ‘Domestic Institutions and International Regulatory Cooperation: Comparat ive Responses to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity’ (1997) 4 World Politics 482, 491-492. 
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ix. Sets out that nothing in its text shall be construed as diminishing or removing 
the rights of ILCs. 
 
As previously stated, the NP does not modify or add new elements to ABS as established 
in the CBD. Therefore, as does the Convention, it stipulates that access to GR is conditional on 
PIC from the Party providing GR (Articles 6.1 and 6.2), and establishes that, unless otherwise 
determined by a national law of that Party, providers of GR could be: (i) the country of origin 
of the resource; (ii) a Party that has acquired the GR in accordance with the Convention (Article 
6.1); and (iii) ILCs respecting the GR located within their territories, provided this right has been 
recognised in their countries of origin (Article 6.2). 
Additionally, Article 3 NP clarifies that TK is within the ABS scope. In this regard it 
establishes that access to TK is conditioned to the PIC conceded by the concerned ILCs, and to 
distribute the benefits derived from its use with these communities (Article 7). Initial doubts 
about the obligation to distribute the benefits derived from the use of TK seem to be generated 
by the fact that, although this aspect was incorporated in the Preamble and Article 8j of the 
CBD, it is not part of Article 15 regulating ABS. Thus, the clarification in the NP that TK is in the 
ABS scope could be perceived as a step forward in the protection of ILCs’ rights. Nonetheless, 
as evidenced in the laws reviewed in the previous chapter, only few countries have included 
the right of ILCs to grant PIC and/or have specified the percentage of monetary benefits they 
should receive. 
As does the CBD, the NP provides that the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits is 
an obligation originating from the utilisation of GR and TK. However, it clarifies that ‘utilisation 
of GR’ means (i) research and development on the genetic/or biochemical composition of GR, 
including the application of biotechnology (Article 2c); (ii) subsequent applications of such 
research and development; and (iii) the commercialisation of these resources (Article 5.1). 
Although the NP does not explain what the utilisation of TK is, given that a distribution of 
benefits derived from the use of TK is only possible when such knowledge is associated with a 
GR, it can be concluded that it involves the use of a TK in research activities, applications, and 
commercialisation. The implication of these concepts on ABS processes is explained in the next 
chapter. 
Finally, both the CBD and the NP require that the conditions for access, utilisation, and 
the distribution of benefits should be upon MATs (Articles 5.5, 6 and 7). 
In addition to what has been said, the NP also:  
 
i. Suggests the creation of a global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism (GMBSM) 
for accessing resources in transboundary situations and when it is not possible to 
grant or obtain PIC (Article 10); and 
ii. Proposes a set of instruments to support ABS compliance, including mechanisms 
for tracking and monitoring the resources through the implementation of 
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checkpoints and/or the use of an internationally-recognised certificate of 
compliance and the inclusion of reporting obligations in MATs (Article 17). 
 
Given the importance of those aspects, each of them is explained as follows. 
 
3.1.1 Traditional knowledge-related developments 
 
The need to protect TK and to share the benefits derived from its utilisation with the 
ILCs is expressed in the Preamble and Article 8j CBD. In the absence of any mention of TK in 
Article 15 CBD establishing ABS, Article 3 NP clarifies that it is in the ABS scope. 
However, the right of ILCs to benefit from the use of their TK seems to be conditional 
upon the recognition of this right in national laws. In other words, the decision to protect TK 
and to recognise the right of ILCs to benefit from its use is taken, in practice, by each state 
through the implementation of national laws. Unfortunately, this does not seem to be a priority 
for either the governments of provider or user countries of TK. This is because, as observed in 
the data presented in Chapter 2, few countries have developed specific regulations on TK and 
ILCs’ rights, and only three countries have integrated customary laws and/or protocols in their 
ABS proceedings (Brazil, Kenya, and Panama). For this reason, as suggested in Section 1.2.2.a 
of Chapter 1, the design of any ABS mechanisms for TK should not be subjected to TK 
protection or the recognition of IPRs over this knowledge. 
 
3.1.2 ILCs-related developments 
 
Besides clarifying that TK is within the scope of ABS, the NP mentions a set of rights that 
could positively contribute to ensuring that ILCs can benefit from the use of their resources 
(GR and TK). For example, it explains that the ILCs can grant PIC for the access to their TK and 
GR when located in their territories (Articles 6.2 and 7). The CBD, containing general rules, was 
silent in this regard. For that reason, before the NP, it was not clear whether PIC could be 
granted by the ILCs or by the state in their behalf. Nonetheless, attention should be given to 
the way in which this right has been recognised. On one hand, users can access the resources 
by obtaining PIC or the ‘approval’ of ILCs. As explained in the next chapter, although PIC 
involves the approval of providers regarding the access to their resources, the distinctive 
characteristics of PIC make of it something more than just an approval. Thus, for the country 
Members of the ILO Convention 169, an approval obtained in a different way than it is 
prescribed for PIC would not be acceptable. 
On the other hand, ILCs can grant PIC for the TK they hold and the GR which is found in 
their territories as long as they have the established right to do so. Regarding TK, the use of 
the word ‘hold’ could be problematic. One possible interpretation could be that the ILCs can 
only benefit from the TK over which some form of control is retained. Another possibility is 
that ILCs could benefit from the use of the TK they hold, irrespective of whether or not it is in 
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the public domain. These opposite interpretations have been found in the laws analysed in the 
previous chapter. In general, the countries were silent on this aspect and in only four of them 
there is the need to conduct an ABS process when TK and/or GR in the public domain have 
been used (Brazil, Costa Rica, Panama, and Peru). The consequence of choosing one of these 
two interpretations is that the ILCs can benefit from the use of a wide range of TK (when it is 
in the public domain)8 or a small amount of it (over which control is attained). 
As evidenced in the official records of the NP negotiations, it seems that this is one of 
the aspects over which the countries would not be able to reach an agreement or a solution 
beyond what they have already established through their national or regional laws.9 
Additionally, as noted by Buck and Hamilton, terms such as ‘traditional knowledge associated 
with genetic resources’, ‘indigenous and local communities’, and ‘held’ are not defined in the 
NP, the CBD, or other international legal instruments.10 For that reason, it could be problematic 
to establish when a TK is associated with a GR, or when a TK is held by an ILC. This could explain 
to some extent, why the different approaches regarding TK in the public domain have been 
found in the laws revised. 
Another clarification made by the NP is that ILCs can be the beneficiaries of the use of 
GR and TK (Article 5.2 and 5.5). 
Finally, the Protocol indicates that access to TK is not only conditional on PIC of the ILCs 
concerned, but also that such a process has to take into consideration their customary laws, 
protocols, and procedures (Article 12.1). To do this, states are required to establish 
mechanisms to inform potential users about their obligations relating to TK (Article 12.2), and 
to support ILCs in the development of their protocols, minimum requirements for MATs, and 
model contractual clauses for ABS (Article 12.3). This aspect is fundamental to the protection 
of ILCs’ rights. However, it also presents a big challenge for the implementation of ABS because 
more laws on ABS will increase the fragmentation and complexity of the system and could 
result in higher transactional costs and lower efficiency. 
 
8 A large amount of TK is considered to be in the public domain because it has been made available to the public, 
by any means. Initially this was caused by colonisation, and later by many other reasons. In the words of Michael 
Brown: ‘In the late 1980s, ownership of knowledge and artistic creations traceable to the world’s indigenous 
societies emerged, seemingly out of nowhere, as a major social issue. Before then, museum curators, archivists, 
and anthropologists had rarely worried about whether the information they collected and managed should be 
treated as someone else’s property.’ 
Michael F Brown, Who Owns Native Culture? (HUP 2003), ix. 
9 The issue of publicly available TK was discussed during the negotiations of the Protocol (Art. 9.5 of the Protocol’s 
Draft). It was particularly considered the need that users enter into a benefit-sharing process with the rightful 
holders of TK when the knowledge is obtained from a source other than a traditional community. 
Stefan Jungcurt and others, ‘Summary of the Resumed Ninth Meeting of the Working Group on Access and 
Benefit-Sharing of the Convention on Biological Diversity: 10-16 July 2010’ (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, iisd 
Reporting Services, IISD, 19 July 2010, vol 9, n 527), 9, 15; Jungcurt and others, ‘Summary of the Tenth Conference 
of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity: 18-29 October 2010’ (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, iisd 
Reporting Services, IISD, 1 November 2010, vol 9, n 544), 4. 
10 Matthias Buck and Clare Hamilton, ‘The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilisation to the Convention on Biological Diversity’ (2011) 20 
RECIEL 47, 54-56. 
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For this reason, and despite recognition of the importance of ILCs having a say in the 
utilisation of the natural resources located within their territories and their TK, this thesis 
acknowledges that ABS processes would be more efficient if each country in consensus with 
its ILCs designed a general and uniform process and MATs forms to obtain PIC and conduct 
benefit-sharing. This could be a more effective way to conduct ABS than seeking individual 
agreements with, possibly, different rules and processes (in accordance with given customary 
laws and protocols) each time there is an attempt to gain access to TK. 
 
3.1.3 The Code of Ethical Conduct 
 
The Tkarihwaié:ri Code of Ethical Conduct to Ensure Respect for the Cultural and 
Intellectual Heritage of Indigenous and Local Communities Relevant to the Conservation and 
Sustainable Use of Biological Diversity was adopted in the COP-10 of the CBD. It is important 
because it provides guidance to states concerning the development of local, national, or 
regional ethical conduct codes for the respect, preservation, and maintenance of TK.11 This 
code is directed to those working with ILCs, specifically: ‘government departments and 
agencies, academic institutions, private sector developers, potential stakeholders in 
development and/or research projects, extractive industries, forestry and any other actors 
eventually involved, and in particular for the development of activities/interactions on lands 
and waters traditionally occupied by indigenous and local communities while enabling the 
indigenous and local communities to promote respect of their traditional knowledge and 
associated biological and genetic resources’ (Section 1. Rationale 3). 
It contains some useful elements for the realisation of ABS processes, and incorporates 
many of the rights enshrined in the ILO Convention 169 on prior consultation. These elements 
are summarised as follows: 
 
i. Recognition that the code should not be construed as altering or interpreting the 
obligations contained in the CBD and other international instruments, or be 
interpreted as altering domestic laws, treaties, agreements, or other constructive 
arrangements that may already exist. 
ii. Understanding that TK is the intellectual property of ILCs and that concerns 
expressed by these communities about it should be acknowledged and addressed 
before the use of TK. 
 
11 CBD, Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Tkarihwaié:ri. Code of Ethical Conduct to Ensure 
Respect for the Cultural and Intellectual Heritage of Indigenous and Local Communities Relevant to the 
Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biological Diversity, (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
2011). 
‘Section 1. Rationale: 1. The following elements of a code of ethical conduct are voluntary and are intended to 
provide guidance in activities/interactions with indigenous and local communities and for the development of 
local, national, or regional codes of ethical conduct, with the aim of promoting respect, preservation and 
maintenance of traditional knowledge, innovations and practices relevant for the conservation and sustainable 
use of biodiversity. (…)’ 
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iii. Recognition of the collective property of ILCs over TK. 
iv. The right of ILCs to receive fair and equitable benefits for the use of their TK. 
v. Recognition of the integral connection of ILCs with the places they live. 
vi. Understanding that access activities must not interfere with the traditional use of 
biodiversity on the part of ILCs. 
vii. Regarding PIC, the code: 
a. Establishes that PIC is required for the development of activities taking place 
or impacting on sacred sites and lands and waters traditionally occupied by 
ILCs, or impacting upon a particular community. 
b. Contains the obligation to inform ILCs in advance about all the 
circumstances involving the interactions carried out that could affect them 
or their territories in a manner that considers their knowledge and cultural 
practices. 
c. Requires that PIC should not be coerced, forced or manipulated. 
d. Asserts that ILCs have the right to identify the authority who can grant PIC. 
e. Establishes the need for an inter-cultural dialogue with ILCs, avoiding the 
imposition of external concepts, standards and value judgments. 
f. Indicates that negotiations with ILCs must be conducted in good faith. 
 
The existence of an international code of conduct emanating from the CBD should be 
helpful in providing guidance on the relationship between users and providers of TK. However, 
its voluntary nature is a cause for concern. Before the Code of Ethical Conduct of the CBD, 
there were other codes of conduct with similar objectives.12 However, they seem not to have 
had the desired effect on the practices of biodiversity and TK users because, since their 
enactment, there have been many claims of unauthorised use of GR and TK. 
Furthermore, although it is not possible to confirm that the unauthorised use of GR and 
TK is caused exclusively by the voluntary nature of these codes, experience shows that 
instruments backed up with enforcement powers are more likely to be implemented. In fact, 
the soft nature of the CBD is usually contrasted with the greater enforcement capacity of TRIPS 
in regard to the lack of compliance with the ABS rules within the processes for granting IPRs 
(this is explained in Chapter 6). 
 
12 For example the Code of Ethics of the International Society of Ethnobiology prime aim is ‘serves to guide 
ethnobiologists and other researchers, business leaders, policy makers, governments, non-government 
organisations, academic institutions, funding agencies and others seeking meaningful partnerships with 
Indigenous peoples, traditional societies and local communities and thus to avoid the perpetuation of past 
injustices to these peoples.’ 
Also, this code’s purpose is to ‘reduce as much as possible the adverse effects of research (in all its forms, including 
applied research and development work) and related activities of ethnobiologists that can disrupt or 
disenfranchise Indigenous peoples, traditional societies and local communities from their customary and chosen 
lifestyles.’ 
International Society of Ethnobiology, ‘International Society of Ethnobiology Code of Ethics (2006)’ 
<http://www.ethnobiology.net/what-we-do/core-programs/ise-ethics-program/code-of-ethics/code-in-
english/> accessed 15 August 2016. 
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The lack of enforcement capacity of the CBD may also explain why this Code of Ethical 
Conduct has been less disseminated than the NP, and why some of the commitments about 
the ILCs’ rights over their TK in ABS processes are contained in a voluntary code instead of the 
Protocol. This was noted by Morgera, who described the Code of Ethical Conduct as ‘the most 
discrete achievement of COP-10 in relation to indigenous and local communities.’13 Moreover, 
without mentioning this code, Article 20 of the Protocol suggests that states should create this 
kind of instrument as voluntary guidelines for the development of the ABS process. 
However, this thesis considers that the principles contained in this code should be 
implemented by the parties of the CBD through national laws rather than voluntary 
instruments. Without including these aspects in national laws, it would be more difficult for 
ILCs to benefit from the utilisation of their knowledge and to succeed in their reclamations on 
ABS infringements. 
 
3.1.4 New concept of utilisation of GR 
 
Paraphrasing the third objective of the CBD, Article 1 of the NP establishes as its main 
objective ‘the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of genetic 
resources, including by appropriate access to genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of 
relevant technologies, taking into account all rights over those resources and to technologies, 
and by appropriate funding, thereby contributing to the conservation of biological diversity 
and the sustainable use of its components.’ 
It is important to note that the obligation to distribute benefits arises from the 
‘utilisation’ of GR and associated TK. The concept of utilisation is therefore essential in 
understanding ABS. The next chapter discusses the implications of the concepts and elements 
in ABS. In this section, therefore, it will be noted only that, although the Protocol does not 
change the meaning of the term utilisation as described in Article 15.7 of the CBD, the NP does 
clarify the way in which ‘utilisation of genetic resources’ should be understood with respect to 
scientific research. 
 
3.1.5 Simplified measures 
 
Article 8a of the NP suggests the creation of ‘simplified measures on access for non-
commercial purposes, taking into account the need to address a change of intent for such 
research.’ On the one hand, this provision expresses a concern from the scientific community 
regarding the alleged hindering of scientific research by the implementation of the Protocol. 
On the other hand, it also indicates providers’ concerns about allowing simplified access to 
their resources for non-commercial research as this has the potential to change into 
commercial research. 
 
13 Elisa Morgera, ‘Post-2010 Implementation’ (2010) 40 Environmental Policy and Law 281, 285. 
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Both concerns are well founded. From the scientific community’s perspective, it is true 
that ABS processes can demand a lot of time and money investment, which can cause delays. 
It is true, however, that some of the difficulties presented during the development of ABS 
processes are caused by the users’ lack of planning of ABS activities, or even because 
conducting an ABS process for obtaining permission to utilise GR and TK was not considered as 
a step in the process of conducting the research.14 
The classification of research into non-commercial and commercial may not be 
accurate as all research could potentially be non-commercial. The first step in all research 
processes is to conduct basic research to improve the understanding of the phenomena being 
studied or to build on the results of other studies. Usually, basic-research is assimilated to non-
commercial research, for which it is often stated that basic-research should be free of ABS 
obligations, as explained in Section 1.2.2.c of Chapter 1. However, sometimes scientists may 
unexpectedly find commercial applications for their ‘non-commercial’ research or, in spite of 
the fact that the research was initially developed with the aim of having a commercial use, it is 
discovered during research that there is no viable commercial use. 
From the provider’s perspective, there is significant uncertainty about the ultimate 
destination and subsequent uses of their resources once they have been accessed. This way, 
some national ABS laws link the obligation to distribute benefits with the ‘access’ rather than 
the ‘utilisation’ of the resources (see Section 2.1.1 of Chapter 2). This manner of regulating ABS 
might be a response to the fact that, once access has occurred, providers have no power and 
cannot control the use of their resources. Such lack of control over accessed GR and TK includes 
the inability to find out about subsequent users and uses. Under the current conditions, it 
seems that the only way to know about other users and uses of accessed resources is through 
the information provided by the users. Given this situation, it is understandable that providers 
have a lack of incentive to facilitate access to their resources, even for laudable non-
commercial scientific research initiatives. 
 
3.1.6 From the disclosure of origin to an internationally recognised certificate of 
compliance 
 
Discussions about the relationship between biodiversity and the Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPRs) are not new. However, during the negotiation of the NP, the debate was focused 
on the need to disclose the origin of GR and TK in IP applications, specifically in patent 
applications. The term ‘disclosure of origin’ means the action of revealing the country of origin 
and the ILCs from where the resources were taken. Regarding ABS, it is claimed that revealing 
the origin will help to fight the unauthorised use of GR and TK, which allegedly happens when 
 
14 Leidy Andrea Ávila Sánchez and others, ‘Estudio Sobre las Solicitudes de Acceso a Recursos Genéticos’ in Gabriel 
Ricardo Nemogá Soto and others, La Investigación Sobre Biodiversidad en Colombia (Instituto de Genética, 
Facultad de Derecho, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2010), 53-54. 
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a patent is granted to protect an invention based on a GR and/or TK that has been used without 
an ABS process being conducted. 
This idea comes from the fact that ABS has not been incorporated into the process of 
granting patents, which means that IP offices may not be checking whether or not the 
resources utilised to develop the invention have been accessed and used according to the CBD. 
It is therefore highly probable that a large amount of GR and TK has been used for the 
development of inventions without the country of origin and/or the ILCs’ authorisation. 
Furthermore, because IPRs confer ownership over intangible assets, it has been argued that 
GR and TK can be appropriated when such patents are granted. Although this is not true, 
technically speaking, the patent owner can prevent unauthorised persons from using the GR 
and/or TK in the same way as it is protected by its patent right. In reality, therefore, countries 
of origin and ILCs cannot use their resources in the same way as the patent owner, even when 
they have not authorised their utilisation, or the resources were utilised without following the 
ABS rules of the country of origin, or no benefits have been distributed. 
This situation has resulted in claims that it is possible to misuse and misappropriate GR 
and TK through the IP system, and that an illegal patenting results from the lack of compliance 
with the CBD. In this context, during the negotiations of the NP, it was stated that such misuse, 
misappropriation, or illegal patenting could be avoided if patent applicants were obliged to 
declare the origin of the resources they use. Moreover, it was thought that an obligation of 
this type would help not only to verify whether GR and TK were used following the CBD, but 
also to corroborate whether the benefits derived from such utilisation were shared. 
Notwithstanding the above, and despite the importance of the disclosure requirement 
to distribute benefits, countries did not reach an agreement on this issue during the 
negotiations of the NP. Furthermore, the references to the obligation to disclose the origin of 
GR and TK were deleted from the draft text of the NP. Instead, Article 17 introduced an 
‘internationally recognised certificate of compliance’ to be produced by the provider country 
as proof of the legal access and utilisation of its resources. Needless to say, a certificate of 
compliance does not help providers to find the origin of the resources utilised by users, as it is 
only proof that certain resources have been used according to the ABS rules of a country. Thus, 
with an internationally recognised certificate of compliance, the origin of the resources 
accessed and utilised in patent applications remains unknown. 
Disclosing the origin of resources is also necessary for distributing the benefits of 
shared GR and TK, where the same GR and TK are present in more than one country and/or 
ILCs. Biological and political borders are not necessarily the same, so different countries with 
similar environmental conditions can have the same biodiversity and, because of this, their ILCs 
in interaction with the same environment can develop the same TK.15 With the exception of 
 
15 As is explained in more detail in the next chapter, TK is the result of an adaptive response of ILCs to the particular 
environmental conditions of the place they live. 
CHAPTER 3. The design of the Access and Benefit-Sharing (ABS) System of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) and the Nagoya Protocol (NP) 
 
 
 
 
83 
endemic species, which are less frequent,16 unless the user reveals the origin of the resources 
they have used, is very hard to know the identity of the provider of shared GR and TK. Similarly, 
the uncertainty about the country of origin could be used as an excuse not to distribute 
benefits. Concerning this issue, the NP suggest the creation of a global multilateral mechanism 
GMBSM (this is explained in Section 3.1.8 of this chapter), for which this thesis elaborates some 
recommendations in Chapter 7. 
The differences between countries in this respect seem to suggest that this obligation 
will never be established by all countries. For example, within the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO), the absence of an agreement on this matter resulted in the cessation of 
activities of the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC) for over a year. For around fifteen years, the IGC has 
been working on the protection of GR, TK, and traditional cultural expressions. 
Misappropriation is one of the issues dealt with by this Committee, so the disclosure 
requirement has also been negotiated in this forum. Its member states are almost the same as 
those of the CBD. Within the IGC, the countries have been discussing a draft text for preventing 
the misappropriation of GR and TK since February 2016.17 In particular, Article 3 of the draft 
introduces the obligation to disclose the origin of the resources in IP applications. Seemingly, 
the majority of providers support mandatory disclosure of the origin of the resources in patent 
and other IP applications, while users claim that a mandatory disclosure requirement would 
introduce uncertainty into the patent system, risk patent invalidation in the case of non-
disclosure, undermine the role of the patent system which seeks to promote innovation, and 
complicate the implementation of ABS.18 Although the WIPO is a different forum from the CBD, 
negotiations within the IGC have opened a path in the search for a solution to this problem. 
The decisions taken by delegates will affect the application of the ABS rules of the CBD. 
Although no consensus has been reached so far, the discussions held within the IGC provide 
an idea about the positions and expectations of providers and users of GR and TK in this regard. 
At present, the disclosure requirement has been established by some parties to the 
CBD.19 However, the limited capacity of countries in the enforcement of their laws in other 
jurisdictions seems to suggest that unless a global solution is implemented, there is little 
 
16 See for example: Jay R Malcom and others, ‘Global Warming and Extinctions of Endemic Species from 
Biodiversity Hotspots’ (2006) 20 Conservation Biology 538, 544-547; John F Lamoreux and others, ‘Global Tests 
of Biodiversity Concordance and the Importance of Endemism’ (2006) 440 Nature 212, 213. 
17 WIPO, Secretariat of the World Intellectual Property Organisation, ‘Consolidated Document Relating to 
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources’ (2015) WIPO/GRTKF/IC/29/4. 
18 ibid 
19 According to the information provided by the WIPO, as for October 2017 the countries establishing disclosure 
requirements are: the Andean Community of Nations, Belgium, Brazil, Burundi, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Djibouti, 
Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, the European Union, Germany, France, India, Indonesia, Italy, Kyrgyzstan, Namibia, 
Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Samoa, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Uganda, Vanuatu, 
and Viet Nam. 
WIPO ‘Disclosure Requirements Table’ (October 2017) 
<http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/documents/pdf/genetic_resources_disclosure.pdf> accessed 09 
May 2018 
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countries can do through their domestic laws to find out who is using their resources and how 
they have been used in other jurisdictions. 
 
3.1.7 Compliance, check points and non-compliance 
 
The NP does not regulate compliance. Instead, it suggests two ways in which it can be 
achieved: the observance of domestic legislation and the fulfilment of MATs. The first aspect 
is left to states to resolve through the development of legislative, administrative, or policy 
measures to provide that GR (Article 15.1) and TK (Article 16.1) utilised within their jurisdiction 
has been accessed in accordance with the domestic ABS legislation of the Party providing the 
resources. The second aspect is essentially limited to recommending the inclusion of 
procedural aspects in MATs, such as the jurisdiction, applicable laws, and options for 
alternative dispute resolution; and to indicate that each state shall ensure that ABS claims fall 
within their legal systems (Article 18). In summary, the provisions of the Protocol are limited 
to indicating that compliance is the responsibility of the parties involved in ABS processes, and 
that states are free to regulate on this matter. 
It is important to note the shared responsibility between the provider and user states 
regarding observance of ABS. The responsibility of providers to set up the legislative, 
administrative, or policy measures for the development of ABS processes (Article 15.7, CBD) is 
complemented by the responsibility of users to ensure that GR and TK utilised within their 
territories have been accessed and utilised according to the provider’s laws (Articles 15 and 
16, Nagoya Protocol). Although the clarification made in the NP is quite obvious, it could be 
seen as a step forward in the achievement of compliance with ABS, because in the CBD the 
obligation of users in this regard are not clear. 
The absence of sanctions in the CBD seems to indirectly encourage the lack of 
regulation on ABS. It may be affecting both setting up ABS processes and demonstrating that 
utilisation of GR and TK from foreign jurisdictions has been carried out according to the 
providers’ regulations. The data provided in the previous chapter (out of 196 countries, only 
57 have ABS measures) reveals that legal regulation of ABS has become a sort of optional 
decision of the Parties to the CBD. In addition, at an international level there is an absence of 
mechanisms dedicated specifically to achieving compliance with national developments based 
on the CBD and the NP, such as the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. This could result in 
major difficulties in achieving observance with local ABS laws. 
Problems stemming from the absence of national or regional ABS laws have the 
potential to impact relationships between providers and users in different ways. For example, 
users of GR and TK in jurisdictions without an ABS law can perceive that what they are doing is 
legal because they have not broken any laws, even though they are accessing and using GR and 
TK without PIC, MAT, or distributing the benefits derived from such use to the providers. It is 
also possible that researchers as well as ex-situ collections in these jurisdictions have not 
integrated the ABS obligations into their practices and procedures. Providers could also face 
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more difficulty in achieving compliance with ABS in jurisdictions without an ABS law as, in the 
absence of such norms, there will be no tribunals or procedures to allow any legal actions to 
be brought. Under these conditions, it can be predicted that the enforcement of ABS 
commitments will be difficult for providers to achieve. Therefore, the national approach of the 
CBD to compliance with ABS appears to be an obstacle for achieving compliance when GR and 
TK are used in jurisdictions other than their country of origin. Based on the WTO’s experience, 
an ABS mechanism with international reach could be expected to be more effective for 
achieving the distribution of benefits. 
To support compliance, the NP suggests the designation of checkpoints. These are 
understood as any office that collects relevant information related to PIC, MAT, and/or to the 
utilisation of GR. Although there is no indicative list as to what these checkpoints might be, the 
Protocol does explain some of the functions they would fulfil (Article 17.1).20 For Cabrera, 
despite the fact that no particular checkpoint is mentioned in the Protocol, IP offices best meet 
the characteristics.21 In his opinion, the absence of a list of examples of checkpoints has 
resulted from the controversy that exists between the Parties to the CBD regarding the 
application of IPRs within ABS.22 Regarding this, Jungcurt and others set out that, in order to 
prevent some countries from not signing the NP, it was agreed to not include any identified 
checkpoint in its text, so that their determination is the decision of each country.23 Despite the 
difficulties experienced by the countries in this regard, it should be noted that there is nothing 
in the CBD or the Protocol to prevent the designation of national IP offices as checkpoints of 
compliance with ABS. 
In addition, the fact that TK was not included in the monitoring activities described in 
the NP should not go unnoticed. This is because it can add difficulties for ILCs in finding out 
who is using their TK and, consequently, in achieving a distribution of benefits derived from it. 
Nonetheless, this could be explained because there is no direct reference to TK in the Article 
establishing ABS obligations in the CBD. Thus, creating checkpoints to determine TK utilisation 
is left in the hands of individual countries. 
Finally, with regard to achieving compliance, the NP is limited to stating that countries 
shall take measures to address situations of non-compliance, and cooperate in cases of alleged 
violation of domestic ABS legislation (Articles 15.2, 15.3, 16.2 and 16.3). 
Sensible aspects of ABS are not regulated by the NP. This seems to be the result of the 
lack of agreement of the countries on these matters. Perhaps this is why, in the Protocol, 
regulation of those aspects is left to the countries to solve through their national laws. 
 
20 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from 
their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity (adopted 29 October 2010, entered into force 12 
October 2014) A-30619 UNTS (Nagoya Protocol), Article 17. 
21 Jorge Cabrera Medaglia, ‘El Protocolo de Nagoya Sobre Acceso a Recursos Genéticos y la Propiedad Intelectual: 
Un paso adelante, muchos por recorrer’ (2010) 11 Puentes 1, 3. 
22 ibid 
23 Jungcurt and others ‘Summary of the Resumed Ninth Meeting of the Working Group on Access and Benefit-
Sharing of the Convention on Biological Diversity: 10-16 July 2010’ (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, iisd Reporting 
Services, IISD, 19 July 2010, vol 9, n 527), 9-11. 
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Although this is not a bad solution in itself, and is consistent with the CBD contents, the fact 
that the countries’ different positions will be reflected in their national laws would make it 
more difficult to achieve benefit-sharing when access and utilisation happen in different 
countries. In this regard, it should be remembered that the Protocol was adopted more than 
fifteen years after the CBD came into force, in a climate of dissatisfaction caused by the limited 
distribution of benefits achieved. One of the issues that appeared to be clear at that time was 
that a national approach to compliance was leading to problems in the enforcement of ABS 
obligations in other jurisdictions. As will be explained in the following sections, the discussions 
held on this matter during the negotiations of the NP resulted in Articles 10 and 11 of its final 
text. Thus, the fact that the Protocol’s text was produced in much the same way as the CBD 
seems to indicate that the decisions might be based more on political than legal or practical 
reasons. 
The national approach of the CBD and its Protocol contrast sharply with the binding 
force provided at international level to the IPRs granted over creations using GR and TK.24 The 
opposing interests of providers and users of these resources, as well as the under-capacity of 
providers to realise their interests in binding international agreements, can be observed in 
their texts. The official records of the negotiations of the NP demonstrate how user countries 
have constantly opposed any modification that could affect the granting of IPRs over inventions 
based on GR and TK, including the designation of IP offices as checkpoints to verify compliance 
with ABS.25 This seems to be another matter of discussion about which it is not clear whether 
the countries could reach an agreement at some point in the future, or no agreement will be 
made. 
 
3.1.8 Global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism 
 
As mentioned above, Article 10 of NP states that parties should consider a global 
multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism (GMBSM) for the distribution of benefits of GR and TK 
accessed in transboundary situations26 and/or when PIC cannot be granted or obtained. 
 
24 The WTO’s official web site that presents the importance or the dispute settlement system starts affirming that: 
‘The best international agreement is not worth very much if its obligations cannot be enforced when one of the 
signatories fails to comply with such obligations. An effective mechanism to settle disputes thus increases the 
practical value of the commitments the signatories undertake in an international agreement. The fact that the 
Members of the WTO established the current dispute settlement system during the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations underscores the high importance they attach to compliance by all Members with 
their obligations under the WTO Agreement.’ 
WTO, ‘Dispute Settlement System Training Module: Chapter 1 Introduction to the WTO Dispute Settlement 
System’ <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c1s1p1_e.htm> accessed 23 
August 2016. 
25 Ibid (n 9) 
26 Regarding the cases which could be considered as ‘transboundary situations’, Eyal Benvenisti affirms that 
transboundary resources are those to which only a number of states have access. These resources can include 
fresh water, clean air, fisheries in shared rivers and lakes, hydrocarbon and mineral deposits, forests and 
rainforests, natural reserves and endangered species of flora and fauna. Thus, their main characteristic is their 
limited access to a number of states, whereby it is also possible to limit the access to other states. 
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This article resulted from the African Group proposal, which included the idea that ABS 
should support the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, and proposed that the 
benefits derived from the utilisation of: 
 
i. GR located in common areas, understood as those over which countries cannot 
have or claim sovereign rights; and  
ii. plant GR outside the MLS should be invested in the global preservation of 
biodiversity. 
 
It seems that the intention was to invest the benefits produced by the utilisation of 
resources that do not belong to any country and those outside the scope of ABS, for the 
protection of global biodiversity, rather than to eliminate the possibility for countries to benefit 
from the use of their resources even in situations where these resources can be found in-situ 
in more than one country. The countries’ willingness to receive compensation derived from 
the use of their shared resources appears to be clear during the negotiations of the NP.27 
The original proposal consisting of investing the benefits in the global conservation of 
biodiversity was associated with the impossibility of claiming property rights over the accessed 
resources, rather than in the number of countries that potentially could claim property rights 
over such resources. It was clear that countries have the right to benefit from the utilisation of 
resources over which they can claim sovereign rights, even when the same resources can be 
found in more than one country. For this reason, it was proposed that the benefits arising from 
the use of resources in common areas be shared globally by investing them in the preservation 
of biodiversity in an abstract sense. However, in contrast to what it was proposed, Article 10 
of the Protocol establishes that: 
 
‘Parties shall consider the need for and modalities of a global multilateral benefit-sharing 
mechanism to address the fair and equitable sharing of benefits derived from the utilization of 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources that occur in 
transboundary situations or for which it is not possible to grant or obtain prior informed 
consent. The benefits shared by users of genetic resources and traditional knowledge 
 
On the contrary, to authors such as Zewdineh Beyene and Ian Wadley, transboundary resources are not only 
transected by a national frontier but also are capable of traversing that frontier ‘by virtue of its state of flux.’ 
Therefore, the main characteristic of transboundary resources is their capability to move, as occurs for example 
with water, rather than the fact of their limited access. It is important to notice that authors standing this position 
are more likely to be referring to transboundary waters management than to biodiversity management. In this 
way, from this classification are excluded static natural resources, such as biodiversity, and those that are capable 
of traversing a boundary because they are animals, for instance straddling and migratory species, including fishes 
or living natural resources which are passively transported by currents and tides. 
By the above, the first concept of transboundary resources is adopted in this thesis. 
Eyal Benvenisty, Sharing Transboundary Resources. International Law and Optimal Resource Use (CUP 2002), 2 -
3; Zewdineh Beyene and Ian L Wadley, ‘Common Goods and the Common Good: Transboundary Natural 
Resources, Principled Cooperation, and the Nile Basin Initiative’ (Breslauer Graduate Symposium on Natural 
Resource Issues in Africa at UC Berkeley, March 2004), 3-4. 
27 ibid (n 9) 
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associated with genetic resources through this mechanism shall be used to support the 
conservation of biological diversity and the sustainable use of its components globally.’ 
 
Article 10 of the Protocol is different from its original draft as it: 
 
i. Changes the subject matter from GR over which it is not possible to claim sovereign 
rights (found in common areas) and those outside the scope of ABS to GR found in 
transboundary situations (i.e., those shared by neighbour countries at their 
borders); 
ii. Includes TK in transboundary situations; 
iii. Includes the situation in which PIC cannot be granted or obtained; and 
iv. Changes the recipient of the benefits from the countries of origin and communities 
to a common fund created to invest the benefits in the global conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity. 
 
These modifications significantly impact the distribution of benefits, mainly because 
countries will not directly benefit from the use of their resources. Perhaps because of this, in 
its 2016 meeting the Expert Group on Article 10 concluded that the need for such a mechanism 
remained unclear due to its narrow application and the insufficient information on and 
experience with ABS.28 Nonetheless, this thesis considers that an ABS mechanism with global 
reach has a better chance of achieving benefit-sharing. For this reason, Chapter 7 includes 
some recommendations for the creation of a basic GMBSM on which the Parties could agree. 
In order to understand the implications of Article 10 on ABS implementation, the 
following sections summarise its key points. They provide an explanation of the use of 
transboundary resources and access without PIC, together with an analysis of the investment 
of benefits in the global conservation of biodiversity. 
 
A. Access in transboundary situations 
 
Access in transboundary situations was addressed by the draft text of the Protocol in 
an article about transboundary cooperation. Accordingly, neighbouring parties should 
cooperate in implementing the Protocol where the same GR and/or TK are found in-situ within 
their territories:29 
 
 
 
 
28 CBD, COP-MOP, ‘Report of the Expert Group Meeting on Article 10 of the Nagoya Protocol on Access and 
Benefit-Sharing’ (2016) UNEP/CBD/NP/COP-MOP/2/10, 6. 
29 CBD, Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-Sharing, ‘Report of the First Part of the Ninth 
Meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-Sharing’ (2010) UNEP/CBD/WG-
ABS/9/3, 47-48. 
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‘Article 8. Transboundary Cooperation: 
1. In instances where the same genetic resources are found in-situ within the territory of 
neighbouring Parties, those Parties shall cooperate, as appropriate, with a view to 
implementing this Protocol, in order to ensure that measures taken are supportive of and do 
not run counter to its objectives. 
2. Where the same traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources is shared by 
different indigenous and local communities in several Parties, those Parties shall cooperate, 
with the involvement of the indigenous and local communities concerned, with a view to 
implementing the objective of this Protocol. 
OR 
1. Where the same genetic resources and/or traditional knowledge associated with genetic 
resources are found in-situ within the territory of more than one Party, those Parties shall 
cooperate with the involvement of the indigenous and local communities concerned, where 
applicable, with a view to implement the objective of this Protocol.’ 
 
Although it became Article 11 of the Protocol, its content changed considerably: 
 
‘Article 11. Transboundary Cooperation: 
1. In instances where the same genetic resources are found in-situ within the territory of more 
than one Party, those Parties shall endeavour to cooperate, as appropriate, with the 
involvement of indigenous and local communities concerned, where applicable, with a view to 
implementing this Protocol. 
2. Where the same traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources is shared by one 
or more indigenous and local communities in several Parties, those Parties shall endeavour to 
cooperate, as appropriate, with the involvement of the indigenous and local communities 
concerned, with a view to implementing the objective of this Protocol.’ 
 
In the Protocol, the word ‘neighbouring’ is deleted from the expression ‘neighbouring 
Parties’, leaving only the word ‘Parties’. This small change fosters a shift in the understanding 
of the way in which ABS of shared resources should be addressed. First, the idea of 
neighbouring countries having the same resources in-situ refers to a situation in which the 
biological and political borders are not the same, so, as already explained in section 3.1.6 of 
this chapter, these neighbouring countries have the same biodiversity, i.e., they could share 
the same GR and TK. This is the situation, for example, between Ecuador, Peru and Brazil. In 
this sense, the draft Article 11 stated that neighbouring countries should cooperate to achieve 
the distribution of benefits of their shared resources. However, the existence of an Article 
about ABS in transboundary situations (where the resources could be found in more than one 
neighbouring country) together with the elimination of the word ‘neighbouring’ from Article 
11 may indicate that it is referring to a situation in which the same resource could be found in-
situ in more than one country which are not neighbours. 
According to Articles 10 and 11 of the NP, therefore, the benefits derived from the use 
of a resource shared by neighbouring countries will not be received by the providers, but given 
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to a common fund, while the benefits from the use of resources shared by non-neighbouring 
countries will be distributed to the providers of the resources. 
In theory, this new method of distributing benefits should not affect the interests of 
provider countries. However, it could be perceived as running contrary to the very nature of 
ABS for two reasons. On the one hand, at the international level, ABS discussions were 
motivated precisely by the wish of provider countries to participate in the benefits produced 
by the utilisation of their resources. Establishing the opposite of this therefore contradicts the 
original intention of the creation of ABS. On the other hand, the practical application of Article 
10 could be affected. As stated in the CBD, the distribution of benefits encourages providers 
to facilitate access, which leads to utilisation. Without a direct distribution of benefits, 
therefore, there will be no reason for providers to allow facilitated access. In practical terms, 
this can be understood as an absence of motivation for providers to create a GMBSM to grant 
access to their resources, because under such a mechanism they will not receive a direct 
benefit. Without that mechanism, the benefits derived from the use of transboundary 
resources will be received by the country providing the resource, instead of being given to a 
fund for the global preservation of biodiversity. Given this, it is unlikely that states develop 
and/or implement the mechanism of Article 10 Nagoya. 
Putting conditions on how providers benefit from the use of their GR and TK, for 
example, whether they can be accessed in a transboundary situation or not could also be 
interpreted as diminishing the sovereign rights of states over their GR and the rights of ILCs 
over their TK. 
 
B. Access for which it is not possible to grant or obtain PIC 
 
Access when PIC cannot be granted or obtained (access without PIC) is the second 
situation for which the creation of a GMBSM has been proposed. It may be thought that Article 
10 puts together two different situations: access in transboundary situations and access 
without PIC, or not. One possible reason to put these aspects together in the same Article, is 
that users could face great difficulties in obtaining PIC for gaining access to transboundary 
resources. Such difficulties can arise when the Parties do not have ABS laws, or when GR and 
TK are stored in ex-situ collections, or databases without identification of the country of origin. 
In any of these situations, the user would not know who should grant PIC (given the importance 
of access ex-situ for ABS, this aspect is explained separately in the next section). 
With regard to the resources in transboundary situations, or those that are shared by 
more than one country, or ILCs belonging or moving through different countries, this thesis 
maintains in Chapter 7 that the benefits should be equally distributed with all possible 
providers, because the impossibility of determining a single provider should not result in the 
benefits not being distributed. 
Finally, it should be stressed that the establishment of a mechanism that allows access 
without PIC should only be considered for cases where it does not constitute a transgression 
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of countries’ and ILCs’ rights. Moreover, the impossibility to grant PIC should not be interpreted 
as a form of permission for the user to gain access to a resource when PIC has been expressly 
denied by the provider. 
 
C. Access without PIC through ex-situ collections 
 
Access without PIC is an issue that gains importance when the resource is accessed 
through an ex-situ conservation centre. For a very long time, natural resources have been 
collected and stored in ex-situ centres. However, the legal obligation to obtain PIC, conduct 
MATs and distribute the benefits was introduced in the CBD. This means that much of the 
biological material stored in ex-situ conservation centres was legally collected without PIC, 
MATs or a distribution of benefits before the CBD came into effect. As access and storage were 
possible without asking for permission (PIC), it is possible that in some cases the origin of the 
stored resources is unknown. It may also be possible that resources collected after the CBD 
came into force have been stored without conducting ABS processes and without any records 
about their origin. In other words, it is possible that not all resources whose origin is unknown 
were collected before the CBD. This clarification is important because ABS does not apply to 
GR collected before the CBD came into force, but only to those acquired subsequently. Under 
these conditions, it is not possible to obtain PIC, not only because it is not possible to know 
who the provider is, but also because the GR have already been stored in an ex-situ centre. The 
problem, in this case, is knowing who to distribute the benefits to, especially when there could 
be more than one possible provider, which could include neighbouring countries. 
This situation casts further doubts on the way in which ABS should be conducted. As 
already mentioned in Section 3.1.8A above, Articles 10 and 11 of the Protocol offer different 
solutions for the distribution of benefits of shared resources depending on whether the 
providers are neighbouring countries or not. However, as the CBD did not regulate access ex-
situ, it is not clear whether the distribution of benefits of shared resources stored in ex-situ 
collections without an identification of their country of origin (where it will not be possible to 
grant or obtain PIC) should be sought through the mechanism of Article 10. 
Nevertheless, while it is true that the origin of some GR located in ex-situ conditions 
was not recorded, it is also true that the possible countries of origin can be determined. It 
would be closer to the nature of ABS (which seeks to ensure that providers can benefit from 
the use of their resources), if the benefits are distributed among all those possible providers 
instead of going to a global fund for the preservation of biodiversity. On this basis, a scale for 
the distribution of benefits through the common fund of Article 10 could be created, where all 
the possible provider countries would be the first to receive financial support. 
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D. The relationship between access without PIC, the ex-situ collections, and the Common 
Fund of the FAO ABS system 
 
It could be claimed that investing the benefits derived from the utilisation of resources 
located ex-situ in the global preservation of biodiversity is coherent with the content of the 
Nairobi Final Act of the CBD. This Act requires that resources acquired before the CBD came 
into effect by ex-situ collections are addressed within the FAO Forum.30 As explained in Chapter 
5, under the Multilateral System MLS (ABS system) of FAO, benefits obtained from the 
utilisation of crops listed in Annex I of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for 
Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA) are sent to support conservation and further development of 
agriculture in the developing world. To that end, the resources are given to a trust fund. 
However, because the scope of this system is limited to plant GR listed in Annex I of the 
ITPGRFA, utilisation of GR outside this list should be carried out according to the CBD, meaning 
the benefits must be shared directly with the provider of the resource instead of being 
deposited in the FAO fund. 
The scope of the MLS is determined by the crops listed in Annex I. Therefore, as long 
as a crop is included in the Annex, the benefits will be sent to the global fund. In order to 
understand the cases in which providers will have no right to benefit from the use of their 
resources, therefore, it is vital to have an understanding of the nature of the crops set out in 
Annex I. The annex comprises most of the crops needed for human nutrition. In other words, 
the crops are considered essential for world food security, for which no one can obtain IPRs. 
Thus, the similarity between the MLS and the GMBSM is that benefits derived from the use of 
plant GR listed in Annex I (i.e., the crops over which it is not possible to claim or obtain property 
rights) should be invested for global benefits. Furthermore, it could be affirmed that this is the 
same logic under used by the African Group regarding its proposal for the use of GR located in 
common areas, beyond national jurisdiction and collected before the CBD. 
 
E. Utilisation of benefits for the conservation of biological diversity and the sustainable 
use of their components globally 
 
The final aspect of Article 10 is the destination of the benefits collected through a 
GMBSM. As set out earlier, the initial proposal comprises resources beyond national 
jurisdiction, common areas and those collected before the CBD came into force. Article 8 of 
the Draft Protocol made it clear that provider countries were expecting to receive benefits 
from the utilisation of their resources, even in the case of shared resources. Nevertheless, 
negotiations concluded differently. 
 
30 José Esquinas Alcázar, Angela Hilmi and Isabel López Noriega, ‘A Brief History of the Negotiations on the 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture’ in Michael Halewood, Isabel López 
Noriega and Selim Louafi (eds), Crop Genetic Resources as a Global Commons: Challenges in International Law and 
Governance (Earthscan from Rutledge 2013), 141-142. 
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As there was no mention of the benefits’ ultimate destination, it could be inferred that 
providers would benefit from the use of their resources and would be able to freely decide 
how the money was invested. However, negotiations concluded with a text in which resources 
accessed in transboundary situations and those accessed without PIC fall under the treatment 
given to goods considered as part of the ‘common heritage of mankind’.31 
Goods belonging to the common heritage of humankind have two distinct 
characteristics. First, they are located in an international area whose characteristics32 prevent 
ownership being assigned to all of humanity or to any sovereign user, i.e., ownership over the 
common area and the resources found there is legally absent (the Antarctic is an example).33 
The second characteristic is related to the mechanism used for the distribution of benefits. In 
principle, the area should be administered by the international community, and the benefits 
received from its utilisation managed through a common fund to ensure all humanity benefits 
from them. 
As noted earlier, this method of distributing benefits matches perfectly with the 
content of Article 10 of the NP. However, there is a difference between the legal nature of the 
GR and TK described in this Article with goods located in common areas or beyond national 
jurisdiction, because particular entities, such as states and ILCs, can claim sovereign rights or 
exclusive property rights over them. 
 
 
 
 
 
31 As asserted by Antônio Cançado, at first, the concept of a ‘common heritage of mankind’ was used to define 
the legal status of resources in common space areas, such as the ocean floor, outer space, the moon and 
Antarctica. However, as explained by Kemal Baslar, its use has been extended by some authors and in some 
political pronouncements to include other areas, for instance, biodiversity preservation and living resources. 
Although the Preamble of the CBD declares that biodiversity preservation is a ‘common concern’  of humankind, 
rather than a ‘common heritage’, which is a very different legal concept, when incorporating a new way to conduct 
benefit-sharing, its Article 10 NP seems to treat resources in transboundary situations and TK, for which it is not 
possible to grant or obtain PIC, in a similar way to the way that resources are dealt with under the concept of a 
‘common heritage of mankind’. Nevertheless, it operates by way of exception to the ordinary rule contained in 
Article 15 CBD. 
Antônio Augusto Cançado Trinidade, International Law for Humankind. Towards a New Jus Gentium (Second 
Edition, The Hague Academy of International Law 2013), 275-288; Kemal Baslar, The Concept of the Common 
Heritage of Mankind in International Law (Kluwer Law International 1998), 307-313. 
32 For Christopher Joyner, there are five elements that characterise this concept: (i) it applies to common areas 
that could not be owned legally in whole or in part by any State or group of States, legally the entire area would 
be administrated by the international community; (ii) all people would expected to share in the management of 
a common space area; (iii) if natural resources were exploited from a common space area, any economic benefits 
derived from those efforts would be shared internationally; (iv) use of the area must be limited exclusively to 
peaceful purposes; and (v) the conduct of research should be freely and openly permissible, so long as the 
environment of the common space area was in no way physically threatened or ecologically impaired, and the 
results would be made available as soon as possible to anyone who genuinely expressed interest in them. 
Christopher C Joyner, ‘Legal Implications of the Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind’ (1986) 35 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 190, 191-192. 
33 ibid, 194. 
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3.2 Non-agreed issues of the Draft Text of the Nagoya Protocol 
 
The Nagoya Protocol has resulted from a long and arduous negotiation process. Since 
the beginning, ABS has been characterised as a polemic subject. Tensions between the 
interests of developing and developed countries (usually identified as provider and user 
countries) have demarcated its legal evolution. Such differences have determined the content 
of the final agreed texts of the CBD and the NP. For this reason, it is important to be aware of 
those non-agreed aspects of the negotiating text of the Protocol, as they provide a complete 
picture of the elements that a comprehensive ABS system should have. To that end, the 
following sections present each of those non-agreed matters. 
 
3.2.1 Pathogens, viruses and their relationship with the WHO Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness (PIP) Framework 
 
The distribution of benefits derived from the utilisation of pathogens was initially 
opposed by the European Union (EU) during the 7th ABS meeting in Paris in 2009. The 
arguments against this have mainly been based on public interest and the negotiations held in 
other forums. On the one hand, it has been argued that the utilisation of pathogens should be 
excluded from the scope of the CBD because it is a fundamental issue related to human, 
animal, and plant health. On the other hand, it was suggested that human-health related 
concerns should be addressed by the WHO. Based on that, it was recommended that the 
distribution of benefits derived from the utilisation of pathogens and viruses should be 
addressed within negotiations under the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework 
for the sharing of influenza viruses and access to vaccines and other benefits.34 For their part, 
developing countries considered that such a proposal would harm their interests. They 
believed that the real intention behind that proposal was to avoid the sharing of benefits 
derived from the utilisation of GR in a highly profitable sector.35 
 
3.2.2 GR for food agriculture 
 
ABS is an obligation triggered by the utilisation of GR and TK. The CBD does not envision 
differential treatment based on the type of usage, such as scientific research on medicine, 
agriculture, or cosmetics. It could, therefore, be argued that ABS should be conducted when 
GR and TK are used in any way. That is why, for example, the NP only suggests the creation of 
simplified measures for the non-commercial use of these resources. In theory, GR for 
agriculture falls within the scope of the CBD. However, it must be considered that agricultural 
issues are usually implemented under the FAO Forum. As explained in Chapter 5, the FAO has 
 
34 CBD, Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-Sharing, ‘Report of the Seventh Meeting of the 
Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-Sharing’ (2009) UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/7/8, 11. 
35 Jungcurt and others (n 23) 15. 
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its own ABS system for the distribution of benefits derived from the utilisation of plant GR for 
food and agriculture with regard to the crops listed in Annex I of the ITPGRFA. These resources 
are outside the scope of the CBD and within the scope of the FAO. 
On this basis, it has been argued that difficulties in ABS implementation are also caused 
by the fact that the distribution of benefits derived from GR and TK utilisation is regulated by 
more than one international treaty. On this subject, different opinions can be found. For 
example, authors such as Rosendal and Steinar consider that the interaction, overlap and 
complexity in the ABS regime can be understood as an externality to the negotiation of ABS, 
and as a strategic move by negotiating parties.36 For their part, Esquinas Alcázar, Hilmi and 
López Noriega affirm that the CBD does not take into account the specific needs of the 
agricultural sector because it was weakly represented during its negotiations.37 Chapter 6 deals 
with this issue in more detail. Among other things, it concludes that complexity and 
fragmentation are the cause of the inefficiency and/or failure to adequately implement 
international laws and that this could be one of the causes for the limited application of ABS. 
 
3.2.3 Ex-situ conservation centres 
 
As presented in Section 1.2.2.c of Chapter 1, access to GR ex-situ has been a matter of 
great controversy. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the link between the CBD and the FAO 
forums was established in May 1992 during the final meeting of the CBD in Nairobi. A group of 
negotiators managed to draft a resolution on agricultural biodiversity to be incorporated in the 
Nairobi Final Act of the CBD. It became Resolution 3 of the Nairobi Final Act and recognised 
that certain matters were left out of the Convention, including access to GR collected and 
stored in ex-situ conservation centres before the CBD came into effect, and the realisation of 
farmers’ rights.38 
For this reason, it was requested that these matters be addressed within the FAO 
Forum.39 Resolution 3 of the Nairobi Final Act appears to suggest that, for those cases where 
the resources have been accessed through ex-situ collections, and whose materials were not 
collected in accordance with the CBD (because it had not yet entered into force), the ABS rules 
of the FAO should apply. However, taking into account the historical moment of the Nairobi 
Final Act, it seems to be clear that the intention of the negotiating parties was to create a 
 
36 Kristin Rosendal and Andresen Steinar, ‘Complexity of International Institutions: Implications for Access and 
Benefit Sharing’ (2015) 11 Trade Insight 28, 29. 
37 Esquinas Alcázar, Hilmi and López Noriega (n 28) 141. 
38 Nairobi Final Act of the Conference for the Adoption of the Agreed Text of the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(1992) 31 ILM 842. Resolution 3: The Interrelationship between the Convention on Biological Diversity and the 
Promotion of Sustainable Agriculture. The Conference, 
‘4. Further recognizes the need to seek solutions to outstanding matters concerning plant genetic resources 
within the Global System for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Sustainable Agriculture, in particular: (a) Access to ex-situ collections not acquired in accordance with this 
Convention; and (b) The question of farmers’ rights.’ 
39 Esquinas Alcázar, Hilmi and López Noriega (n 28) 141-142. 
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solution for the management of the biological material collected before the existence of the 
CBD, rather than to concede free access to GR ex-situ or to exclude it from ABS. 
 
3.2.4 Publicly-available TK 
 
Publicly-available TK refers to the knowledge that has been made accessible to the 
public. As explained in Section 1.2.2.e of Chapter 1, very often this situation is understood as 
referring to TK in the public domain. In fact, at the Expert Group Meeting on Article 10 of the 
Nagoya Protocol in 2016, it was considered that access to publicly-available TK is one of the 
situations in which it is not possible to grant or obtain PIC.40 It could, therefore, be interpreted 
that the GMBSM of Article 10 NP is making reference to TK in the public domain. Nonetheless, 
available TK and TK in the public domain are two completely different things. 
Much TK has been released to the public as a consequence of the practice of some 
social sciences professionals of entering ILCs’ territories to record, photograph, document, 
reproduce, and communicate to the public their traditional lifestyles, including TK.41 This 
situation could have two particular consequences. First, the ILCs may lose control over their 
TK. Secondly, in most cases, public communication of ILCs’ lifestyles has been without the 
consent of communities, or even without their knowledge. This thesis considers that it is not 
possible to ascertain the extent to which TK has been disclosed into the public domain without 
the consent or knowledge of ILCs. 
The public domain is a concept related to the exercise of intellectual IPRs. An asset 
belongs to the public domain when IPRs over it cannot be exercised, mainly because of the 
expiration of the term of protection. The immediate consequence of this is that goods in the 
public domain are available for anyone to use without limitation. Given this, the notion of 
public domain involves the prior existence of a right. This is important because, nowadays, the 
IPRs of ILCs over their TK have not yet been recognised through an international instrument. It 
is not, thus, accurate to claim that a right has ended when it has never existed. Moreover, 
under the IP rules, the holder of an IPR has the power to control the public communication of 
the IPR-protected good. In other words, before the time of protection has expired, it is only 
possible to make an IPR-protected good available to the public through the authorisation of 
the rightful holder. In applying these rules to TK, considering disclosed TK to be in the public 
domain seems contrary to the IP logic. 
Finally, publicly-available TK was not included in the NP for two main reasons. First, at 
the March 2010 sixth meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working Group on Access and 
Benefit-sharing, the EU opposed any reference to such knowledge in the Protocol arguing that 
this issue was being discussed in the IGC of WIPO.42 In other words, the EU considered that TK 
protection is an issue which belongs to the IP field. However, as explained in Chapter 6, one of 
 
40 COP-MOP (n 28) 5. 
41 ibid (n 8). 
42 CBD (n 29) 18. 
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the effects of fragmenting the same topic into different issues to be addressed in various 
forums could be the non-recognition of some of the rights of other negotiating parties.43 
Second, it was considered that sharing the benefits arising from the utilisation of available TK 
is difficult to achieve because a mechanism of this kind should operate without subjecting the 
knowledge to requirements of IP protection, while at the same time ensuring a distribution of 
benefits with TK right holders.44 
 
3.2.5 GR over which it is not possible to claim or obtain property rights 
 
During the negotiations of the Protocol it was suggested that the following be included: 
(i) GR in the Antarctic Treaty Area and (ii) marine GR from areas beyond national jurisdictions 
within the scope of ABS. Provider countries proposed adding the continued and new uses of 
lawfully-acquired GR before the CBD, and the African Group suggested that plant GR outside 
the MLS be included. The establishment of a trust fund to be used for conservation and 
sustainable use of global biodiversity was recommended to distribute benefits derived from 
the utilisation of such resources.45 
These initiatives were made within the discussions on the temporal and geographical 
scope of the NP, which included a review of the content of Article 7 of the Revised Draft:46 
 
‘Article 7. Contribution to Conservation and Sustainable Use: 
Parties shall encourage users and providers to direct benefits arising from the utilization of 
genetic resources towards the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity in 
support of the objectives of the Convention.’ 
 
This Article suggested that those directly benefiting from the use of GR should invest 
these benefits in the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, in line with the 
objectives of the CBD. 
However, and in spite of the fact that these proposals are at the root of the GMBSM of 
Article 10, proposing that the benefits derived from the use of resources in common areas and 
areas beyond national jurisdictions are invested for the general benefit is different from 
proposing that providers of resources in transboundary areas will not benefit from their 
utilisation. Areas without national jurisdiction are not the same as boundary areas between 
countries, and the absence of sovereign rights over a particular area is not the same as finding 
the same resource in-situ in more than one country. In the first case, countries cannot claim 
sovereign rights over the resources found there, whereas in the second case they can. 
 
43 Rosendal and Steinar (n 36) 29. 
44 Jungcurt and others (n 23) 15. 
45 ibid 5. 
46 CBD (n 29) 47. 
Annex I. Revised Draft Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair And Equitable Sharing of Benefits 
Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity. 
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The distribution of benefits in the GMBSM would be more logical if Article 10 had been 
maintained in its original version. It is reasonable to invest the benefits produced by the use of 
resources that cannot belong to any country in the global preservation of biodiversity. 
 
3.3 Utilisation without access (the use of databases of genetic sequence data and new 
technologies such as synthetic biology and bioinformatics) – a non-discussed issue 
 
Discussions over this matter could not be found in the reports of the negotiation 
meetings for the agreement on the NP.47 However, this issue is important because current 
technologies allow researchers to conduct scientific research on GR using the information 
contained in databases of genetic sequence data without the need to use the GR material. In 
other words, it is possible to utilise a GR without physically accessing it. 
Because access without utilisation is not included in ABS, but allegedly some 
technologies allow it (such as synthetic biology and bioinformatics), its inclusion within the 
scope of ABS is currently under consideration by the Parties to the CBD.48 Also, it is a topic 
debated by some scholars which has led to the creation of the term ‘digital biopiracy’, as 
explained in Section 1.2.2.d of Chapter 1. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The CBD acknowledges the right of states to concede access to, and benefit from, the 
utilisation of GR and associated TK, based on the recognition of their sovereign rights over 
natural resources within their frontiers. Despite the enormous achievement the creation of an 
international agreement on ABS represents, the lack of agreement on sensitive issues affected 
its design and have resulted in a reduced distribution of benefits. 
Regarding its enforceability, the first element to note is that the CBD operates as an 
aspirational policy-oriented agreement in which provisions are commonly expressed as general 
goals and policies rather than as concrete obligations. Because of this, it does not have 
enforcement mechanisms to impose sanctions on Parties which do not comply with its rules. 
Consequently, ABS compliance is in the hands of the parties through the development of 
national laws, and thus, dependent on the enforcement capacity of states, which is limited to 
their territories. 
The Nagoya Protocol reproduces the contents of the CBD and does not modify its 
obligations. As a result, like the CBD, it is limited to suggesting that compliance with ABS should 
 
47 Johannes Gnann and others, ‘Summary of the Ninth Meeting of the Working Group on Access and Benefit-
Sharing of the Convention on Biological Diversity: 22-28 March 2010’ (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, iisd Reporting 
Services, IISD, 31 March 2010, vol 9, n 503); Jungcurt and others (n 26); CBD (n 29). 
48 Jerome H Reichman, Paul F Uhlir and Tom Dedeurwaerdere, Governing Digitally Integrated Genetic Resources, 
Data, and Literature. Global Intellectual Property Strategies for a Redesigned Microbial Research Commons (CUP 
2016), 148. 
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be achieved by each state through the strengthening of domestic legislation and contractual 
obligations (MATs). 
Implementing the GMBSM proposed in Article 10 of the Protocol requires that the 
countries enter in new negotiations. For this reason, it is unclear whether the countries will 
negotiate and, if so, whether they could reach agreement on the way the GMBSM should 
operate. Chapter 7 contain few suggestions regarding the minimum elements needed for such 
a mechanism to operate and, on which, the countries can come to agreements. 
Another reason for the lack of efficiency of ABS is that many important aspects have 
been left out, particularly regulation of: (i) access ex-situ; (ii) resources in the public domain; 
(iii) the continued and new utilisations of resources accessed before the CBD; and (iv) 
utilisation without access. 
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CHAPTER 4. Content and scope of the ABS system of the CBD and the NP 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter concluded that the design of ABS could be considered as an 
element affecting the distribution of benefits. This is primarily due to its national/bilateral 
approach and because access ex-situ and the public domain were left out of its regulation. 
This chapter continues examining the content and scope of the elements of ABS to 
determine whether the content also could be a factor affecting the limited distribution of 
benefits, as evidenced in Chapter 1 in the number of MATs reported to the ABSCH. 
To this end, the chapter has been divided into five sections. The first examines the core 
concepts of ABS, the second its scope, the third its structural elements, the fourth its 
obligations, and the final section examines the parties involved in an ABS transaction. Each 
section starts with an explanation of the content of the CBD, followed by the clarifications 
made by the NP. 
The chapter concludes that ABS does not do justice to reality. For example, it only 
regulates access in-situ, it does not include the public domain, and its content does not take 
into consideration the way scientific research is carried out in practice and therefore the 
concepts of GR and utilisation, and the way in which GR and TK are accessed, do not correspond 
to the way in which scientists actually work. Consequently, the content of ABS appears to be 
another element undermining the distribution of benefits. 
 
2. The core concept of ABS 
 
There are countless definitions of ABS.1 All of them agree on the basic idea contained 
in the CBD and the NP: users of GR and TK have the obligation to distribute the benefits to the 
provider arising out of utilisation of the resources in a fair and equitable way. 
As briefly mentioned in Chapter 3, this obligation was included in the CBD with the 
objective of supporting the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. For this purpose, 
the distribution of benefits was established as a means of supplying monetary and non-
monetary aids to providers of GR and TK, who would invest those resources in the preservation 
of their biodiversity in-situ. This notion is integrated into the Preamble of the CBD, which states 
that ‘the provision of new and additional financial resources and appropriate access to relevant 
technologies can be expected to make a substantial difference in the world’s ability to address 
the loss of biological diversity’ for which ‘substantial investments are required’ and such an 
investment is justified by the fact that it is expected to produce ‘a broad range of 
environmental, economic and social benefits.’ 
 
1 For example it has been defined as ‘the action of giving a portion of advantages/profits derived from the use of 
genetic resources or traditional knowledge to resource providers.’ 
Doris Schroeder, ‘Benefit Sharing: It’s Time for a Definition’ (2007) 33 Journal of Medical Ethics 205, 206. 
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Despite the advantages that ABS is supposed to bring for the environment, the 
economy, and society, the Parties to the CBD do not seem to be sufficiently motivated to 
develop and/or implement its measures, as seen in Figure 1 of Chapter 2. Apart from the 
limitations derived from the way in which the system has been designed, it is possible that the 
implementation of ABS has also been hampered in part by failures in the content, scope, and 
conceptual and legal definition of the elements comprising the distribution of benefits. To be 
certain as to whether or not this is the case, details of the scope and elements of ABS are set 
out below. 
 
3. The scope of ABS 
 
The scope of ABS is contained in Articles 1 and 3 of the CBD and the NP, respectively. 
As mentioned throughout this thesis, these Articles create an obligation to share the benefits 
produced by the use of GR and associated TK. The scope of ABS is therefore determined by the 
ambit and content of the words ‘utilisation’, ‘genetic resource’, ‘traditional knowledge’, and 
‘fair and equitable distribution of benefits’. In this respect, the discussion does not relate to 
whether there is an obligation to share benefits (which appears to be clear), but rather on the 
definition of the situations in which an ABS obligation exists. 
Discussion about the length and scope of the elements triggering the obligation to 
distribute benefits continues to this day. Questions such as what a GR is, how to identify when 
a resource has been used as a genetic or a biological material, and whether the way in which 
it has been used (for example through the application of biotechnological tools) can serve to 
determine whether a sample was used as a genetic or a biological material remain 
unanswered.2 A similar situation surrounds the issue of how to integrate ABS with the rights of 
ILCs when TK has been used. 
Given this, this section studies the content of the elements comprising the scope of 
ABS. Such analysis will provide important insights into the current obstacles that countries 
might face when producing and implementing ABS measures. 
 
3.1 Utilisation 
 
There is an obligation to distribute benefits when GR and TK are ‘used’. Because of this, 
knowing the precise scope of the term ‘utilisation’ is vital in determining when an ABS 
obligation exists. Despite this, the CBD does not define ‘utilisation’ as it does other terms, such 
as biotechnology and GR. 
Nevertheless, while the concept of utilisation cannot be found in the Article of 
‘definitions’ in the CBD, its meaning can be extracted from the content of Article 15.7, which 
states that there is an obligation to share in a fair and equitable way ‘the results of research 
 
2 Thomas Greiber and others ‘An Explanatory Guide to the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing’ (IUCN 
Environmental Policy and Law Paper No. 83) (2012), 85. 
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and development and the benefits arising from the commercial and other utilisation’ of the 
resources accessed. It is therefore possible to argue that for ABS purposes, utilisation means 
conducting research, development and commercialisation activities, and other kinds of 
utilisation of GR and associated TK. For ten Kate and Laird, the use of the expression ‘other 
utilisation’ opens the door to considering activities other than research or commercialisation, 
such as horticulture, crop protection, or health care as ‘utilisation’.3 Moreover, as technology 
is in constant evolution, the expression ‘other utilisation’ might be intended to cover the 
application of technologies not yet developed, but that in the future will definitively involve 
the utilisation of GR and TK. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that the idea of benefitting from ‘other utilisations’ of 
the resources has its origin in the negotiations of the CBD. At that moment it was said that the 
distribution of benefits ‘can only be effective if it extends to products and processes developed 
along the value chain.’4 In this way, it was expected that the concept of utilisation in the CBD 
also covers a broad range of activities carried out when GR and TK are used, as well as their 
subsequent applications in the market. 
 
For its part, Article 2c of the Nagoya Protocol defines utilisation of GR in the following 
terms: 
 
‘(c) “Utilization of genetic resources” means to conduct research and development on the 
genetic and/or biochemical composition of genetic resources, including through the 
application of biotechnology as defined in Article 2 of the Convention;’ 
 
The Protocol’s definition mentions the application of biotechnology in such activities. 
Although it may seem obvious that the use of GR in any kind of scientific research falls within 
the scope of ABS, the reasons for including this clarification in the NP can be appreciated in the 
records of its negotiation. At that time, a number of developed countries, led by the USA and 
Japan, opposed the distribution of benefits arising from the use of GR and TK forming the basis 
of products obtained following the application of biotechnology.5 The countries also discussed 
the possibility of including ‘derivatives’ in the scope of ABS. These positions made negotiations 
difficult. Tsioumani explains that in order to reach agreement, the countries accepted the 
compromise package proposed by the Japanese COP Presidency. This included, in the Protocol, 
the definitions of ‘utilisation of genetic resources’, ‘biotechnology’, and ‘derivatives’ in relation 
 
3 Kerry ten Kate and Sarah Laird, The Commercial Use of Biodiversity. Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-
Sharing (Earthscan Publications Ltd 2000), 1-3. 
4 Greiber and others (n 2) 85. 
5 In this regard, it is precise to remember the position of the USA and Japan in the WTO by the time of discussions 
about the relation between trade and nature. These countries claim to have property rights over the natural 
resources modified using biotechnology, and at the same time they refused to accept the obligations of PIC and 
MAT of the CBD. 
Amy Dwyer, ‘Trade-Related Aspects on Intellectual Property Rights’ in Terence P Stewart (ed), The GATT Uruguay 
Round a Negotiating History (1986-1994) (Kluwer Law International 1999), 473. 
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to biotechnology, but did not include ‘derivatives’ within the scope of ABS and did not use this 
term in the rest of the Protocol’s text.6 Jungcurt and others affirm that this solution allows each 
country to decide whether to include derivatives in their ABS law, without creating this as a 
general obligation for all the Parties to the NP.7 (The implications of the inclusion of this term 
within the scope of ABS is explained in Section 3.2.3 of this chapter.) 
The question here is why the countries opposing the inclusion of derivatives within the 
scope of ABS allowed for the possibility of other countries including them in their national ABS 
laws, when there is the obligation for users to comply with the rules of provider countries. In 
other words, why did they allow this at national level but not international level when GR and 
TK have to be accessed according to the provider’s country law? Whatever their motivations, 
this appears to indicate that countries may be aware of the difficulties in achieving 
international compliance through the implementation of national or regional laws. Seemingly, 
the countries are willing to accept commitments regarding ABS to the extent that they are not 
included in international instruments, but in national laws. 
Finally, regarding TK, although it is true that TK is not mentioned in the concept of 
utilisation, it is reasonable to conclude that providers of TK are entitled to compensation every 
time their knowledge is used in association with a GR which has been utilised. 
 
3.1.1 Examples of utilisation in the CBD and the NP 
 
The notion of utilisation has two distinct elements: first the kind of resources that can 
be utilised in ABS contexts; and second the ways in which such resources can be used. 
According to the NP, ABS processes have to be conducted for the utilisation of GR, its 
biochemical composition, and associated TK. This mean that there is no obligation to share the 
benefits derived from the use of other resources, such as biological resources, human genetic 
resources,8 or TK not associated with GR or traditional cultural expression. 
In terms of the kind of activities that could be considered as ‘utilisation’, based on the 
contents of the CBD and the NP, it can be affirmed that utilisation is: 
 
i. Conducting research and development, including the use of different 
technologies, such as biotechnology; 
ii. The commercialisation of the products developed from the research and 
development activities; 
 
6 Elsa Tsioumani, ‘Access and Benefit Sharing -The Nagoya Protocol-’ (2010) 40 Environmental Policy and Law 288, 
289. 
7 Stefan Jungcurt and others, ‘Summary of the Resumed Ninth Meeting of the Working Group on Access and 
Benefit-Sharing of the Convention on Biological Diversity: 10-16 July 2010’ (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, iisd 
Reporting Services, IISD, 19 July 2010, vol 9, n 527), 6. 
8 The decision of excluding human genetic resources from the ABS framework is contained in paragraph 2 of the 
Decision II/2 of the Conference of the Parties to the CBD. 
CBD, Conference of the Parties (COP), ‘Access to Genetic Resources’ (1995) UNEP/CBD/COP/2/19, 22. 
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iii. The commercialisation of the resources regardless of whether they have 
resulted from the abovementioned activities or not; 
iv. The subsequent applications of the use of such resources; and 
v. Any other kind of utilisation, which could include, for example, horticulture, 
crop protection or health care, and the future use of technologies that have not 
yet been developed. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Accordingly, a list of examples of cases when GR and TK have been used is provided in 
Table 7. The Table shows that the ABS obligations can potentially apply to a broad range of 
This table has been made by the author based on the information contained in 
the document produced by the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working Group on Access 
and Benefit-Sharing of the CBD ‘Report of the Meeting of the Group of Legal 
and Technical Experts on Concepts, Terms, Working Definitions and Sectoral 
Approaches’ (2008) UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/7/2, 7-8, 12-13 
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research and development activities as well as their subsequent commercial applications in 
different fields (including plant breeding, cosmetics, medicine and the pharmaceutical 
industry). However, this is not an exhaustive list of the types of utilisation of these resources. 
In the opinion of Buck and Hamilton, the fact that a difference between ‘utilisation’ and 
‘subsequent applications and commercialisation’ of the resources is emphasised might imply 
that the activities following the use of GR and TK will need to be carried out on the basis of the 
content of what has been agreed on MATs. For them, this situation presupposes that, in turn, 
the parties to an ABS transaction should make a proper decision upon access, i.e., they should 
know or at least anticipate the potential future use of the resources so they can agree on their 
possible subsequent applications and commercialisation.9 However, in spite of the importance 
of appropriate planning for successful ABS negotiation, in practice, the impossibility of 
anticipating all the future consequences derived from the utilisation of GR and TK is one of the 
reasons that monitoring and control is so difficult. Perhaps because of that, the possibility of a 
change in the intended use of the resources from non-commercial to commercial has been 
contemplated as a probability in ABS transactions. However, monitoring and controlling the 
further utilisation of GR and TK (which increases the possibilities of benefitting from the use of 
these resources) would be better addressed if an ABS mechanism with some level of 
international reach was implemented, such as a GMBSM. 
It follows that although there is no definition of the term ‘utilisation’ in the CBD, and 
that this is mainly linked to research activities in the NP, the CBD contains enough elements 
for countries to establish a broad range of activities as ‘utilisation of GR and TK’ within their 
national ABS laws. 
 
3.1.2 Use of GR by ex-situ conservation centres 
 
Ex-situ conservation centres were initially created for storing and preserving samples 
of biodiversity. Because of this, there is debate as to whether or not the storing activities 
performed by these centres constitute ‘utilisation’ of GR and, consequently, if they have to 
comply with ABS obligations. In spite of their original intention, it cannot be denied that today, 
the vast majority of these centres have ceased to be merely storage facilities and perhaps have 
become the biggest providers of GR and their related information according to the figures 
published by the FAO regarding the number of samples accessed through the MLS.10 In 
addition, this is allegedly happening without following the ABS rules.11 Moreover, even in the 
 
9 Matthias Buck and Clare Hamilton, ‘The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilisation to the Convention on Biological Diversity’ (2011) 20 
RECIEL 47, 52. 
10 CBD, COP-MOP, ‘Update on recent developments under the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources 
for Food and Agriculture of relevance to the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilisation’ (2016) UNEP/CBD/NP/COP-MOP/2/INF/10. 
11 As noted by Myrna Watanabe, disclosing the scientific data obtained from the accessed resource is the benefit 
usually received by the ex-situ collections providing GR. This clearly leaves out the participation of providing 
countries in regards to the decision of granting access and the negotiation of the benefits to distribute. 
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case where ex-situ centres are solely storing biological materials, the Expert Group of Legal and 
Technical Experts on Concepts, Terms, Working Definitions and Sectoral Approaches of the 
CBD considers the activities of collection and conservation as types of use of GR (see Table 7 
above). 
Moreover, Article 13.1 of the ITPGRFA, establishing the MLS, acknowledges that 
accessing the resources ‘constitutes itself a major benefit’ of the ABS system. Following this 
logic, even in the case where an ex-situ centre only acts as a storage facility, the resources it 
preserves should be acquired under the CBD rules. It also should be remembered that ex-situ 
centres have to gain authorisation of the country of origin when acting as providers of GT. 
Nevertheless, it seems that the absence of regulation for ex-situ conservation centres 
in the CBD poses many constraints and difficulties for ABS. This is why it can be affirmed, that 
their regulation is crucial for a better implementation of ABS. 
 
3.2 Genetic Resources (GR) 
 
The subject matter of ABS (GR and TK) is another crucial element that serves the 
purpose of determining when the obligation to distribute benefits arises. An analysis of this 
element starts in this section with the examination of the concept of GR, preceded by a short 
discussion of the concept of biological diversity. It should be noted that this analysis does not 
include considerations of GR and TK as information. This is not due to a lack of consistency in 
such a proposal, but because this section is intended to analyse the contents of the CBD and 
the NP. The discussion of GR and TK as information can be found in Chapter 7, where the 
proposals for the improvement of ABS are analysed. 
Although the ABS scope does not include biological resources, the distinction made in 
the CBD between biological resources and GR might be difficult to identify in practice, because 
they are contained in biological resources. This means, that, when someone gains access to a 
GR, in practice, he/she is sometimes accessing a biological resource. Thus, the determination 
of the type of the resource that has been accessed (biological resource or GR) will depend on 
its use, with respect to what is understood as the ‘functional units of heredity’ (this will be 
explained later in this section). Hence, it is important to know the difference between these 
concepts. 
According to the CBD, biological resources ‘includes genetic resources, organisms or 
parts thereof, populations, or any other biotic component of ecosystems with actual or 
potential use or value for humanity.’ That is, GR form just one part of many elements 
comprising biological resources. Consequently, it is understandable that accessing and using 
biological resources does not necessarily imply that a GR has been used and, therefore, that a 
benefit-sharing obligation has emerged. 
GR are defined in the CBD as ‘any material containing functional units of heredity.’ 
 
Myrna Watanabe, ‘The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing. International Treaty Poses Challenges for 
Biological Collections’ (2015) 65 BioScience 543, 548. 
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Notably ‘functional units of heredity’ serves to determine what a GR is, and that is why it is 
important to understand what this concept means. Tvedt and Young observe that this term is 
not defined anywhere in the CBD, and was selected by policymakers rather than genetic 
scientists, so that it was never clarified.12 From a technical definition, Glowka, Burhenne-
Guilmin, and Synge understand that ‘functional units of heredity’ incorporates DNA and RNA.13 
However, in their opinion, finding a definition of this concept ‘is made more difficult by the fact 
that the CBD does not use the term gene or DNA-molecule or any other more definite term, 
possibly in an effort to maximize the flexibility of Article 15 and enable it to cover the evolving 
state-of-the-art in the utilization of genetic material.’14 As observed in Chapter 2, this lack of 
clarity has generated the inclusion of different elements within the ABS scope in national laws 
(see Table 1). Nevertheless, the mention of ‘functional units of heredity’ as the differentiating 
element in this concept seems to suggest that a good starting point for the establishment of 
ABS obligations could be the use of biological materials containing these units. 
To the concept of the CBD, Article 2c of NP adds the ‘biochemical composition of 
genetic resources’ and defines ‘derivatives’ in connection with the biotechnological use of 
GR.15 However, the Protocol does not provide a concept for ‘biochemical composition’ nor 
does it mention ‘derivatives’ in any other section of its text. This legal vacuum has been filled 
by the Parties to the NP through their national laws, and may result in three consequences: (i) 
variation between national laws and a flexible understanding of this notion;16 (ii) an increase 
in the transactional costs of the ABS processes due to fragmentation and complexity; and (iii) 
difficulties in tracking and monitoring the use of the resources, since not all countries will 
report the same activities because ‘access’ and ‘utilisation’ can be interpreted by each Party 
and, therefore, these concepts could be different from one country to another. 
Doubts about the possible negative effects of the concept of GR on ABS transactions 
 
12 Morten Walløe Tvedt and Tomme Young, ‘Beyond Access: Exploring Implementation of the Fair and Equitable 
Sharing Commitment in the CBD’ (IUCN - The World Conservation Union, Environmental Policy and Law Paper No. 
67/2, Fridtjof Nansen Institute, ABS Series No. 2, 2007) p. 54 
13 Lyle Glowka, Françoise Burhenne-Guilmin, and Hugh Synge, A Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(IUCN - The World Conservation Union, Environmental Policy and Law Paper No. 30, 1994) p. 21-22 ; (n 12) p. 54 
14 (n 12) pp. 54-55 
15 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from 
their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity (adopted 29 October 2010, entered into force 12 
October 2014) A-30619 UNTS (Nagoya Protocol). 
‘Article 2. Use of Terms: 
d. “Biotechnology” as defined in Article 2 of the Convention means any technological application that uses 
biological systems, living organisms, or derivatives thereof, to make or modify products or processes for specific 
use; 
e. “Derivative” means a naturally occurring biochemical compound resulting from the genetic expression or 
metabolism of biological or genetic resources, even if it does not contain functional units of heredity.’ 
16 For example, interpreting Article 2 of the Nagoya Protocol Costa Rica has determined that access is the ‘action 
to obtain samples of components of biodiversity, wild or domesticated, in in-situ or ex-situ conditions, or to obtain 
associated knowledge, with basic aims of research, bioprospecting or commercial use’. (Costa Rica, Biodiversity 
Law No. 7788, May 27 1998, Art 7). Accordingly, it could be understood that users must have to conduct an ABS 
process to access any component of the Costa Rican biodiversity. This means that Costa Rica is required to make 
an enormous inversion in economic and human capital to reinforce its institutional structure and to respond to 
all these access applications adequately. 
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are frequently expressed (see, for example, Rosell and Chaparro in Section 3.2.2). Furthermore, 
the inclusion in the NP of the aforementioned aspects has raised the question of whether the 
biochemical composition of GR expands the scope of ABS, and whether derivatives are also 
included in it. These issues increase doubts about the actual extent of such a concept. For 
example, it may be questioned whether GR incorporate more components than functional 
units of heredity, and therefore raises the question of whether something has been excluded 
from the scope of ABS. 
For the purpose of clarifying these doubts, the following sections first consider the 
concepts used in the Protocol to explain the term utilisation and try to understand them from 
a biological perspective. Following that, there is a review of the concepts of GR included in the 
CBD and the NP, and then a closing with an analysis of the notion of derivatives. 
 
3.2.1 Understanding the concepts of genetic composition of GR and the biological 
composition of GR using notions from the field of biology  
 
A. The genetic composition of GR 
 
This term ‘genetic composition’ refers to the genetic information found in nuclear DNA 
(deoxyribonucleic acid).17 According to the CBD, this information can be found in any material 
of plant, animal, microbial or other origin containing functional units of heredity. This might 
include, for example: 
 
• Mitochondria, which are structures common to all cells (including reproductive 
cells) that are only inherited from the mother;18 
• Viruses, which, despite having a genetic composition, cannot be classified as 
nuclear or mitochondrial because viruses have no distinct nucleus or 
mitochondria;19 
• Bacteria, protozoa, fungi, and plasmids.20 
 
 
 
 
17 Bruce Alberts and others, Molecular Biology of the Cell (3rd edn, Garland Science 1994), 173. 
18 Rob Ogden and Adrian Linacre, ‘Wildlife Forensic Science: A Review of Genetic Geographic Origin Assignment’ 
(2015) 18 Forensic Science International: Genetics 152. 
19 Michael Madigan, John Martinko and Jack Parker, Brock Biología de Los Microorganismos (10 edn, Pearson 
Educacion 2003). 
20 Note that the term ‘bacteria’ was once conventionally employed (and is still sometimes used) in relation to all 
the prokaryotes (simple, unicellular organisms lacking a structured cell nucleus), but that it is now widely accepted 
that the Archaea (formerly known as archaebacteria) are in fact so fundamentally different as to constitute a 
completely separate domain. Along with the true bacteria and the eukaryotes (more complex organisms), this 
makes the three such domains in all. 
Yoshizumi Ishino and Sonoko Ishino, ‘DNA Replication in Archaea, the Third Domain of Life’ in David Stuart (ed), 
The mechanisms of DNA Replication (InTech 2013). 
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B. The biochemical composition of GR 
 
This concept may indicate that genes are fragments of DNA. Also, and more likely, it 
might be illustrating that any gene has a particular sequence of nucleotide pairs (or 
nitrogenous bases: adenine, guanine, thymine and cytosine), which codify to produce 
particular proteins (every three nucleotides codify to an amino acid, and proteins are long 
chains of amino acids).21 For example, the proteins of milk, meat, and beans are the products 
of genes that are expressed so that cells of the cow or the bean plant produce these proteins. 
Currently, there are biotechnology techniques that allow the identification of a particular gene 
through its study and comparison with other genes from the same or different individuals. The 
economic interest in this kind of technology and its applications include, for example, the 
opportunity to create genetically modified organisms (GMOs) with special characteristics, such 
as exceptional levels of protein production. 
There seems to be no difference between the notions of the genetic composition of GR 
and the biochemical composition of GR. Indeed, these terms are referring to GR from two 
different perspectives. The first points to genetic information, whereas the second is related 
to the uses and applications of GR. The intention to differentiate between the genetic and 
biochemical composition of GR in the NP may have been to make clear that the use of 
biotechnology forms part of the scope of ABS. As indicated earlier, some developed countries 
intend to put biotechnological products outside the scope of ABS. With that purpose, they 
opposed ABS for products obtained from the use of GR and TK in biotechnological processes.22 
In this sense, the concept of biochemical composition of GR introduced by the NP does 
not expand the scope of ABS in the CBD. However, it should be noted that there are DNA 
Regions without genes that codify proteins. They contain short tandem repeats (STR) which 
have so far been used for the forensic analysis of remains, the identification of criminals, and 
paternity tests.23 Apart from these uses, the commercial applications of such Regions are not 
yet clear. Nevertheless, this does not mean that new applications could not be realized in the 
future. In fact, this is an example of genetic material that does not contain functional units of 
heredity, but has practical application that has been left out of the scope of ABS. Based on this, 
it can be argued that only including the genetic material containing functional units of heredity 
limits the possibility of providers benefitting from the use of their resources; and it is for this 
reason that it could be argued that the concept of GR is a factor contributing to the small 
number of MATs. 
 
3.2.2 Understanding the concept of GR in the CBD and the Protocol 
 
The CBD has ascribed two primary meanings to GR. First, as the ‘material from any 
 
21 Herve Seligmann (ed), DNA Replication. Current Advances. Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology (InTech 
2011). 
22 Dwyer (n 5) 473. 
23 Mahmut Caliskan (ed), Genetic Diversity in Microorganisms (InTech 2012). 
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biological source where units of heredity are operating or having a function,’24 i.e., as any 
biological material containing units of heredity. Second, as ‘natural resources needed or used 
for their genetic material and not for their other attributes.’25 Without adding something new, 
this second approach emphases the fact that all biological resources contain GR. For this 
reason, in practice, the difference between a biological resource and a GR is not the resource 
itself, but the way in which the resource is used.26 
For example, traditional plant breeding is a technique used by farmers to improve 
resistance to pests and diseases and enhance the diversity and quality of agriculture and food 
products. It consists of the planting of certain varieties chosen through the observation of their 
particular characteristics. Farmers preserve the best seeds from the best plants from each 
planting for sowing, and continue to do this for generation after generation of the same plants. 
When doing this, farmers improve the characteristics they want in these plants. These seeds 
have the potential to be used as biological or genetic resources. When they are used for 
seeding, they are used as a biological resource. On the contrary, when the same seeds are used 
for research, for example, exploring the genetic characteristics that determine their resistance 
to pests and diseases, they are classed as GR. Allegedly, this is one aspect that makes 
monitoring and tracking the use of GR and TK difficult. As this example illustrates, the accessed 
resource is a seed, and it is the way in which that seed is used which determines whether it is 
regarded as a biological or genetic resource. 
The set of definitions included in the CBD and the NP are the result of a long and hard 
negotiation process, demonstrating that ABS is a controversial topic. In the opinion of Rosell, 
the definition of GR is intentionally narrow and/or incomplete, so that valuable genetic 
information that could be obtained from materials other than those containing functional units 
of heredity has been left out of ABS transactions.27 For Chaparro, the concept of GR has two 
general problems: (i) an artificial separation between biological and genetic resources;28 and 
(ii) the use of classical concepts of genetics that were well established at the time of the CBD, 
which limit ABS to the use of molecular tools.29 
In their opinion, such faults can significantly reduce the scope of ABS. On the one hand, 
it is argued that non-functional units of heredity must be included in the concept of GR because 
 
24 WIPO, Secretariat of the World Intellectual Property Organisation, ‘Glossary of Key Terms Related to Intellectual 
Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Traditional Cultural Expressions’ (2015) 
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/30/INF/7, Annex 16. 
25 Greiber and others (n 2) 6. 
26 UICN, ‘Recursos Biológicos Y Recursos Genéticos: El reto de diferenciarlos y regularlos’ (2013) 
<https://www.iucn.org/es/content/recursos-biol%C3%B3gicos-y-recursos-gen%C3%A9ticos-el-reto-de-
diferenciarlos-y-regularlos> accessed 6 October 2016. 
27 Monica Rosell, ‘Access to Genetic Resources: A Critical Approach to Decision 391 “Common Regime on Access 
to Genetic Resources”’ (1997) 6 RECIEL 274, 276. 
28 In other words, a biological resource is the expression of the genetic information it has. Thus, all biological 
resources contain genetic resources within themselves. Therefore, accessing to a biological resource also implies 
accessing to their genetic resources. 
29 Alejandro Chaparro Giraldo, ‘Definiciones de Acceso a Recursos Genéticos en la Legislación Colombiana y sus  
efectos en la Investigación Científica’ (2016) 21 Acta Biológica Colombiana 305, 305-306. 
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the constant advances of molecular biology mean that anything considered without function 
today may have a use tomorrow. An example of this is that GR, as resources, did not exist 
before biotechnology. More recently, this is the case with research on micro-RNAs, small non-
coding sequences, which do not contain functional units of heredity or genes, but play an 
important role in controlling gene expression through complementary mRNA degradation.30 
For example, controlling gene expression is essential for the production of crops or animals 
with a high protein content. In this regard, such non-functional units of heredity are 
fundamental for the expression of the proteins which provide particular phenotypic 
characteristics to biological resources; in this example, crops or animals with a high protein 
content. On the other hand, the definition of GR in the CBD excludes any activity in genetics 
that uses conventional tools, such as hybridisation and selection.31 
From a different point of view, scholars such as Tvedt and Schei consider that the 
concept of GR in the CBD can be interpreted in a broad sense. In their approach, the term 
‘functional’ qualifies the object, thus scientific advances can link the concept of GR to ‘the 
scientific and technological understanding of what is working or operating as functional units 
of heredity’. Additionally, they propose that functional ‘could refer both to the genetic 
structure per se and to the information encoded in the DNA sequence (nucleotide) that can be 
screened and transferred into a digital form and become functional in a new, digital form.’32 
Although this thesis agrees with the position of these authors that the CBD’s concept 
of functionality could be interpreted in a broader sense to admit that ‘having a role in 
controlling gene expression’ actually suggests that so-called ‘non-functional’ units of heredity 
might themselves be regarded as ‘functional’ after all, it also acknowledges that when it comes 
to practice this flexibility is more difficult to achieve. Resistance to including new 
interpretations of GR has been addressed in Section 1.2.2 A of Chapter 1. 
 
3.2.3 Derivatives 
 
Derivatives are one of the non-agreed topics of ABS. During the Protocol’s negotiations, 
developed countries requested that derivatives be outside of the scope of ABS, and proposed 
that the use of GR be considered as ‘solely a commodity’.33 As a result, derivatives remain 
outside the scope of ABS, and there were no modifications to the concept of GR. Nevertheless, 
developed countries argued that the distribution of benefits arising from the utilisation of 
derivatives could be possible if agreed and recorded in MATs by the parties involved in each 
 
30 Álvaro Pérez Quintero and Camilo López, ‘Identificación de Elementos cisRegulatorios y Predicción 
Bioinformática de Factores de Transcipción Involucrados en la Regulación de miARNs en Plantas’ (2013) 18 Acta 
Biológica Colombiana 107. Cited in: Chaparro Giraldo (n 29) 309. 
31 Chaparro Giraldo (n 29) 309. 
32 Morten Walløe Tvedt and Peter Johan Schei. ‘The term ‘genetic resources’: flexible and dynamic while providing 
legal certainty?’ (ch 2) in Sebastian Oberthür and G. Kristin Rosendal (eds), Global Governance of Genetic 
Resources: Access and Benefit Sharing after the Nagoya Protocol (Routledge, New York, 2014) 20. 
33 Jungcurt and others (n 7) 4-8. 
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particular case.34 However, because derivatives are not within the scope of ABS, provider 
countries may experience difficulties in receiving the benefits derived from their use, even if 
they are recorded in MATs. 
Derivatives are still a matter of dispute, and doubts have been raised as to whether 
their utilisation results in ABS obligations. For example, according to Tsioumani, the concept of 
derivatives in combination with Article 3 of the NP (which defines the scope of ABS), implies 
that derivatives are covered by ABS.35 On the contrary, Schroeder considers that derivatives 
are excluded from the scope of ABS because, even if it is accepted that they are included, it is 
still necessary to establish how they relate to GR as well as the type of practices and innovations 
in which they can be used.36 
Derivatives are a matter of ongoing concern and constant discussion. This is a possible 
indication that the market for products developed using derivatives of GR is bigger than the 
market of products developed from GR as described in the CBD, or at least, big enough to still 
be a matter of discussion between the Parties to the CBD. 
 
3.3 Traditional Knowledge (TK) 
 
The second element comprising the subject matter of the scope of ABS is TK. This can 
be understood as the knowledge developed by ILCs regarding the use and management of the 
biodiversity located in the territory in which they live. This is a complex concept with specific 
characteristics that interact with other notions such as traditional cultural expression and 
indigenous and local communities. With the aim of providing a better understanding of TK, the 
following sections explain its meaning and the meaning of its interrelated concepts. 
 
3.3.1 Conceptualising TK 
 
The legal approach to the protection of TK has been made through intellectual property 
rights (IPRs). This branch of the law, commonly split between industrial property and authors’ 
rights/copyright, serves to protect intangible goods, typically associated with creation or 
innovation, by awarding property rights over them. IPRs can protect certain cultural 
manifestations, such as works of art, pieces of music, dances, and handicraft (via copyright, 
trademark, or design law), while certain types of knowledge concerning the use and 
 
34 Johannes Gnann and others, ‘Summary of the Ninth Meeting of the Working Group on Access and Benefit-
Sharing of the Convention on Biological Diversity: 22-28 March 2010’ (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, iisd Reporting 
Services, IISD, 31 March 2010, vol 9, n 503), 5; CBD, Group of Technical and Legal Experts on Concepts Terms 
Working Definitions and Sectoral Approaches in the Context of the International Regime on Access and Benefit-
Sharing, ‘Compilation of Submissions by Parties, International Organisations, Indigenous and Local Communities 
and Stakeholders on Concepts, Terms, Working Definitions and Sectoral Approaches. Addendum. Submission 
from the Government of Japan’ (2008) UNEP/CBD/ABS/GTLE/1/2/Add.1, 2. 
35 Tsioumani (n 6) 289. 
36 Schroeder (n 1) 206. 
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management of biodiversity may be protectable (patents, plant breeders’ rights, or 
geographical indications). 
However, it is not possible to protect all the cultural expressions of ILCs either 
exclusively as industrial property or via authors’ rights/copyright law. That is why, for their 
protection, the adoption of two sui generis schemes were proposed: one similar to industrial 
property (relevant to scientific knowledge about biodiversity), and the other similar to authors’ 
rights/copyright (relevant for creative expression). 
This approach has apparently had a significant impact on the conceptualisation of TK. 
In order to make protection possible through the proposed twin-track sui generis systems, the 
cultural expression of ILCs has also been divided in two: the term Traditional Knowledge (TK) is 
only used to identify the knowledge about biodiversity, while the term Traditional Cultural 
Expressions is used for cultural expressions which are comparable to works of art. For ILCs, 
there is no such fragmentation of their culture. On the contrary, these communities have a 
holistic view of their world, where everything is a piece of an existent whole. Because of that, 
the fragmentation of their culture is artificial, and this may be a contributory factor in the 
difficulties facing the distribution of benefits derived from the use of TK. 
However, as this thesis sets as its principal focus ABS concerning the use of TK 
associated with GR, traditional cultural expression and any interrelated subjects are excluded 
from this study, irrespective of the difficulty in separating them from TK. 
 
3.3.2 The concept of TK in national laws 
 
There is a significant variation in definitions and approaches to TK. There is also the 
absence of any consensus among laws, international instruments, and academics concerning 
the definition, scope, and content of TK, as previously stated in Section 1.2.1.b of Chapter 1. 
At national level, conceptualisation about TK shows a similar approach to that used in 
the CBD. For example, some national laws consider TK as knowledge about biodiversity 
(Botswana,37 Brazil,38 and Peru39), which has been collectively created and held by indigenous 
or local communities (Botswana,40 Brazil,41 Burundi,42 Bhutan,43 and Peru44). A few countries 
also include traditional cultural expressions in the definition of TK (Burundi,45 Bhutan,46 and 
 
37 Botswana, Industrial Property Act, 2010, (Act No. 08 of 2010), Section 2. 
38 Brazil, Presidency of the Federative Republic of Brazil. Civil House. Legal Sub-Office. Law 13, 123, 2015, Article 
2. 
39 Peru, Law No 27811 of July 2002, introducing a Protection Regime for the Collective Knowledge of Indigenous 
Peoples derived from Biological Resources 2002, Art. 2. 
40 Botswana (n 37) Section 2. 
41 Brazil (n 38) Art. 2. 
42 Burundi, Law No 1/13 of July 28, 2009, on Industrial Property in Burundi, Art. 2. 
43 Bhutan, The Biodiversity Act of Bhutan of 2003, Art. 3. 
44 Peru (n 39) Art. 2. 
45 Burundi (n 42) Art. 2. 
46 Bhutan (43) Art. 3. 
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Panama).47 
Despite the many instruments defining TK from a variety of perspectives, it is possible 
to identify some common elements in these: 
 
i. It involves knowledge about the use, management, and preservation of natural 
resources, in applications such as ethno-medicine, agriculture and water 
management; 
ii. It is holistic, in the sense that TK is an inseparable part of the traditional 
community’s worldview, which is perceived as a whole; 
iii. It originates and is held collectively; 
iv. It is dynamic, evolving over time; 
v. It is learned through observation and experience; 
vi. It is mainly recorded and transmitted orally, and sometimes it can be codified;48 
vii. It is inter-generational because it is transmitted from one generation to the next, 
and it is intra-generational because it may be shared simultaneously by different 
age groups (grandfathers, sons, and grandsons for example); 
viii. It has been exercised as perpetual property. TK has belonged to ILCs since the 
beginning of humankind; 
ix. It could be disclosed49 or undisclosed; 
x. Depending upon the rules of each traditional community, TK may have different 
levels of disclosure inside the community: (i) ‘public TK’ shared by all community 
members, located in the community’s public domain; (ii) ‘specialised TK’, which 
although not confidential, is not shared by all the community members, because it 
tends to relate to gender and/or role (for example midwives); and, (iii) ‘secret TK’ 
known and carefully preserved by a limited group within the community, (for 
example shamans) and shared only with the next keeper or group of keepers; and 
xi. It is possible that more than one community shares the same TK: (i) owing to its 
 
47 Panama. Law No 20 of June 26, 2000, on Special System for the Collective Intellectual Property Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples for the Protection and Defence of their Cultural Identity and their Traditional Knowledge, Art. 
1. 
48 ‘Codified TK has been understood as TK, which is in some systematic and structured form, in which the 
knowledge is ordered, organised, classified and categorised in some manner. For example, in the field of 
traditional medicine, the WHO distinguishes between (i) codified systems of traditional medicine, which have 
been disclosed in writing in ancient scriptures and are fully in the public domain (e.g. traditional Chinese medicine 
disclosed in ancient Chinese medical texts); and (ii) non-codified traditional medicinal knowledge which has not 
been fixed in writing, often remains undisclosed by traditional knowledge holders, and is passed on in oral 
traditions from generation to generation. 
Codified TK is different than the TK that has been recorded in written form and because it is accessible to the 
public, is considered for some to be in the public domain.’ WIPO (n 24) Annex 4-5. 
49 Disclosed traditional knowledge refers to TK which is accessible to persons beyond the traditional community. 
Such TK might be widely accessible to the public and might be accessed through physical documentation, the 
internet and other kinds of telecommunication or recording. It also might be disclosed with or without the 
authorization of the ILCs who had created, developed and/or maintained the knowledge. 
ibid Annex 10-11. 
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association with the use and management of natural resources located in a specific 
environment, it is possible that different communities located in similar 
environmental conditions can develop similar TK independently; and, (ii) ILCs 
usually share their resources and knowledge with each other. 
 
3.3.3 The concept of TK in the CBD 
 
The CBD establishes the rules for distributing the benefits arising from the use of TK 
associated with GR. Because of this, of all the definitions that exist for TK, the concept offered 
in the CBD has particular relevance for this analysis. According to the Convention: 
 
‘Article 8. Each Contracting Party shall, as far as possible and as appropriate: 
(j) Subject to its national legislation, respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, 
innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying 
traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity and promote their wider application with the approval and involvement of 
the holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage the 
equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilisation of such knowledge, 
innovations and practices.’ 
 
Two main elements are identifiable in this definition. The first refers to the knowledge 
itself and the second relates to the group of people that create or preserve this knowledge. 
First, TK is identified as the ‘knowledge, innovations and practices…relevant for the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity’. It may be deduced, therefore, that 
the Convention’s scope is confined to TK concerning knowledge, innovation and practices 
associated with biodiversity. Second, TK is that which has been created and/or preserved by 
‘indigenous or local communities embodying traditional lifestyles’. 
Despite the coexistence of these two elements, it appears that it is the nature of the 
community that creates and/or preserves the TK that prevails over the characteristics of this 
knowledge. In other words, it seems that the ‘traditional’ nature of the community creating TK 
is what characterises that knowledge as ‘traditional knowledge’, and allocates specific rights 
and economic expectations in favour of the communities having a ‘traditional’ lifestyle. In other 
words, according to the CBD, the opportunity to claim property rights over TK and 
compensation for its use is dependent on being considered as an indigenous or local 
community embodying a ‘traditional’ lifestyle. 
The ‘traditional lifestyle’ is apparently the most important aspect of the concept of the 
CBD, since this characterises a community as having the right to benefit from the use of their 
TK and the knowledge produced by them as ‘traditional knowledge’. Consequently, in the 
terms of the Convention, TK is that which has been created or preserved by ILCs having a 
traditional lifestyle. In addition, the CBD contains no definition or indication of any special 
characteristics of such communities beyond the mention of their traditional lifestyles. This is 
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something to be resolved by the Parties to the CBD through their national laws. Section 6.2 of 
this chapter explains the way in which the concept of ILCs may be understood. 
 
4. The structural elements of ABS 
 
Access is conditional on the prior informed consent (PIC) of the Party providing the 
resource. The terms for accessing and distributing the benefits arising from the utilisation of 
the accessed resource must be recorded in mutually agreed terms (MATs). This is the very basis 
of ABS—a system founded on the idea of asking for permission before using someone else’s 
property, with the consequent duty of sharing with the owner the benefits resulting from the 
utilisation of their property. In order to understand if the conceptualisation of PIC and MAT is 
a factor which adds to the difficulties of realising ABS, a more detailed explanation of the 
meaning of its elements is provided below. 
 
4.1 Prior Informed Consent (PIC) 
 
4.1.1 The origins of the concept of PIC 
 
The concept of PIC was originally derived from medical ethics, which recognises the 
right of patients to decide whether or not to undergo a medical treatment, for which they 
should be fully informed about the risks and benefits. PIC has evolved from this concept to 
become the required condition for accessing GR and TK which leads to utilisation, and the 
consequent distribution of benefits derived from such utilisation. 
For ILCs particularly, this concept has evolved to integrate the general principle of 
participation in decision-making and involvement in the formulation, implementation, and 
evaluation of works and programs affecting them.50 In this regard, it has been argued that PIC 
is a principle that functions as protective of and instrumental to the enjoyment of the rights 
recognised in favour of such communities.51 This could also be the reason why, for many 
authors, PIC derives from the same right of self-determination,52 which is understood to be the 
 
50 ibid Annex 30-31. 
51 James Anaya, ‘Technical Review of Key Intellectual Property-Related Issues of the WIPO Draft Instruments on 
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Traditional Cultural Expressions’ (2016) 
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/29/INF/10, Annex 3. 
52 In this regard, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1996, 
entered into force 03 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR), states in Article 1.1 that: ‘[a]ll peoples have the right of 
self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development’, and in Article 1.2 that ‘[a]ll peoples may, for their own ends, freely 
dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international 
economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a 
people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.’ Furthermore, the ILCs’ right to determine their development 
is articulated in Article 31 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (adopted 13 
September 2007), which states that ‘indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop 
their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions, as well as the manifestations of 
their sciences, technologies and cultures, including human and genetic resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge 
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founding principle of indigenous peoples’ rights53 as well as a collective human right. As a part 
of the right to self-determination, which derives from the right to autonomy or self-
government, ILCs have the right to manage and regulate the use of their GR, TK, and traditional 
cultural expressions, in accordance with their customs, laws, and traditions. The exercise of 
such a right implies that they can determine to what extent and under what conditions these 
resources can be accessed and used by others,54 and they have the right to withdraw their 
consent. (Some examples of this are provided in Section 2.1.1 of Chapter 1.) 
In addition, PIC from countries of origin of GR has been linked to the exercise of 
sovereign rights.55 
 
4.1.2 The concept of PIC 
 
PIC, sometimes referred as to ‘free, prior and informed consent’ (FPIC), is usually found 
as a right or principle in international instruments in the environmental field. Within the 
particular frame of the CBD, access is conditional on PIC granted by the party providing GR 
and/or TK. Because of this, PIC has been understood as the permission granted by the right 
holder of GR and/or TK, given before access, and conducted with the aim of using the resource 
accessed. 
Because PIC is considered as the mechanism for assisting the achievement of the 
objectives of the CBD, its correct implementation is of great significance.56 However, the CBD 
did not provide a solution for cases of access without PIC. Although it could be claimed that 
those situations can be addressed by the mechanism proposed in Article 10 of the Nagoya 
Protocol, as mentioned earlier, the establishment of such a mechanism was aimed at solving 
situations in which PIC could not be obtained for reasons associated with accessing GR and TK 
in transboundary situations, or because the resources were accessed before the CBD came 
into force. 
 
 
 
 
of the properties of fauna and flora, oral traditions, literatures, designs, sports and traditional games and visual 
and performing arts. They also have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their intellectual property 
over such cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, and traditional cultural expressions.’ 
53 Tara Ward, ‘The Right to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent:  Indigenous Peoples’ Participation Rights within 
International Law’ (2011) 10 Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 54, 55. 
54 Anaya (51) Annex 2-3. 
55 Nagoya Protocol (n 12). 
‘Article 6. Access to Genetic Resources: 
1. In the exercise of sovereign rights over natural resources, and subject to domestic access and benefit-sharing 
legislation or regulatory requirements, access to genetic resources for their utilization shall be subject to the prior 
informed consent of the Party providing such resources that is the country of origin of such resources or a Party 
that has acquired the genetic resources in accordance with the Convention, unless otherwise determined by that 
Party.’ 
56 Stuart Harrop, ‘“Living in Harmony with Nature”? Outcomes of the 2010 Nagoya Conference of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity’ (2011) 23 Journal of Environmental Law 118, 127.  
CHAPTER 4. Content and scope of the ABS system of the CBD and the NP 
 
 
 
 
 
118 
4.1.3 PIC obtained from ILCs 
 
The NP establishes that PIC for accessing TK have to be obtained from ILCs, and that 
they have the right to determine the competent authority for doing so. However, as this right 
was not completely clear in the CBD, and almost twenty years elapsed between the CBD (1992) 
and the NP (2010), some countries determined, for example, that this PIC could be obtained 
from the ILC that owns the knowledge, or from a national authority on its behalf.57 While today 
it seems to be clear that PIC should be granted only by ILCs,58 it should be remembered that 
ILCs can exercise those rights to the extent they are recognised in the national law of the 
country in which they live. 
 
4.1.4 PIC and the Human Rights of ILCs 
 
PIC is linked to the human rights of ILCs. This is because the concept of PIC is also 
contained in several international human rights instruments59 in which it is associated with 
cultural rights and the right to non-discrimination.60 The latter recognises ILCs’ ‘inherent and 
prior rights to their lands and resources’ that are derived from ‘their legitimate authority to 
require that third parties enter into an equal and respectful relationship with them, based on 
the principle of informed consent.’61 In this regard, PIC further supports the recognition of the 
property rights of ILCs over their lands as well as the natural resources therein. The latter is a 
consequence of the acceptance of their ancestral presence in the territories they occupy, and 
the consequent right to participate in the political and economic life of the states in which they 
 
57 For example, this is the case of the Decision No 391 of 1996, establishing the Common Regime on Access to 
Genetic Resources of the Andean Community of Nations, whose paragraph 2 of Article 35 establishes: 
‘(…) 
The annex shall be signed by the supplier of the intangible component and the applicant for the access. It may 
also be signed by the Competent National Authority, in accordance with the provisions of national law of the 
Member Country. If that annex is not signed by the Competent National Authority, it shall be subject to the 
suspensive condition referred to in Article 42 of this Decision. (...)’ (Emphasis added) 
58 This certainty comes from the text of the Nagoya Protocol and case law of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights: Case of the Saramaka People v Suriname (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs) Inter-
American Court of Human Rights Series C 172 (28 November 2007) 
<http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_172_ing.pdf> accessed 13 January 2015 
59 For instance, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR); the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the 
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples; and the International Labour Organization Convention 169. 
60 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has also made recognition of PIC on the basis of ancestral occupation 
of the lands. It can be found, for example in the Case of Saramaka People v. Suriname and the Case of the Kichwa 
Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. 
Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Working 
Group on Indigenous Populations, Twenty-second session, 19 -13 July 2004, 5. 
61 ibid 
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live.62 In the same way, the NP recognises the right of ILCs to grant PIC before accessing their 
TK63 and GR.64 
Along the same lines, the concept of PIC has also evolved from the right to self-
determination at the International Labour Organisation (ILO). In this regard, the 1989 ILO 
Convention 169 considers PIC as a mechanism to ensure that ILCs can fully and effectively enjoy 
their collective rights to property over lands and resources, autonomy, participation, and 
cultural identity. Moreover, because the full enjoyment of the right to self-determination 
requires consultation and participation, both the consultation process for obtaining PIC, as well 
as its inclusion in an agreement (MAT) needs to be reached under the following conditions: (i) 
the application of ILCs’ customary laws, procedures and protocols; (ii) good faith; and (iii) 
guaranteed full participation of ILCs through their truly representative authorities.65 
 
4.1.5 The PIC elements 
 
Proposals for the specific elements of a PIC mechanism are found in a number of 
instruments. These include, for example, the 2005 International Workshop on Methodologies 
regarding Free, Prior and Informed Consent and Indigenous Peoples of the Permanent Forum 
on Indigenous Issues,66 the Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of Their Utilization (the Bonn Guidelines),67 the 
Manual of the ILO Convention 169,68 and the Akwé: Kon Guidelines.69 They all confirm that PIC 
needs to be: 
 
i. Prior; 
ii. Informed; 
iii. In good faith; 
 
62 Inter-American Court of Human Rights (n 53); Case of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v Ecuador 
(Merits and Preparations) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C 245 (27 June 2012) 
<http://corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_245_ing.pdf> accessed 13 January 2015. 
63 Nagoya Protocol (n 15), Article 7. 
64 ibid, Article 6.2 
65 Parshuram Tamang, ‘An Overview of the Principle of Free, Prior and Informed Consent and Indigenous Peoples 
in International and Domestic Law and Practices’ (Presented at the Workshop on Free, Prior and Informed Consent 
and Indigenous Peoples, organized by the Secretariat of UNPFII, 17- 
19 January 2005,UN Headquarter, New York, USA). 
66 Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, ‘Report of the International Workshop on Methodologies Regarding 
Free, Prior and Informed Consent and Indigenous Peoples’ (Economic and Social Council, United Nations 2005) 
E/C.19/2005/3. 
67 CBD, Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and 
Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of Their Utilization (2002). 
68 International Labour Organization, ‘ILO Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples No. 169: A Manual’ (1989).  
69 CBD, Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Akwé: Kon Voluntary Guidelines for the Conduct of 
Cultural, Environmental and Social Impact Assessments Regarding Developments Proposed to Take Place On, or 
Which Are Likely to Impact On, Sacred Sites and on Lands and Waters Traditionally Occupied or Used 
<https://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/akwe-brochure-en.pdf> accessed 20 February 2015. 
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iv. Without coercion, intimidation, or manipulation of the relevant information; 
and, 
v. Obtained from the competent national authority(ies) for the GR,70 and from the 
traditional authority(ies) for the TK in accordance with the ILCs’ customary law, 
otherwise it is not possible to confirm that the provider has actually expressed their will. 
 
These concepts are explained as follows: 
 
A. Prior 
 
As a requirement, prior means that the consent of the provider should be obtained 
before accessing their GR or TK. This is because PIC was initially developed from a principle 
that those giving an authorisation have the right to be informed before giving their consent 
about the potential damage, harm, or threat caused by the development of determined 
activities. In this sense, prior means not only that such information must be provided to give 
consent, but also that the user gives their consent through an affirmative act based on the 
information delivered by the user. Both the consent and all the relevant information have to 
be communicated before access. 
 
B. Informed 
 
The user has to communicate all the required information so that the provider can 
decide with a full understanding of the conditions and consequences involving access. The 
importance of the information provided by the user is of such magnitude that PIC can be 
invalidated when relevant information regarding access has been omitted in order to obtain 
consent.71 
 
 
 
 
 
70 For the cases when GR are accessed through an ex-situ conservation centre, the Bonn Guidelines suggest that 
PIC could be obtained from the competent national authority, or from the body governing the ex-situ collection, 
under the understanding that the resources were acquired under the CBD rules or before its issuance. 
CBD (n 67) Art. 32. 
71 The minimum information required includes: 
The nature, size, pace, reversibility and scope of any proposed project or activity; 
The reason(s) for, or purpose(s) of, the project and/or activity; 
The duration of the project/activity; 
The locality of areas that will be affected; 
A preliminary assessment of the likely economic, social, cultural and environmental impact, including potential 
risks; and fair and equitable benefit-sharing in a context that respects the precautionary principle; 
Personnel likely to be involved in the proposed project (including indigenous peoples, private sector staff, 
research institutions, government employees and others); and procedures that the project may entail. 
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C. In good faith 
 
This characteristic refers to the process of obtaining PIC. During this process, in addition 
to the need to deliver all the information regarding access, users also have to provide clear and 
accurate information about the intended use of the resource, including its possible transfer to 
third parties. PIC should be sought far enough in advance to give states, and particularly ILCs, 
enough time to understand the conditions for the access, as well as its possible impacts on 
their traditional lifestyles and the environment. Because for ILCs PIC relates to other 
fundamental rights such as self-determination, cultural identity, autonomy and participation, 
granting authorisation also involves the right to refuse and withdraw consent.72 
 
D. Obtained from the competent authority 
 
According to the CBD, PIC should be obtained from the Party providing the resource, 
otherwise determined by that Party. This is the country of origin of the resources, or the Parties 
that have acquired the resources, according to the CBD. The NP has established that, in cases 
where national legislation provides them with such a right, ILCs can grant PIC for access to their 
TK and GR. An explanation about the identity of the provider of GR is set out in Section 6.1 of 
this chapter. In the same way, a description of ILCs is provided in the Section 3.4 
 
4.1.6 PIC in Article 10 of the Nagoya Protocol 
 
A contradiction may result from the content of Article 10 NP. It states that Parties shall 
consider the need for and method of a GMBSM to address the distribution of benefits derived 
from the utilisation of GR and/or TK for which it is not possible to grant or obtain PIC. 
Reading this Article in isolation could lead to two possible conclusions: (i) that GR and 
TK can be accessed and used without conducting PIC, or (ii) they can be accessed without 
obtaining the consent of the provider by claiming that it was not possible to obtain. However, 
from a comprehensive reading of the CBD and the NP it can be seen that the proposed 
mechanism in the Protocol was not meant to allow or legalise access without PIC. 
Accepting otherwise would be a violation of the sovereign rights of provider countries 
over their GR and ILCs’ rights over their TK. It should be kept in mind that the authority to 
determine access, including decisions about which resources or the conditions under which 
some of them can be accessed without PIC, rests in the country of origin of GR and TK. 
 
72 This right has been recognised in some national legislation. A case in point is the Biological Diversity Act of 2000 
of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, in which Art. 43 acknowledges such a right in the following terms: ‘The 
State recognises local communities and indigenous peoples have the right to refuse consent to authorise the 
collection of biotic and genetic materials, access to traditional knowledge, and the development of plans and 
projects of biotechnological character on their territory, if the information in terms of utilisation of resources and 
the benefits that could be obtained is not provided in advance. Local communities and indigenous peoples may 
also require the elimination of any activity when demonstrated that it affects their cultural heritage or biological 
diversity.’ 
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In addition, as explained in Section 3.1.8 of Chapter 3, Article 10 NP resulted from 
discussions about the use of GR accessed before the CBD came into force and GR located 
beyond national jurisdiction. It is therefore in this context in which the impossibility of granting 
or obtaining PIC should be understood. 
 
4.2 Mutually Agreed Terms (MATs) 
 
Mutually Agreed Terms (MATs) is the agreement that governs ABS of GR and TK. It 
should be contained in a written document which specifies the conditions for accessing and 
using the authorised GR and TK. Its main provisions typically contain information about: 
 
i. Obligations for providers and users; 
ii. The type, amount and place where the resources can be accessed from 
(collected); 
iii. Rules and conditions for the use of the resources, including ethical 
considerations and whether the user can share the accessed resources with 
third parties or save samples for further research; 
iv. Considerations about the customary use of GR and TK by ILCs; 
v. Rules for the use of IPR and licences for use;73 
vi. Financial compensation for using the resources; 
vii. Transfer of technology; and 
viii. Other agreed obligations between the parties. 
 
The Bonn Guidelines also set out the basic requirements for MATs and contains a list 
of typical MAT provisions, possible forms of benefits and a pro-forma MAT. From these, it can 
be implied that MATs involve a negotiation between providers and users of GR and TK. 
Consequently, and contrary to claims by some,74 MATs cannot simply be assimilated with a 
material transfer agreement (MTA) typically used by ex-situ collections when providing 
samples of biological materials. In fact, the Executive Secretary of the Convention has noted 
that contracts are the most common way of recording MATs, even before the CBD and other 
laws governing ABS came into force.75 As the name indicates, an MTA is an agreement involving 
the handing-over of biological material. It does not necessarily, and does not normally, include 
a distribution of benefits with the country of origin of these resources.76 In contrast, the main 
 
73 CBD, (n 67) Arts. 42 and 43. 
74 Greiber and others (n 2) 9. 
75 CBD, Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, ‘Addressing the Fair and Equitable Sharing  of the 
Benefits Arising out of Genetic Resources: Options for Assistance to Developing Country Parties to the Convention 
on Biological Diversity’ (1998) UNEP/CBD/COP/4/22, para 32. 
76 Kate Davis and others, ‘An Access and Benefit-Sharing Awareness Survey for Botanic Gardens: Are they prepared 
for the Nagoya Protocol?’ (2015) 98 South African Journal of Botany 148, 153-154. 
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objective of a MAT is to record the conditions about access and distribution of the benefits 
derived from the utilisation of GR and TK that have been agreed. 
 
5. PIC and MAT in short 
 
To summarise, access to GR and TK is conditional on PIC, and where granted, it must 
be recorded in MATs. The primary aims of PIC and MAT are to: (i) authorise and determine the 
conditions for access; (ii) set out the rules for the utilisation of the resources, including the 
authorisation (or not) of subsequent uses; and (iii) establish the conditions for the distribution 
of benefits. Finally, owing to the desirability that PIC and MATs should be recorded in written 
form, authors such as Torres and Chávez consider that a non-recorded PIC or MAT do not have 
any legal validity.77 However, although this effect is not considered in the CBD or the NP and, 
therefore, it cannot be taken for granted; it cannot be denied that a recorded PIC and MAT 
gives greater legal certainty to the contracting parties. 
Taking all the above into account, it can be concluded that PIC and MAT as such do not 
pose limitations on ABS. The limitations stem instead from the system’s design, of which PIC 
and MAT constitute foundation elements whereby the distribution of benefits occurs. 
 
6. The ABS obligations 
 
6.1 Facilitated access 
 
ABS is a right built in relation to access to GR and associated TK. The reference to this is in 
Article 15 CBD, which enacted the ABS system under the subheading ‘Access to Genetic 
Resources’, and later in the title of the NP ‘Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources 
and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits arising from their Utilisation’ (emphasis added). 
Article 15 CBD is the core ABS provision, to which Articles 8j, 16, 18, and 19 are related, and 
the NP is a legally-binding supplementary agreement to the CBD in the matter of ABS. 
Despite the utilisation of the word ‘access’ throughout the CBD and the NP, there is no 
definition of ‘access’ in these instruments. Nonetheless, the Convention establishes that: ‘Each 
Contracting Party shall endeavour to create conditions to facilitate access to genetic resources 
for environmentally sound uses by other Contracting Parties (…)’ (Article 15.2) (emphasis 
added). The authority to determine access to the resources and to decide when a use is 
environmentally sound is left to the discretion of the providing Party (Article 15.1). At first 
glance, it could be assumed that the primary aim of Article 15.2 is the promotion of biodiversity 
protection through increasing the opportunity for providing countries to achieve more 
benefits, given that a facilitated access will produce greater benefits. However, maybe because 
the Convention does not include an effective system of compliance with the ABS obligations, 
 
77 Ricardo Torres and Juanita Chávez, Posibles Elementos Para La Protección Del Conocimiento Tradicional En 
Colombia, Instituto Alexander von Humboldt (2003), 17. 
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the benefits derived from the use of the resources are difficult to obtain (as the number of 
MATs in Chapter 1 seem to show). Under these circumstances, the practical effect of the 
obligation to provide facilitated access to GR is that users can easily have access to these 
resources, while enforcement of the obligations deriving from it is very difficult to achieve. 
With regard to the content of Article 15.2, Greiber and others argue that the logic 
behind it is that fair and equitable sharing of benefits can only be realised after access to GR 
and TK has actually been granted.78 However, while it is true that access is often a required 
condition for the utilisation of the resources,79 it is also the case that the motivation for 
allowing facilitated access is precisely the benefit received in return. Following this logic, what 
would ensure facilitated access is the certainty of the distribution of benefits and not vice 
versa. Seemingly, herein lies another flaw of the ABS system: there is nothing in the CBD or the 
NP to ensure the distribution of benefits once a resource has been accessed. 
In the absence of a definition of ‘utilisation’ in the CBD and the NP, some countries have 
developed their own concepts in their national laws on ABS. As noticed by Glowka,80 access is 
generally defined through the use of terms such as ‘prospecting’, ‘bioprospecting’, and 
‘biodiversity prospecting’. All refer to the physical possession of GR that enables their use in 
scientific, economic, and other applications. As ABS has been designed to conduct access in-
situ, it should be taken into account that such concepts leave out the dynamics of accessing 
GR and TK in ex-situ conditions, which have distinct features from access in-situ. 
The possibility of gaining access to GR ex-situ without the need to follow an ABS process 
affects the opportunity for states to control the use of their resources. For this analysis, the 
practices developed by scientists regarding this kind of access are of great importance. As 
demonstrated by Davis and others, accessing GR in ex-situ collections is an activity usually 
accompanied by the sharing of the information obtained after conducting research over the 
accessed resources. In ABS terms, the ex-situ collection usually benefits from the disclosure of 
scientific data obtained from the accessed resource in exchange for allowing access to the 
resources they store.81 Nowadays, genetic information has progressively gained in importance 
for researchers’ activities. The main consequence of this is that access in-situ is needed less 
and less as scientists can make their discoveries using the information already available in 
databases, using technologies such as synthetic biology.82 Thus, under the CBD logic, not only 
access ex-situ but also access to genetic information and its utilisation in new biotechnological 
fields are excluded from the ABS scope. 
In addition, difficulties in determining what access is, or when it occurs, continue to be 
a cause of controversy among providers and users of these resources. These problems are 
 
78 Greiber and others (n 2) 8. 
79 It should be remembered that technologies such as the synthetic biology allow the utilisation of GT without 
physically accessing the resource. 
80 Lyle Glowka, ‘Emerging Legislative Approaches to Implement Article 15 of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity’ (1997) 6 RECIEL 249, 250. 
81 Watanabe (n 11) 548. 
82 ibid 549. 
CHAPTER 4. Content and scope of the ABS system of the CBD and the NP 
 
 
 
 
 
125 
derived from the particular conditions surrounding access rather than in the lack of acceptance 
that access is the physical possession of the resources, or that (at least initially) it is required 
for developing research activities. The factors involving access activities, such as the identity of 
the provider, when the resource is accessed from an ex-situ conservation centre, whether the 
resources were acquired by the ex-situ centre according to the CBD, and the kind of intended 
uses of the resources (whether the resource has been used as a biological resource or as a GR) 
are some of those preventing ABS agreements when GR and TK are used. 
Determining access to TK has its own obstacles. These can be divided into three main 
groups. The first is that TK has not been properly documented. It may, therefore, be difficult 
to: (i) link TK with one or more specific ILCs; and (ii) find TK in a prior art search. The second is 
directly related to the first. Neither the CBD nor the NP suggest how to conclude ABS 
transactions over shared resources, which is a common characteristic of TK, leaving this 
problem to the countries for a solution. The difficulties regarding access to TK in these 
circumstances are associated with situations in which: (i) one ILC authorises access to a TK 
while at the same time another ILC opposes access to that TK; and/or (ii) ILCs sharing the same 
TK who are not the provider claim that they are also entitled to compensation; and finally, (iii) 
the assumption that almost all TK is in the public domain. This last situation results from the 
erroneous idea that everything which is publicly accessible is in the public domain and, 
consequently, can be freely accessed, used, and appropriated. Under these conditions TK has 
been accessed and used without the consent or knowledge of the ILCs to whom the TK belongs. 
Because of this, a distribution of benefits from the use of such TK has probably not yet 
occurred. 
Despite the difficulties in determining ‘access’ as a subject matter, provider countries 
have the responsibility to provide for: (i) legal certainty, clarity and transparency of their ABS 
domestic legislation and regulatory requirements; (ii) fair and non-arbitrary rules and 
procedures; (iii) clear rules and procedures for PIC and MATs; (iv) the issuing of a permit or 
equivalent as evidence of the decision to grant PIC and of the establishment of MATs; and (v) 
notification to the ABSCH about the access activities carried out by them (Article 6.3 NP). This 
means that countries will determine the content and scope of the term ‘access’ at their own 
discretion and according to their particularities and needs. 
Consequently, heavy burdens are imposed on both providers and users of GR and TK. 
Providers have to fill in the gaps of the CBD through their national laws, which creates 
multiplicity of rules and approaches to ABS. For their part, users have to know, understand, 
and follow all the different rules and approaches of providers. Needless to say, this problem 
would be better addressed with a mechanism with some level of international reach, such as 
the GMBSM, rather than seeking compliance through the creation and application of disparate 
national laws. 
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6.2 The Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits 
 
Bioprospecting is the search for valuable components in biological resources that could 
potentially lead to marketable products. This activity has value in industries such as medicine, 
pharmacology, cosmetics, and agriculture. Megadiverse countries are a good place for 
bioprospecting due to their wide variety of natural resources. Megadiverse countries are 
usually developing countries which often lack the scientific research capacity to conduct their 
own bioprospecting over their biodiversity and do not have enough technology development 
to make use of it. On the other hand, the ILCs from megadiverse countries have developed the 
knowledge about how to use and manage the natural resources located in the territory in 
which they live. Such TK is also important for bioprospecting activities. It helps to identify the 
resources with potential uses, without the need for conducting research over all the natural 
resources located in a particular area, instead observing how they are utilised by ILCs. In 
practical terms, this means that TK helps to reduce bioprospecting costs. 
For a long time, industrialised countries have conducted research and development on 
the biological resources of developing countries. Sometimes, the development of such 
products has included TK. For many years, these activities were conducted without sharing the 
benefits arising from the use of the resources and knowledge from the developing world. Over 
time, the provider countries of these natural resources, together with the ILCs, have achieved 
recognition of their rights over such biodiversity and TK, respectively. This acknowledgement, 
in turn, has led to recognition of their right to receive compensation for the use of their 
resources. Furthermore, it has been established that such a distribution of benefits needs to 
be done in a fair and equitable way. 
However, these terms are not defined in the CBD or the NP. Similarly, and even though 
some rules about the proportion of benefits that should be distributed have been found in the 
laws analysed in Chapter 2, no reference to what a ‘fair and equitable distribution of benefits’ 
might be could be found. This section builds on these concepts using notions from international 
law and, particularly, form the international agreements for the use of resources in 
transboundary situations. In doing so, the notion of what is fair and equitable in the CBD, the 
NP, and in transboundary situations is explained. This thesis argues that the term ‘fair and 
equitable’ has the same meaning as that in international law. 
 
6.2.1 The notion of ‘Fair and Equitable’ in International Law 
 
The concepts of fairness and equity are usually interchangeable, and traditionally have 
been associated with the idea of justice. In spite of this, it is possible to distinguish different 
approaches to these concepts. For example, fairness and equity are considered by Soltau as 
deep-rooted concepts in human relations, and invoked when decisions involve far-reaching 
social, economic, and environmental decisions.83 His hypothesis can be verified by the common 
 
83 Friedrich Soltau, Fairness in International Climate Change Law and Policy (CUP 2009), 2.  
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use of these concepts in many international environmental agreements for sustainable 
development.84 In addition, it has also been argued that the legal concept of equity ‘is a general 
principle directly applicable as law,’85 which, in international law, has two routes of entry. The 
first is via general principles of law frequently referred to as equity infra, praetor, and contra 
legem. The second is its application in other principles such as good faith, unjust enrichment, 
abuse of rights, estoppel, and acquiescence.86 
In international environmental agreements, the notions of fairness and equity have 
been used to provide a ‘commonly accepted operational framework for addressing 
cooperation, compliance, and the appropriate use of international transboundary resources.’87 
Accordingly, it could be argued that because the CBD is an agreement in the environmental 
field it is embedded within the same principles, and that their inclusion is intended to achieve 
the aims set out above. Furthermore, the use of the principles of ‘equity and equitable’ by 
international courts and tribunals as a part of general international law has been interpreted 
by Gourgourinis as an indicator of the common use of these concepts in the international 
arena.88 
One particularly useful example of the application of the notion of ‘equity’ in 
international law can be found in the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention and the earlier ILA 
Helsinki Rules, since they illustrate the possibility of formally identifying and itemising the kinds 
of consideration that may be relevant to its interpretation and application in a specific context. 
 
6.2.2 The notion of ‘Fair and Equitable’ in the CBD and the Protocol 
 
A possible understanding of the concept of fair and equitable distribution of benefits in 
the CBD has been proposed by Koester.89 According to him, this notion is the expression of the 
principle of intra-generational equity. He argues that the obligation of users to share the 
benefits arising from the use of GR and TK has its origins in the idea that all people have the 
right to benefit from the use of natural resources. He links the principle of intra-generational 
equity with the idea that conservation of biological diversity is a common concern of 
humankind. He argues that the fair and equitable sharing of benefits relates to the use of 
 
84 For instance, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC), the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED), the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (UNMDG), the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the United Nations Conference on 
Sustainable Development (UNCSD), and the CBD. 
85 Case Concerning the Continental Shelf. Cited in: Anastasios Gourgourinis, ‘Equity in International Law Revisited 
(with Special Reference to Fragmentation of International Law)’ (2009) 103 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting 
of the American Society of International Law 79, 80. 
86 ibid 
87 Brooke Campbell and Quentin Hanich, ‘Principles and Practice for the Equitable Governance of Transboundary 
Natural Resources: Cross-Cutting Lessons for Marine Fisheries Management’ (2015) 14 Maritime Studies 1, 3. 
88 Gourgourinis (n 85) 80. 
89 Veit Koester, ‘The Convention on Biological Diversity and the Concept of Sustainable Development: The Extent 
and Manner of the Convention’s Application of Components of the Concept’ in Michael Bowman, Peter Davies 
and Edward Goodwin (eds), Research Handbook on Biodiversity and Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2016), 280. 
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biodiversity in connection to the right of everyone to benefit from such resources.90 In this 
sense, it can be understood that distributing the benefits derived from the use of GR and TK 
will help their conservation, which ultimately could ensure that all can benefit from them. 
While it is not possible to conclude that the drafters of the CBD used the principle of 
intra-generational equity to support benefit-sharing, the link between the preservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity as a common concern, along with the idea that a distribution of 
benefits would help to achieve that objective, is clear in the CBD. 
Additionally, the NP establishes the obligation to share with ILCs the benefits of the use 
of their TK. From this, it seems clear that benefit-sharing is intended not only to preserve 
biodiversity but also to protect the people directly involved with the conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity. 
Notwithstanding the above, it is still unclear as to what is meant by ‘fair and equitable 
distribution of benefits’. With the aim of finding out how this concept should be understood, 
the next sections attempt to provide clarity on this issue. 
 
6.2.3 Fairness in ABS 
 
In relation to ABS, fairness is connected with the unjust situation previously faced by 
provider countries and ILCs, in which it was considered that they had no compensation rights 
for the use of their resources. This situation was considered unjust, and its amendment 
logically implied the opposite, i.e., the recognition of a compensation right. This approach, 
supported by discussions regarding farmers’ rights within the FAO, helped to gain acceptance 
of the distribution of benefits as an obligation on the Party using GR and TK. Legally, such a 
right is derived from the sovereign rights of the provider countries over their natural resources 
and the acknowledgement of the contributions made (in past, present, and future) by ILCs (and 
farmers) for the preservation and sustainable use of biodiversity (and food security). 
 
6.2.4 Equity in ABS 
 
For Tvedt and Young, in ABS contexts equity is connected: (i) with the amount of money 
that should be shared by the use of GR and TK, for the historic contribution of these resources; 
(ii) with the question of to what extent the properties of a given GR are the reason that the 
innovation or product was developed; and, (iii) with the contribution made that enabled the 
existence of a particular GR or ecosystem.91 
Additionally, the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Inter-Sessional Working Group on Article 8(j) 
notes that while GR has been generally considered as raw material, TK valuation should be 
different. For them, TK’s valuation could be determined either by its economic value to 
industry (on the basis of the particular needs of industries, availability of the knowledge and 
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its usefulness), or by its contribution to the greater good of humanity in biodiversity 
conservation (TK’s role in conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity).92 
For his part, Millum considers that where multiple parties contribute to the creation of 
some social surplus, a fair share of benefits should reflect this contribution. He maintains that 
the economic value of GR and TK should be calculated on the basis of how much people are 
willing to pay for them, which can be done by modelling the market. In his opinion, this will 
allow fair transactions without the need to determine a principle of fairness.93 From a different 
perspective, but with a similar meaning, for the WIPO, an equitable remuneration is ‘the 
remuneration of certain acts carried out in respect of a work or an object of related rights in 
an amount and in a manner consistent with what may be regarded as normal commercial 
standards in case of authorization of the same act by the owner of a copyright or related 
rights.’94 Despite this concept specifically referring to cases in which an economic right has 
been reduced to a right to remuneration, the reference to ‘normal commercial standards’ is 
used to indicate that an equitable remuneration is that which is established according to the 
market. 
It seems clear from the above that, despite the acknowledgment of the countries’ and 
ILCs’ contributions to preservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, the proposals of a ‘fair 
and equitable distribution of benefits’ apparently only consider the value that GR and TK in the 
market. This may be a consequence of the difficulties in the measurement of the intrinsic value 
that GR and TK have. For this reason, it could be argued that the minimum amount of money 
to distribute should be the economic value of GR and TK, which can be determined by 
calculating the market. 
Nevertheless, as explained in the following section, although the intrinsic value of GR 
and TK may be difficult to establish, a fair and equitable distribution of benefits would be more 
likely to be achieved if the principles used in international law for the use of transboundary 
natural resources are applied. 
 
6.2.5 The Notion of Fair and Equitable Benefit-Sharing in Transboundary Situations 
 
Article 10 NP apparently confirms the need for a GMBSM to address the fair and 
equitable sharing of benefits derived from the utilisation of GR and TK in transboundary 
situations. However, as set out by Campbell and Hanich, the best-written intentions have been 
poorly converted into effective practice when sharing the benefits in transboundary 
situations.95 For these authors, the main factor affecting such a distribution of benefits lies in 
 
92 CBD, Ad Hoc Open-Ended Inter-Sessional Working Group on Article 8(j) and Related Provisions of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, ‘Development of Elements of Sui Generis Systems for the Protection of 
Traditional Knowledge, Innovations and Practices’ (2007) UNEP/CBD/WG8J/5/6, 9. 
93 Joseph Millum, ‘How Should the Benefits of Bioprospecting be Shared?’ (2010) 40 The Hastings Center Report 
24, 28. 
94 WIPO (n 24) Annex 13. 
95 Campbell and Hanich (n 87) 1. 
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the ability to relate key human social interactions to conservation outcomes. A key social 
interaction is the way in which the stakeholders perceived fairness and equity. This perception 
is affected by asymmetries in wealth, power, capacity, and need.96 Consequently, it is possible 
that different stakeholders have different perceptions of fairness and equity in the distribution 
of benefits. 
The use of natural resources in transboundary situations is also an issue largely 
addressed by international law. In this regard, the core elements in transboundary natural 
resource policy include responsibility, rights, and justice. Responsibility is associated with 
established international legal obligations, which requires states to apply other international 
principles such as good faith. Rights are the rules that interact with the responsibility to assist 
in procedural and substantive interpretations of what is fair in a given context. Finally, justice 
is concerned with the distributive aspects of social justice.97 
To Rawls, distributive justice supports the notion of ‘fair-sharing’, ‘equitable utilisation’, 
and ‘fair equality of opportunity’.98 Moreover, distributive justice has been considered to be 
related to individual well-being99 and to be a guide in the procedural relationship between the 
equity of a decision-making process and the perceived equitability of its outcome.100 On this 
basis, Campbell and Hanich argue that distributive justice provides essential structural 
underpinnings for the negotiation of the use of transboundary resources. For them, an ‘equity 
process’ could be integrated into regular negotiation processes by requiring negotiating 
stakeholders to answer procedural questions about the conceptual framing elements of 
responsibility and rights.101 In other words, for these authors, equity in the distribution of 
benefits in transboundary situations could be achieved by respecting the recognised 
responsibilities and rights of the different stakeholders involved. Consequently, ABS 
negotiations should include the concepts and general principles of ‘fair and equitable’ in 
international law, and the particular considerations regarding rights and obligations related to 
the use of transboundary resources. 
The last aspect to be examined regarding ABS in transboundary situations is that the 
benefits use in supporting the conservation of biodiversity and the sustainable use of its 
components globally. As mentioned above, the concepts of fairness and equity involve the idea 
of justice. Likewise, it was pointed out that social interactions are a key factor in conservation 
outcomes. On this basis, states and ILCs could find it unfair and inequitable that the benefits 
arising from the utilisation of their GR and TK are used for global biodiversity conservation 
instead of being used to help them to meet their needs. This is the biggest weakness of the 
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97 ibid 3-4. 
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proposed mechanism because, as set out earlier, providers are not likely to be motivated to 
share their resources. For this reason, a GMBSM should consider a system in which countries 
and ILCs are the first beneficiaries of the benefits arising from the use of their GR and TK, 
otherwise, it is highly probable that such a mechanism will never be implemented. 
Against this background, it seems that the contribution of countries and ILCs to the 
conservation of biodiversity should be included in the distribution of benefits. As explained 
earlier in this section, a fair and equitable distribution of benefits derived from the utilisation 
of GR and TK could be achieved if, in addition to the economic value of these resources, 
considerations about conceptual framing elements of responsibility and rights are taken into 
account. 
 
6.2.6 Need for Legal Provisions and Standards to enable fair and equitable sharing of 
benefits 
 
MATs are the instrument whereby the ‘fair and equitable’ sharing of benefits should be 
achieved. Because of that, for Tvedt and Young, the Parties to the CBD and the NP are in need 
of ‘legal provisions and standards to enable all users (and providers/sources) to know what is 
required – and especially to know when the arrangements they make will meet the required 
standard of “fair and equitable” sharing.’102 In case of dispute, this guidance is required for 
courts, arbitrators, officials, and others seeking to determine whether the benefits agreed in 
MATs are fair and equitable. 
In order to fulfil this end, they propose that national laws provide for:103 
 
i. Clarification of what could be understood as ‘fair sharing’ i.e., provide some 
standards and other bases for determining the value of the resource and the 
manner in which it should (or can) be paid, including differences between 
monetary and non-monetary benefits; 
ii. Equity, i.e., reflection on the contribution and needs of source countries, along 
with contributions to the local economy, research directed towards priority 
needs, food and livelihood, security benefits, social recognition, among others; 
and 
iii. Practical application of these concepts. 
 
6.3 Benefits 
 
The CBD includes some examples of Benefits in Articles 15.6, 15.7, 16.3, 16.4, 19.1, and 
19.2. However, the first instrument to specify the type of activities that could be considered as 
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benefits was the Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable 
Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their Utilisation (the Bonn Guidelines). 
This instrument was created with the aim of guiding the parties to the CBD in the 
development of their national laws concerning ABS. Its Appendix II condenses some examples 
of monetary and non-monetary benefits that users can share with providers to fulfil their ABS 
obligations. 
For its part, and with only a few differences, the Annex of the NP reproduces the list of 
benefits enclosed in the Bonn Guidelines. As their name suggests, the examples of monetary 
benefits consist of payment methods, including fees, payment of royalties, salaries, or joint 
ownership of IPRs. Similarly, the list of non-monetary benefits describes activities such as the 
sharing of research and development results, participation in product development and the 
admittance to ex-situ facilities of GR and databases. 
A comparison between the benefits described in the CBD, the Bonn Guidelines, and the 
Protocol is presented in Table 8. 
The Table shows that the disparity between the texts of the Bonn Guidelines and the 
NP is in the use of the words ‘provider country’ and ‘country providing genetic resources.’ As 
explained in Sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 of the next section, there is no difference between the 
expressions ‘provider country’ and ‘the Party providing the resources’. However, the exclusion 
of TK from the Protocol’s list of benefits does not seem to be justified. 
The Bonn Guidelines omission is understandable because the CBD does not explicitly 
include TK within the scope of ABS, and the Bonn Guidelines were written in 2002 before the 
Protocol was enacted. Nonetheless, this omission does not mean that ILCs are not entitled to 
receive the monetary and non-monetary benefits described therein. 
For that reason, it can be argued that the conceptualisation of the term ‘benefits’ has 
no negative effect on ABS. The valuation of GR and TK as merely raw materials, and the culture 
of utilisation-without-compensation, emerged as a consequence of the fact that for a long time 
users did not compensate providers for the utilisation of their resources. This seems to be a 
real factor affecting negotiations about the benefits to distribute. 
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This table has been made by the author from the texts of the CBD, the NP, and 
the Bonn Guidelines, as indicated in the table 
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7. The Parties of ABS 
 
The parties of ABS are providers and users. Providers are the countries of origin of GR, 
TK and other parties to the CBD, provided that such resources were acquired according to the 
CBD or were accessed before the Convention came into force. The user is the party seeking 
access to the resources. However, there is no clear line between providers and users. 
Sometimes providers and users are the same entity 
Despite complexities in accessing GR and TK, the relationship between providers and 
users of such resources, as recorded in the CBD, have been reduced to the mutual satisfaction 
of their needs. In other words, it is believed that providers have something users want, and 
that those users have something providers want. 
Following this logic, ABS was built upon the idea that providers host a significant 
amount of natural resources and TK, but have fewer or less advanced technologies. Similarly, 
it was thought that users have a smaller number and/or variety of natural resources, but are 
industrialised countries with better opportunities to have, use, and improve the technologies 
needed to transform natural resources and TK into useful products. 
For these reasons, the relationships between providers and users of GR and TK consist 
of the obligation for providers to facilitate access to their resources, and the consequent users’ 
commitment to share the benefits obtained from the utilisation of such resources, including 
by appropriate transfer of relevant technologies. In this way, providers would be able to access 
the technologies they do not have, and obtain some profit from the use of their resources, 
while users could facilitate access to the resources they want. 
The following sections explains the meaning of providers and users. ILCs are included 
because they could be providers of GR and TK when such a right is recognised through the 
provider countries’ ABS laws. 
 
7.1 The provider of GR 
 
7.1.1 Country of Origin of GR 
 
To establish the person entitled to provide GR, it is necessary to review some of the 
concepts in the CBD. As the ABS is a right, born in connection with the exercise of sovereign 
rights, the notion of provider has been built over that right. In fact, the ABS transactions 
designed in the CBD are meant to be developed by their Parties, in other words, by countries. 
One country is the provider and the other is the user. The first relevant concept is country of 
origin of GR. 
The country of origin is described in Article 2 CBD as ‘the country which possesses those 
resources in in-situ conditions.’ The mention of the conditions in which the resources can be 
found directly relates to the sovereign rights of the countries over the resources found within 
their frontiers, and begs the question as to the legal status of the resources in ex-situ 
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conditions. The response to this question leads straight into the concept of providing country, 
which is explained in the following section. 
 
7.1.2 County providing GR 
 
In this respect, the CBD indicates, in Article 2, that the country providing GR is the one 
‘supplying GR collected from in-situ sources, including populations of both wild and 
domesticated species, or taken from ex-situ sources, which may or may not have originated in 
that country.’ From these concepts, some preliminary conclusions can be drafted: (i) the 
provider is a country, not a natural or a legal person (i.e., not a researcher or an ex-situ centre); 
(ii) the resources given can be found in in-situ and ex-situ conditions; and (iii) the providing 
country is not necessarily, at the same time, the country of origin of the resources. However, 
as already stated, when GR is accessed through an ex-situ centre, it is required that the 
resources have been legally acquired, i.e., in accordance with the CBD or before its entry into 
force. Therefore, pursuant to Article 2 CBD, the ‘provider country’ is the one supplying GR 
collected from in-situ sources (including populations of wild or domesticated species) or taken 
from ex-situ sources (which may or may not have originated in that country) (Article 15.3, CBD). 
As mentioned above, access ex-situ is one of the biggest voids left in the CBD and has a negative 
impact on ABS. 
 
7.2 The provider of TK: indigenous and local communities (ILCs) 
 
The responsible people of TK creation are described in Article 8j CBD as human groups 
‘embodying traditional lifestyles’. As mentioned in Section 3.3.3 of this chapter, this is the 
aspect which distinguishes them from other human groups developing knowledge about the 
use and management of biodiversity, such as scientists over many hundreds of years of study. 
While this is certainly an important characteristic of these communities, this concept 
does not offer enough clarity concerning the kind of communities who could claim a 
distribution of benefits arising out of the utilisation of their TK. In this context, the question of 
who could be an ILC results in the possibility of ‘someone’ being identified as the person who 
may claim and exercise certain rights. 
Different concepts about which human group falls to be considered as having a 
traditional lifestyle have been incorporated into local and regional laws in various parts of the 
world. A brief comparative analysis of accessible legislation permits the identification of more 
elements than the one provided in the CBD. From this, and according to the laws reviewed in 
Chapter 2, it is noticeable that ILCs are: 
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i. Always a collective group ‘human group’ (Brazil);104 ‘human population’ 
(OAU)105; 
ii. With specific cultural characteristics that make them clearly different from the 
rest of society (Brazil,106 Peru107); 
iii. Collectively regarded as the creators of TK (Ethiopia,108 India,109 Panama,110 and 
ARIPO111); and, 
iv. Therefore, collective owners of their TK (Bhutan,112 India,113 and ARIPO114). In 
these laws, the ownership characteristic is sometimes accompanied by the 
description of the kind of goods that comprise TK (Panama115 and ARIPO116). 
 
For a better understanding of the differences between indigenous and local 
communities and their common elements, each concept is explained below. 
 
7.2.1 Indigenous peoples 
 
Indigenous peoples are described, for example, as ‘any community of people’ (South 
Africa),117 as ‘rural and native communities’ (Peru),118 and as ‘descendant from indigenous 
peoples’ (ILO Convention 169).119 These may all be general references, as indigenous peoples 
are easily identified by their legal status according to rules made, for example, by the 
governments of the countries in which they live. 
They have also been illustrated as ‘those which, having a historical continuity with pre-
invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves 
distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those countries, or parts of them. 
They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, 
 
104 (n 38) Article 2. 
105 African Model Legislation for the Protection of the Rights of Local Communities, Farmers and Breeders, and 
for the Regulation of Access to Biological Resources, 2000, Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU), Algeria, Article 1 
106 ibidem (n 100) 
107 (n 39) Article 2. 
108 Ethiopia, Access to Genetic Resources and Community Knowledge, and Community Rights Council of Ministers 
Regulation No. 169/2009, Part 1 Articles 2 and 2.6, Part 3 Article 2.1 
109 India, The Biological Diversity Act, 2002, Article 2a ‘benefit claimers’ 
110 (n 47) Article 1. 
111 African Regional Intellectual Property Organisation (ARIPO), Swakopmund Protocol on the Protection of 
Traditional Knowledge and Expressions of Folklore, Adopted by the Diplomatic Conference of ARIPO at 
Swakopmund (Namibia) on August 9, 2010, Part II, Sections 4(iii) and 5 
112 (n 43) Article 6p 
113 ibid (n 109) 
114 (n 111) Part I, Section 2.1, Part II, Section 5 
115 (n 47) Article 6. 
116 (n 111) Part II, Section 4 
117 Republic of South Africa, National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act, 2004, Article 1. 
118 (n 39) Article 2. 
119 International Labour Organisation (ILO), Convention No. 169 of 1989, Convention concerning Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, Article 1.1b 
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develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic 
identities, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own 
cultural pattern, social institutions and legal systems.’120 
Similarly, it has been argued that indigenous peoples usually ‘include cultural groups 
and their descendants who have a historical continuity or association with a given region, or 
parts of a region, and who currently inhabit or have formerly inhabited the region either before 
its subsequent colonization or annexation, or alongside other cultural groups during the 
formation of a nation-state, or independently or largely isolated from the influence of the 
claimed governance by a nation-state, and who furthermore have maintained, at least in part, 
their distinct linguistic, cultural and social / organizational characteristics, and in doing so 
remain differentiated in some degree from the surrounding populations and dominant culture 
of the nation-state. Also include people who are self-identified as indigenous, and those 
recognized as such by other groups.’121 
 
7.2.2 Local communities 
 
In contrast, the identification of local communities seems to be more difficult. Primarily 
it can be seen that local communities are non-indigenous descendants, as occurs with African 
and Asian traditional communities. This element has been included in the law of countries such 
as Brazil,122 Burundi,123 South Africa,124 and the ARIPO.125 Furthermore, in countries with 
indigenous peoples, some communities of non-indigenous descendants with traditional 
lifestyles have also been considered as a part of ILCs, e.g., craftsmen and peasants. On this 
basis, craftsmen were included in Panamanian law for the protection of TK,126 and the 
Colombian Multicultural Public Policy Proposal for the Protection of Knowledge Systems 
Associated with Biodiversity considers country folk, afro-descendants, and the ‘rom’ people 
(Romany people) as local communities.127 It should be highlighted that Colombian recognition 
of its local communities was made on the basis of the traditional lifestyle of these people. This 
is the reason why it includes two non-American native groups: afro-descendants and rom. The 
first group arrived in America from Africa during the colonial period, and the second from 
 
120 WIPO (n 25) Annex 20. 
121 Charlotte Salpin, Arnold Kreilhuber and Elizabeth Mrema, Glossary of Terms for Negotiators of Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements (Bakary Kante ed, UNEP 2007), 49-50. 
122 (n 38) Article 2iv ‘traditional community’ 
123 (n 42) Article 2 ‘local communities’ 
124 (n 117) Article 1. 
125 (n 111) Part II, Section 6. 
126 (n 47) ‘Article 23: Small-scale non-indigenous craftspeople who earn their living producing, reproducing and 
selling replicas of Ngöbe and Buglé indigenous crafts and who reside in the districts of Tolé, Remedios, San Félix 
and San Lorenzo in the province of Chiriquí shall be exempt from the present Act. These small-scale nonindigenous 
craftspeople may manufacture and market these replicas, but they may not claim the collective rights of 
indigenous peoples recognized by this Act.’ 
127 Marcela Jiménez Larrarte, Propuesta de Política Pública Pluricultural para la Protección de los Sistemas de 
Conocimiento Asociado a la Biodiversidad en Colombia, (Ministerio de Ambiente 2013), 14, 18-21. 
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Europe as a consequence of more recent migrations. 
Local communities have also been understood as ‘the human population in a distinct 
ecological area who depend directly on its biodiversity and ecosystem goods and services for 
all or part of their livelihood and who have developed or acquired traditional knowledge as a 
result of this dependence, including farmers, fisherfolk, pastoralists, forest dwellers, and 
others.’128 These communities are also named ‘tribal people’ in ILO Convention169. According 
to this instrument, they are those ‘whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish 
them from other sections of the national community, and whose status is regulated wholly or 
partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or regulation.’129 For its part, the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) acknowledges that tribal peoples are those ‘not 
indigenous to the region, but that share similar characteristics with indigenous peoples, such 
as having social, cultural and economic traditions different from other sections of the national 
community, identifying themselves with their ancestral territories, and regulating themselves, 
at least partially, by their own norms, customs, and traditions.’130 In addition, both the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO)131 and the FAO132 have been using the terms ‘local 
communities’ and ‘indigenous peoples’ to identify the right holders of TK. In other words, 
within the international forums dealing with ABS, indigenous peoples and local communities 
are recognised as the beneficiaries of ABS and right holders of TK. 
 
7.2.3 The common characteristics in the concepts of indigenous and local 
communities (ILCs) 
 
Within the ABS context, the traditional lifestyle is what characterises a community as 
ILCs and, consequently, as having the right to grant PIC and benefit from the use of their TK. 
This element has been recognised as a distinct cultural way of being and understanding the 
world, which is adopted by a group of people, who identify themselves as a different group 
from the rest of the society in which they live, precisely for sharing their particular cultural 
lifestyle among all members of the group. In addition, the following characteristics are also 
found in the concepts of indigenous peoples and local communities previously presented: 
 
i. Indigenous and local communities can be both descendant and non-descendant 
indigenous; 
ii. They have a collective nature, expressed in, for example: 
 
128 CBD, Ad Hoc Open-Ended Inter-Sessional Working Group on Article 8(j) and Related Provisions of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, ‘Development of Elements of Sui Generis Systems for the Protection of 
Traditional Knowledge, Innovations and Practices’ (2005) UNEP/CBD/WG8J/4/INF/18, 5. 
129 (n 119) Article 1.1a 
130 Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname (n 58) para 79. 
131 WIPO, Secretariat of the World Intellectual Property Organisation, ‘The Protection of Traditional Knowledge: 
Draft Articles’ (2016) WIPO/GRTKF/IC/31/4, Annex 8, Article 2. 
132 FAO, International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (adopted 03 November 2001, 
entered into force 29 June 2004) 2400 UNTS 303 (ITPGRFA), Article 9. 
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a. Always being a human group that is markedly different from the rest of society, 
in aspects such as culture, economy, and social or political institutions; 
b. Their TK is collectively created, held and owned; and 
c. Their rights have a collective nature resulting, for example, in the collective 
exercise of some human rights (e.g. property rights over the land and the 
resources located therein); 
iii. They live in a close relationship with natural resources, and sometimes have 
historically been attached to geographically-distinct habitats or ancestral 
territories; 
iv. Their status is regulated wholly or partially by their own norms, customs, or 
traditions, or by special state laws or regulations; and 
v. They self-identify as a different part of society; as a ‘traditional community’. 
 
As can be seen in the concepts set out in this section and Section 3.3.3, ILCs have been 
identified in different national laws and international instruments as the developers, keepers, 
and rightsholders of TK. The existence of national laws allocating rights to ILCs over their TK in 
ABS transactions seems to indicate that the CBD does not prevent such a recognition or the 
protection of ILCs’ rights through the development of national laws. 
Nevertheless, it should be remembered that the national approach to compliance with 
the ABS obligations is a factor that significantly affects the possibility of providers achieving a 
distribution of benefits when their resources are used. In this regard, the limitation placed by 
the CBD on the distribution of benefits from TK utilisation does not result from the narrow 
scope of a concept, such as in the case of GR, but from the exclusion of ILCs and TK from the 
Article ruling ABS. This means that the recognition of ILCs as providers of TK is not an obligation 
for the Parties to the CBD, but a voluntary acknowledgement that these Parties could make via 
national laws. This can be seen as a factor limiting ABS transaction on TK. 
 
7.3 Users of GR and TK 
 
Users of GR and TK are responsible for sharing the benefits derived from their utilisation 
with the providers. They seek access for different reasons, including basic research, applied 
research, or the development of marketable products. This is why users can comprise research 
institutes, universities, industry researchers, ex-situ centres. and private companies. They 
operate in a wide range of sectors, namely pharmaceutical, biotechnology, the cosmetics 
industry, seed and crop protection, horticulture, cosmetic and personal care, fragrance and 
flavour, botanicals, and food and beverage industries.133 
 
 
133 Sarah Laird and Rachel Wynberg, Access and Benefit-Sharing in Practice: Trends in Partnerships Across Sectors, 
(Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, CBD Technical Series No. 38, 2008), 8. 
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8. Conclusion 
 
The contents of the CBD and the NP set out the scope of ABS and specify the parties’ 
obligations for the access and utilisation of GR and TK. Therein lies the importance of studying 
these legal texts. Despite their limitations, there is also the impossibility for countries to 
achieve better agreement. This is, perhaps, the fundamental obstacle for the establishment of 
a more functional ABS system, or at least one that is different from what now exists. Given that 
reality, the choices are either to do nothing or to examine these laws to understand their 
meaning and identify those aspects that may require revision. Taking this latter choice means 
being prepared for when countries feel ready to enter into new negotiations. Having chosen 
the second option for this study, this chapter has analysed the contents of the CBD and NP and 
identified a number of concerns. 
Notably, a number of concepts within the CBD and NP require attention due to their 
inaccuracy or even omission; for instance, in the case of the term ‘access’, which is not defined 
in the CBD or NP. Above all, the following aspects must be clarified towards better functionality 
of ABS: (i) the meaning of GR and TK; (ii) the expansion of their scope to make them operational 
and in line with new technologies; (iii) the inclusion of new aspects such as derivatives and 
information; (iv) the identification of ex-situ centres’ role, obligations and rights; (v) the actions 
that triggers ABS obligations; and (vi) the way the concept of the ‘public domain’ should be 
applied in ABS contexts. 
In addition, the analysis of the legal texts reveals some limitations to the exercise of 
ABS. First, in both the CBD and NP it seems to be clear that GR accessed before the CBD fall 
outside the ABS scope. Second, that access to GR and TK should be facilitated. Third, that PIC 
is a prerequisite for access. Fourth, that providers of GR and TK have the right to benefit from 
the use of their resources. Fifth, that those benefits could be monetary and/or non-monetary. 
Sixth, that human GR are outside the ABS scope. Additionally, because principles and concepts 
of international environmental law can be found in the CBD, the concepts of ‘fair and equitable’ 
could be interpreted using other international instruments and international jurisprudence 
from this legal field. 
The aspects mentioned above seem to indicate that the contents of the CBD and NP 
are a factor contributing to the limited efficiency of the ABS system. Together, they underpin 
the different interpretations and implementation of the CBD and NP found in national laws, 
which in turn can be considered the main source for legal complications when compliance at 
the international level is sought. 
Under the current state of affairs, it would be useful for countries to develop and 
implement their national ABS laws by integrating the existing usual international practices on 
GR and TK utilisation. It is also recommended that, while implementing, the legal instruments 
should aim to be as clear as possible in the delimitation and establishment of the ABS scope, 
obligations, processes and requirements. 
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CHAPTER 5. The international system of ABS: the ABS Systems of the CBD, FAO and WHO 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Chapters 3 and 4 concluded that the ABS system of the CBD does not work properly as 
a consequence of failures in its design and legal vacuums in the content and scope of the 
elements it comprises. However, it can be argued that these are not the only causes of the 
failure of ABS. As the CBD is not the only international instrument regulating the distribution 
of benefits arising out of the utilisation of GR and TK, it is frequently claimed that such a failure 
occurs because the laws and rules of the different instruments comprising the international 
ABS system overlap to such a degree that they make the distribution of benefits difficult to 
achieve.1 In response to these claims, this chapter argues that the rules of the international 
ABS system do not contradict or overlap, but are instead mutually supportive, as they were 
created for that purpose. To support this claim, the chapter describes the FAO and WHO ABS 
systems, showing the ways in which they interrelated with the CBD. 
The chapter also concludes by suggesting that access to GR that should be occurring 
through the CBD is instead probably being conducted through the FAO and WHO ABS systems. 
As the CBD does not regulate access ex-situ, this might be one of the principal problems in 
achieving the distribution of benefits. 
 
2. The FAO ABS system 
 
2.1 Background: its negotiation process 
 
As with the CBD, the FAO ABS system is the result of a long process of negotiation which 
was strongly influenced by discussions taking place in other trading venues. The international 
negotiations concerning the use of biodiversity started within the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) in connection with agricultural trade. The need for a change in the protectionist and 
distorting policies in agriculture was first raised at the twelfth session of the contracting parties 
in 1957. Gottfried Haberler was appointed as chair to examine international trade trends, 
assess their future and prepare a report with suggestions for furthering the objectives of the 
 
1 See for example: Ulrich Brand and others, Conflicts in Environmental Regulation and the Internationalisation of 
the State: Contested terrains (Routledge/Ripe, Studies in Global Political Economy, 2008), CBD, Ad Hoc Open-
Ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-Sharing ‘Study on the Relationship Between an International Regime 
on Access and Benefit-Sharing and Other International Instruments and Forums that Govern the Use of Genetic 
Resources’ (2009) UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/7/INF/3/Part.1, 125-127; 3.2.19, 3.2.20; Mathias Koenig-Archibugi and 
Michael Zürn (eds), New Models of Governance in the Global System: Exploring publicness, delegation and 
inclusiveness (Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 66-73. 
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multilateral trading system. However, it was not until the Uruguay Round in 1994 that the 
Agreement on Agriculture was achieved as a concrete result of these negotiations.2 
In this context, Article 20 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture mandates negotiations 
for continuing the agricultural trade process.3 However, its tariff system or green box has been 
criticised for allegedly promoting unfair competition in developing countries.4 This is because, 
under such a system, developed countries can reduce tariffs on small farmers while 
simultaneously granting national subsidies for agriculture.5 
After concluding the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, negotiations concerning the use 
of GR for agriculture continued within the FAO. The key stages in these negotiations are as 
follows: 
 
i. The adoption of the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources in 
1983 (Resolution 8/83); 
ii. The development of the concept of farmers’ rights in 1986;  
iii. The inclusion of the concept of farmers’ rights in a binding instrument in 1989 
(Resolution 5/89); 
iv. The creation of the International Code of Conduct for Plant Germplasm 
Collection and Transfer in 1993 (Resolution 8/93); 
v. The adoption of the International Treaty of Plant Genetic Resources for Food 
and Agriculture (ITPGRFA) in 2001, which incorporates the FAO ABS system 
(Resolution 3/2001); and 
vi. The creation of a Standard Material Transfer Agreement (SMTA) to serve as a 
guide for research centres and ex-situ collections in 2006 (Resolution 1/2006). 
 
These negotiations also reveal changes in the notion of property rights over GR. Its 
implications for the distribution of benefits are presented in the next section. 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Néstor Stancanelli, ‘The Historical Context of the Green Box’ in Ricardo Meléndez Ortiz, Christophe Bellmann 
and Jonathan Hepburn (eds), Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Green Box. Ensuring Coherence with Sustainable 
Development Goals (CUP 2009), 23. 
3 WTO, Agreement on Agriculture (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1A/2, Article 20. 
4 The WTO Agreement on Agriculture includes a classification of subsidies for agriculture into ‘boxes’. The 
inclusion of products in such boxes depends on their effects on production and trade. This way, amber serves to 
identify domestic support measures considered to distort production and trade; blue (amber box with conditions), 
any support that additionally requires farmers to limit production; and green (defined in Annex 2 of the 
Agreement), subsidies causing not more than minimal distortion of trade production, they have to be 
government-funded and must not involve price support. 
More information available on: WTO, ‘Domestic support in agriculture: The boxes’ 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agboxes_e.htm> accessed 10 October 2016. 
5 Timothy Josling, Rethinking the Rules for Agricultural Subsidies (E15Initiative, International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and World Economic Forum 2015), 2,3. 
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2.2 Changes in the concept of property rights over plant GR for food and agriculture 
 
While agriculture was discussed in terms of agricultural trade at the WTO, within the 
FAO the discussion included the nature of the rights that would allow the use of plant GR for 
food and agriculture. This discussion had two clear phases: one in which plant GR for food and 
agriculture were considered to be freely available for use, and another in which these 
resources were deemed to be subject to state sovereignty. What this draws attention to is the 
fact that these opposing ways of conceiving property rights over plant GR for food and 
agriculture were developed from the idea that these resources are humankind’s heritage. 
In the first phase, before the Uruguay Round began, the International Undertaking on 
Plant Genetic Resources (the International Undertaking) was adopted through Resolution 8/83. 
The language of the Resolution reflects the concept of property rights over nature in existence 
at that time. The International Undertaking stated that ‘plant genetic resources are a heritage 
to be preserved and freely available for use for the benefit of present and future generations.’6 
What the International Undertaking reflects is the consideration of such resources as part of 
the ‘common heritage of mankind’ that allowed their free access and utilisation. 
In this specific context, it was considered that plant GR for food and agriculture should 
remain free to allow the development of scientific research, plant breeding or GR conservation 
without the possibility of national sovereign rights being claimed over them.7 As pointed out 
by Philippe Cullet, this was the guidance concerning the management of the Consultative 
Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR),8 which worked on the basis of sharing 
resources and information located in ex-situ collections.9 
Moreover, because the language used in the International Undertaking does not 
impose limitations on the concept of plant GR for food and agriculture, it was also understood 
that (i) traditional cultivars (in current use and newly-developed varieties), (ii) obsolete 
cultivars, (iii) primitive cultivars, (iv) wild and weed species, (v) special genetic stocks (including 
elite and current breeders’ lines and mutants),10 and the varieties developed by scientists in 
laboratories were covered by FAO Resolution 8/83.11 Apparently, the free availability of plant 
GR for food and agriculture improved in laboratories was an obstacle to the acceptance of the 
International Undertaking, especially by developed countries with interests in the trade of 
 
6 FAO, Res 8/83 ‘International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources’ (adopted 23 November 1983). 
7 ibid. Annex, Art. 5 
8 The CGIAR is a global agricultural research body devoted to ‘advance agri-food science and innovation to enable 
poor people, especially poor women, to increase agricultural productivity and resilience, share in economic 
growth, feed themselves and their families better, and conserve natural resources in the face of climate change 
and other threats.’ 
More information available in: 
CGIAR, ‘CGIAR A Global Agricultural Research Partnership’ <http://www.cgiar.org/> accessed 11 October 2016. 
9 Philippe Cullet, ‘The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture’ (2003) IELRC 
Briefing Paper 2003-2, 2-3. 
10 FAO, International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources (n 6) Annex, Art. 2.1a 
11 Cullet (n 9) 1. 
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these products. Agreement on this topic was only achieved in 2001 following a change in the 
concept of property rights over plant GR for food and agriculture. 
The international negotiations within the FAO led to Resolutions 4/89 and 5/89. These 
respectively observe that plant breeders’ rights, as contemplated in the International 
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV),12 were not inconsistent with 
the International Undertaking and introduce the concept of farmers’ rights in recognition of 
the contributions made by farmers in conserving, improving and making available GR for food 
and agriculture.13 
The importance of the notion of farmer’s rights is that it introduces for first time the 
right for farmers ‘to participate fully in the benefits derived, at present and in the future, from 
the improved use of plant genetic resources, through plant breeding and other scientific 
methods.’ Thus, farmers’ rights can be regarded as the most important precedent in the 
acknowledgement of the right of ILCs to be compensated for the use of their TK. 
By the time these Resolutions were devised, the United Nations Environmental 
Programme (UNEP) had established an Ad Hoc Working Group of Technical and Legal Experts 
to create a text for an international convention on biological diversity. The working group then 
became the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee that elaborated the later drafts of the 
CBD. During these discussions, the United States of America (USA), supported by Japan, 
expressed an interest in access to biodiversity, laboratory production of genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs), and their protection through intellectual property rights, while opposing 
PIC and ABS over GMOs and biotechnology products.14 In the opinion of Cullet, this position 
caused a strong reaction from developing countries,15 and is perhaps the factor triggering the 
 
12 According to its Articles 1 and 2, the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants of 
December 2, 1961, as Revised at Geneva on November 10, 1972, on October 23, 1978, and on March 19, 1991 
(UPOV) aims ‘to recognise and to ensure to the breeder of a new plant variety or to his successor in title’ a right 
over such new plant variety, which may be granted ‘either of a special title of protection or of a patent.’ 
More information available in: UPOV, ‘International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants’ (2011) 
<http://www.upov.int/upovlex/en/upov_convention.html> accessed 10 October 2016. 
13 FAO, Resolution 5/89 ‘Framers’ Rights’ (adopted 29 November 1989). ‘Framers’ Rights mean rights arising from 
the past, present and future contributions of farmers in conserving, improving, and making available plant genetic 
resources, particularly those in the International Community, as trustee for present and future generations of 
farmers, for the purpose of ensuring full benefits to farmers, and supporting the continuation of their 
contributions, as well as the attainment of the overall purposes of the International Undertaking) in order to: 
a) ensure that the need for conservation is globally recognized and that sufficient funds for these purposes will 
be available; 
b) assist farmers and farming communities, in all regions of the world, but especially in the areas of origin/diversity 
of plant genetic resources, in the protection and conservation of their plant genetic resources, and of the natural 
biosphere; 
c) allow farmers, their communities, and countries in all regions, to participate fully in the benefits derived, at 
present and in the future, from the improved use of plant genetic resources, through plant breeding and other 
scientific methods.’ 
14 Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, ‘Convention on Biological Diversity and Its Protocol on Biosafety’ (United 
Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law 2009) <http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/cpbcbd/cpbcbd_e.pdf> 
accessed 10 October 2016, p. 3 
15 Cullet (n 9) 2. 
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change in the concept of property rights over GR which occurred within the FAO and was 
subsequently implemented in the CBD. 
In the middle of discussions within the CBD, through Resolution 3/91, the FAO 
recognised the sovereign rights of countries over their plant GR for food and agriculture in 
these terms: ‘The Conference, Recognising that: the concept of mankind’s heritage, as applied 
in the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, is subject to the sovereignty of 
the states over their plant genetic resources, (…) conditions of access to plant genetic 
resources need further clarification; (…) Endorses the following points: 1. That nations have 
sovereign rights over their plant genetic resources;’ 
A comparison of the texts of FAO Resolutions 8/83 and 3/91, contained in Table 9, 
shows how the concept of mankind’s heritage has been used to develop these different 
notions about property rights over GR. 
 
 
 
 
 
In the first phase, this concept supported the idea that GR are free to use, while 
subsequently noting that they are the objects of states’ sovereign rights. This change in the 
conception of property rights over plant GR for food and agriculture within the FAO constitutes 
the direct precedent for the recognition of sovereign rights of states over their GR in the CBD. 
In turn, this is the pillar that provides legal support for ABS. 
 
2.3 Harmonising the FAO and the CBD: the 2001 International Treaty of Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
 
The year after the CBD was signed, through Resolution 7/93, the FAO Conference 
requested further revision of the International Undertaking and its harmonisation with the 
CBD. It also asked for ABS for plant GR for food and agriculture through ex-situ collections to 
be considered, as this issue had not been addressed by the Convention.16 This last mandate 
 
16 FAO, Resolution 7/93 ‘Revision of the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources’ (adopted 22 
November 1993). 
‘1. Requests the Director-General to provide a forum for negotiations among governments: 
This table has been made by the author from the text of Resolutions 8/83 and 
3/91 of FAO, as indicated in the table 
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was made in recognition that the Nairobi Final Act of the CBD proposes that access to GR ex-
situ collected before the CBD is an issue that should be resolved using the FAO system.17 
For this purpose, the negotiations began at the First Extraordinary Session of the 
Commission on Plant Genetic Resources in November 1994 and ended with the adoption in 
2001 of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
(ITPGRFA). This instrument recognises the sovereign rights of states over their plant GR for 
food and agriculture18 and aims to achieve, ‘in harmony with the CBD,’ the fair and equitable 
sharing of the benefits arising out of their use,19 including the protection of TK relevant to plant 
GR for food and agriculture, the right for ILCs to participate in the sharing of benefits, and 
decision-making on matters related to the preservation of plant GR for food and agriculture.20 
In addition, Articles 10-13 regulate the ABS system of FAO (multilateral system - MLS), which 
is explained in Section 2.6 of this chapter. 
 
2.4 Access to GR through ex-situ collections and its relationship with the FAO ABS 
system 
 
As mentioned earlier, since 1991 the FAO has recognised the sovereign rights of states 
over their plant GR (Resolution 3/91). However, it was not until 2001 that the ITPGRFA, 
containing an ABS system, was adopted. The consequence of the absence of a law regulating 
ABS was that the International Undertaking of 1983 was applied until 2001, although the 
common heritage principle espoused in that instrument had, by 1991, already been 
significantly modified by resolutions reasserting the sovereign rights of states over their GR 
and clarifying that ‘free’ access to such resources did not necessarily mean free of charge. 
The relationship between the FAO and the CBD was also unclear. For this reason, GR 
located in ex-situ collections were freely accessed, used, and shared without ABS obligations 
until 2001. This is the case, for example, for the resources found in the collections under the 
CGIAR management, which comprise ‘the world’s largest and most diverse crop and forage 
germplasm, indispensable to future food security.’21 The CGIAR is a global partnership carrying 
out scientific research on food and agriculture through fifteen centres, which integrate the 
 
(a) for the adaptation of the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, in harmony with the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, 
(b) for consideration of the issue of access on mutually agreed terms to plant genetic resources, including ex situ 
collections not addressed by the Convention,’ 
17  Nairobi Final Act of the Conference for the Adoption of the Agreed Text of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (1992) 31 ILM 842. Resolution 3: The Interrelationship between the Convention on Biological Diversity 
and the Promotion of Sustainable Agriculture. The Conference, 
‘4. Further recognizes the need to seek solutions to outstanding matters concerning plant genetic resources 
within the Global System for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Sustainable Agriculture, in particular: (a) Access to ex-situ collections not acquired in accordance with this 
Convention; and (b) The question of farmers’ rights.’ 
18 FAO, International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (adopted 03 November 2001, 
entered into force 29 June 2004) 2400 UNTS 303 (ITPGRFA), Article 10.1 
19 ibid, Article 1 
20 ibid, Article 9.2 
21 CGIAR, ‘About Us’ <http://www.cgiar.org/about-us/> accessed 11 October 2016. 
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CGIAR Consortium of International Agricultural Research Centres.22 These centres are spread 
around the world and conduct research in close collaboration ‘with hundreds of partners’ 
including national and regional research institutes, civil society organisations, academia, 
development organisations and the private sector.23 In other words, it seems that the CGIAR is 
one of the biggest providers of GR in the world, and that its resources have been accessed 
globally by many and different users. 
Given the volume of accesses to plant GR that may have occurred through the ex-situ 
collections belonging to the CGIAR, and its philosophy of free sharing of GR, some concerns 
are raised regarding the use of such resources. For example: is there any factual or legal 
guarantee that the GR accessed through the collections belonging to the CGIAR have been 
used respecting the sovereign rights of their countries of origin and only for the purpose 
defined under the International Undertaking mandate? Are there assurances that those 
resources have not been used for purposes other than food and agriculture, such as 
pharmacology and medicine? Not having clear answers to such questions creates doubts as to 
whether the research associated with these resources has been conducted with the exclusive 
purpose of benefitting humankind, or whether it has also been used to develop marketable 
products with the mere interest of profit. Such doubts are very difficult to resolve, as it is very 
difficult for the provider country to trace the further use of the resources once they have been 
accessed, unless this information is disclosed by the user. 
Access to GR through CGIAR collections highlights two different problems regarding the 
application of the ABS rules of the CBD. First, for the period between when the CBD entered 
into force (29 December 1993) and the adoption of the ITPGRFA (3 November 2001), many GR 
were accessed without fulfilling the ABS obligations of the CBD. Second, tracking and 
monitoring the subsequent uses of such resources is an almost impossible task because, 
among other things, the sharing of samples and their information is a common practice in 
research.24 It could be interpreted that this practice goes not only against the sovereign rights 
of states over their GR regarding their exclusive right to grant access, but also points to possible 
gaps in information about who received samples initially stored in a CGIAR collection. That is 
to say, after a GR is given to a user, it is almost impossible to find out who the subsequent users 
are and the uses of that sample unless this information is recorded by the parties involved in 
the resource-sharing chain. 
 
22 These centres are: Africa Rice Centre, Biodiversity International, International Center for Tropical Agriculture, 
Centre for International Forestry Research, International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre, International 
Potato Centre, International Centre for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas, International Crops Research 
Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics, International Food Policy Research Institute, International Institute of Tropical 
Agriculture, International Livestock Research Institute, International Rice Research Institute, International Water 
Management Institute, World Agroforestry Centre, and WorldFish. 
More information in: CGIAR, ‘Our Research Centres’ <http://www.cgiar.org/about-us/research-centers/> 
accessed 11 October 2016. 
23 CGIAR (n 21) 
24 Myrna Watanabe, ‘The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing. International Treaty Poses Challenges 
for Biological Collections’ (2015) 65 BioScience 543, 548. 
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For these reasons, access to GR through ex-situ collections has been perceived as one 
of the largest obstacles to ABS implementation. In fact, this is a topic of such controversy that, 
despite it being mentioned during the negotiation of the NP, agreement could not be reached. 
 
2.5 Limits to the use of GR located in ex-situ collections 
 
The use of GR ex-situ (such as the CGIAR gene banks), for purposes other than food and 
agriculture led to accusations which link the access of these resources with biopiracy.25 This is 
particularly so because, allegedly, some uses were not for plant breeding and scientific 
purposes, and their benefit was not enjoyed by humanity in the abstract, but instead to satisfy 
private interests. In other words, using GR ex-situ in a different way to how it was authorised 
in the International Undertaking of 1983 is considered as a form of biopiracy.26 
A possible scenario has been raised in which private companies were accessing GR 
through ex-situ collections to develop marketable products without distributing the benefits 
to the providers of GR. It should be keep in mind that the agreements on ABS are typically 
made between the ex-situ collection supplying the GR and the user of the resource.27 That is 
to say, that the distribution of benefits is happening between the user and the ex-situ centre, 
rather than between the user and the provider country. The accusation of biopiracy was 
therefore built on the possibility that providers of GR are not benefitting from the use of their 
resources. Additionally, some claims of several non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 
indigenous organisations demonstrate concerns about the use of associated TK in the 
developing process of those marketable products and the absence of a distribution of benefits 
to ILCs. Despite the fact that these reclamations usually do not to point specifically to the 
development of products using materials accessed ex-situ, the validity of their concerns cannot 
be denied, especially when it is very difficult to know the origin of the resources used.28 
The need to clarify the uses of GR ex-situ becomes evident, because their access outside 
the CBD was potentially affecting both countries of origin and ILCs’ rights. The first step in the 
achievement of this task was the change in the perception that GR were goods of free access, 
and the specific reference of sovereign rights expressed in the right for states to determine the 
conditions for accessing GR. The second step was identifying which crops are vital for food and 
agriculture and which are not. The identification of these crops was made with the intention 
 
25 Biopiracy is understood as the access and utilisation of GR and TK without fulfilling the obligations of the CBD. 
26 International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources (n 6). 
‘Article 1. Objective: The objective of this Undertaking is to ensure that plant genetic resources of economic 
and/or social interest, particularly for agriculture, will be explored, preserved, evaluated and made available for 
plant breeding and scientific purposes. This Undertaking is based on the universally accepted principle that plant 
genetic resources are a heritage of mankind and consequently should be available without restriction.’ 
27 Kate Davis and others, ‘An Access and Benefit-Sharing Awareness Survey for Botanic Gardens: Are they prepared 
for the Nagoya Protocol?’ (2015) 98 South African Journal of Botany 148, 153-154. 
28 See for example, the analysis of the cases of the International Cooperative Biodiversity Group (ICBG) with the 
Chiapas Highland Maya (Mexico) and the Aguaruna people (Peru): 
Ronald Nigh, ‘Maya Medicine in the Biological Gaze. Bioprospecting Research as Herbal Fetshism’ (2002) 43 
Current Anthropology 451, 652; Shane Greene, ‘Indigenous Peoples Incorporated? Culture as Politics, Culture as 
Property in Pharmaceutical Bioprospecting’ (2004) 45 Current Anthropology, 211. 
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of allowing their free use for food and agriculture. These were recorded in Annex I of the 
ITPGRFA. 
 
2.6 The Multilateral System (MLS): the FAO ABS system 
 
Paraphrasing the objectives of the CBD, the ITPGRFA aims are: 
 
i. The conservation and sustainable use of plant GR for food and agriculture; and 
ii. The fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of their use.29 
 
Notably the ITPGRFA aims to provide ‘sustainable agriculture and food security’, which 
have to be achieved ‘by close linking’ of the ITPGRFA with the CBD.30 In this regard, the content 
of this treaty indicates that ABS under FAO rules should not oppose or contradict the ABS 
system of the CBD. 
 
2.6.1 Kinds of utilisation 
 
Access to plant GR for food and agriculture is limited to the exclusive realisation of two 
activities: utilisation and conservation. However, not all kinds of utilisation or conservation are 
permitted. These activities can be conducted solely for the purposes of research, breeding, and 
training for food and agriculture. The use and conservation of these resources for different 
purposes such as ‘chemical, pharmaceutical and/or other non-food/feed industrial uses’ are 
also not covered under the ITPGRFA.31 
This last aspect is of vast importance because makes it clear that the utilisation and 
conservation (the latter being understood as the preservation by the user of the samples 
received for their further use) are restricted to activities related to food and agriculture. 
Consequently, any activity other than those triggers the obligation to conduct an ABS process 
under the CBD. 
 
2.6.2 Conditions for the utilisation of GR under the FAO ABS system 
 
Under the FAO ABS system, states only have an obligation to provide facilitated access 
to their plant GR for food and agriculture for those parties who have also included their GR in 
the MLS.32 
In addition, it has been specifically established that facilitated access: 
 
 
29 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (n 18), Article 1.1 
30 ibid, Article 1.2 
31 ibid, Article 12a 
32 ibid, Articles 11.4, 12.2 
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i. Shall be accorded expeditiously, without tracking individual accessions, and free 
of charge or with a charge that should not exceed the minimal cost involved; 
ii. All non-confidential information shall be made available; 
iii. Recipients shall not claim IPRs or other rights that limit facilitated access to plant 
GR for food and agriculture in the form received from the FAO ABS; 
iv. Plant GR for food and agriculture under development shall be at the discretion 
of its developer during the period of development; 
v. Access to plant GR for food and agriculture protected by IPRs or other property 
rights shall be consistent with international and national laws; 
vi. Plant GR for food and agriculture accessed under the MLS shall continue to be 
made available to this system under the terms of the ITPGRFA; and 
vii. Plant GR for food and agriculture found in ex-situ conditions will be provided 
according to national legislation or, in absence of these laws, in accordance with 
the standards set by the Governing Body of the ITPGRFA. 
 
One important aspect of these rules is related to IPRs. As noted earlier, users of plant 
GR for food and agriculture covered by the ITPGRFA cannot claim IPRs over the materials in 
the form they were received. This is because under the IP law of some countries it is possible 
to obtain IPRs over separate components or genetic parts of such materials. This limitation 
seeks to ensure that these resources cannot be appropriated by anyone, including States and 
private entities. An explanation for this can be found in the first FAO Millennium Development 
Goal,33 consisting of the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger by, among other things, 
improving agricultural productivity. In this sense, for the purpose of conducting research on 
food and agriculture to improve agricultural productivity that helps to reduce poverty and 
hunger, the MLS has been designed to allow free access to those GR considered as the most 
important crops for world food security. For this same reason, it is also required that such GR 
continue to be free for research, breeding, and agriculture. 
Consequently, utilising these resources for the satisfaction of private interests or in 
fields other than food and agriculture runs contrary to the spirit of the ITPGRFA. 
 
2.6.3 GR ex-situ under the MLS 
 
Two criteria were used to define which plant GR are covered under the MLS: the 
resources considered as such and the authorised uses described in the section above. It was 
therefore established that these plant GR are: 
 
i. A list of most of the crops needed for human nutrition (Annex I of the 
ITPGRFA),34 including those: 
 
33 More information available in: FAO, ‘Sustainable Development Goals’ (2016) <http://www.fao.org/sustainable-
development-goals/mdg/en/> accessed 14 October 2016. 
34 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (n 18), Article 11.1 
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a. Under the management and control of the Contracting Parties, 
b. In the public domain,35 and 
c. In the ex-situ collections of the CGIAR;36 and 
ii. Crops not listed in Annex I but collected before the CBD came into force.37 
 
On this basis, accessing GR ex-situ through the MLS has two conditions. First, it is crucial 
that the genetic material corresponds to one of those comprising the previous list, and, second, 
that the resource is used in a way that has been authorised. Otherwise, these GR are covered 
by the rules of the ABS system of the CBD, meaning that PIC, MAT and a distribution of benefits 
must be conducted with the provider of the resource. Second, access to GR not listed in Annex 
I is possible if collected before the CBD. 
 
2.6.4 GR ex-situ under the ABS system of the CBD 
 
As can be inferred from the previous section, the ABS rules of the CBD must be followed 
for accessing: 
i. Plant GR not included in Annex I, even when they were intended to be used 
and/or conserved for research, breeding, and training for food and agriculture; 
ii. Plant GR included in Annex I but used for purposes other than those previously 
described, such as chemical, pharmaceutical, or other industrial utilisation; and 
iii. GR collected after the CBD came into force, but used for purposes other than 
those described in paragraph i above, such as chemical, pharmaceutical or 
other industrial utilisation. 
 
2.7 The structural elements of the MLS 
 
2.7.1 No Prior Informed Consent (PIC) 
 
The ITPGRFA covers a particular plant GR. These resources must be exclusively used for 
research on food and agriculture because the utmost purpose of these research activities is to 
benefit society in the abstract by, for example, contributing to eradicate poverty and hunger. 
With this aim, it was agreed that access to such plant GR must remain free, so anyone could 
conduct research which, in the end, would benefit humanity. Consequently, no sovereign 
rights or any other kind of property rights can be claimed over these plant GR. 
 
35 ibid, Article 11.2 
36 ibid, Article 11.5 
37 Nairobi Final Act (n 17). Resolution 3: The Interrelationship between the Convention on Biological Diversity and 
the Promotion of Sustainable Agriculture. The Conference, 
‘4. Further recognizes the need to seek solutions to outstanding matters concerning plant genetic resources 
within the Global System for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Sustainable Agriculture, in particular: (a) Access to ex-situ collections not acquired in accordance with this 
Convention; and (b) The question of farmers’ rights.’ 
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In this context, PIC does not make sense. In other words, because no one can have 
property rights over specific GR, there is no one with the right to authorise their access. 
It is paradoxical, however, that no one can have property rights over these resources 
but that this limitation does not exist for the developments made using them. This system 
appears to create the conditions for freely conducting research over some GR whose results 
may be privately appropriated. In other words, under this system, providers cannot claim 
property rights over their GR but users can obtain property rights over the developments 
achieved using such resources. 
Finally, it must be remembered that GR ex-situ are subject to the CBD when they are 
not listed in Annex I of the ITPGRFA and/or used for purposes other than food and agriculture. 
Consequently, for these cases the user must obtain PIC from the provider country before 
conducting access. 
 
2.7.2 Standard Material Transfer Agreement (MTA) 
 
Facilitated access to plant GR for food and agriculture shall be provided pursuant to a 
standard material transfer agreement (MTA). A MTA is an agreement between the ex-situ 
collection supplying the resource and the user, which must contain: (i) the purpose of access; 
(ii) the benefit-sharing provisions; and, (iii) an indication that the conditions of the MTA apply 
to subsequent transfers of the resource to another person or entity.38 
Through Resolution 1/2006, the Governing Body of the Treaty adopted a model MTA, 
and nowadays several research centres are operating in accordance with that model.39 
 
2.7.3 The 1993 International Code of Conduct for Plant Germplasm Collecting and 
Transfer 
 
A component of the MLS is the International Code of Conduct for Plant Germplasm 
Collecting and Transfer, adopted in 1993 as a voluntary instrument that could be used by 
governments to develop national regulations or bilateral agreements on the collection of 
germplasm.40 
As shown in Table 10, by means of its consideration of the conservation and continued 
availability of plant GR as a common concern of humankind, this Code of Conduct seems to 
evoke the idea of facilitated access in Article 15.2 CBD by stating that access to plant GR should 
not be unduly restricted (Article 3.2). 
The use of concepts such as ‘mankind’s heritage’ and ‘common concern of humankind’ 
as a basis for claiming that access to GR should be both free, facilitated and subjected to 
 
38 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (n 18), Article 12.4 
39 See for example: CropGenebank Knowledge Base, ‘Collecting plant genetic diversity: Technical guidelines. 2011 
update’ <http://cropgenebank.sgrp.cgiar.org/index.php/procedures-mainmenu-242/collecting> accessed 12 
October 2016 
40 FAO, Resolution 8/93 ‘International Code of Conduct for Plant Germplasm Collecting and Transfer’ (adopted 22 
November 1993), Article 3.6 
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sovereign rights perhaps also provides evidence of the tension between provider and user 
countries, and their particular interests about the free or regulated access to these resources. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.8 The ABS obligations 
 
2.8.1 Facilitated access 
 
In the same way as the CBD establishes its ABS system, the ITPGRFA starts by affirming 
the sovereign rights of states over their plant GR for food and agriculture, including the 
authority to determine their access through national laws.41 Subsequently, it is affirmed that 
in the exercise of such sovereign rights, states agree to establish the MLS,42 which includes in 
its objectives: 
 
i. Facilitating access to plant GR food and agriculture (the GR concerning is 
explained in Section 2.6.3 of this chapter); and 
ii. Sharing, in a fair and equitable way, the benefits arising out of the utilisation of 
these resources, on a complementary and mutually-reinforcing basis. 
 
On this matter there is no difference between the MLS and the CBD. In both cases, 
access must be facilitated by the provider of the resource. This obligation is, however, 
determined by the utilisation of GR. In this way, under the MLS, the obligation to facilitate 
 
41 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (n18), Article 10.1 
42 ibid, Article 10.2 
This table has been made by the author from the text of the Resolutions 8/83 and 
3/91 of FAO, and the International Code of Conduct for Plant Germplasm 
Collecting and Transfer, as indicated in the table 
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access to GR only exists for their use in food and agriculture while access within the CBD must 
be for environmentally-sound uses.43 
This limitation on the providers’ responsibility regarding facilitating access has two 
effects. Firstly, any other utilisation will not generate the obligation to facilitate access. 
Secondly, access to plant GR for food and agriculture through the MLS utilised for purposes 
other than food and agriculture generates the obligation for users to share the benefits with 
providers rather than have them shared through the FAO fund, as explained in the next section. 
 
2.8.2 Benefits derived from the utilisation of GR 
 
MLS is a multilateral mechanism that facilitates access and the distribution of benefits 
derived from the use of plant GR for food and agriculture. Under this logic, ‘facilitated access’ 
is itself the major benefit for users.44 
The system operates on a complementary and mutually-reinforcing basis, meaning 
that: (i) no one can claim property or other rights over them;45 (ii) GR accessed through this 
mechanism shall continue to be made available;46 and, (iii) the benefits will form a trust fund47 
from which money should flow primarily, directly and indirectly, to farmers and ILCs in 
developing countries and economies in transition.48 
The fund operates in a simple way. Those who access materials through the MLS have 
an obligation to disclose any new development. However, users also have the option of keeping 
those new developments to themselves. In doing so, they only have to reach an agreement to 
pay a percentage of any commercial benefits into the common fund.49 
This way of distributing benefits is the opposite of that established in the CBD. As 
explained in Chapter 4, under the Convention, the benefits must be distributed to the provider 
countries. For this reason, a clear identification of the plant GR for food and agriculture 
accessed under the MLS is of great importance, since this determines whether the benefits are 
shared with the provider country or not. 
Similar to the CBD system, the MLS includes some examples of benefits. For example: 
the exchange of information,50 access to and transfer of technology, capacity-building,51 and 
 
43 Convention on Biological Diversity (adopted 05 June 1992, entered into force 29 December 1993) 1760 UNTS 
79 (CBD), Article 15.2 
44 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (n 18), Article 13.1 
45 ibid, Article 12.3d 
46 ibid, Article 12.3g 
47 ibid, Article 13d.ii, 19.3f 
48 ibid, Article 13d 
49 More information about this fund is available in the web site: 
Benefit-sharing Fund <http://www.planttreaty.org/content/benefits-multilateral-system> accessed 2 April 2017. 
50 These can include catalogues and inventories of crop diversity and the results of research. With regard to the 
sharing of information, the ITPGRFA provides the Global Information System, which serve to provide relevant 
information about crops in the MLS. 
This system is available on: <http://www.planttreaty.org/content/multilateral-system> accessed 2 April 2017 
51 Such capacity building can involve programmes for scientific and technical education and training, help with 
the build of research facilities in developed countries and the collaborative development of research between 
developed and developing countries. 
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the sharing of monetary and other benefits of commercialisation.52 It is noticeable that the 
provisions concerning ABS lack specificity which, again, could be an indication of the difficulties 
in balancing the interest of providers and users of GR during the negotiations of the ITPGRFA, 
also causes practical difficulties for the distribution of benefits. 
Moreover, it can be appreciated that the benefits contained in the ITPGRFA are similar 
but not identical to the benefits set out in the CBD. Unlike the CBD, the FAO includes capacity-
building as part of the distribution of benefits, but only enshrines the distribution of benefits 
from commercial use of these resources. In contrast, the CBD establishes the distribution of 
benefits for any use of such resources, either commercial or non-commercial, for which the 
Bonn Guidelines include some examples of monetary and non-monetary benefits to be utilised 
by the stakeholders. Therefore, under the CBD, non-commercial uses can result in non-
commercial benefits, while commercial uses can be compensated with commercial and non-
commercial benefits. Table 11 includes a comparison of the benefits in both systems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.8.3 Benefits derived from the utilisation of TK 
 
In the same way as in the CBD, TK is not included in the Article regulating benefit-
sharing of the ITPGRFA.53 It has been interpreted that the distribution of benefits derived from 
the use of TK evolved from the content of Article 9.2b of the ITPGRFA, which includes the 
recognition of the farmers’ rights. In this regard, the International Treaty provides that: 
 
 
‘9. Farmers’ rights: 
1. The Contracting Parties recognize the enormous contribution that the local and indigenous 
communities and farmers of all regions of the world, particularly those in the centres of origin 
and crop diversity, have made and will continue to make for the conservation and 
 
52 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (n 18), Article 13.2 
53 ibid, Articles 3 and 10 
This table has been made by the author from Article 13.2 of the ITPGRFA and 
Article 15.7 of the CBD 
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development of plant genetic resources which constitute the basis of food and agriculture 
production throughout the world. 
 
2. (…) In accordance with their needs and priorities, each Contracting Party should, as 
appropriate, and subject to its national legislation, take measures to protect and promote 
Farmers’ Rights, including: 
b) the right to equitably participate in sharing benefits arising from the utilization of plant 
genetic resources for food and agriculture;’ 
(Emphasis added) 
 
The link between the content of the ITPGRFA and the incorporation of TK within the 
scope of the ABS system in the CBD has been established in relation to the recognition of the 
contribution of ILCs to the conservation and development of biodiversity. Over time, it was 
recognized that TK plays a key role in the development of such conservation and development 
activities. This recognition was incorporated into Articles 8j of the CBD and Article 3 of the NP. 
Perhaps because of this, in the ITPGRFA, farmers and ILCs do not directly benefit from 
the utilisation of plant GR for food and agriculture. This occurs instead through FAO financial 
assistance delivered to farmers and ILCs through the funding strategy for farming that is part 
of the MLS.54 
Although the ITPGRFA is limited to recognising the enormous contribution of farmers 
and ILCs to food and agriculture preservation and production,55 these communities have been 
able to benefit from the MLS by retrieving money for funding some of their projects. Thus, 
maybe, in the case of ILCs, it would be better for the CBD to establish a benefit-sharing system 
similar to the one implemented in the MLS. 
 
2.9 The Parties of ABS 
 
As with the ABS system of the CBD, the parties of the FAO system are the countries of 
origin, ex-situ conservation centres, farmers (including ILCs), and users. These concepts were 
addressed in more detail in Section 6 of the previous chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 ibid, Article 13.3 
55 ibid, Article 9.1 
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2.10 The ABS Process 
 
The first step of functionality for the ITPGRFA involves the inclusion of plant GR for food 
and agriculture and their related information56 in the system.57 It also incorporates (i) the plant 
GR for food and agriculture located in the ex-situ collections of the International Agricultural 
Research Centres (IARCs) of the CGIAR;58 and, (ii) complementarily, all holders of plant GR for 
food and agriculture listed in Annex I are invited to add these resources to the system.59 
The information about the resources that are part of this system, as well as the ex-situ 
collection in which they can be found, is available on the web.60 Thus, in practice, this ABS 
system is a focal point containing information on plant GR stored in different ex-situ collections 
across the world, instead of being a single place where all those resources are preserved. 
In this way, access to plant GR for food and agriculture is through the ex-situ 
conservation centres in the world. These centres can include national seed collections, private 
collections such as research centre collections, or seeds kept in small refrigeration units in 
research labs. GR users therefore access the MLS to find the resource they want and to identify 
the ex-situ collection in which the resource is stored. These users then make contact with the 
collection to access the GR through a standard material transfer agreement (explained in 
Section 2.7.2 of this chapter) that contains the conditions for access as well as the distribution 
of benefits. 
 
3. The ABS system of the WHO 
 
3.1 Background 
 
The Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework for the sharing of influenza 
viruses and access to vaccines and other benefits was adopted by 194 countries of the World 
Health Assembly in May 2011. It is generally known as the PIP Framework. It was created in 
response to the need to increase access to vaccines after the world faced outbreaks of H5N1 
 
56 Such related information refers to the ‘passport information’, consisting of detailed information about the 
samples stored in a gene bank. The minimum required passport data may include the following: 
a) Samples from collecting missions: Common crop name and/or genus and species, collecting number, location 
of collecting site, country of origin, collecting date, phenology, collecting source and number of plants sampled. 
b) Samples received as donations: Common crop name and/or genus and species, accession name and/or other 
identification associated with the sample, pedigree information and breeding institute’s details (for breeding 
lines), phenology, acquisition source, country of origin, and donor accession number (if applicable). 
More information available in: Crop Genebank Knowledge Base ‘Registration’ 
<http://cropgenebank.sgrp.cgiar.org/index.php/procedures-mainmenu-242/registration-mainmenu-195> 
accessed 2 April 2017 
57 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (n 18), Article 11.2 
58 ibid, Article 11.5 
59 ibid, Articles 11.2 and 11.3 
60 Web site of the Treaty: FAO, ‘The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. 
Easy-SMTA Homepage’ <https://mls.planttreaty.org/itt/> accessed 22 October 2017. 
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influenza cases in 2006. Nonetheless, its relationship with the CBD goes back to the NP 
negotiations. 
Access to pathogens was raised for the first time by the US during the ABS 7. From then 
on, a number of developed countries have requested the acknowledgment of ongoing related 
work in various forums including the WHO.61 They suggested excluding pathogens from the 
ABS system of the CBD and regulating their access through other organisations or 
conventions.62 Their claims were based on two principal arguments. First, in their opinion, 
there was no need for the NP to regulate issues already in discussion in other negotiating 
forums. Second, they claimed that human-health related concerns should be addressed 
exclusively by the WHO.63 
For their part, developing countries pointed out that pathogens are the raw material 
for vaccines. Based on this, they argued that the real intention of developed countries was not 
to discuss access to pathogens in connection with human-health related concerns, but to 
exclude a highly-profitable sector from the obligation to distribute benefits.64 
As with other topics, no agreement could be reached on this matter. For this reason, 
the NP is limited to mentioning in its Preamble ‘the importance of ensuring access to human 
pathogens for public health preparedness and response purposes’ and to ‘acknowledging 
ongoing work in other international forums relating to access and benefit-sharing.’ 
 
3.2 The WHO ABS process 
 
The PIP Framework establishes among countries, national laboratories, vaccine 
manufacturers, and the WHO the responsibility of sharing biological materials65 and 
contributing to a global ABS system. This system seeks to provide equitable access to vaccines, 
surveillance and risk assessment information, transfer of technology, skills and know-how, 
technical assistance, and help with building domestic capacities to respond to pandemic 
influenza.66 
 
61 Stefan Jungcurt and others, ‘Summary of the Resumed Ninth Meeting of the Working Group on Access and 
Benefit-Sharing of the Convention on Biological Diversity: 10-16 July 2010’ (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, iisd 
Reporting Services, IISD, 19 July 2010, vol 9, n 527), 4. 
62 ibid 5, 8. 
63 ibid 15. 
64 ibid 
65 According to the PIP Preparedness these pandemic influenza preparedness biological materials or PIP biological 
materials includes human clinical specimens, virus isolates of wild type human H5N1 and other influenza viruses 
with human pandemic potential; and modified viruses prepared from H5N1 and/or other influenza viruses with 
human pandemic potential developed by WHO GISRS laboratories, these being candidate vaccine viruses 
generated by reverse genetics and/or high growth re-assortment and the RNA extracted from wild-type H5N1 
and other human influenza viruses with human pandemic potential and cDNA that encompass the entire coding 
region of one or more viral genes. 
WHO, Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework for the Sharing of Influenza Viruses and Access to Vaccines 
and Other Benefits (2011). 
66 Seasonal Influenza is a common disease that can sometimes cause epidemics with different degrees of severity. 
Pandemic influenza is rare, and its appearance cannot be predicted. It occurs when humanity faces a new flu virus 
for which there is no pre-existing immunity defence. This is why, during the epidemic time, pharmaceutical 
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It uses Standard Material Transfer Agreements (SMTAs) for the transfer of materials 
and the distribution of benefits. These instruments consist of legally-binding agreements 
between the WHO and parties receiving biological samples. They aim to ensure that all the 
parties involved commit to sharing the benefits derived from access. In this way, the WHO 
ensures its access to vaccines, antivirals, and other supplies at the time of a pandemic.67 In 
other words, the PIP Framework serves to coordinate the delivery of biological materials for 
the production of vaccines and the distribution of the vaccines produced. 
The benefit for the provider is to receive vaccines, while for the user it is the access to 
the pathogens that allow the production of vaccines they can later sell, and for the WHO to 
ensure a proper provision of vaccines required to address a pandemic situation. 
The relationship between the ABS systems of the CBD and the WHO can be established 
through the application of Article 4.4 of the NP. This article establishes that the Protocol does 
not apply ‘for the Party or Parties to the specialised instrument in respect of the specific genetic 
resource covered by and for the purpose of the specialised instrument.’ From this it can be 
deduced that (i) there is more than one international treaty addressing access to GR; and (ii) 
the Protocol does not apply in cases where there is a treaty governing access to GR for 
particular conditions. It can also be deduced that the ABS system of the CBD does not apply for 
access to GR (i) regulated by the PIP Framework, (ii) to address a pandemic situation. It may, 
therefore, be concluded that access to GR used to develop vaccines outside the PIP Framework 
and/or outside a pandemic situation should be conducted through the ABS system of the CBD. 
In spite of this, for authors such as Adachi and others, the language employed in Article 
4.3 of the NP68 ‘serves as a reminder that unless specifically excepted by a separate treaty, the 
ABS system established by the Protocol may be interpreted by courts to cover influenza 
viruses.’69 Nonetheless, in the application of the lex specialis principle, this thesis argues that 
the ABS system of the CBD does not apply in the areas regulated by the WHO. Consequently, 
contrary to what Adachi and others express, the CBD does not cover the distribution of the 
benefits derived from the use of GR for the production of vaccines in a pandemic situation. 
With regard to TK, it might be expected that since the scheme of distribution of benefits 
under the PIP Framework is intended for the production of vaccines resulting from the study 
 
intervention is crucial to stop the disease. What is more, for the creation of vaccines the sharing of the relevant 
viruses as well as the benefits derived from sharing these materials is required. 
67 WHO, ‘Addressing Our Health Responsibilities for Pandemic Influenza Preparedness’ 
<http://www.who.int/influenza/pip/WHO_PIP_brochure.pdf> accessed 15 October 2016, 3-4. 
68 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from 
their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity (adopted 29 October 2010, entered into force 12 
October 2014) A-30619 UNTS (Nagoya Protocol). 
‘Article 4.3. This Protocol shall be implemented in a mutually supportive manner with other international 
instruments relevant to this Protocol. Due regard should be paid to useful and relevant ongoing work or practices 
under such international instruments and relevant international organizations, provided that they are supportive 
of and do not run counter to the objectives of the Convention and this Protocol.’ 
69 Kiyoshi Adachi and others, The Convention on Biodiversity and the Nagoya Protocol: Intellectual Property 
Implications. A Handbook on the Interface between Global Access and Benefit Sharing Rules and Intellectual 
Property, (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNCTAD 2014), 40. 
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of biological material in laboratories, the manufacture of such products does not include the 
use of TK and, therefore, in this context there is no room for ABS claims from ILCs. 
However, although the use of TK for the development of these vaccines is highly 
unlikely, it is a situation that could eventually happen. In such a situation, ILCs are entitled to 
compensation because this right is due every time a TK is used. Moreover, such a payment 
must be made in accordance with the laws of the country of origin of ILCs. 
 
4. Complementarity between the ABS Process in the CBD, the FAO and the WHO 
 
As stated in the introduction, this chapter argues that the ABS systems of the CBD, FAO, 
and WHO are complementary and mutually supportive instead of opposing and overlapping, 
as some claim. Each regulates access to and utilisation of GR and TK in specific contexts. The 
CBD governs general GR and TK for general uses, the FAO regulates plant GR for food and 
agriculture, and the WHO regulates pathogens for the production of vaccines in a pandemic 
situation. Based on the content of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 and 
the application of the lex specialis principle,70 there seems to be no doubt that the CBD does 
not apply to the special situations regulated by the FAO and the WHO. In the same way, it 
appears clear that the CBD must be used for all general cases, including those not covered by 
the ABS systems of the FAO and the WHO. 
Consequently, an ABS process under the CBD should be conducted for access to: 
 
i. GR not included in Annex I of the ITPGRFA; 
ii. GR included in Annex I of the ITPGRFA, when used for purposes other than food 
and agriculture; 
iii. Pathogens not accessed through the PIP Framework; and 
iv. Pathogens used for vaccine production outside a pandemic situation. 
 
Regarding PIC and MAT, it should be remembered that PIC is only mandatory for the 
development of ABS processes under the CBD. However, within all three systems the 
 
70 Although the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) does not contain a specific clause for the 
implementation of the lex specialis principle, in the opinion of some scholars, in the VCLT this principle is 
implemented through specific provisions many of which contain caveats, such as ‘unless the treaty otherwise 
provides’. From there it may be argued that the application of the clauses of a special treaty on a subject matter 
should prevail over the application of the clauses of a general treaty on the same subject matter. Similarly, the 
principle according to which lex specialis derogat lege generali is a widely accepted maxim of legal interpretation, 
used for the resolution of normative conflicts, including, treaty interpretation. Hence, in this case, the effect of 
combining the VCLT with the lex specialis principle, is that the CBD can be seen as the general rule of ABS and the 
International Treaty of FAO and the PIP Framework of WHO as the special rules governing ABS transactions for 
the use of specific GR. 
See for example, Christian Tams, ‘The Oxford Guide to Treaty Symposium: The General Law of Treaties and its 
Limits’ (Opinio Juris, 12 November 2012) http://opiniojuris.org/2012/11/12/the-oxford-guide-to-treaties-
symposium-the-general-law-of-treaties-and-its-limits/ accessed 22 August 2018; Ahmad Ali, ‘Determining 
Hierarchy Between Conflicting Treaties: Are there vertical rules in the horizontal system?’ (2012) 2 Asian Journal 
of International Law 1,18. 
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distribution of benefits is an obligation to be fulfilled on the basis of mutually agreed terms 
(MATs), also called standard material transfer agreements (SMTA) within the FAO and the 
WHO. 
In general terms, these three systems provide that access to GR shall be facilitated, that 
TK should be protected, and that countries of origin and ILCs have the right to benefit from the 
utilisation of their resources. Finally, despite the fact that using TK for vaccine production 
during a pandemic situation is unlikely, if it happens, ILCs will have the right to benefit from 
the use of their TK. The CBD rules should guide the agreements on the distribution of benefits 
derived from the utilisation of TK, as this knowledge is not included in the PIP Framework. 
From the individual analysis of these different ABS systems, it is possible to confirm that 
there is no contradiction between the CBD, FAO, and WHO systems. On the contrary, it could 
also be stated that these instruments were created with the aim of, among other things, 
reaching a balanced international and supportive international ABS system. 
 
5. The relationship between the ABS systems of the CBD, FAO and WHO 
 
This chapter is dedicated to demonstrating, through a separate explanation of the ABS 
systems of the FAO and WHO, that they are not contradictory, but complementary, to the CBD. 
It must be emphasised, however, that a distribution of benefits from the use of GR and TK can 
only be successfully implemented if the ABS rules are correctly applied. Otherwise, the 
coexistence of more than one ABS system regulating access to the same resources may hinder 
the distribution of benefits, as explained in Chapter 6 regarding the joint application of the CBD 
and TRIPS. 
To better understand what happens when these systems are applied, some context for 
the explanations provided above may be useful. Imagine that someone wants to use a TK to 
develop a new product. This product has the potential to be used in the food and the 
pharmaceutical sectors. Also, this user needs the GR to which the TK is associated as the raw 
material to make the product. 
What are the options for this user to conduct ABS? 
The first thing to be done is to identify the ABS system which should be used. To this 
end, it will be necessary to determine whether the GR to be used is in Annex I of the ITPGRFA 
or if it is required for vaccine production during a pandemic situation. If the answer is 
affirmative for the first option, the MLS must be used. If affirmative for the second, the access 
must be conducted through the PIP Framework. Finally, if the answer to both is negative, the 
CBD must be used. 
The following scenarios present the ways in which access could be conducted. 
 
5.1 Scenario 1: the ABS system of the CBD 
 
Suppose the answer to both the previous options was negative. In this case, the user 
must access GR and TK using the ABS system of the CBD. According to the Convention, access 
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to GR can be conducted in-situ or ex-situ. This is a decision for the user to make. However, 
access ex-situ can only be carried out if the GR was collected according to the CBD unless it 
happened before the CBD came into force. The differences between these types of access and 
the possible situations that this represents are described below. 
 
5.1.1 Access to GR in-situ 
 
The process starts with the request for access to GR to the competent authority of the 
country of origin of the GR. To that end, since the distribution of benefits depends on it, the 
user must provide all the information related to the intended uses of the GR. Once permission 
for access is granted and an agreement has been reached, the terms for access and the way in 
which the benefits will be distributed should be recorded in a MAT. If the access was requested 
only for research, the user has an obligation to provide information about the future 
commercial applications, as well as reach a new MAT to distribute the commercial benefits. 
Nevertheless, such an obligation also exists in the event of access for commercial purposes. In 
other words, the provider has the right to benefit every time their resources are used. This is 
why the user must inform the provider about the different uses and benefits derived from such 
utilisation. Moreover, this may also explain why the user is not usually allowed to share samples 
of the GR with other people. 
In this case, access is requested for manufacturing a product. Therefore, it is expected 
that the MAT includes the sharing of monetary and non-monetary benefits with the country of 
origin. 
Once a MAT has been concluded, its obligations are mandatory for the parties. Hence, 
the provider has a duty to provide access to the GR and the right to benefit from its utilisation, 
and the user has the right to access the resource and the obligation to share the benefits they 
gain from its use. 
 
5.1.2 Access to GR ex-situ 
 
In theory, the only difference between access in-situ and access ex-situ is the provider 
of GR. In the first case, it is a country of origin, and in the second it is an ex-situ conservation 
centre. For this reason, it is expected that the countries of origin also benefit from the use of 
their resources when accessed in ex-situ conditions. However, this does not seem to be 
happening. 
As explained earlier, access ex-situ means, for example, access through a collection. 
This should not be a problem. However, for a long time, collections were operating under the 
mandate of the CGIAR which promoted the free sharing of GR and their associated information 
for research.71 Furthermore, the sharing of GR and their related information is a common 
 
71 Cullet (n 9) 2-3. 
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practice developed by collections using the MTA adopted by the FAO with Resolution 1/2006.72 
In addition, MTAs are usually implemented using the FAO ‘International Code of Conduct for 
Plant Germplasm Collecting and Transfer’ which contains voluntary guidelines to access GR in 
ex-situ conditions. The problem caused by the application of this Code in ABS transactions is 
that it refers to the countries of origin as ‘donors’ of GR.73 Although the Code recognises the 
need to promote the sharing of benefits between users and donors,74 there is a risk that the 
word ‘donor’ may perhaps evoke the idea of giving something for free. In this way, access to 
GR ex-situ maintains the idea of access without the need for benefit-sharing. 
Moreover, ex-situ conservation centres have allegedly not fully implemented the 
CBD.75 Consequently, in a relationship which does not include the countries of origin, they 
continue to share GR in exchange for information with the collection, regardless of whether: 
(i) this GR is in Annex I of the FAO International Treaty; (ii) if their use will be exclusively in the 
fields of food and agriculture; and (iii) whether they were collected before or according to the 
CBD. Apparently, users are not asking for this information. It also appears they do not mind 
that only a few GR can be accessed for free and that they cannot be used for any purpose. 
Given the above, it seems that is the incorrect application of the ABS systems that is 
undermining the distribution of benefits rather than their joint application. 
Under these conditions, it is highly probably that users are accessing the GR they need 
without having complied with the obligations of PIC, MAT, or the distribution of benefits as 
stipulated in the CBD. 
 
5.1.3 Access to TK 
 
TK should be accessed conducting PIC, MAT, and the distribution of benefits. This 
process is the same regardless of whether the GR to which TK is associated was accessed in in-
situ or ex-situ conditions. The benefits from the utilisation of TK should be shared with the ILC 
who developed and/or maintained the knowledge. Also, this community is the only one 
entitled to grant PIC. Therefore, the first step in accessing TK is the identification of the ILCs to 
which such a TK belongs. 
Accessing TK should be developed following the national laws of the given country and 
the customary laws and protocols of the ILCs. However, sometimes ILCs’ customary law is not 
written. This could create uncertainty for the user about the proper procedures to follow. As a 
consequence, some users may be less motivated to conduct processes to access TK and this 
could therefore be perceived as an obstacle for the distribution of benefits to ILCs. 
In addition, much TK is accessible to the public. As explained in the Section 3.2.4 of 
Chapter 4, this has led to the erroneous assumption that this TK is in the public domain and 
 
72 Several ex-situ collections and research centres operate using the MTA established by the FAO. See for example: 
Crop Genebank Knowledge Base (n 39) 
73 FAO, ‘International Code of Conduct for Plant Germplasm Collecting and Transfer’ (n 40), Article 2.1 
74 ibid, Article 1.7 
75 Watanabe (n 24) 548. 
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therefore is free to use without generating obligations of PIC and the distribution of benefits 
to ILCs. 
Therefore, although in theory ILCs have the right to benefit from the use of their TK, 
what could be happening is that the user knew about the existence of the TK because it is 
publicly accessible. Hence, it is very likely that such a user will not carry out an ABS process to 
access such a TK because access has already been gained. This leads to the conclusion that 
access to publicly-available TK should be regulated, otherwise ILCs will not benefit from the 
utilisation of a large proportion of their TK. 
 
5.2 Scenario 2: the FAO ABS system 
 
Access must be conducted through the MLS when the GR is listed in Annex I of the 
ITPGRFA and will be used for food and agriculture, or for the use of GR collected before the 
CBD came into force. This last aspect can only be clarified by the ex-situ conservation centre. 
The MLS is not clear about the way in which ILCs can benefit from the use of their TK. 
The system does not contain a single article specifying how the benefits should be distributed 
when TK is accessed. Nevertheless, the countries’ right to regulate access to plant GR for food 
and agriculture is established in Article 10. Users should, therefore, follow the national 
legislation of the collection in those cases where access to associated TK has been regulated 
by a party to the ITPGRFA. Seemingly, the national approach to compliance hinders ABS, and 
in this particular case, the rights of ILCs to benefit from the use of their TK. 
 
5.3 Scenario 3: the WHO ABS system 
 
The task of recognising when the PIP Framework must be used is easier. The factor 
unequivocally indicating this point is when the world faces a pandemic situation. In such 
circumstances, countries and companies around the world will work together under the 
direction of the WHO to produce sufficient vaccine to control the situation. This is not the 
hypothetical situation presented above and, hence, this ABS system would not apply. 
The PIP Framework was adopted after the outbreaks of H5N1 influenza cases in 2006, 
meaning that its scope is precise. This also may explain why it was designed to allow a fast and 
efficient response to control pandemic situations. 
This fact is crucial, as Article 4.4 of the Protocol limits its application to the existence of 
a ‘specialised instrument in respect of the specific genetic resource covered by and for the 
purpose of the specialised instrument.’ As noted, the main elements of this article are a 
specialised instrument that regulates the use of specific GR for a precise purpose. It follows 
that if these conditions do not apply, the ABS system of the CBD should be applied. In other 
words, vaccine production happening outside a pandemic situation should be addressed using 
the CBD. 
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5.4 Final remarks 
 
This section aims to illustrate the explanations given above through one example. 
Although it describes a hypothetical situation, the course of the events demonstrates some of 
the most frequent criticisms related to the unauthorised access of GR and TK, often called 
biopiracy.76 
Based on this, it is possible to affirm that there is no conflict between the ABS systems 
of the CBD, FAO, and WHO. Instead, as noted by Watanabe, what appears to be happening is 
that access to GR is mainly conducted in ex-situ conditions,77 and, as pointed out by Davis and 
others, that ex-situ collections have not integrated the ABS system of the CBD into their 
practices.78 This might be because they work under the CGIAR logic in which GR are apparently 
freely accessed and shared. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The CBD is not the only international treaty governing the distribution of benefits 
derived from the utilisation of GR and TK. The FAO and WHO also contain ABS systems. 
Together, the CBD, FAO, and WHO comprise the international ABS system. These systems were 
created to complement each other. Because of this, they regulate ABS within a particular scope 
and therefore do not overlap, contradict, or oppose each other. The scope of the MLS is the 
utilisation of plant GR listed in Annex I of the ITPGRFA for food and agriculture purposes, and 
GR collected before the CBD. The scope of the PIP Framework is the utilisation of pathogens 
and viruses for vaccine production in a pandemic situation. Finally, the general rule of the CBD 
ABS system is that it does not apply to situations ruled by a specialised instrument. In this way, 
access to GR and its associated TK, which is not included within the scope of the FAO or WHO, 
ABS systems should be conducted using the CBD. 
However, it appears that access to all kinds of GR ex-situ (not only those listed in Annex 
I of the ITPGRFA) for all kind of uses (not only for food and agriculture) is being conducted 
within the FAO ABS system. This situation, together with the fact that the CBD does not 
regulate access ex-situ, may be the cause of one of the principal problems in achieving the 
distribution of benefits. This is particularly because indications suggest that GR is mainly 
accessed in ex-situ conditions. (This idea is developed in Chapters 3 and 6.) 
Similarly, it seems that access to GR for vaccine production outside a pandemic 
situation is not happening through the ABS systems of WHO or the CBD. As indicated, some 
countries opposed the inclusion of pathogens and viruses within the scope of the CBD. As a 
result, it was agreed that access and utilisation of these resources would be addressed within 
the WHO. That is why the PIP Framework was created. However, this system only applies to 
 
76 See for example: Sociedad Peruana de Derecho Ambiental, ‘Documentos de Investigación’ 
<http://www.spda.org.pe/publicaciones/documentos-de-investigacion/> accessed 3 October 2016. 
77 Watanabe (n 24) 549. 
78 Davis and others (n 27) 152. 
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access to GR for vaccine production during a pandemic situation. The practical consequence 
of this is that access to and utilisation of pathogens and viruses in a non-pandemic situation 
are conducted outside the ABS rules of the WHO and the CBD. This is another big gap in ABS. 
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CHAPTER 6. The relationship between ABS and Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 explained the ABS design, content, scope, functioning, and the 
relationship between the CBD and the ABS systems of FAO and WHO, which constitute the 
international ABS system. It was concluded that flaws in all those dimensions could be the 
cause for the scarce distribution of benefits. 
In spite of this, criticism is mainly reduced to pointing out that the exercise of 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) is the primary reason for the lack of compliance with ABS. 
For this reason, this chapter explores the relationship between ABS and IPRs with a view to 
understanding the way in which the exercise of IPRs could be another cause that undermines 
the distribution of benefits. In doing so, the chapter first explains the lack of parity between 
ABS and IP, using theories of fragmentation and complexity in international law. Here, it is 
concluded that, although the CBD and IP norms do not formally contradict each other, the non-
integration of the ABS rules within the procedures for granting IPRs over creations using GR 
and TK may affect the distribution of benefits. Following that, an overview of biodiversity and 
TK utilisation is provided to give a general view about their value. Finally, a synopsis of the main 
proposals for the joint exercise of ABS and IPRs is provided. 
The chapter concludes that the failure to integrate ABS in the IP system could affect 
the functional effectiveness of ABS, because this flaw makes it possible to obtain IPRs over 
creations using GR and TK without conducting ABS and without distributing the benefits 
derived from such utilisation. Another conclusion is that due to fragmentation and the 
complexity of the international system of ABS, the distribution of benefits seems very hard to 
achieve. Consequently, a global solution is a good option for tackling these particular issues. 
 
2. TRIPS and CBD 
 
The first and most conspicuous thing that can be noted about ABS is that the 
relationship between TRIPS and the CBD is highly problematic. Several and opposite positions 
can be found in the academic literature explaining, for example, their interconnections and the 
possible causes for the difficulties of their joint implementation. In contrast to what happens 
with the matters studied in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, the amount and vast array of information that 
can be found in this regard makes the presentation of this topic a difficult task. However, to 
introduce it to the reader, a summary of the most important points is presented below, along 
with a delimitation of its analysis. 
There is a general trend towards identifying the relationship between TRIPS and the 
CBD by matching such a relationship with the interests and expectations of providers and users 
of GR and TK regarding the distribution of benefits. For this reason, providers and users are 
often considered as two different parties in the same affair. In such a way, developing countries 
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are viewed as the providers and developed countries (more precisely, the private sector 
businesses and scientific research institutions within their jurisdictions) as the users of GR and 
TK. Of course, there are exceptions. For example, Australia is a developed country rich in 
biodiversity, whilst Brazil is a developing country that is biotechnologically developed with 
important agro-industrial capacities.1 Moreover, the range and depth of concerns regarding 
ABS cover different stakeholders (for example, countries, private sector, ILCs, and NGOs) and 
many views about the way in which biodiversity can be used (for instance, for human 
development, equity and justice, the ecological relationships upon which sustainable 
development must be built, health, agriculture, or technology). These factors open a broad 
range of possibilities and relationships to make ABS even more challenging to achieve.2 
Notwithstanding the possibility that providers and users are not always a developing 
and a developed country respectively, the analysis presented in this work was not elaborated 
on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, although it is acknowledged that the roles of provider and 
user have different nuances, in this thesis the party providing a resource is referred to as the 
provider, and the party using a resource is described as the user. It is also recognised that in 
most cases, providers are in developing countries and users are mainly located in developed 
countries. Hence, in general, the terms provider and user can typically be regarded as 
connoting developing and developed countries respectively, and, therefore, these terms are 
mutually interchangeable in this thesis. 
The relationship between TRIPS and the CBD is usually described as conflicting. 
Nonetheless, such allegations should be clarified as drawing a line between legal and policy 
conflicts. In terms of form, it is possible to affirm that laws rarely conflict in the sense of two 
rules contradicting one to another. Thus, no rule in TRIPS contradicts the CBD. Moreover, the 
principles and objectives of TRIPS seem to support ABS compliance. However, unlike laws, legal 
principles can stand in tension with another. For instance, it is often affirmed that the principle 
of national sovereignty over GR in the CBD is in tension with the principle in TRIPS that IPRs are 
private property. In other words, it is stated that TRIPS and the CBD are in conflict because they 
concede at the same time two different kind of property rights over an identical subject 
matter—sovereign and private rights over GR. While this may be true, it seems that it is not 
the existence of sovereign and private rights over GR and associated TK which causes the 
inoperability of ABS, but the fact that the absence of compliance with ABS does not affect the 
concession of IPRs. 
In this respect, the discussion has been focused on the extent TRIPS violates and/or 
undermines ABS, and, therefore, if an amendment to the Agreement is required. Accordingly, 
the incorporation of rules for compliance with ABS in the legal procedure for the concession 
of IPRs will depend on the policies adopted by each Member State of the WTO and the CBD. It 
 
1 Charles Victor Barber, Sam Johnston and Brendan Tobin, ‘User Measures. Options for Developing Measures in 
User Countries to Implement the Access and Benefit-Sharing Provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity’ 
(UNU-IAS-Report, 2nd edn 2003). 
2 DG TRADE European Commission, CEAS Consultants (Wye) Ltd Centre for European Agricultural Studies, Geoff 
Tansey, and Queen Mary Intellectual Property Research Institute, ‘Study on the Relationship Between the 
Agreement on TRIPS and Biodiversity Related Issues. Final Report’ (CEAS, September 2000), 55. 
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can be noted in this regard that, for example, some countries have incorporated disclosure 
requirements for patent applications in their national laws and others have not.3 Nevertheless, 
these different approaches produce diversification of the requirements and conditions for the 
granting of IPRs as well as problems of compliance with ABS within different jurisdictions. This 
is because someone can, at the same time, be acting in compliance with the law of the country 
granting a patent right, but against the legislation of the country of origin of the GR and TK with 
respect to the use of such resources in the invention that has been protected with such a 
patent right. 
In addition to what is expressed above, it should be highlighted that the relationship 
between TRIPS and the CBD is not limited to the legal level. In fact, the content and scope of 
the rights they recognise have been shaped in the political sphere. More precisely, the rights 
ultimately envisaged in TRIPS and the CBD were simultaneously developed in different fora in 
which many interconnected topics were discussed. Nevertheless, despite the multiplicity of 
interests expressed, it is possible to identify a common concern in TRIPS and the CBD: the 
regulation of access to and utilisation of natural resources. Two positions can be clearly seen 
in this regard. On the one hand, an interest for controlled access to biodiversity and the 
distribution of benefits derived from its utilisation. On the other hand, a demand for facilitated 
access to biological diversity, with an obligation to distribute benefits limited exclusively to the 
use of biological material containing units of heredity. To some extent, the CBD and TRIPS 
envisage these positions. 
Finally, although conflicts between TRIPS and the CBD should be resolved at the legal 
level, this is a subject matter so highly politicised that a legal solution might not be easy to 
achieve. This thesis acknowledges this fact as a limitation for the amendment of flaws in the 
CBD and the NP. Thus, with the aim to provide an overall picture of the obstacles posed from 
the international/political dimension of ABS, the following two sections contain information 
regarding some of the difficulties found in the application of international law. 
 
2.1 The International Arena 
 
Tensions between TRIPS and the CBD are a recurrent topic in the analysis of compliance 
with ABS. On this subject, it is commonly affirmed that one of the factors affecting the 
application of ABS is that the CBD overlaps with other international treaties regulating GR and 
TK utilisation. Therefore, the rules of the instruments comprising the international ABS system4 
create multiple and different requisites and approaches towards the distribution of benefits, 
 
3 For example, disclosure is an obligation under the legislation of the countries of the Andean Community of 
Nations, Costa Rica and Brazil, while, for European countries, disclosure by patent applicants is encouraged but 
not obligatory. 
Alison Hoare and Richard Tarasofsky, ‘Asking and Telling: Can “Disclosure of Origin” Requirements in Patent 
Applications Make a Difference?’ (2007) 10 The Journal of World Intellectual Property 149, 152, 155-156. 
4 As explained in Chapter 5, these instruments are: the CBD, the Nagoya Protocol to the CBD, the International 
Treaty on Plan Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA) of the FAO, and the Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness (PIP) Framework of the WHO. 
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which result in the inoperability of ABS. Despite these allegations, this thesis has shown in 
Chapter 5 that the norms of the international ABS system do not contradict or overlap. This 
can be seen, for example, in the way they cross-reference each other. Nevertheless, many 
studies about the functioning of international law have concluded that responses composed 
of more than one international treaty might be difficult to implement. Thus, at the 
international level, ABS failure might be caused not because the norms that comprise the 
international system contradict and overlap, but because ABS has been fragmented in more 
than one international instrument. 
ABS is a fragmented system. Fragmentation of international law is a phenomenon 
considered as one of the most serious sources of conflict between treaty regimes.5 As noted 
by Jenks, fragmented systems are the result of a law-making process in which treaties are 
developed ‘in a number of historical, functional and regional groups which are separate from 
each other and whose mutual relationships are in some respects analogous to those of 
separate systems of municipal law.’6 For Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, such a process led to 
the so-called ‘functional differentiation’ consisting of the emergence at the international level 
of specialised and relatively autonomous rules, legal institutions, and spheres of legal practice, 
each possessing their own principles and institutions.7 In the opinion of Koskenniemi, the 
practical effect is that conflicts emerge between rules and rule-systems, which divert 
institutional actions and produce the loss of an overall perspective on the law.8 
Furthermore, overlapping systems are considered as ‘regime complexes’. A regime is 
complex when ‘a network of three or more international regimes that relate to a common 
subject matter; exhibit overlapping membership; and generate substantive, normative, or 
operative interactions recognised as potentially problematic whether or not they are managed 
effectively.’9 Accordingly, difficulties in the operability of complex regimes are the result of 
their overlapping, regardless of whether their norms contradict each other or not; because, as 
a result of this overlapping, a wide range of organisations10 with general, functional, or regional 
responsibilities are created.11 The production of the legislative instruments for ratification or 
acceptance by states is one of the responsibilities of these organisations; the way in which they 
interact to produce such instruments is one of the causes for the inoperability of complex 
regimes, rather than the overlapping which characterises this kind of system.12 According to 
 
5 Wilfred Jenks, ‘The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties’ (1953) 30 BYBIL 401, 403 in UN, General Assembly, 
International Law Commission, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification 
and Expansion of International Law. Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, Finalised by 
Martti Koskenniemi’ (2006) A/CN.4/L.682, 10. 
6 ibid 
7 Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner, ‘Regime-Collisions: the vain search for legal unity in the 
fragmentation of global law’ (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 999 in UN (n 32) 11. 
8 UN (n 5) 11. 
9 Amandine Orsini, Jean-Frédéric Morin and Oran Young, ‘Regime complexes - a buzz, a boom or a boost?’ (2013) 
19 Global Governance 27, 29. 
10 In the case of ABS, these institutions are not only created between the organisations dealing directly with an 
ABS system, but also within the WIPO and WTO. 
11 Jenks (n 5) 403. 
12 ibid 
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Orsini, Morin, and Young, the interplay between these organisations leads to mutual 
adjustments having the potential to generate beneficial or negative cooperative relationships 
among the common Parties of the international treaties comprising the regime complex.13 In 
this respect, these authors understand that interplay can change global governance14 by 
‘strengthening the power asymmetries to favour the already powerful players’ which affects 
the functionality of the regime.15 
It follows from this that the operability of fragmented and complex regimes is not 
totally determined by the content of the legal instruments of the regime, but largely 
delimitated by the interplay of their institutions. In this vein, studies on fragmentation and 
complexity have concluded that the divergence of rules across systems constitutes a major 
source of transnational conflict. Regarding the food security regime, it has been noted, for 
example, that fragmentation leads to the practical consequence of inefficiency in solving the 
problem for which it was created, namely, global hunger.16 
For this reason, one of the biggest concerns in this matter is how easy or difficult it is 
to resolve or manage the transnational problems derived from the application of fragmented 
and complex regimes. For authors such as Robert, Keohane, and David, complexity facilitates 
flexibility and renovation of the architecture of governance which simplifies its organisation,17 
while for Struett and others complexity is harmful to global governance.18 
Regardless of the position taken on this problem, it should also be considered that the 
instruments comprising a complex regime do not exhibit hierarchical relations, otherwise, their 
interactions would not be problematic. Furthermore, it should be noted that the jurisdiction 
of most international tribunals is limited to particular types of disputes or disputes arising 
under particular treaties. 
Accordingly, one of the major obstacles for the implementation of fragmented and 
complex regimes is the absence of a mechanism that allows the Parties to solve the 
transnational problems of the system at the international level rather than in national or 
regional spheres. Because of this, and with the aim to contribute to a solution for the lack of 
distribution of benefits derived from the use of GR and TK, from a legal perspective, Chapter 7 
contains a proposal of key elements that could be used for ABS implementation. 
 
 
13 Orsini, Morin and Young (n 9) 28, 34. 
14 ibid 34. 
‘Governance is the sum of many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common 
affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-
operative action taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as 
informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest.’ Peter 
Hägel, Global Governance (2011). 
15 Orsini, Morin and Young (n 9) 34-35. 
16 Matias Margulis, ‘The Regime Complex for Food Security: Implications for the Global Hunger Challenge’ (2013) 
19 Global Governance 53, in Orsini, Morin and Young (n 9) 34. 
17 ibid 
18 Michael Struett, Mark Nance and Diane Armstrong, ‘Navigating the Maritime Piracy Regime Complex’ (2013) 
19 Global Governance 93, in Orsini, Morin and Young (n 9) 34. 
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2.2 The legal relationship between TRIPS and the CBD 
 
As mentioned before, while TRIPS and the CBD do not conflict in a strictly legal sense, 
national or regional policy conflicts do arise out of their implementation.19 On this matter it is 
consistently affirmed that Article 27.3b of TRIPS, on patentability or non-patentability of plant 
and animal inventions and the protection of plant varieties, is the point connecting IPRs with 
the CBD. Allegedly, there is a strong likelihood of granting IP rights on inventions using GR and 
TK that do not comply with the ABS obligations. As a result, since the WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Doha in 2001, the protection of TK and the relationship between ABS and IP 
began to be considered within the WTO. Thus, Paragraph 19 of the 2001 Doha Declaration 
broadens the scope of the effects of TRIPS beyond IPRs when requesting an analysis on its 
relationship with the CBD and the protection of TK and folklore. Furthermore, it was stated 
that such a task shall be guided by the TRIPS Agreement’s objectives (Article 7) and principles 
(Article 8).20 
Within the TRIPS Council, State Members seek the implementation of TRIPS and the 
CBD in a mutually supportive manner. To that end, the content of Articles 16.5 of the CBD and 
17 of the Nagoya Protocol have been considered. The former provides that Contracting Parties 
should cooperate to ensure that IPRs are supportive and do not run against the CBD objectives. 
The latter establishes that State Members should take measures to monitor and enhance 
transparency concerning the utilisation of GR, including designating effective checkpoints to 
collect or receive relevant information at any stage of research, development, innovation, pre-
commercialisation, or commercialisation. Patent offices have been suggested as checkpoints 
as a way to know the use made of GR and TK in jurisdictions other than in countries of origin. 
As a result of these meetings, the need to disclose the origin of GR and TK used in the 
invention for which protection is sought in patent applications is a topic under current analysis 
by the Members of the WTO. This idea was drawn up on the confidence that a legal obligation 
establishing this requirement in patent applications would contribute to preventing both 
misappropriation of GR and TK, and the erroneous granting of patents.21 It was consequently 
affirmed that a disclosure requirement would enhance transparency about the utilisation of 
GR and TK, and compliance with patentability criteria that has frequently been criticised for 
 
19 DG TRADE European Commission, CEAS Consultants (Wye) Ltd Centre for European Agricultural Studies, Geoff 
Tansey, and Queen Mary Intellectual Property Research Institute, ‘Study on the Relationship Between the 
Agreement on TRIPS and Biodiversity Related Issues. Final Report’ (CEAS, September 2000), 75.  
20 WTO, ‘Doha Ministerial Declaration’ (2001) WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1. Paragraph 19: 
We instruct the Council for TRIPS, in pursuing its work programme including under the review of Article 27.3(b), 
the review of the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement under Article 71.1 and the work foreseen pursuant to 
paragraph 12 of this Declaration, to examine, inter alia, the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, the protection of traditional knowledge and folklore, and other relevant new 
developments raised by Members pursuant to Article 71.1. In undertaking this work, the TRIPS Council shall be 
guided by the objectives and principles set out in Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement and shall take fully into 
account the development dimension. 
21 WTO, Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, ‘The Relationship Between the TRIPS 
Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity. Summary of Issues Raised and Points Made’ (2006) 
IP/C/W/368/Rev.1, 27-34. 
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allegedly being applied with too little rigor when the use of TK is involved.22 An opposite view 
was expressed that no amendment to the patent system is needed because the problems 
derived from the CBD application can be solved using contract law and the strengthening of 
the national laws on ABS.23 These two positions constitute the basis for the current negotiation 
taking place within the WIPO, of one or more international instruments relating to IP that will 
ensure the balanced and effective protection of GR, TK and traditional cultural expressions. 
The content of these proposals is explained in more detail in Section 4 of this chapter. 
 
3. The use of Biodiversity and TK 
 
For Groth, the value of biodiversity and the role of TK in biodiversity preservation and 
the maintenance of culture and identity are undervalued in international negotiations. He 
points out, as an example of this, the way in which the policy objectives and core principles for 
both the protection of TK and traditional cultural expressions have been drafted was 
negotiated within the WIPO.24 Indeed, poor valuation of GR and TK has the potential to affect 
the negotiations on the distribution of benefits derived from the use of these resources. In 
fact, GR and TK are often valued only in economic terms, equated with raw materials that have 
little or no value, whilst their biological and cultural dimensions seem to be disregarded in such 
valuation (see Section 5.2.4 of Chapter 4). In this regard, this section aims to demonstrate that 
GR and TK are of value and are widely used by industry and commerce. It is expected that the 
data presented below can overcome the possible doubts about the value of these resources 
as well as the right of providers to benefit from the use of them. 
 
3.1 The use of biodiversity and TK in health services 
 
Biodiversity and TK directly relate to the fundamental rights of life and health of poor 
populations in developing countries. Concerning this, the WHO has pointed out that TK 
replaces the usual means of supplying medical services for ILCs in developing countries, which 
would otherwise be provided by hospitals and medicines. As an example, the ratio of 
traditional healers to the population in Africa is 1:500 whereas the ratio of medical doctors to 
population is 1:40.000. Thus, for millions of people in rural areas, traditional healers and 
traditional medical knowledge25 remain their primary source of health services.26 In the same 
 
22 ibid 
23 ibid 14-16. 
24 Stefan Groth, Negotiating Tradition. The Pragmatics of International Deliberations on Cultural Property 
(Göttingen Studies in Cultural Property, vol 4, Universitätsverlag Göttingen, 2012), 157. 
25 According to the World Health Organisation traditional medicine is ‘the knowledge, skills and practices based 
on the theories, beliefs and experiences indigenous to different cultures, used in the maintenance of health and 
in the prevention, diagnosis, improvement or treatment of physical and mental illness’ that ‘covers a wide variety 
of therapies and practices which vary from country to country and region to region’ and ‘in some countries, it is 
referred to as “alternative” or “complementary” medicine (CAM).’ WHO, ‘Traditional and Complementary 
Medicine’ <http://www.who.int/topics/traditional_medicine/en/> accessed 19 November 2015 
26 WHO, WHO Traditional Medicine Strategy: 2014-2023 (WHO 2013), 27. 
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direction, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has stressed 
that the use of traditional medical knowledge by the poorest segments of developing countries 
has major repercussions, due to the fact that ‘modern medicine is unlikely to be a realistic 
treatment option’.27 The UNCTAD observes that in contrast to the difficulties of accessing 
modern medicine, traditional medicine is widely available, even in remote areas, which results 
in its large-scale use, as is the case in India and Africa, where it is utilised by 70% and 80% of 
the population respectively.28 
Notwithstanding the above, the use of traditional medical knowledge is not exclusive 
to developing countries. According to the WHO, this is because this kind of TK can be found in 
almost every country in the world and is proven to be of good quality, safe, and effective.29 
Consequently, the market for traditional medical knowledge is huge. As an illustration, over 
100 million Europeans are currently users of traditional medicine, with one fifth using it 
regularly, and the same number preferring health care services that includes traditional 
medicine.30 Among all manifestations of traditional medicine knowledge, traditional Chinese 
medicine is arguably the world’s most widely used.31 The market of this single service in China 
represented an amount estimated to $83.1 billion  USD in 2012, for Korea $7.4 billion USD in 
2009, and for the US, $14.8 billion USD in 2008.32 These figures show that TK has a prominent 
place in the medicine market. 
 
3.2 The use of biodiversity and TK in commerce 
 
ten Kate and Laird concluded in 2002 that the annual market for various categories of 
products derived from GR was between $500 billion USD and $800 billion USD. This number 
includes the sectors of: pharmaceuticals $75-$150 billion USD; botanical medicines $20-$40 
billion USD; agriculture produce $330-$470 billion USD; ornamental horticultural products 
$16-$19 billion USD; crop protection products $0.6-$3 billion USD; biotechnologies in fields 
other than healthcare and agriculture $60-$120 billion USD; and personal care and cosmetic 
products $2.8-$2.8 billion USD.33 
More recently, Laird and Wynberg demonstrated that in 2004 there was a great 
demand for access to GR in five sectors: pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, seed, crop 
protection, and horticulture—the same sectors as in 2002. Reportedly, the pharmaceutical 
industry grew around 9% in 2004 from 2003, presenting gains of approximately $500 billion 
 
27 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘Protecting and Promoting Traditional Knowledge: 
Systems, National Experiences and International Dimensions’ Sophia Twarog and Promila Kapoor (eds) (2004) 
UNCTAD/DITC/TED/10, 3. 
28 ibid 3. 
29 WHO (n 26) 7. 
30 ibid 25. 
31 ibid 22. 
32 ibid 26. 
33 Kerry ten Kate and Sarah Laird, The Commercial Use of Biodiversity. Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-
Sharing (Earthscan Publications Ltd 2000), 2. 
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USD. This industry was concentrated in North America, Europe, and Japan.34 For the same year, 
the biotechnology industry increased by 17% over 2003 and had revenues of $54.6 billion USD. 
This sector was dominated by the US with 78% of global public company revenues, followed 
by Europe at 14%, Canada at 4%, and the Asia-Pacific region at 4%.35 Regarding the breeding 
and sale of agricultural products, the use of GR presented variations depending on the sector. 
For example, the seed sector was far more reliant on breeding material from its own private 
collections or other genebanks than from the wild, whereas the crop protection sector had a 
greater interest in wild GR for chemical protection or plant improvement. In this sector, ten 
companies controlled 49% of the global seed market in 2004. During that year, commercial 
seed sales were estimated at between $21 billion USD and $30 billion USD.36 Genetically 
modified (GM) crops increased more than 47-fold from 1.7 million hectares in 1996 to 81 
million hectares in 2004, with soya as the most commonly planted GM crop. During that year, 
this market was $4.70 billion USD.37 The horticultural industry was $12.425 USD, showing an 
increase of 28% since 2001.38 Fifty-five percent of the import value of the live plant trade was 
accounted for by Germany (20%), France (11%), the United Kingdom (8.8%), the United States 
(8.5%), and the Netherlands (6.5%). The export trade of live plants was dominated by the 
Netherlands (41%), with Denmark, Belgium, Italy, and Germany, comprising 32%.39 
For its part, TK associated with GR has been seen as a valuable global resource. It has, 
for example, been acknowledged that TK contributes significantly to scientific discoveries and 
biotechnology development. In this field, the use of TK has reportedly allowed researchers to 
find and move genetic sequences responsible for particular traits in a plant, move traits from 
one species to another, and even isolate many molecules, which are the active compounds for 
agricultural and pharmaceutical uses.40 It has also been accepted that, although the role of TK 
in pharmaceutical discovery was relatively small before 2000, during the following years, it 
grew at a slow rate.41 
Finally, it should be said that despite the usefulness of economic studies about the use 
of biodiversity and TK, some flaws have been identified. For example, Pearce and Moran point 
out that these studies have usually been restricted to use values.42 They note that, as a result, 
some ecosystems or regions are systematically left out from these analyses, while some others, 
such as tropical forests and wetlands, are common subjects of research.43 Christie and others 
observe that the content of the questionnaires used in the studies about the value of 
 
34 Sarah Laird and Rachel Wynberg, Access and Benefit-Sharing in Practice: Trends in Partnerships Across Sectors, 
(Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, CBD Technical Series No. 38, 2008), 100. 
35 ibid 106. 
36 ibid 111. 
37 ibid 112. 
38 ibid 115. 
39 ibid 116. 
40 Tesh Dagne, ‘Protecting Traditional Knowledge in International Intellectual Property Law: Imperatives for 
Protection and Choice of Modalities’ (2014) 14 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 25, 33. 
41 Laird and Wynberg (n 34) 100. 
42 David William Pearce and Dominic Moran, The Economic Value of Biodiversity (Earthscan Publications Ltd 1997), 
85. 
43 ibid 
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biodiversity have limitations in literacy and language, social context and values, the validity of 
utilitarian assumptions, and in the design of the guidelines about how to answer the 
questionnaires.44 In their view, these limitations create significant problems for the 
respondents who are not literate or specialist and, therefore, will not be able to read the 
material, to complete the questionnaire, or to express complex standpoints.45 Lastly, 
Wekundah highlights the fact that the commercial use of TK has been more frequently 
analysed within the frame of traditional medicinal knowledge, leaving out the analysis of other 
aspects of this knowledge.46 
For these reasons, despite the many studies conducted on the economic value of 
biodiversity and TK, more analysis is required to determine the value of those ecosystems and 
expressions of TK that have not yet been adequately addressed. Nonetheless, from the existing 
studies and data, it is possible to conclude that biodiversity and TK are valuable resources and 
that their protection and preservation are more than justified, of which ABS is an important 
part. 
 
3.3 The use of biodiversity and TK in patent activities 
 
There are not many studies about how GR and TK have been used in patent activities. 
This fact has been broadly reported as an issue in intergovernmental debates about the 
governance of GR, TK, and IP.47 For that reason this section is only based on three sources 
reporting the use of GR and TK in patent activities.48 Two of them analyse the use of plants, 
while the other is dedicated to animal GR. 
Overall, these studies affirm that human societies depend upon biodiversity (plants and 
animals) for the fulfilment of basic needs.49 For example, when analysing the sources of all new 
chemicals between 1981 and 2002, it was found that 63% were derived from some natural 
product, and that this number increases to 80% between 2002 and 2003.50 However, they also 
indicate that patent activity is focused upon a narrow range of biological species.51 In spite of 
 
44 Mike Christie and others, ‘An Evaluation of Monetary and Non-monetary Techniques for Assessing the 
Importance of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services in Countries with Developing Economies’ (2012) 83 Ecological 
Economics 67, 73-75. 
45 ibid 
46 Joseph Wekundah, Why Protect Traditional Knowledge? (African Technology Policy Studies Network, 2012), 10. 
47 Paul Oldham, Stephen Hall and Oscar Forero, ‘Biological Diversity in the Patent System’ (2013) 8 PLOS ONE 1, 
2. 
48 1. Oldham, Hall and Forero (n 47). 
2. WIPO Patent Landscape Report on Animal Genetic Resources (by Paul Oldham, Stephen Hall and Colin Barnes 
in cooperation with the Food Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) with contributions of Irene 
Hoffman and Paul Boettcher (Animal Production and Health Division, FAO, 2014). 
3. WIPO, ‘Record Year for International Patent Applications in 2016; Strong Demand Also for Trademark and 
Industrial Design Protection’ (2017) <www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2017/article_0002.html> accessed 31 
March 2017. 
49 WIPO (n 48) 22; Luciana Costa Brandão and Júlia Paludo, ‘Biodiversity and Gene Patents’ (2013) 1 UFRGS Model 
United Nations Journal 244, 244. 
50 Costa Brandão and Paludo (n 49) 248. 
51 ibid 
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this, it is reported that in 1997, 10 of the 25 best-selling drugs were related to natural products, 
which represented 42% of all pharmaceutical industry sales for $17.5 billion broadly.52 This led 
to the conclusion that, although patent activity centres on a few portions of biological diversity, 
the market of such products is not necessarily small. According to Oldham, Hall, and Forero, 
despite approximately 1% of biodiversity on the planet being used for patent purposes, global 
receipts from IP from creations using natural resources stood at $180 billion USD in 2009.53 
 
3.3.1 Study No. 1 
 
Without including viruses, Oldham and others carried out a study in 2013 about patent 
activity on biodiversity using the documents from the European Patent Office (EPO), the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), and the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) for the 
period 1976-2010.54 The mention of the absence of viruses in their report is important because 
they are the raw material for producing vaccines, which constitute an important branch of the 
medical market. 
This study declares that 136,880 patent documents contain 25,495 species names from 
the 1,347,224 species listed within the Species 2000/ICTIS Catalogue of Life Annual Checklist 
2011.55 The major fields of patent applications identified in this study are 
pharmaceuticals/medicinal preparations, genetic engineering of foods, peptides, testing 
enzymes/microorganisms—DNA sequencing, analysing chemical/physical properties, and 
fermentation/enzyme using chemical synthesis.56 
Some interesting conclusions can be made about the use of natural products and 
traditional medicines. For example, natural products play a key role in the development of 
approved pharmaceuticals and cosmetics,57 the ‘presence of plants in pharmaceutical 
preparations is strongly associated with traditional medicines as a growing area of patent 
activity,’58 and the use of 12,045 plant species and 1,519 species of fungi in pharmaceutical 
preparations associated with traditional medicines makes this a growing area of patent 
activity.59 These findings confirm the arguments of the WHO and UNCTAD in relation with the 
crucial role played by traditional medicine knowledge in the medical field, and also run counter 
to some statements asserting that natural products are a declining focus of interest for R&D.60 
The study found two major focuses of patent activity. The first is that genetic 
engineering using both biotechnology and genomics as tools. In contrast with traditional 
medicines, biotechnology involves diversification in the patent system. That is to say, despite 
biotechnology (including emerging fields such as synthetic biology) focusing on a small group 
 
52 ibid 
53 Oldham, Hall and Forero (n 47) 9, 11. 
54 ibid 2-3. 
55 ibid 3. 
56 ibid 5. 
57 ibid 6. 
58 ibid 
59 ibid 
60 ibid 5, 6. 
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of species, it allows the extension of patent claims across multiple organisms sharing the 
evolutionary history of the species upon which the claims of the patent have been written.61 
This finding affirms the fact that there is no requirement that patent activity must relate to a 
larger number of species to be a profitable business. 
The second major focus of patent activity is the genetic engineering of foods. 
Nonetheless, these authors noted that, due to the narrowness of agricultural R&D to a small 
number of companies, it is hard to draw final conclusions regarding the strategic importance 
of in-situ agricultural biodiversity in contrast with ex-situ collections under the MLS.62 
Finally, an important feature of patent activity was identified in relation to biocides and 
the use of marine GR beyond national boundaries.63 
 
3.3.2 Study No. 2 
 
Study No. 2 is entitled ‘Patent Landscape Report on Animal Genetic Resources’64 and 
contains information on patent documents of the European Patent Office (EPO), the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), and the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) from 
the period between 1976 and 2013. It searched for the use of 17 animal species65 (using their 
Latin species names and common names) in the title, abstract, and claims of 14,038,743 patent 
documents,66 to identify i) patent activity involving animals as a GR, and ii) activity involving 
animal breeding for food and agriculture.67 The main conclusions of this study are:68 
 
i. Developments involving transgenic animals now focus on recombinant proteins and 
medical markets rather than products for human consumption; 
ii. Phenotypic selection is being replaced by genomic selection; 
iii. Emerging developments in synthetic biology, metabolic engineering, genome 
engineering, and genome editing have potentially important implications for food 
and agriculture; 
iv. Following a surge of patent activity in the late 1990s, the dominant trend in patent 
filings involving animal genetic resources of relevance to food and agriculture has 
been downward. However, this may change due to completion of major genome 
sequencing projects and the rise of new technologies such as synthetic biology, 
genome engineering, and genome editing; 
 
61 ibid 6, 7. 
62 ibid 8. 
63 ibid 8, 9. 
64 WIPO (n 48) 43. 
65 Duck, muscovy duck, zebu cattle, auroch cattle, taurine cattle, water buffalo, pig, sheep, goat, horse, donkey, 
bactrian camel, dromedary camel, llama, alpaca, chicken, and turkey. 
ibid. 
66 ibid 9-10. 
67 ibid 10-11. 
68 ibid 5-6. 
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v. Much of patent activity focuses on dominant breeds and does not involve genetic 
material from rarer breeds from specific countries or the use of TK; 
vi. There is no ‘evidence of patent activity that could be considered to constitute 
potential biopiracy in the form of misappropriation of genetic material without the 
knowledge or consent of a country of origin’ and ‘of the use of traditional 
knowledge in the documents reviewed in the research;’69 and, 
vii. The data collected ‘reflects the reality that traditional knowledge with respect to 
animal genetic resources is not presently recognised as important by patent 
applicants.’70 
 
These conclusions are particularly relevant for two reasons. First, the report is part of 
the WIPO Development Agenda project ‘Developing Tools for Access to Patent Information,’ 
aimed at the compilation of information on the patterns of patenting and innovation activity 
related to specific technologies in various domains.71 As such, it is highly likely that it has been 
used as a source of information during the meetings conducted within this organisation, which 
include discussion of the distribution of benefits derived from GR and TK in patent activities. 
Second, its conclusions contradict a vast number of claims regarding the feasible use of GR and 
TK in patent activity. Therefore, such results can be a politically sensitive issue. For the 
previously mentioned reasons, it is important to read the report of this study with caution. In 
this regard, two evident failures in the drafting of the conclusions can be outlined. 
First, the most important aspect is that the information used for this study ‘was 
reviewed by text mining patent applications.’72 This is relevant because, as has been repeatedly 
pointed out throughout this thesis, the patent system does not incorporate any ABS obligation 
(PIC, MATs, and benefit-sharing) or the commitment to disclose the source of origin of the 
resources used in the invention. So far, the criticism on this point has led to new negotiations 
regarding the possibility of integrating the disclosure of origin as another requirement for 
patent applicants. Thus, from the information disclosed in patent documents, it cannot be 
affirmed that all GR used in patent activities were accessed with the PIC of the country of origin 
and that no TK had been used (conclusion vi), because that information is not part of patent 
documents. 
Second, in a similar way, it cannot be claimed that ‘the majority of patent activity 
focuses on dominant breeds and does not involve genetic material from rarer breeds from 
specific countries or the use of TK’ (conclusion v). This, because the subject matter of this study 
are the species most commonly used for food and agriculture, it does not include rare, 
endemic, promising, and other distinct species. Likewise, from the information found in the 
patent documents analysed, it is not possible to conclude that developers are not interested 
 
69 ibid 128. 
70 ibid 14. 
71 WIPO, ‘Patent Landscape Reports’ <http://www.wipo.int/patentscope/en/programs/patent_landscapes/> 
accessed 31 March 2017. 
72 WIPO (n 48) 128. 
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in different breeds or TK than those reported, because this research did not search for all 
animal species used for breeding but focused only on seventeen, which happen to be the most 
commonly used in animal breeding for food and agriculture. Moreover, the FAO recognises 
that animal domestication (selection of animals for food, fibre, draught, and other agricultural 
uses) has ‘resulted in thousands of genetically diverse breeds of domestic animals adapted to 
a wide range of environmental conditions and human needs.’73 Given this fact, it is unlikely 
that scientists have no interest at all in the species domesticated by ILCs. 
In spite of these flaws, it should be acknowledged that the report contains information 
useful to understanding the trends in patent activities about animal species most frequently 
used for food and agriculture:, its conclusion regarding the possible change in patent activities 
due to completion of major genome sequencing projects and the use of new technologies 
(synthetic biology, genome engineering, and genome editing). This is because it evidences the 
possibility of obtaining patent rights over inventions developed using technologies that allow 
the utilisation of GR without the need of accessing the resource. As explained in Section 3.3 of 
Chapter 3, this situation was not a part of ABS. 
 
3.3.3 Study No. 3 
 
Finally, according to the Record Year for International Patent Applications the total of 
applications in 2016 was 233,000; 7.3% more than in 2015.74 The countries with the largest 
number of PCT applications were the USA (56,595), Japan (45,239), China (43,168), Germany 
(18,315), Republic of Korea (15,560), France (8,208), the UK (5,496), the Netherlands (4,679), 
Switzerland (4,365), and Sweden (3,720). The highest concentrations of PCT patent 
applications were in Asia (47.4%), followed by Europe (25.6%), and North America (25.3%). The 
top 10 companies making applications consist of seven companies from Asia and three from 
the USA, while the top 20 educational institutions comprised 10 USA and 10 Asian universities. 
The largest PCT applications were in digital communication (8.5%), followed by computer 
technology (8.2%), electrical machinery (6.9%), and medical technology (6.8%). It is striking 
that China has been experiencing a double-digit growth every year since 2002. If China 
maintains that growth, it will be the country with the largest number of patent applications 
within two years. This, together with the fact that China is also a wealthy country in terms of 
traditional medical knowledge, is a factor that could change the international emphasis on the 
importance of the use of TK within the patent system. 
 
 
 
 
73 FAO, ‘Harvesting Nature’s Diversity’ <http://www.fao.org/docrep/004/v1430e/V1430E00.htm> accessed 2 
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74 WIPO, ‘Record Year for International Patent Applications in 2016; Strong Demand Also for Trademark and 
Industrial Design Protection’ (2017) <www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2017/article_0002.html> accessed 31 
March 2017. 
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3.4 The fair and equitable distribution of benefits in patent activities 
 
In general terms, the concession of IPRs is supported on equity grounds. Receiving 
returns on the investments made to produce an invention is considered fair. Such 
compensation is expected to constitute an incentive for the development of further inventions. 
This, in theory, would be for the benefit of humankind. The same idea is expressed in almost 
identical terms to support the granting of IPRs for inventions based on living entities. It is 
claimed that IP protection promotes research that increases plant genetic variability to be used 
to breed thousands of varieties of food crops and domesticated animals.75 Thus, the 
concession of IPRs is defended based on the idea that IP establishes a sort of creative circle, 
since the protection of inventions stimulates the production of more inventions, from which 
humanity ultimately benefits. Allegedly, the fairness of the patent system is found in the 
protection of the interests of all participants, creators and consumers. Because creators 
benefit from the protection of their inventions and the entire society, in turn, enjoys the 
technological and cultural developments protected with IPRs. 
Nevertheless, when it comes to ABS, for example, Dutfield noted that, in practice, 
patents rarely shield the collective interests of all partners in bioprospecting activities. On the 
one hand, the poverty of many ILCs puts them in a situation of extreme vulnerability that makes 
it easy to exploit them. On the other hand, once natural resources are taken outside the 
countries of origin without their authorisation, their use becomes difficult to control.76 To this 
last argument it could be added that providers depend on the users’ information to know the 
ways in which their resources are used. Such disclosure allows benefit-sharing rather than the 
way in which GR is subsequently shared, either authorised or unauthorised. Because of this, 
Dutfield concludes that the patent system is ‘unhelpful in promoting fair and equitable benefit 
sharing.’77 
In addition to these arguments, it should be noted that IPRs and ABS have different 
interests and viewpoints, and so the concept of fair and equitable in the CBD is different from 
TRIPS. As explained in Section 5.2 of Chapter 4, the concept of fair and equitable sharing of 
benefits of the CBD is commonly used in international environmental agreements to provide a 
‘commonly accepted operational framework for addressing cooperation, compliance and the 
appropriate use of international transboundary resources.’78 Fairness is connected with the 
unjust situation previously faced by providers inasmuch as they had no right to be 
compensated for the use of their resources. Equity is linked with the amount of money that 
should be shared with providers of GR and TK.79 Accordingly, for Campbell and Hanich, the 
 
75 FAO (n 173). 
76 Graham Dutfield, Intellectual Property, Biogenetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge (Earthscan 2004), 48. 
77 ibid 
78 Brooke Campbell and Quentin Hanich, ‘Principles and Practice for the Equitable Governance of Transboundary 
Natual Resources: Cross-Cutting Lessons for Marine Fisheries Management’ (2015) 14 Maritime Studies 1, 3. 
79 CBD, Ad Hoc Open-Ended Inter-Sessional Working Group on Article 8(j) and Related Provisions of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, ‘Development of Elements of Sui Generis Systems for the Protection of 
Traditional Knowledge, Innovations and Practices’ (2007) UNEP/CBD/WG8J/5/6, 9. 
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concept of ‘fair and equitable distribution of benefits’ of the CBD is related to the distributive 
aspects of social justice. Therefore, to achieve a distribution of benefits that can be considered 
fair and equitable, the asymmetries between providers and users regarding wealth, power, 
capacity, and need must be considered in addition to the economic value of the resources.80 
Considering the particular characteristics of the parties when negotiating the terms for 
a distribution of benefits has the potential to change the balance of valuation of GR and TK in 
favour of providers. This because the recognition of their contributions in the preservation and 
improvement of biodiversity might be taken into account for the valuation of GR and TK, which 
are usually considered as merely raw materials. 
 
3.5 Accessions of GR through the Multilateral System (MLS) 
 
As explained in Section 2 of Chapter 5, the MLS is an information system regarding the 
plant GR that are stored in ex-situ collections around the world.81 For the sharing of plant GR, 
information plays a key role in providing the precise location of the resources. The MLS can be 
seen as the biggest initiative for the global distribution of GR in a coordinated manner. 
According to the information available in the MLS, as of 31 October 2016, Easy-SMTA 
(an online non-mandatory application that assists users in the generation of Standard Material 
Transfer Agreements (SMTA)) had 1,272 users with 5,985 unique recipients of material 
worldwide. 48,313 SMTAs made agreements with providers located in 35 countries, and the 
plant GR was distributed to recipients based in 175 countries. Over time, these SMTAs had 
transferred 3.25 million accessions.82 In other words, the samples provided by 35 countries are 
stored in collections located in another 175 countries, which have provided samples of these 
resources 3.25 million times. This example serves to show the efficiency of the MLS to 
distribute plant GR to users around the world. These 3.25 million accessions to plant GR 
originating from 35 countries, contrasted with the 149 contracts/permits on ABS issued by 12 
countries (see Section 3.1 of Chapter 2), seems a clear indication that GR is highly used and 
their access is primarily carried out through the MLS. Additionally, this information indicates 
that a small group of countries are the main providers of a vast amount of plant GR. This, 
therefore, may justify that the benefits derived from their utilisation should be directed 
primarily towards providers. 
 
 
 
 
 
80 Campbell and Hanich (n 78) 3-4. 
81 FAO, ‘International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. The Multilateral System’ 
<http://www.fao.org/plant-treaty/areas-of-work/the-multilateral-system/overview/en/> accessed 31 October 
2017. 
82 CBD, COP-MOP, ‘Update on recent developments under the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources 
for Food and Agriculture of relevance to the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilisation’ (2016) UNEP/CBD/NP/COP-MOP/2/INF/10. 
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4. Proposals to tackle the existing issues regarding TRIPS and ABS 
 
Over time, conflicts related to sovereignty rights over GR and TK, and the rights of 
providing countries and ILCs to benefit from the use of their resources, have become evident. 
In addressing these concerns, two approaches have been proposed within the international 
fora dealing with ABS: the national-based approach and the disclosure approach. The first 
suggests the use of national solutions, including ABS laws and contract law, while the second 
recommends the inclusion of a disclosure requirement in IP applications. It has proved an 
intractable problem whether to leave ABS compliance to be resolved at the national level or to 
attempt a global solution involving incorporation of a disclosure requirement in patent 
applications. Since these proposals go to the very heart of the research questions of this thesis, 
a summary is provided below. 
 
4.1 National-based approach 
 
According to this approach, ABS compliance can be achieved outside the IP system 
through the development of national legislation incorporating the objectives of the CBD, 
including the use of permits, contractual obligations, and civil and/or criminal penalties for 
non-compliance. Regarding the erroneous concession of IPRs, has been suggested that 
national systems can contain the obligation to provide information about the material sought 
to be protected, post-grant opposition, re-examination and revocation proceedings, along with 
the creation of databases of TK available to patent examiners.83 In general terms, it is stated 
that a nationally-based approach would: 
 
i. Provide a balance between the value attributable to GR and TK and to that 
attributable to the efforts of inventors and developers of plant varieties; 
ii. Be appropriately tailored so as not to have negative consequences on the IP 
system; 
iii. Provide penalties against those violating the ABS law; 
iv. Be put in place immediately; 
v. Have the potential to clarify definitions of terms that may not be so clear in the 
CBD and the Nagoya Protocol; and 
vi. Use contracts that can control access, utilisation and benefit-sharing of GR and 
TK. 
 
Opponents of this proposal point out the difficulties of achieving compliance with ABS 
through a national approach. Among the main factors identified as the reasons for this are: (i) 
the transboundary nature involving the acquisition of resources in one country and the seeking 
of IPRs in another;84 (ii) the limited capacity of national laws and contractual arrangements 
 
83 WTO (n 21) 14-16. 
84 ibid 23. 
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developed in accordance with those national laws to achieve compliance with ABS, because 
they would only be useful if their obligations are mandatory and enforceable across borders;85 
and, (iii) that actions considered to be legal under one jurisdiction could be illegal in another.86. 
In addition, the fact that there is no obligation in international law for all countries to legislate 
on ABS has been highlighted.87 Thus, ABS will be even harder to achieve within countries 
without ABS laws.88 
Accordingly, it has been stressed that if national laws and the contracts correspondingly 
developed provide sufficient means for ensuring the respect of rights, it is unclear why a 
different logic is applied to the protection of IPRs, where legislation applies even in the absence 
of contracts, and an international agreement with a strong enforcement capacity has been 
created to protect IPRs worldwide.89 Moreover, it is evident that a national contract-based 
system with an international outlook is already in place, yet incidents of erroneous concession 
of patents and other conduct that might be considered as misuse/misappropriation/biopiracy 
of GR and TK are increasing.90 For those who oppose the national-based approach, these are 
some of the reasons that justify the creation and implementation of an international binding 
instrument for achieving compliance with ABS. 
 
4.2 Disclosure approach 
 
Overall, defenders of this approach seek the establishment, in patent applications, of 
the obligation to disclose the origin of the GR and TK used for the development of the creation 
for which protection is sought. To this end, amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, and/or the 
Patent Co-operation Treaty (PCT), and/or the introduction of a general ‘mandatory disclosure’ 
requirement to be applied to all patent applications have been suggested. All of these 
proposals condition the acquiring of patent rights on:91 
 
i. Revealing the source and the provider country of origin and traditional 
community of origin;92 
ii. Providing evidence that PIC was obtained from the competent authorities 
under the relevant national regime; and 
 
85 ibid 
86 ibid 
87 ibid 24. 
88 ibid 
89 ibid 
90 ibid 25. 
91 ibid 27-34. 
92 Under the PCT disclosure proposal, the disclosure obligations would be triggered for patent applicants applying 
for patents in a Members’ jurisdiction whenever they are the country of orig in of the resources used in the 
invention. While, for the mandatory disclosure proposal, the disclosure would be an obligation only when the use 
of a GR or TK has been necessary for the development resulting in the invention. 
ibid 31, 33. 
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iii. Providing evidence that fair and equitable benefit-sharing has been done 
according to the terms mutually agreed under the relevant national regime. 
 
Supporters of this approach argue that a disclosure obligation would increase 
transparency regarding access to GR and TK while helping countries and ILCs of origin to track 
and monitor compliance with ABS.93 Further, it would also contribute to a more efficient 
implementation of the CBD and improve the functioning of the patent system, as additional 
information would be available to patent examiners, including TK recorded only orally and/or 
TK outside of the scope of established databases. In this way, the implementation of a 
disclosure obligation would contribute to confidence-building that the patent system works in 
an equitable manner for all stakeholders.94 The need to clarify how the disclosure requirement 
would work for resources obtained from ex-situ sources has also been mentioned.95 
For ensuring that the disclosure requirement becomes binding on WTO Members, it 
has often been recommended that there be the inclusion of an Article 29bis in TRIPS. Article 
29 establishes the obligation to ‘disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and 
complete for the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art.’ Thus, such Article 
29bis would add the obligation ‘to disclose the source providing the biological material and 
TK.’ 
Nevertheless, because some countries are not keen to agree on limitations to patent 
concession, or on the application of remedies for non-compliance (such as revocation or 
invalidation of patents), it seems that the implementation of this approach would be hard to 
achieve.96 Moreover, there is uncertainty about the possible negative effects that including 
compliance with ABS in the patent system may have over technological development. For this 
reason, it has been proposed that the problem of misappropriation of TK should be dealt with 
outside the patent system.97 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The concession of IPRs over creations using GR and TK is the point connecting ABS with 
IP. It is constantly affirmed that the different approach to ownership rights over GR is the 
primary cause of the problem for the joint implementation of the CBD and IP law. This is 
because the CBD recognises States’ sovereign rights over GR while, under TRIPS, private rights 
(IPRs) can be granted over creations based on GR and TK. Nevertheless, what might be the real 
cause of conflicts between the ABS and the IP systems is the fact that non-compliance with the 
ABS obligations does not affect the granting of IPRs. This problem is more serious because IP 
 
93 ibid 34. 
94 ibid 35. 
95 ibid 44. 
96 ibid 47. 
97 ibid 47-48. 
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law does not provide protection for TK and for the plants/plant varieties created/improved 
through the application of traditional breeding processes. 
At the international level, the ABS system is a fragmented and complex regime. In this 
sense, countries exhibit overlapping memberships to the many international organisations, 
legal institutions, and spheres of legal practice (each possessing their own principles and 
institutions) where the relationship between ABS and IP is discussed, negotiated, and agreed. 
This means that the solution to the same problem is sought at the same time by the 
participation of the same Parties in different forums, each of them having particular interests 
and their own political agenda. This fact also seems to constitute an obstacle for the countries 
to advance in any solution on the matter. 
Another issue that could be affecting ABS compliance is the consideration of GR (and 
biodiversity in general) and TK as raw materials with little (if any) commercial value. This 
argument is commonly expressed to avoid or minimise the obligation to comply with ABS. Such 
a consideration may negatively influence users’ attitude towards ABS compliance and the 
benefits they are willing to distribute with providers. However, contrary to what is claimed, 
different studies about the utilisation of GR and TK evidence their value and show that, despite 
R&D being directed towards a particular spectrum of natural resources, their economic 
exploitation produces substantial annual profits. In the same direction, these studies show that 
TK is a valuable resource, which generates important profits in the pharmaceutical and medical 
fields. Therefore, it is not true that GR and TK are resources of no commercial value. 
Because of the problems regarding the joint implementation of the CBD and TRIPs, 
complexity and fragmentation of the international ABS system, and the arguments about the 
limited commercial value of GR and TK, there is well-founded suspicion that GR and TK could 
occasionally be used outside ABS (without complying with PIC, MAT, and the distribution of 
benefits), particularly, through the MLS in the case of GR. To overcome this possibility two 
solutions have been proposed. The strengthening of national laws on ABS, and the inclusion of 
a disclosure obligation for IP applicants. 
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CHAPTER 7. Conclusions 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The aim of the present research was to examine ABS to determine what key elements 
are required for feasible implementation. To answer this question, each chapter of the thesis 
studied a different aspect of ABS: (i) the way the Parties to the CBD and the NP have developed 
national laws on ABS and how application of those laws is reflected in MATs; (ii) how ABS was 
designed in the CBD and the NP, and how their final texts are the result of a process highly 
influenced by the political decisions made at an international level; (iii) the manner in which 
the core elements of ABS could be understood; (iv) the way in which the ABS system of the 
CBD is interconnected with the ABS systems of the FAO and the WHO; and, (v) the way in which 
ABS relates to IPRs. 
From the contents of these chapters some conclusions can be offered. First, the major 
obstacles for the implementation of ABS are caused by the way it was designed, specially its 
national/bilateral approach, its failure to integrate GR ex-situ into the system, and the absence 
of considerations regarding the public domain. Second, at least for now, it does not seem that 
the Parties to the CBD and the NP would be able to reach new agreements on ABS-related 
matters different from the existing ones. Third, the FAO and the WHO have ABS mechanisms 
in place that could provide practical information useful for the implementation of ABS under 
the CBD and the NP. Fourth, some solutions have been proposed from academia, but it appears 
that some of them have not been taken into consideration in the international fora where ABS 
is discussed.1 Fifth, the practical experience gained by some countries from the 
implementation of national laws on ABS offer some helpful insights on possible ways in which 
ABS processes could be better conducted. 
Based on the foregoing, the following sections present the conclusions of each of these 
subjects, and, finally, a synthesis of the key elements useful for the implementation of ABS will 
be provided. 
 
2. ABS design 
 
As explained in Chapter 3, the Parties to the CBD and the NP could not agree on better 
conditions for the ABS system. Moreover, during the negotiations of the NP, the countries 
seemed to be aware of the problems derived from the contents of the CBD.2 Furthermore, 
 
1 Joseph Henry Vogel and Manuel Ruiz, ‘The Economics of Information, Studiously Ignored in the Nagoya Protocol 
on Access and Benefit Sharing’ (2011) 7(1) Law, Environment and Development Journal 52, 65. 
2 See for example: Stefan Jungcurt and others, ‘Summary of the Resumed Ninth Meeting of the Working Group 
on Access and Benefit-Sharing of the Convention on Biological Diversity: 10-16 July 2010’ (Earth Negotiations 
Bulletin, iisd Reporting Services, IISD, 19 July 2010, vol 9, n 527); and ‘Summary of the Tenth Conference of the 
Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity: 18-29 October 2010’ (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, iisd Reporting 
Services, IISD, 1 November 2010, vol 9, n 544); Johannes Gnann and others, ‘Summary of the Ninth Meeting of 
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Article 10 of NP is the result of a proposal to invest the benefits derived from the use of GR 
located in common areas and accessed in ex-situ conditions in the global preservation of 
biodiversity. Hence, it seems that what was an idea for seeking global benefit from the use of 
common goods and GR ex-situ became something different: the creation of a parallel ABS 
system which should apply for resources accessed in transboundary situations, and for GR and 
TK for which it is not possible to grant or obtain PIC. This aspect alone shows the complexity 
and intricacy of the negotiations on ABS, without even taking into consideration those aspects 
derived from the complexity and fragmentation of the international ABS system (see Chapter 
6). 
Chapter 3 also demonstrated that, owing to the lack of agreement of the countries, 
many sensible issues have not been solved through the development of national laws. Among 
all the aspects having the potential to hinder ABS implementation, three constitute the most 
significant obstacles: (i) the national/bilateral approach; (ii) access to GR ex-situ; and, (iii) the 
assumption that publicly accessible GR and TK are in the public domain and are, therefore, free 
to use outside any property system. Given the impact that these aspects have on the 
application of ABS, it could be argued that the ABS system would not be able to work properly 
unless they are amended. However, because this would require new negotiations, this seems 
a remote possibility at present. 
For that reason, it is understandable that some of the proposals created for the 
implementation of a GMBSM include formulas that could solve the above-mentioned 
difficulties, despite the fact that they are not part of Article 10 of NP. For example, to overcome 
the problems derived from the national/bilateral approach, those proposals tend to seek a 
bundle of solutions. First, the implementation of a mechanism with a global or regional reach. 
Second, within the given mechanism, users would pay a flat rate established by all providers 
by a common agreement. Third, the rate would be paid into a single system, which would 
collect and distribute benefits. Finally, such a system could be a fund or a collecting society. 
Likewise, to overcome the problems derived related to GR ex-situ and the public domain, the 
proposals are meant to apply to all GR and TK, including: (i) GR ex-situ; (ii) GR and TK disclosed 
in databases; and, (iii) TK widely shared and dispersed. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, there seems to be nothing wrong with the proposals 
summarised therein. In fact, their effectiveness could only be verified through their 
implementation. That is to say, until they have been applied, all theoretical approaches have a 
level of uncertainty. Moreover, as some studies on legal transplants and legal pluralism 
suggest, it may be possible that the same or similar laws would produce different results in 
different countries. For this reason, the practical experience of ABS gained through the 
implementation of national laws has a dominant influence upon the conclusions of this thesis. 
 
 
 
 
the Working Group on Access and Benefit-Sharing of the Convention on Biological Diversity: 22-28 March 2010’ 
(Earth Negotiations Bulletin, iisd Reporting Services, IISD, 31 March 2010, vol 9, n 503). 
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3. Existent proposals for improving ABS 
 
Proposals found in academic literature are rich and creative regarding the possible 
ways ABS could be addressed. They focus on two aspects: the identification of ABS flaws and 
corresponding forms to overcome them, and the development of recommendations for the 
creation of a GMBSM. 
Regarding ABS, suggestions include (i) the use of defensive measures for preventing 
the improper granting of IPRs and the protection of TK; (ii) a trade secret based approach to 
ensure that TK is guarded and maintained undisclosed; (iii) the use of customary law both for 
seeking enforcement of national ABS laws at an international level and achieving benefit-
sharing from the use of TK; (iv) the implementation of the domaine public payant and 
biocultural protocols—including the cultural objection—to obtain a distribution for the use of 
TK, the strengthening of national/regional laws on ABS; (v) the use of national and international 
courts to achieve compliance with ABS obligations, modelling of particular elements of ABS on 
existent international instruments e.g. MLS; and, (vi) the development of new agreements. 
Although the content of all these proposals has the potential of improving ABS, the 
alleged benefits of a few have already been questioned by some academics. Likewise, because 
some of the elements were not found in the national laws reviewed in Chapter 2, the 
application might be difficult to achieve. 
In this way, the effectiveness of the use of defensive measures and of national/regional 
laws and courts to achieve ABS compliance is commonly disputed. For example, it is affirmed 
that using GR and TK disclosed in databases not only ‘serve primarily the ultimate purpose of 
denying entitlement claims, thus effectively transforming GR, TK and TCEs into a commons and 
justifying anyone’s access and use of these resources’ but also offers no meaningful protection 
against the erroneous granting of IPRs because it confers no value added to the operation of 
the patent system.3 Nevertheless, the value of these databases should not be overlooked, 
because, at least, they could be used as proof that a given GR or TK has been previously used 
in the same or similar way as in the invention whose protection is sought. Therefore, they offer 
a possibility for opposing the patenting of an invention. 
The difficulties experienced by the countries in giving full effect to their national laws 
in another country is apparently clear. Because of that, recommendations on the application 
of national/regional laws focuses on the need for harmonised systems of national laws and 
local ABS offices. To accomplish this, it has been proposed that national laws should ensure (i) 
that foreigners would have the opportunity to bring actions for ABS infractions occurring in 
other jurisdictions; (ii) mutual recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements and arbitral 
awards; and (iii) the recognition of the validity of MATs reached in different countries.4 This 
 
3 Ruth Okediji, ‘Negotiating the public domain in an international framework for genetic resources, traditional 
knowledge and traditional cultural expressions’ in Daniel F. Robinson, Ahmed Abdel-Latif and Pedro Roffe (eds) 
Protecting Traditional Knowledge: The WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic 
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (Routledge, London, New York, 2017), 153, 156. 
4 Sebastian Oberthür and G. Kristin Rosendal ‘Global governance of genetic resources. Background and analytical 
framework’ (ch 1) in Sebastian Oberthür and G. Kristin Rosendal (eds), Global Governance of Genetic Resources: 
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thesis agrees that deficiencies in the implementation of ABS laws are caused, among other 
things, both by the absence of legislative developments and a failure to enact compatible 
legislation among countries. For this reason, in a similar way as other authors, it considers that 
the best opportunity for the countries to improve ABS is through the implementation of 
national laws. However, this thesis does not agree with the proposed approach of creating 
three parallel provisions of ABS within the patent, trademark, and copyright laws.5 This is 
because ABS is also related to other forms of IP protection (such as breeder’s rights and 
designations of origin), and because, as explained in Chapter 6, fragmentation and complexity 
are other causes which also contribute to the limited efficiency of ABS. Thus, excluding 
important aspects of ABS such as the discussions involving plant breeders’ and farmers’ rights, 
and adding more fragmentation and complexity to ABS at the national level, does not seem to 
be the most efficient solution to this problem. 
The use of national/regional courts present similar disadvantages to the application of 
national/regional laws. For these courts to have the power of resolving ABS-related disputes, 
the creation of laws and jurisdiction in the country are required. For this reason, despite some 
existent proposals affirming that ABS reclamations can be based upon the law of contracts or 
torts,6 and that compliance with MATs can be achieved through national courts7 and private 
international law,8 this thesis considers those to be unlikely options. 
Similarly, the use of international customary law, human rights and the customary law 
of ILCs, in practice, could face difficulties. With regard to the first, the experience of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights shows that occasionally, the countries do not comply with 
the judgement of the court. Therefore, it appears that winning a case before this Court does 
not necessarily mean achieving the distribution of benefits sought. Tvedt suggests that the 
reason for this is that the ABS systems need to be complemented with strong sanctions.9 
However, as expressed above, this thesis does not believe that the ultimate aim of ABS is to 
impose sanctions, but to achieve benefit-sharing. Because of this, and given the small level of 
implementation of ABS at the national level (see Figure 1 in Chapter 2), it is not clear if, in this 
context, a strong sanction system would effectively contribute to increased benefit-sharing. 
 
Access and Benefit Sharing after the Nagoya Protocol (Routledge, New York, 2014) 6; Morten Walløe Tvedt, 
‘Beyond Nagoya: Towards a legally functional system of access and benefit sharing’ (ch 9) in Sebastian Oberthür 
and G. Kristin Rosendal (eds), Global Governance of Genetic Resources: Access and Benefit Sharing after the 
Nagoya Protocol (Routledge, New York, 2014) 158-159, 172. 
5 William Fisher, ‘Two Thoughts About Traditional Knowledge’ (2007) 70 Law and Contemporary Problems 131–
134 in Okediji (n 3) 161-162. 
6 Christine Godt, ‘Enforcement of Benefit-Sharing Duties in User Countries’ (Chapter 22) in Evanson Kamau, and 
Gerd Winter (eds), Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and the Law. Solutions for Access & Benefit Sharing 
(Earthscan, 2009), 432. 
7 Hiroji Isozaki, ‘Enforcement of ABS Agreements in User States’ (ch 23) in Evanson Kamau, and Gerd Winter (eds), 
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and the Law. Solutions for Access & Benefit Sharing (Earthscan, 2009), 
441. 
8 Claudio Chiarolla, ‘The Role of Private International Law under the Nagoya Protocol’ (ch 4) in Elisa Morgera, 
Matthias Buck and Elsa Tsioumani (eds), The 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing in Perspective: 
Implications for International Law and Implementation Challenges (Legal Studies on Access and Benefit-sharing, 
v. 1, BRILL Nijhoff 2012), 424. 
9 Tvedt (n 4) 165. 
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Regarding the use of the customary law of ILCs, based on the complexity and 
fragmentation of the ABS system (see Chapter 6), this thesis considers that each country should 
design and implement a single and uniform process for the obtaining of PIC and the adoption 
of MATs with ILCs. Such a system should be based on the principles contained in the ILO 
Convention 169 about prior consultation. The reasons for this are (i) many provider countries 
are also Members of that Convention,10 meaning that their national processes will be based on 
the same principles, requirements and steps; and, (ii) because there is a huge amount of case 
law in this field at both the national and international level, countries and ILCs may be more 
certain about how to proceed. The same comments apply for the implementation of 
biocultural/community protocols and cultural objection. 
As indicated earlier, the proposals from academia contain few proposals that have not 
been included in any of the laws reviewed. These proposals are the trade secret based 
approach and the domaine public payant.11 This fact could indicate that the countries have not 
considered these options or, having considered them, decided not to implement them. 
Whatever the case, this thesis does not believe that a trade secret based approach would be 
easy to implement. This is because, as noted by the author of this proposal,12 it would require 
the development of the ILCs’ capacity building (i) to work in a coordinated way with other ILCs, 
(ii) to understand different concepts of IP that may be unfamiliar to them, and (iii) to be able 
to negotiate MATs including confidentially clauses. Additionally, TK would have to be 
incorporated within the unfair competition framework. 
In regards to the domaine public payant, it should be noted that this has been used by 
some African countries as a way to obtain benefits from the use of traditional cultural 
expressions. This is an important aspect to consider, because unlike TK, the immaterial cultural 
expression should be fixed or contained on material support (e.g. a mask) for its use. This way, 
controlling the access and use of these expressions is different to controlling the access and 
use of knowledge. The material component is what allows one to track and identify the use of 
traditional cultural expressions. As this is not the case for TK, it would be possible that the 
domaine public payant could not be implemented for it, in which case a tariff system would be 
a better option. 
Finally, this thesis agrees with those academics proposing the use of international 
instruments or existing instruments such as the MLS of FAO13 to integrate a single ABS system 
 
10 See information available at: 
<< https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO::P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312314>> 
accessed 20.07.2019 
11 Manuel Ruiz, ‘The legal protection of widely shared and dispersed traditional knowledge’ in Daniel F. Robinson, 
Ahmed Abdel-Latif and Pedro Roffe (eds) Protecting Traditional Knowledge: The WIPO Intergovernmental 
Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (Routledge, 
London, New York, 2017), 128-129. 
12 ibidem 
13 Brendan Coolsaet, Tom Dedeurwaerdere, John Pitseys, ‘The Challenges for Implementing the Nagoya Protocol 
in a Multi-Level Governance Context: Lessons from the Belgian Case’ (2013) 2(4) Resources 555, 573-574; Tomme 
Rosanne Young, ‘An International Cooperation Perspective on the Implementation of the Nagoya Protocol’ (ch 5) 
in Elisa Morgera, Matthias Buck and Elsa Tsioumani (eds), The 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-
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that could reduce the negative effects of having a fragmented system, and who affirm that 
new negotiations for the creation of regional patent systems14 or ABS framework agreements 
between willing governments,15 are possible ways to improve ABS. However, as mentioned 
before, it is unclear whether the countries will enter into new negotiations and if so, whether 
they could reach new agreements. Thus, despite the opportunities to enhance ABS through 
new negotiations, this seems unlikely to occur in the near future. 
As for the design of a GMBSM, academics suggest implementing a handful of options: 
a cartel of provider countries, rents, bounded openness, common pools, a global biocollecting 
society, the development of new agreements for regional mechanisms or for a global solution, 
the establishment of fixed tariffs, and the use of funds. 
As mentioned before, all these proposals have the potential to improve the functioning 
of ABS. However, their implementation would require that the countries reach new 
agreements on matters on which they could not agree during the negotiations of the NP. For 
this reason, at least for now, it seems unlikely that these solutions will be sought. For example, 
bounded openness or common pools, which are based on the same general principle that 
concedes unrestricted access to GR, would operate, in the first case, under a fixed rent system 
to be established by common agreement of provider countries, and, in the second case, by the 
obligation to feed the R&D results into the pool. This second option also considers a later stage 
for the commercial use of the resources taken from the pool which requires user confirmation. 
In other words, it would operate in the same way as ABS has been designed in the CBD. The 
difference between the common pool proposed and the CBD is that in the first case, 
unrestricted access is permitted by default. A logical concern is why something that has not 
properly worked in the CBD will work in the case of common pools. 
Regarding bounded openness, it is not clear if provider countries would be able to form 
a single block to provide GR and TK, and to what extent this would be accepted by user 
countries. Another question is how useful this would be, given that the line between provider 
and user is not always straightforward, and that the challenges posed by the use and 
development of new technologies do not always require physical access to the GR. 
The global biocollecting society is a different alternative to the funds, and consists of a 
private organisation, based on copyright collecting societies, but rather than having many 
collecting societies at the national level, there will be only one global collecting society, whose 
resources arise from the payment of voluntary contributions and funds from the World Bank. 
Donations will be encouraged through the provision of essential ABS services such as 
monitoring the use of the resources, help with licence agreements (MATs), functioning as a 
 
Sharing in Perspective: Implications for International Law and Implementation Challenges (Legal Studies on Access 
and Benefit-sharing, v. 1, BRILL Nijhoff 2012), 464. 465. 
14 Ikechi Mgboji, Global Biopiracy : Patents, Plants, and Indigenous Knowledge (UBC Press, 2005) 195. 
15 Jorge Cabrera Medaglia and Cristian López Silva, ‘Addressing the Problems of Access: Protecting sources, while 
giving users certainty’ (IUCN Environmental Policy and Law, Paper No. 67/1 2007), 65; Tom Dedeurwaerdere and 
others, ‘Governing Global Scientific Research Commons under the Nagoya Protocol’ (ch 13) in Elisa Morgera, 
Matthias Buck and Elsa Tsioumani (eds), The 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing in Perspective: 
Implications for International Law and Implementation Challenges (Legal Studies on Access and Benefit-sharing, 
v. 1, BRILL Nijhoff 2012), 410 
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repository of documents, and as a dispute resolution institution, among others. Although this 
is a good idea, the functioning of this bio-collecting society largely depends upon its 
membership. For this reason, instead of a private organisation, it would be better to have the 
mechanism enshrined in Article 10 of the NP. Also, as in the case of copyright collecting 
societies, it would be beneficial to have a responsible authority in each country for collecting 
and distributing the benefits. 
Finally, as already mentioned, fixing tariffs for the use of GR and TK require agreement 
among all Parties to the CBD and the NP. 
 
4. The MLS of FAO and the PIP Framework of WHO 
 
As explained in Chapter 6, the possibility that access to GR is largely happening through 
the MLS of the FAO appears to be confirmed from the data revealing its number of accessions. 
In 2016, samples from 35 countries were stored in collections located in 175 countries which 
permitted access 3.25 million times. This figure contrasts sharply with the 149 MATs subscribed 
to under the ABS system of the CBD, as revealed by the information on the ABSCH through to 
15 March 2018. 
From another point of view, the fact that the MLS was used 3.25 million times during 
2016 could be considered a success. The global nature of the MLS appears to be the key aspect 
for such a success. The MLS is the biggest initiative for the global distribution of GR; its Benefit-
sharing Fund (a global fund) had directly invested in projects supporting farmers in developing 
countries; and its Global Information System offers the fullest possible information on the plant 
GR of the MLS. Its weak aspect seems to be its online voluntary system to achieve compliance. 
For example, although the MLS has 144 State Parties through October 2017, only 19 countries 
submitted their reports on compliance. Despite this, it is a fact that the MLS has been able to 
support farming projects in different countries for a number of years. This being the case, for 
this thesis, such a fact should not be underestimated. Thus, a benefit-sharing scheme including 
mandatory sharing of non-monetary benefits and voluntary sharing of monetary benefits 
should be considered for the ABS system of the CBD. 
For its part, the distribution of benefits occurring through the PIP Framework of the 
WHO seems to work for two principal reasons: (i) it is based on SMTAs (Standard Material 
Transfer Agreements) which consist of legally-binding agreements between the WHO and the 
Parties providing and receiving biological samples; and (ii) the Party in breach of contract 
obligations will not receive the vaccines required to face a given pandemic situation. In 
contrast, a different circumstance is experienced by users of GR and TK, because they do not 
have an urgent need to receive something in exchange for benefit-sharing. However, all laws 
reviewed in Chapter 2 included the suggestion to create a certification system that could serve 
as a proof of legal access. It is, therefore, possible that this is a common perceived need by the 
countries. In this way, establishing a certificate of compliance, which will be only delivered after 
distributing the benefits, may be a motivation that can help to increase the number of benefits 
received by providers of GR and TK. 
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From these practical experiences, it would be possible to affirm that an ABS mechanism 
should have: (i) a certain level of international reach; (ii) a standardised, efficient, and clear 
processes for accessing the resources and the sharing of benefits; and, (iii) the capacity to 
enforce compliance with MATs. 
 
5. Countries’ ABS implementation through national laws 
 
Despite the fact that implementation of ABS is low and usually incomplete, ABS 
measures provide useful information from which some conclusions can be drawn. As perhaps 
expected, national laws reflect the specific characteristics of each country. In this regard, 
similar trends are observed between provider countries, which, at the same time, are different 
from those experienced among user countries. 
For example, provider countries are more likely to establish ‘access’ activities as the 
aspect which triggers the obligation to distribute benefits, rather than the ‘use’ of GR and TK. 
This may be explained by the fact that once access is granted, controlling the use of the 
accessed resources is difficult to achieve. Therefore, by establishing ABS obligations from the 
‘access’ activities rather than from the ‘use’ of the resources, the countries could have a little 
more of control over their resources. The ABS concepts are usually interpreted in a broad 
sense, so that they often include elements other than GR and TK, albeit related to them, such 
as: biological resources, biochemical elements, by-products, derivatives, genetic heritage, 
viruses, cell cultures, information of GR and TK in databases, and GR and TK in the public 
domain. These processes tend to specify the obligations of users regarding the need to obtain 
PIC and agree MATs and, occasionally, they also establish the amount of money and kind of 
benefits to distribute. Moreover, they contain a set of relatively common rules regarding the 
requirements for the obtaining of authorisations of access/use of GR and TK, such as the 
participation of nationals in research activities, the transfer of scientific knowledge and 
technologies, and the disclosure of the origin of the resources in scientific publications, among 
others. All provisions contain two stages: one for non-commercial utilisation and a second for 
the commercial use of the accessed resources. The latter sometimes involves the obtaining of 
a new PIC, and always requires a new MAT for the agreement of the benefits to distribute. 
Almost always, the sharing of samples of GR or TK is forbidden, and when that is not the case, 
a new PIC, authorisation, or a different ABS process is needed. These new MATs usually 
regulate TK utilisation and the consequent benefit-sharing. Sometimes ABS provisions 
recognise the property rights of ILCs over their TK and their right to grant PIC when the GR for 
which a permit of access is asked for is found in their territories. 
For their part, in user countries’ laws, ‘utilisation’ is often the aspect triggering ABS 
obligations. These laws also tend to show a restrictive interpretation of the ABS concepts and 
usually clarify that they will only apply for GR and TK as described in the CBD. In general terms, 
they expressly exclude from the ABS scope subject matters such as GR used as commodities, 
derivatives, information, synthetic nucleoid, and GR and TK accessed before the NP. User 
countries tend to be more specific with respect to the cases when an ABS obligation could 
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exist. Despite all this, these laws acknowledge that ILCs’ rights must be respected when 
accessing TK, no measures with specific instructions about the process or the way ILCs’ rights 
should be respected could be found. 
In addition to the differences observed between providers and users’ laws, some 
similarities were also identified. All laws reviewed contain different processes for commercial 
and non-commercial utilisation, with fewer requirements for non-commercial activities. 
Another similarity is that, there seems to be facilitated access for GR ex-situ. In some cases, 
such access only requires a formal communication with the national authority; in others, the 
use of MTAs are needed, and in some instances, the subscription of MATs for the distribution 
of benefits is also required. This means that, despite the fact that all countries employing 
measures of this kind appear to stipulate facilitated access for GR ex-situ, such access is not 
always free of monetary obligations. Moreover, according to some provisions, part of the 
money collected should be directed towards the ex-situ collection acting as the provider of the 
resource. All countries seem interested in having in place a system that could provide 
assurance of the legal access and utilisation of GR and TK. Though not implemented, all 
mention an internationally recognised certificate of compliance (not necessarily using these 
exact words), and some mention the creation of inventories for the sharing of information 
among national authorities, an obligation to disclose the origin of the resources, certificates of 
fair trade, and a barcode system. 
Some sensitive issues where agreement seems difficult are: the use of GR ex-situ, 
instances where TK is widely shared and dispersed, and the expansion of the ABS scope to 
cover aspects other than those contained in the CBD and the NP; in particular, those linked to 
the use of GR and TK in biotechnology activities and the inclusion of related information in 
databases. Given the difficulties that the countries seem to experience in finding agreement 
on these issues, it is advisable that they are left aside from the negotiations in the creation of 
a GMBSM. The Parties to the CBD and the NP could continue their work in the search for 
agreement and solutions on these matters after establishing the GMBSM and, if any kind of 
agreement is achieved, there should be no problem in adjusting the mechanism. 
No regulation was found specifically suggesting how to implement Article 10 of the NP. 
However, some laws include measures on aspects identified in the academic literature as cases 
where GR and TK could be considered in a transboundary situation, i.e., GR ex-situ and GR and 
TK or their information in the public domain. All laws reviewed contain rules about 
international cooperation that leave open the possibility for future development of 
international instruments. Interestingly, from the texts of the laws analysed, it is not possible 
to know what countries understand as fair and equitable because these concepts are, at best, 
limited to establishing percentages of participation and specific obligations for the distribution 
of benefits. Therefore, there is not enough information in these laws to know what levels of 
monetary and non-monetary resources the countries would accept as a fair and equitable 
distribution of benefits. However, all laws reviewed contemplate the possibility of creating 
funds as a means to collect and distribute the monetary benefits derived from the use of GR 
and TK, while none of them contain a different alternative. 
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On the MATs reported to the ABSCH it is worth highlighting that: (i) despite the fact 
that national research institutes are the main users of GR and TK, there is a clear commercial 
interest in using GR and TK (62% of all MATs are for commercial uses, see Tables 4 and 5); (ii) 
the information provided on MATs is incomplete, so that in many cases it is not possible to 
determine the resource accessed, the user, the authority granting permission, or the intended 
use of the resource (see Tables 4, 5 and 6). This trend is predominantly observed in countries 
considered in this study as user countries (Bulgaria, Belarus, Malta, and Spain). Similarly, 
provider countries seem to be more likely to disclose information more completely (the 
Dominican Republic, Guatemala, India, Kenya, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and South Africa). Given 
this, it is possible to affirm that, in general, countries are not willing or might not have the 
priority to disclose information about MATs to the ABSCH. Thus, for further developments on 
ABS, countries should not rely exclusively on the information disclosed to this site. 
 
6. Key elements required for a feasible implementation of ABS 
 
Ideally, ABS operativity could be improved if more uniformity is reached among 
national laws. However, with the current lack of agreement on sensitive issues, it seems that 
the design of ABS laws will continue to reflect the countries’ particular interests. For example, 
national laws present differences regarding the subject matter that triggers ABS obligations. 
Additionally, from the laws reviewed in Chapter 1, it can be observed that national 
developments usually include a second phase to conduct new negotiations to agree on new 
benefits when a change in the utilisation of the resource from non-commercial to commercial 
has occurred. These two factors may hinder the distribution of benefits: first, because, for the 
provider, it is difficult to know when the use of a resource has changed, and, second, because 
it is difficult to obtain a distribution of benefits from the use of a resource when such an 
obligation does not exist for that particular resource in the country where it has been used. 
For these reasons, this thesis proposes that the countries should abandon the task of 
controlling and monitoring all uses of GR and TK, together with the expectation of entering into 
individual bargains with each user. This is all well and good on paper, but could be difficult to 
implement in practice. Renouncing the control and monitoring the use of the resources also 
means that countries should abandon the idea of a mandatory obligation for the sharing of 
monetary benefits. Instead, this thesis considers that the establishment of mandatory 
obligations for the sharing of non-monetary benefits would be an obligation that all users be 
willing to fulfil. Therefore, this could be a feasible way to ensure that providers receive non-
monetary benefits. Furthermore, because these benefits are described in nearly the same way 
in all the laws examined, obtaining distribution would be easy to achieve. Also, the sharing of 
non-monetary benefits could improve the scientific capabilities of provider countries. 
Despite the above, it should be noted that the sharing of benefits happening between 
ex-situ centres and their users cannot be regarded as cases in which the parties involved are 
fully complying with the ABS rules. This is because, this sharing of benefits seems to be largely 
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occurring between ex-situ centres and among their users,16 while the CBD establishes that in 
every sharing of benefits should be involved the country of origin, even when GR ex-situ is 
accessed. Thus, as discussed in Section 3 of Chapter 2, it seems that the only measure ex-situ 
centres should take to fulfil the obligations contained in the CBD is to ensure that the countries 
of origin are also the beneficiaries of the benefits distributed when such centres share samples 
of GR. Moreover, because the experience shows that users of biodiversity are familiar with the 
existing rules of ex-situ centres and are willing to follow them, countries should integrate those 
practices into their national ABS laws. Furthermore, ideally, ex-situ centres’ ABS policies should 
be developed with the guidance of their national competition authorities, and these centres 
should be reporting on their activities to the ABSCH. 
Contractual clauses in MATs are accepted by all laws studied as legitimate agreements 
to determine ABS obligations. For this reason, they should be used to establish the non-
commercial obligations as a means to facilitate dispute resolution at an international level 
when necessary. 
Under this proposal, the sharing of monetary benefits would be voluntary. For its 
promotion, the countries could provide tax benefits, as is already happening in some sectors. 
To promote the sharing of non-monetary benefits, the countries should use a certificate of 
compliance, issued only after the benefits have been shared. 
This proposed solution may not be ideal nor may it even be possible to affirm that under 
such a scheme a fair and equitable sharing of benefits would be conducted. Yet given the 
experience of the MLS, for this thesis, a solution like this could be beneficial. This is because, 
despite criticisms,17 the MLS has in place a similar benefit-sharing scheme which has been able 
to support the development of farming projects in different countries for many years. 
Therefore, it is possible to expect that a voluntary system such as proposed here would be able 
to collect economic resources that would allow the provider countries to invest in the 
preservation and promotion of their national biodiversity and TK. 
With regard to the GMBSM, this thesis considers that this mechanism has the greatest 
potential to achieve benefit-sharing. For this reason, a proposal for its creation is also a part of 
these conclusions. The solution proposed for implementing ABS at a national level is 
considered to be useful for the creation of a GMBSM as well. This is because the establishment 
of a global mechanism for the distribution of monetary benefits requires new agreements of 
all Parties to the CBD and the NP on aspects such as tariffs, kind of uses, and sectors of the 
economy for which such tariffs would be compulsory, among others. Thus, a voluntary system 
could operate until such agreements are concluded. 
Some aspects should not be initially included in a GMBSM. As the countries have not 
reached agreement regarding GR ex-situ, and TK widely shared and dispersed, until there is 
 
16 See for example: Kate Davis and others, ‘An Access and Benefit-Sharing Awareness Survey for Botanic Gardens: 
Are They Prepared for the Nagoya Protocol?’ (2015) 98 South African Journal of Botany 148 
17 See for example: Margo A. Bagley, ‘De-materializing genetic RESOURCES Synthetic biology, intellectual property 
and the ABS bypass’ (ch 15) in Charles R. McManis and Burton Ong (eds) Routledge Handbook of Biodiversity and 
the Law (Routledge, London and New York, 2018) 229-230. 
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clarity on how the issue of the public domain should be applied to GR and TK, the Parties to 
the CBD and the NP would probably not agree throughout the global mechanism. The inclusion 
in national laws of elements other than GR and TK as defined in the CBD might also be 
controversial. For instance, there is no consensus among the countries on elements such as 
information, genetic material that does not contain functional units of heredity, by-products, 
derivatives, viruses, and any other related elements. It could also be problematic that the 
inclusion of sanctions could affect the obtaining of IPRs or existing rights. It is possible that 
including any of these aspects in a proposal for the implementation of a GMBSM would 
obstruct the opportunity for agreement. Hence, a basic GMBSM, containing no other elements 
than those incorporated in Article 10 of NP as defined in Article 2 of the CBD, and containing 
only a mandatory obligation for the sharing of non-commercial benefits, would be easier to 
agree upon and implement, and could secure the sharing of non-commercial benefits and 
provide some money for supporting projects directed towards the preservation of biodiversity 
and TK. 
One possible obstacle for the establishment of a GMBSM such as this is that a similar 
mechanism exists within the FAO. For this reason, it could be possible that users of GR and TK 
would not see a clear difference between the MLS and the GMBSM and, therefore, the 
contributions to the GMBSM could be less significant than expected. However, this should not 
be a concern. This thesis considers that receiving monetary benefits (even though they are less 
than forecasted) is better than having no benefits to invest in the preservation of biodiversity 
and TK. Moreover, modifications to the mechanism can be done after it has been established 
and, because of that, such modifications could be based on the experience about its real needs 
and functions. Furthermore, in the future, countries could consider the possibility of uniting 
the MLS and the GMBSM into a single mechanism to integrate GR and TK accessed in 
transboundary situations, GR and TK for which it is not possible to grant or obtain PIC, and GR 
accessed ex-situ. Also, the countries could further consider expanding the scope of this 
mechanism to GR ex-situ worldwide and widely disseminated TK/TK in the public domain. 
As all countries analysed mention the possibility to create a fund, it seems clear that 
they will accept it as the financial mechanism for a GMBSM. In a similar way as is happening 
with the MLS, the funds of the GMBSM could be distributed through the financing of projects; 
in this case, for the preservation of biodiversity and TK. Also, as prescribed in Brazilian law, it 
would be useful for a portion of the fund be saved to ensure that any ILCs affected by the use 
of their shared TK will be compensated. However, on the contrary, as proposed for the creation 
of a global biocollecting society, having a national authority responsible in each country for 
collecting and distributing benefits, would be more beneficial. 
In sum, the proposed elements for the improvement of ABS and the creation of a 
GMBSM are as follows: 
 
1. For the improvement of ABS at a national level: 
a. Only mandatory obligations for the sharing of non-commercial benefits. 
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b. The use of MATs for establishing ABS and the distribution of non-monetary 
benefits. 
c. The use of an international recognised certificate of compliance issued after 
the sharing of benefits has been conducted. 
d. A voluntary sharing of monetary benefits. 
e. The moneys collected should be distributed to finance projects for the 
preservation of biodiversity and TK. 
 
2. Additional elements for the establishment of a GMBSM: 
a. The mechanism should have a global rather than a regional reach. 
b. Should apply to GR and TK as described in Articles 2 of CBD and 10 of NP. 
c. Should use a global fund as its financial mechanism. 
d. The fund should make national authorities responsible for collecting and 
distributing the benefits in each country. 
e. One part of the moneys collected should be invested in the compensation 
of any ILCs affected by the use of their shared TK. 
 
Overall, this study strengthens the idea that creating operative ABS mechanisms would 
be possible if existing experiences are incorporated. Non-monetary benefits could be 
established by observing what users of GR and TK are currently sharing in the MATs agreed so 
far and the MTAs subscribed with ex-situ centres. 
This thesis’ main recommendation is to implement, to the extent possible, a 
harmonised approach through national laws, in order to create the best way forward towards 
addressing existent limitations on the implementation of ABS, given the current circumstances. 
The insights gained from this thesis may be of assistance to policymakers and countries, who 
could engage in a study to combine the theoretical and practical approaches to ABS 
implementation. In spite of these conclusions, this study is limited by the lack of information 
disclosed to the ABSCH in regards of national laws, the small number of MATs reported, and 
the little information on the ABS conditions contained therein. Also, during the research 
process it was observed that little information exists on ABS contractual experiences and 
decisions from the judiciary on these matters. 
 
The findings stated above provide the following insights for future research: 
 
1. A wider approach to practical experiences implementing ABS is needed, including 
studies of contracts and case law. 
2. As explained in Section 6.1.8 of Chapter 3, Article 10 of the NP was initially intended 
to apply to GR located in common areas and in ex-situ conditions. For this reason, 
further research should be aimed to address that problem. 
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